Identifying individual differences: An algorithm with application to Phineas Gage

In many research contexts it is useful to group experimental subjects into behavioral “types.” Usually, this is done by pre-specifying a set of candidate decision-making heuristics and assigning each subject to a heuristic in that set. Such approaches might perform poorly when applied to subjects with prefrontal cortex damage, because it can be hard to know what cognitive heuristics such subjects might use. We suggest that the Houser, Keane and McCabe (HKM) robust classification algorithm can be a useful tool in these cases. An important advantage of this classification approach is that it does not require one to specify either the nature or number of subjects' heuristics in advance. Rather, both the number and nature of the heuristics are discerned directly from the data. To illustrate the HKM approach, we draw inferences about heuristics used by subjects in the well-known gambling task [Bechara, A., Damasio, A.R., Damasio, H., Anderson, S., 1994. Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex. Cognition 50, 7–12].     

Social responsibility promotes conservative risk behavior

Previous studies show that group risk taking can be more conservative than individual risk taking. Two common, but untested reasons for this greater caution are the influence of social responsibility and a tendency to conform to the preferences of others. We study changes in risk taking in simple settings, where another’s risk taking can sometimes be observed, and where decisions affect not only one’s own payoffs but sometimes also affect those of a passive, second party. We find that social responsibility leads to more conservative risk behavior in group decision making. Conformism has a more symmetric effect: observing the choice of another tends to lead both individual and social decisions toward whatever the other’s expressed risk preference is. Direct tests fail to link the social behavior we observe to the social preference for distributional fairness common in decision-making under certainty.     

On the bad reputation of reputational concerns

Can reputational concerns do any good? Economists have shown how they lead agents to ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how they may be a social blessing. An agent may exert effort to become informed about the uncertain benefits of a project. A smart agent's efforts make him better informed; a dumb agent's efforts are to no avail. If an agent does not know his type, reputational concerns are socially beneficial. If an agent knows his type, reputational concerns may be socially beneficial. A dumb agent takes inefficient, unconventional decisions to mimic a smart agent. The latter exerts more effort in order not to be mistaken for a dumb. This holds whether or not project rejection is a safe haven for the dumb.     

RENT SEEKING AND SOCIAL INVESTMENT IN TASTE CHANGE*

We study the social allocation of resources to the alteration of preferences. Such taste changes are Pareto-preferred if, according to both the original and the new taste regime, the resource allocation resulting from the taste change constitutes an improvement. According to this criterion, a degree of altruism is in general Pareto-preferred, because it reduces socially wasteful activities, such as lobbying, bargaining and other rent seeking activities designed to increase one agent's expected share of the contested rent. We present a stylized model that captures the role of education in generating altruism and thus reducing the expenditure on rent seeking.     

Social Learning in a Common Interest Voting Game

This paper describes the experimental results of a dynamic voting game. Subjects are induced with common preferences, but have asymmetric and incomplete information about the payoff-generating behavior of two available proposals. The election process serves as a mechanism to gather the dispersed information. It is shown that subjects are more effective in coordinating their decisions to a socially optimal equilibrium when they get more experienced. The way they succeed in doing this is by paying less attention to the popularity of a proposal.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D72, D82.     

Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis

In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction channels. When subjects play both roles in such experiments, a positive correlation between first- and second-mover behavior is frequently reported. We find that the observed correlation primarily originates via an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs through a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. However, we also find evidence for a direct, preference-based channel. When first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first moves.     

Consumption externalities with endogenous time preference

This paper shows that in a model with inelastic labor supply, consumption externalities have impacts on stationary consumption and capital. The key element in observing the effects of consumption externalities on stationary consumption and capital is the endogeneity of the time preference rate, which depends on future-oriented resources rather than on private consumption. We conclude that when individuals experience jealousy, they become more impatient, leading to a lower level of capital stock and a higher level of consumption relative to those of the social optimum, while when they experience admiration, these relationships are reversed. We examine an optimal tax policy that replicates the socially optimal path in the centrally planned economy. Finally, using numerical analysis we explore how this economy evolves through time.      

