Incentive effects of executive compensation and the valuation of firm assets

This paper examines how executive compensation influences the market value of the firm's assets. After controlling for endogeneity, we find that boards have set the incentive to incur risk (vega) to maximize shareholder value, but that incentives to increase returns (delta) do not maximize shareholder value. We also find that current levels of cash compensation do not maximize shareholder value. Finally, we consider the moneyness of stock options. We find that the level of at- and out-of-the money options maximize shareholder value, but the level of in-the money options do not maximize shareholder value.     

Relevance of the disposition effect on the options market: New evidence

A moneyness‐based propensity to sell (MPS) measure, at the aggregate level, determines the propensity of option holders to exercise their winning relative to losing positions. Using data on individual stock and S&P 500 Index options, we find that the MPS measure has significant predictive power over the cross section of delta‐hedged option returns. We test the disposition effect in the options market based on a long–short strategy that exploits price distortions induced by the disposition bias. More pronounced evidence of the disposition bias is found for individual at‐the‐money call options than put options where the significance of abnormal returns remains robust across different subsamples even after we control for the portfolio option greeks and market‐based risk factors. The profitability of the long–short strategy is related to limit‐to‐arbitrage proxies suggesting that behavioral explanations help explain the positive relation between the MPS measure and delta‐hedged option returns.     

Informed trading under different market conditions and moneyness: Evidence from TXO options

We examine the informational role of options across exercise prices under different market conditions. We analyze the influence of options' leverage effect, and market cycles on the cause–effect relation between stock and options markets based on an emerging options market—the Taiwan stock index options market. When aggregating market data irrespective of market cycles and options moneyness, we find that the equity market leads the options market. However, as we control options' moneyness and market cycles, we find that out-of-the-money options lead the stock market by up to 90 min with more pronounced results in downtrends and periods of political tension. Our findings suggest that the informational role of options is interacted with leverage effect and market conditions.     

Application of Heston’s Model to the Chinese Stock Market

This article applies Heston’s (1993) stochastic volatility model to the Chinese stock market indices and subsequently assesses its pricing performance. A two-step estimation procedure is adopted to calibrate Heston’s model. First, we find that the option price is affected by both the moneyness and the maturity. Second, Heston’s model is more likely to overprice options, whereas the BS model tends to underestimate options. Finally, Heston’s model, by employing volatility as a random process, significantly improves the pricing accuracy compared to the BS model. Therefore, Heston’s model is tractable to analyze the Chinese stock market indices, and there is volatility risk that must not be overlooked in the Chinese stock market.     

An option pricing approach to corporate dividends and the capital investment financing decision

In light of a growing trend toward viewing dividends as an investable asset class, this article opens up a new perspective on their valuation. We show that dividends can be viewed as options on the cash flow of the firm. That is, a firm either pays zero dividends, in which case the option expires out‐of‐the‐money, or it pays a positive dividend, the value of which corresponds to the option's moneyness. The exercise price is determined by the capital budget, the flexibility of the company to use external financing, and whether it has minimum and maximum dividends. The model is also capable of accommodating a stochastic capital budget, which allows for uncertain growth opportunities and their correlation with the firm's cash flows. We also present an application of the model using actual data for a large multinational company.     

Is backdating executive stock options always costly to shareholders?

We use a binomial model to investigate the cost to shareholders of backdating employee stock option (ESO) grants to award in‐the‐money rather than at‐the‐money options to a manager. When the expected return of the stock underlying an ESO is sufficiently close to the risk‐free rate, a backdating arrangement can always be structured to simultaneously improve shareholders’ wealth and the manager's utility. The smaller the manager's non‐option wealth, personal income tax rate or risk tolerance, the more likely a backdating arrangement can be welfare improving.     

