混合契约规制下的企业员工——组织配适关系研究

在设计一种有效的企业组织结构时,劳动力交易的频率、不确定性和资产专用性等因素的作用非常重要.本文论证不同的员工特征与环境特征决定了企业内不同的契约组合,从而导致了企业组织形式各异.各类员工--组织关系的构建都是在交易成本最小化前提下的适应性制度安排.     

中小银行发展与对中小企业的信贷支持

中小银行与国有大银行相比,具有产权结构清晰,交易成本低廉,经营灵活、方便服务等优势。中小银行可以通过建立有效的风险控制机制,完善经营环境等举措来降低经营风险,实现对中小企业的信贷支持。     

试析我国私营企业交易成本的控制

我国目前的市场环境下仍然存在许多导致我国私营企业交易成本提高的因素,主要包括信息不对称、企业产权不明晰,内部管理制度不完善和寻租现象等。     

不同企业治理结构下的交易成本分析

本文通过解析不同类型企业治理结构的交易成本,指出治理结构变革的交易成本与论理结构中正式契约的作用呈负相关关系,探讨了最优治理结构的决定问题.并且阐明,家族企业治理模式与现代公众公司治理模式均属自发有序形成的适应性制度安排,均有其存在的经济合理性,无须人为地强制变迁.     

社会创业活动驱动机制研究——一个模糊集定性比较分析

利用fsQCA方法,以22个经济体为样本分析个体、制度环境以及文化层面的5个条件联动匹配对社会创业活跃度的影响。结果表明：第一,机会感知、失败恐惧感、制度环境以及人文导向文化维度无法单独构成高或者非高社会创业活跃度的必要条件。第二,高社会创业活跃度路径有3种：高人文导向下的环境—能力型、低人文导向下的环境拉动型与环境推拉型。第三,非高社会创业活跃度产生路径有两种：低人文导向及拉动型制度环境缺失条件下,与其它要素联动匹配;高人文导向文化、低机会感知以及低失败恐惧感条件下,与不同类型制度环境联动匹配。第四,社会创业活跃度影响路径具有非对称性。     

科斯定理:反思与拓展——兼论中国农地流转制度改革与选择

科斯及其追随者关注于产权界定对生产制度结构的影响,从而使产权成为新制度经济学的中心命题。但产权界定与产权交易是两个不同的问题,尽管科斯定理并未否定产权界定所隐含的交易含义,但却未能顾及人格化财产及其交易性质。本文认为,基于中国农地制度的特殊性,并鉴于新一轮农地确权中"生不增、死不减"的身份产权固化与地块"四至"的空间产权界定,有必要将科斯的思想范式进一步拓展到农地产权的交易问题——当存在交易成本时,如果不能通过产权的重新调整来改善效率,那么就有必要选择适当的产权交易装置进行匹配来改善总的福利效果。作者强调,应该在重视产权的生产制度结构的同时,深化对产权的交易制度结构的研究。     

从产权理论看国有商业银行股份制改革

若交易成本为正 ,只有在产权清晰下 ,通过协商交易 ,重新安排产权引起的产值增加超过交易费时 ,产权结构重组才有可能影响资源的最优配置。而国有产权的根本问题是产权模糊、所有者缺位 ,外部性极大。因此对国有商业银行进行股份制改革 ,建立与现代金融制度相适应的金融产权结构 ,让所有权与经营权彻底分开 ,让所有者去约束经营者 ,让经营者去维护所有者的利益。     

产权制度与环境:“科斯定理”的延伸

Coase提出了在侵害问题上产权的分配对社会总效应的影响,开启了对产权和交易成本等研究的先河。文章在Coase提出的理论基础上,进一步分析了产权制度对环境的影响机制,通过简单公式重新解释"科斯定理",在零交易成本和产权被清晰界定的假设下,探讨不同的自然资源所有制的界定对追求利润最大化的经济人、自然资源的价值和社会总收益的影响。另外,结合近年来对世界各国环境管理机制的相关研究,延伸了"科斯定理"中的假设条件,探讨在正交易成本下的真实世界中如何更有效的利用产权制度来解决环境问题,包括产权清晰界定的成本、签订契约的成本、产权保护的成本、环保法的制定和公平与福利等因素对社会总效应的影响。     

地区市场化进程、市场分割与公司关联交易行为

文章以我国制造类行业上市公司为研究样本,考察转轨经济环境下不同地区间市场化发育水平对企业交易方式的影响。研究发现,与资金占用型关联交易显著不同,购销关联交易能显著提高公司绩效;产品和要素市场越不发达、市场化水平越低的地区企业购销类关联交易越多。结论证明,在市场发育不完善制度环境下,关联购销成为企业降低交易成本的有效交易方式,这支持了关联交易具有效率观的思想。文章结论对于理解转轨经济环境下企业特殊交易行为具有重要意义。     

试论现代企业制度下的会计改革

会计信息的传递和使用过程，是现代企业制度运转的一个基本微观机制。现代企业制度运转的一个显著特征，就是体现在产权结构的变化上，即作为现代企业制度下的企业，其产权结构能为节约交易成本提供内生性的激励机制。另外，也能使外部的会计信息使用者得到更大的内部性会计信息。产权改革或明晰的另一个好处在于有引导人们更好地发展动力的功能。     

Transaction costs and environmental policy design

This article synthesizes the growing empirical literature on transaction costs to identify pragmatic design recommendations for environmental and natural resource policies. The New Institutional Economics literature recognizes that appropriate policy choice and design will be a function of the specific characteristics of the problem. The physical and institutional determinants of both transaction costs and abatement costs should be considered in the policy design process due to potential interactions between them. Analysts also need to incorporate the extent to which the technologies, institutional environment, governance structures, or policy designs can be changed; some factors can only be adjusted to or “designed around” while others can be designed differently. This framework highlights the importance of property rights since transaction costs will be incurred to obtain or retain property rights and since the rights assignment may affect both the magnitudes and distribution of costs. Another implication is that education and extension programs or use of behavioral economics concepts to affect choices can be cost-effective in some circumstances. Policy design should take advantage of economies of scale and foster technical change. Appropriate sequencing of policy instruments may decrease transaction costs, particularly if there is potential for technical change.     