A Measure Of The Trade‐Off Between Responsiveness and Nondictatorship for Arrovian Social Welfare Functions

If individuals are never indifferent between distinct alternatives then for any transitive‐valued social welfare function satisfying IIA, and any fraction t, either the set of pairs of alternatives that are socially ordered without consulting more than one individual's preferences comprises at least the fraction t of all pairs, or else the fraction of pairs that have their social ordering determined independently of everyone's s preferences exceeds, or is very close to, 1 ?t. The Pareto criterion is not imposed. (There is also a version of this result for the domain of preferences that admit indifference.)     

The Postwar Japanese Political Economy in an Exchange Perspective

Early postwar Japan represented a Coasian social contract between an unproductive majority and a productive minority. The contract was possible and enforceable due to the American Occupation of Japan. It was socially desirable because it induced economic growth. It was self-enforcing due to specific Japanese conditions. However, the contract became socially undesirable as Japanese economy matured and the initial conditions changed, contributing to an increase in rent seeking. It also became unenforceable because the distribution of surpluses became more difficult as economic growth declined. As contractual enforcement mechanisms weakened, dynamic rent seeking activities further reduced Japanese economic growth rate (JLE# D72).     

How German Labor Courts Decide: An Econometric Case Study

Abstract. Courts are an important element in the institutional framework of labor markets, often determining the degree of employment protection. German labor courts provide a vivid example in this regard. However, we know relatively little about court behavior. A unique dataset on German labor court verdicts reveals that social and other criteria like employee characteristics, the type of job, local labor market conditions and court composition influence court decisions. At least as striking is that workers' chances to win depend on where and when their cases are filed. This generates considerable ex ante uncertainty about outcomes.     

An Experimental Study of Communication and Coordination in Noncooperative Games

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test the usefulness of alternative solution concepts to explain players' behavior in noncooperative games with preplay communication. In the experiment subjects communicate byplain conversationprior to playing a simple game. In this setting, we find that the presumption ofindividualisticandindependentbehavior underlying the concept of Nash equilibrium is inappropriate. Instead, we observe behavior to becoordinatedandcorrelated. Statistical tests reject Nash equilibrium as an explanation of observed play. The coalition proof correlated equilibrium of the game, however, explains the data when the possibility of errors by players is introduced.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C92.     

On the optimality of social status seeking

We present an endogenous growth model in which households display their social status by holding not only capital but also bonds. According to conventional wisdom, the quest for social status provides an incentive for individuals to accumulate wealth, which stimulates economic growth and elevates it to a socially optimal level. Instead, we show that portfolio allocation is crucial to the growth-enhancing effect of the quest for social status. If households exhibit their social status by accumulating physical capital and holding government bonds, the quest for social status may not increase economic growth. As a result, social status seeking cannot achieve the social optimum. Calibrating our model to data, we find that if government bonds constitute part of the wealth for households’ quest for social status, the quest for social status decreases economic growth.     

Harvesting to Extinction: Is It Socially Rational?

This paper presents a critique of the neoclassical view of the optimal use of renewable resources and offers an alternative view based on the method of classical thermodynamics. The presentation is forwarded via the issue of harvesting to extinction. Based on simple models, the traditional theory suggests that society would benefit from wiping out any renewable resource whose intrinsic growth rate, though positive, is smaller than the social rate of time preference. The latter is the rate society is using to discount its future benefits and costs. To bypass this ecologically implausible outcome, the simplistic assumptions have been modified in various ways. For example, either the costs or the benefits of harvesting have been made to depend on the stock of the resource as well as on the yield. The modifications offered make society less prone to wipe out resources intentionally, but they still disregard a more fundamental difficulty: The traditional theory is not consistent with the second law of thermodynamics; it describes a process that defies the second law, which no known system is able to be undergoing. No doubt, the theory should be challenged first and foremost on this ground, but none of the offered modifications is capable of annulling this inconsistency. A deeper change is needed because the social values of the resource as perceived by a society that behaves in manners consistent with the second law and as defined by the traditional theory necessarily differ. The paper identifies the socially consistent value and shows that harvesting to extinction is never optimal socially. Were society to follow the socially inconsistent value, it would always underestimate the importance of self-sustained resources. However, the unlikely refutability of the second law turns this possibility and the socially favored extinctions into arguable outcomes of an untenable theory rather than undesirable outcomes of a sound theory. Potentially growing renewable resources are wiped out in real life for various reasons, but when they are preyed to extinction, their unfortunate fate is an outcome of the dynamics of a socially unregulated system rather than a social objective coming to fruition. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Altruism and social integration

We report on a two-stage experiment in which (i) we first elicit the social network within a section of undergraduate students and (ii) we then measure their altruistic attitudes by means of a standard Dictator game. We observe that more socially integrated subjects are also more altruistic, as betweenness centrality and reciprocal degree are positively correlated with the level of giving, even after controlling for framing and social distance, which have been shown to significantly affect giving in previous studies. Our findings suggest that social distance and social integration are complementary determinants of altruistic behavior.     