Slow diffusion of information and price momentum in stocks: Evidence from options markets

This paper investigates the source of price momentum in the stock market using information from options markets. We provide direct evidence of the gradual information diffusion model in Hong and Stein (1999): momentum profits are larger for stocks whose information diffuses slowly into the stock market. We exploit the options markets to identify stocks with slow information diffusion speed. As informed traders trade options to realize the information that has not been fully incorporated in the stock price, we are able to enhance the momentum strategy by selecting winner/loser stocks with high growth/large drop in call option implied volatility. Our empirical strategy generates a risk-adjusted alpha of 1.8% per month over the 1996–2011 period, during which the simple momentum strategy fails to perform. The results are robust to the impact of earnings announcement, transaction costs, industry concentration, and choice of options’ moneyness and time-to-maturity. Finally, our finding is not driven by existing stock- or option-related characteristics that are known to improve momentum.     

Stock Options and the Corporate Demand for Insurance

This article shows that a corporate manager compensated in stock options makes corporate decisions to maximize stock option value. Overinvestment is a consequence if risk increases with investment. Facing the choice of hedging corporate risk with forward contracts on a stock market index fund and insuring pure risks the manager will choose the latter. Hedging with forwards reduces weight in both tails of corporate payoff distribution and thus reduces option value. Insuring pure risks reduces the weight in the left tail where the options are out‐of‐the‐money and increases the weight in the right tail where the options are in‐the‐money; the effect is an increase in the option value. Insurance reduces the overinvestment problem but no level of insurance coverage can reduce investment to that which maximizes the shareholder value.     

Financial derivatives,opacity, and crash risk: Evidence from large US banks

We test how the use of financial derivatives affects banks’ informational structure and future stock performance based on a sample of large bank holding companies in the US. Using banks’ use of financial derivatives as a proxy for opacity, we find that high level use of interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives are associated with an increase in the synchronicity (R²) of stock price movements with the market index, which indicates less revelation of bank-specific information to the market. This finding is consistent with the prediction of the model developed by Wagner (2007). We document that superior corporate governance tempers these effects. Finally, we find that an increase in the opacity is significantly and positively related to an increase in banks’ future stock price crash risk.     

A note on a simple,accurate formula to compute implied standard deviations

We derive a simple, accurate formula to compute implied standard deviations for options priced in the classic framework developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). When a stock price is equal to a discounted strike price, this formula reduces to a formula provided by Brenner and Subrahmanyam (1988). However, their formula's accuracy is sensitive to stock price deviations from a discounted strike price. The formula derived here extends the range of accuracy to a wide band of option moneyness.     

How smart is money? An investigation into investor behaviour in the Australian managed fund industry

Gruber [Gruber, M., 1996. Another puzzle: the growth in actively managed mutual funds. Journal of Finance 51, 783–810] and Zheng [Zheng, L., 1999. Is money smart? A study of mutual fund investors’ fund selection ability. Journal of Finance 54, 901–933] document that managed fund investors demonstrate fund selection ability as they invest in funds whose subsequent performance is greater than that of funds from which they divest. This phenomenon has been since been termed the ‘smart money effect’. In contrast, Sapp and Tiwari [Sapp, T., Tiwari, A., 2004. Does stock return momentum explain the ‘smart money’ effect? Journal of Finance 59, 2605–2622] find that after controlling for stock return momentum, there is no evidence of a smart money effect. In this paper, we investigate whether a smart money effect exists in the Australian managed funds industry. The key findings of our paper are that there is a smart money effect in Australia and that stock return momentum does not explain this effect. We also find that the effect is not conditional on fund size. Our cross-sectional analysis indicates that investors are chasing funds that have performed well in the past and that cash flows to funds are persistent. However, we do not find any evidence that investors are pursuing funds that employ momentum trading strategies.     