The nature of Coasean property

The Coase Theorem is widely regarded as pointing to the importance of positive transaction costs for the analysis of economic institutions. Various interpretations of the Coase Theorem regard transaction costs as some set of impediments to contracting, or more broadly, as the costs of providing institutional solutions to conflicts over resource use. The abstract nature of the Coasean hypothetical tends to promote an abstract notion of property as a thin entitlement: a right in a designated person to take certain actions or derive value from a set of resource attributes. On this view, property is like a collection of tiny contracts. The property rights furnished by actual property law are much more coarse grained than this, and property is correspondingly “incomplete” for transaction costs reasons. Property and contract are substitutes in some situations, but they often are not interchangeable—because of Coasean transaction costs.     

论市场产权及其成本构成要素

市场是一个有着丰富涵义与本质规定性的复杂有机体。从产权角度讲,市场是一国政府构建、所有、运作、管理市场及从市场获益的一系列产权规则与制度安排(权力束集合体)。市场产权归中央政府(国家)所有。市场产权成本包括有形成本、制度成本及人力成本等,研究市场产权成本有利于确立投资与所有匹配原则、投资与收益匹配原则及成本与效率统一原则。     

碳排放交易的经济学分析及应对思路

在全球范围内,碳排放交易日益活跃。碳排放交易有着深刻的产权经济学内涵,是一种交易成本最小化的制度安排,是市场化的减污手段。在碳排放问题上,西方国家经历了从行政手段的庇古税到经济手段的排放权交易的演变过程。碳排放交易品种较多,构成了一个较为完整的产品体系。金融危机后,碳排放交易呈现出特定的发展趋势。我国需要进一步探索和发展碳排放交易市场,走好低碳经济时代的增长之路。     

农地确权、信贷配给释缓与农村金融的深度发展*

作为一项基础性、制度环境层面的变革，农地确权帮助更多农户进入金融市场、促进农村金融宽度意义上的“量”变作用已经初步显现。但是，它是否可以提高农户贷款数量，缓解信贷配给并促进农村金融深度意义上的“质”变？这是一个重要但鲜有研究的问题。本文从供给、需求、交易成本、价格、风险配给等角度，分析了农地确权缓解信贷配给、促进农村金融深度发展的理论机理，并通过有序多分类变量回归及倾向得分匹配方法进行实证分析。研究表明，农地确权对农户金融参与深度的影响主要表现为：因降低信息成本而缓解价格配给，因弱化农户的损失规避心理而缓解风险配给；同时，数量配给和交易成本配给的释缓作用尚未充分显示。     

Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security

This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights are more likely to opt for their riskless outside option rather than pay the costs of bargaining.     

Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm

The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non-investing party is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable, because it implies large gains from trade, such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs.     

人力资本产权的引入与国有企业的制度创新

当国有企业引入人力资本产权、把国有企业看成一个人力资本和物质资本的特别合约时，国有企业的产权制度、法人治理结构和企业文化也进行了制度创新，从而大大节约了国有企业内部的交易费用，进而指明了未来国企改革的新方向。     

Factors that influence transaction costs in development offsets: Who bears what and why?

Environmental policy instruments generate transaction costs to public and private parties. There is a growing literature reporting on the size of transaction costs produced by environmental policy instruments. This paper extends that literature through an analysis of the factors that influence transaction costs in environmental policy and how this influence occurs. The theory based factors that influence transaction costs are categorised as: 1) transaction characteristics; 2) transactor characteristics; 3) nature of the institutional environment; and 4) nature of the institutional arrangements. We examined how these factors influenced transaction costs through the analysis of two Australian-based development offset schemes with different policy designs. We found evidence of all four theory-based categories of influence in the policy case studies. The degree of influence and how each factor influenced transaction costs varies across the two policies and between parties. Policy design as a component of the institutional environment had a particularly large bearing on transaction costs of offset buyers and the policy administrator. An important contribution to transaction cost theory assumes the institutional environment as given.     

Transaction costs and economic growth under common legal system: State‐level evidence from Mexico

This paper examines the contribution of administrative and procedural transaction costs to economic growth under common legal system. We show that administrative and procedural costs vary quite a lot even within the institutional environment sharing the common legal system. States with low‐cost business registration, low‐cost access to property rights and greater judicial efficiency tend to have consistently higher growth. The established effects are robust to alternative model specifications, heterogeneity bias, and to a variety of control variables that might confound the effects of administrative and procedural costs on growth. Such differences in costs are far from being trivial as we show that these within‐system differences might be instrumental in influencing economic growth. Lower administrative and procedural costs induce growth by increasing investment rate, lowering unemployment rate, encouraging labor supply and improving total factor productivity. In the counterfactual scenario, the transition from high‐cost to low‐cost regime is associated with substantial growth and development gains over time. By exploiting the variation in the disease environment, ethnic fractionalization and historical urbanization, we show that the negative effect of rising procedural and administrative costs on growth and development appears to be causal.