Optimal pricing and capacity choice for a public service under risk of interruption

We develop rules for pricing and capacity choice for an interruptible service that recognize the interdependence between consumers’ perceptions of system reliability and their market behavior. Consumers post ex ante demands, based on their expectations on aggregate demand. Posted demands are met if ex post supply capacity is sufficient. However, if supply is inadequate all ex ante demands are proportionally interrupted. Consumers’ expectations of aggregate demand are assumed to be rational. Under reasonable values for the consumer’s degrees of relative risk aversion and prudence, demand is decreasing in supply reliability. We derive operational expressions for the optimal pricing rule and the capacity expansion rule. We show that the optimal price under uncertainty consists of the optimal price under certainty plus a markup that positively depends on the degrees of relative risk aversion, relative prudence and system reliability. We also show that any reliability enhancing investment—though lowering the operating surplus of the public utility—is socially desirable as long as it covers the cost of investment.     

Risk breeds risk aversion

We examine whether exposure to a more or less risky environment affects people’s subsequent risk-taking behavior. In a laboratory setting, all subjects went through twelve rounds of multiple-price-list decisions between a risky alternative and a safe alternative. In the first six rounds, subjects were randomly assigned to a high-, moderate-, or low-risk environment, which differed in the variances of the lotteries they were exposed to. In the last six rounds, subjects in all treatments made decisions on an identical set of lotteries. We found that subjects who had experienced a riskier environment exhibited a higher degree of risk aversion. Our experimental design allows us to conclude that this effect is driven by the risk environment per se, rather than the realized outcomes of the risk. This finding has important theoretical and policy implications.     

Bargaining Economies with Patient and Impatient Agents: Equilibria and Intermediation

This paper investigates the characteristics of steady-state equilibria in a bargaining economy in which there are both patient and impatient agents and the possibility of intermediation arising in such an economy. The equilibrium in the unmediated economy is inefficient if the proportion of impatient agents is sufficiently high. There is a simple fee mechanism, which induces patient and impatient agents to trade in separate groups, under which there is always an efficient equilibrium. Such separation is also induced by the option to trade at fixed prices, and profit-seeking intermediaries have an incentive to facilitate such trade.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C78.     

Keeping up appearances: Motivations for socially desirable responding in contingent valuation interviews

The tendency to give socially desirable rather than true statements of willingness to pay (WTP) is an often reported form of bias in contingent valuation surveys. While previous research on this bias has exclusively focused on the detection of mode effects, the present study directly assesses a respondent's motivation to state WTP in a socially desirable manner. This study tests the effect of three theoretical motivations for socially desirable responding on WTP responses: A general need for social approval, a perceived social norm calling for a high contribution and perceived lack of anonymity of the interview situation. Questions for the empirical assessment of these factors are developed.Results of a valuation study in Southwest China show differing and independent impacts of these factors. While there is no effect of perceived anonymity, need for social approval biases WTP responses upwards but does not influence the general decision to state a positive WTP. It also turns out that rather the fear of losing social status than the striving for higher social approval is the main driver of this bias. Respondents perceiving a social norm for high WTP are more likely to state a positive WTP, but the specific amount is not affected.     

Antitrust reform: Predatory practices and the competitive process

Conclusion This article has suggested that the general theory of predatory practices is seriously flawed. Predatory behavior cannot be logically distinguished from benign competitive behavior either by intent or by any price-cost rules. Price reductions, selective or otherwise, and various nonprice rivalrous strategies (such as advertising and innovation) are all part and parcel of a competitive market process. This process serves an important social purpose: it serves to discover the products and services that consumers prefer, and the business organizations that can provide those products and services. Antitrust regulation of this process is based on inappropriate equilibrium theorizing, and it serves only to inhibit the discovery of consumer preferences and the flow of resources from less efficient suppliers to more efficient suppliers. Thus, the legal restriction or prohibition of any competitive practice is inappropriate and appears contrary to the newer antitrust reform attitudes.