Taming animal spirits: risk management with behavioural factors

In several countries a major factor contributing to the current economic crisis was massive borrowing to fund investment projects on the basis of, in retrospect, grossly optimistic valuations. The purpose of this paper is to initiate an approach to project valuation and risk management in which ‘behavioural’ factors—Keynes’ ‘animal spirits’ or Greenspan’s ‘irrational exuberance’—can be explicitly included. An appropriate framework is risk-neutral valuation based on the use of the numéraire portfolio—the ‘benchmark’ approach advocated by Platen and Heath (A benchmark approach to quantitative finance. Springer, Berlin, 2006). In the paper, we start by discussing the ingredients of the problem: ‘animal spirits’, financial instability, market-consistent valuation, the numéraire portfolio and structural models of credit risk. We then study a project finance problem in which a bank lends money to an entrepreneur, collateralized by the value of the latter’s investment project. This contains all the components of our approach in a simple setting and illustrates what steps are required. In a final section, we briefly discuss the econometric problems that need to be solved next.     

Finance, Politics, and the Accounting for Stock Options

The politics of option accounting crosses party lines, reflecting both the interests of the affected constituencies and the desire for power over standard setting. House Bill HR-3574, which mandates an assumption of zero stock price volatility, runs counter to the recently passed Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rule requiring fair-value expensing of stock options. For any option issued at or out of the money, where strike prices are normally set, expense recognition is zero under this bill's mandated assumption.
Besides excessive use of stock options, the lack of a "final peace" in the option accounting war appears to have encouraged another questionable corporate practice. This article examines a sample of "six-and-one restructurings," exchanges of options in which expensing of re-priced (deep out-of-the-money) options can be avoided if employees wait at least six months and one day before receiving new options. The authors found that market-adjusted stock prices tend to decrease during the six-month period before the strike price is reset. This result provides one more reason why companies should be required to use fair-value option pricing models to expense options.     

Implied volatility skews and stock return skewness and kurtosis implied by stock option prices

The Black-Scholes* option pricing model is commonly applied to value a wide range of option contracts. However, the model often inconsistently prices deep in-the-money and deep out-of-the-money options. Options professionals refer to this well-known phenomenon as a volatility ‘skew’ or ‘smile’. In this paper, we examine an extension of the Black-Scholes model developed by Corrado and Su that suggests skewness and kurtosis in the option-implied distributions of stock returns as the source of volatility skews. Adapting their methodology, we estimate option-implied coefficients of skewness and kurtosis for four actively traded stock options. We find significantly nonnormal skewness and kurtosis in the option-implied distributions of stock returns.     

SIX CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING EQUITY-BASED PAY

The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the equitybased pay of U.S. corporate executives, an increase that has been driven almost entirely by the explosion of stock option grants. When properly designed, equity‐based pay can raise corporate productivity and shareholder value by helping companies attract, motivate, and retain talented managers. But there are good reasons to question whether the current forms of U.S. equity pay are optimal. In many cases, substantial stock and option payoffs to top executives–particularly those who cashed out much of their holdings near the top of the market–appear to have come at the expense of their shareholders, generating considerable skepticism about not just executive pay practices, but the overall quality of U.S. corporate governance. At the same time, many companies that have experienced sharp stock price declines are now struggling with the problem of retaining employees holding lots of deep‐underwater options. This article discusses the design of equity‐based pay plans that aim to motivate sustainable, or long‐run, value creation. As a first step, the author recommends the use of longer vesting periods and other requirements on executive stock and option holdings, both to limit managers' ability to “time” the market and to reduce their incentives to take shortsighted actions that increase near‐term earnings at the expense of longer‐term cash flow. Besides requiring “more permanent” holdings, the author also proposes a change in how stock options are issued. In place of popular “fixed value” plans that adjust the number of options awarded each year to reflect changes in the share price (and that effectively reward management for poor performance by granting more options when the price falls, and fewer when it rises), the author recommends the use of “fixed number” plans that avoid this unintended distortion of incentives. As the author also notes, there is considerable confusion about the real economic cost of options relative to stock. Part of the confusion stems, of course, from current GAAP accounting, which allows companies to report the issuance of at‐the‐money options as costless and so creates a bias against stock and other forms of compensation. But, coming on top of the “opportunity cost” of executive stock options to the company's shareholders, there is another, potentially significant cost of options (and, to a lesser extent, stock) that arises from the propensity of executives and employees to place a lower value on company stock and options than well‐diversified outside investors. The author's conclusion is that grants of (slow‐vesting) stock are likely to have at least three significant advantages over employee stock options:

• ? they are more highly valued by executives and employees (per dollar of cost to shareholders);
• ? they continue to provide reasonably strong ownership incentives and retention power, regardless of whether the stock price rises or falls, because they don't go underwater; and
• ? the value of such grants is much more transparent to stockholders, employees, and the press.

     

Can banks individually create money out of nothing? — The theories and the empirical evidence

This paper presents the first empirical evidence in the history of banking on the question of whether banks can create money out of nothing. The banking crisis has revived interest in this issue, but it had remained unsettled. Three hypotheses are recognised in the literature. According to the financial intermediation theory of banking, banks are merely intermediaries like other non-bank financial institutions, collecting deposits that are then lent out. According to the fractional reserve theory of banking, individual banks are mere financial intermediaries that cannot create money, but collectively they end up creating money through systemic interaction. A third theory maintains that each individual bank has the power to create money ‘out of nothing’ and does so when it extends credit (the credit creation theory of banking). The question which of the theories is correct has far-reaching implications for research and policy. Surprisingly, despite the longstanding controversy, until now no empirical study has tested the theories. This is the contribution of the present paper. An empirical test is conducted, whereby money is borrowed from a cooperating bank, while its internal records are being monitored, to establish whether in the process of making the loan available to the borrower, the bank transfers these funds from other accounts within or outside the bank, or whether they are newly created. This study establishes for the first time empirically that banks individually create money out of nothing. The money supply is created as ‘fairy dust’ produced by the banks individually, "out of thin air".     

Stock repurchasing and corporate social responsibility

Stock repurchases are controversial. Researchers often view the positive association between free cash flow and the volume of the stock repurchases to be in the shareholders’ interest and the positive association between executive options and stock repurchases to be in the managers’ interest. Using firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings as a measure of ethical culture—one that increases the cost of self-serving behavior for managers— we examine whether a firm’s CSR rating is related to its stock repurchase decisions. Although the baseline regression shows a positive association between CSR and repurchases, we find that CSR amplifies the positive association between free cash flow and stock repurchases and lessens the positive association between executive options and stock repurchases. These results indicate that ethical culture might play a role in repurchase decisions: it may encourage repurchases aligned with shareholders’ interests and discourage those primarily in managers’ interest. Furthermore, we also find that high CSR firms are associated with a greater completion rate of announced repurchase programs and receive more favorable stock market reaction to their repurchase announcements.     

Employee stock options as warrants

Previous studies ignore the fact that employee stock options are warrants because these options have been an insignificant component of firms’ capital structures. I show that this assumption is no longer correct. For example, for more than 36% of my sample firms, employee stock options represent a more significant claim on firm value than the firm’s debt and preferred stock combined. Moreover, in contrast to the suggestions of previous research, I show that employee stock options are a significant claim on firms throughout the economy, including larger firms, older firms, and firms in “Old Economy” industries. Finally, I show that the presumption in prior studies that employee stock options are not warrants causes a potential misunderstanding of the risk-shifting interests of securityholders and biases the analysis of capital structure issues.     

Are paper winners gamblers? Evidence from Australian retail investors

This study examines stock market gambling using a comprehensive set of investor characteristics and past portfolio performance measures. We find that retail investors overinvest in ‘lottery stocks’, stocks with gambling‐like properties. Significant portfolio underperformance is the result of gambling through lottery stocks. Investors are more likely to gamble following recent portfolio paper gains, regardless of realised performance, providing new evidence that paper gains trigger a house money effect. Investors trading greater values or holding more stocks, and older and female investors, are less likely to invest in lottery stocks.