股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护

公司治理的核心是对投资者利益的保护 ,公司治理、股权结构与企业绩效之间存在非常密切的内在联系。本文对深交所 1 996— 1 999年除金融性行业以外的上市公司股权结构与企业绩效之间的关系所进行的经验研究表明 ,在公司治理对外部投资人利益缺乏保护的情况下 ,流通股比例与企业业绩之间负相关 ;在非保护性行业第一大股东持股比例与企业业绩正相关 ;国有股比例、① 法人股比例与企业业绩之间的相关关系不显著。本文的研究结果表明 ,国有股减持和民营化必须建立在保护投资者利益的基础上 ,否则将不利于公司治理的优化和企业绩效的提高。     

Privatization and capital formation in developing countries: an empirical analysis

The spur for privatization and its impact on economic performance have been analysed from many perspectives, including microeconomics, macroeconomics, and institutional economics. Previous research has focused on efficiency reasons for privatization at the level of the firm, and the relative performance of state‐owned enterprises and privately owned firms. This article investigates the macroeconomic facet of privatization with particular attention paid to the relation between privatization and capital formation in developing countries. Our study uses recent World Bank data on privatization for 105 countries over the time period 1988–2003. We explore the impact of privatization on capital formation by conducting two‐stage least squares and ordinary least squares estimations within three time frames. Our findings indicate that the effect of privatization on capital formation varies across regions and time frames. In general, privatization is neutral with regard to investment.     

POST‐PRIVATIZATION OWNERSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: A LARGE META‐ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSITION LITERATURE

This paper aims to perform a large‐scale meta‐analysis of the relationship between post‐privatization ownership and firm performance in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Baseline estimation of a meta‐regression model that employs a total of 2,894 estimates drawn from 121 previous studies indicated the superior impact of foreign ownership on firm performance in comparison with state and domestic private entities. Furthermore, the estimation of an extended meta‐regression model that explicitly controls for the idiosyncrasies of transition economies and privatization policies strongly suggested that differences between countries in location, privatization method, and speed of policy implementation strongly influence the link between post‐privatization ownership structure and firm performance. We also found that these factors not only cause a remarkable gap between countries in terms of ex post improvement in firm performance but also significantly affect the interrelationship between foreign investors, domestic outsider owners, and firm managers, and the relative superiority of various domestic outsiders. Conclusive evidence of the harm caused to ex post firm performance by voucher privatization is one of the most noteworthy empirical findings in this paper.     

HOW DID STATE‐OWNED BANKS RESPOND TO PRIVATIZATION? EVIDENCE FROM THE INDIAN EXPERIMENT

ABSTRACT ** : The paper examines the response of banks to privatization. Using data on all state‐owned banks for the period 1990–2006, the findings indicate that fully state‐owned banks are significantly less profitable than partially privatized ones. The improvements in performance by partially privatized banks are, in fact, sustained after privatization. In addition, the analysis indicates that privatization improves profitability, efficiency and improves bank soundness, while lowering bank risk. While the improvement in bank risk is typically spread out over a much longer period, the progress in terms of profitability and economic efficiency typically occurs in the post‐privatization period.     

国有企业改制对就业的影响——来自11个城市的证据

在20世纪90年代中后期,中国工业企业的就业规模大幅度下降,许多人认为,企业改制是其主要原因。本文通过对11个城市386家企业从1995年到2001年的面板数据的研究,评估了企业改制对就业的影响。我们的面板数据回归结果显示,和一般印象相反,改制显著地减缓了就业的下降趋势。我们还发现,改制对企业的就业增长有持续的和递增的积极作用。即使在控制了企业的绩效、就业条件、资产结构以及改制前就业历史之后,我们仍然得到相同的结论。另外,我们还使用了倾向分值匹配基础上的差分内差分方法对我们的结果进行了验证,也得到了相似的结论。     

Causes of privatization in China

We test five hypotheses regarding the causes of privatization in China by using firm‐level panel data collected in 11 cities in the period 1995–2001. We have found that privatization is positively linked with hardened firm budgets and the extent of market liberalization, but is constrained by excessive debts and worker redundancy. Firm efficiency and state‐owned enterprises’ financial liabilities imposed on local governments are not factors of influence. These findings match the broad flow of events in China and highlight the role of market building in bringing about efficient institutional changes.     

Strategic Privatization in Developing Countries

Privatization of state‐owned enterprises may have important welfare implications, in particular in less developed economies where markets are small and domestic firms are typically relatively weak, both technologically and financially. In these environments, a high‐tech foreign investor acquiring the state‐owned assets may end up dominating the local market, thereby harming local consumer and producer interests. A foreign investor, however, is likely to be both willing and able to offer a higher bid for the assets than local investors. This paper addresses the trade‐off for local governments between privatization revenues and foreign market power. The authors find that there may be an incentive to privatize “strategically” by selling the state‐owned firm to a local (less advanced) investor at a lower price in order to achieve a more competitive post‐privatization market structure.     

Partial privatization in mixed duopoly

We investigate a quantity-setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors. The private firm maximizes profits, while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration. We consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm. We find that neither full privatization (the government does not hold any shares) nor full nationalization (the government holds all of the shares) is optimal under moderate conditions.     

Mixed duopoly: Differential game approach

This study formulates a dynamic mixed oligopoly model, in which a state‐owned public firm competes against a private firm over multiple periods. We adopt a differential game formulated by Fershtman and Kamien [Econometrica 55 (1987), pp. 1151–1164] and investigate how the dynamic competition affects the optimal privatization policy. We characterize the open‐loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) and Markov‐perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE). We show that in the MPNE, an increase in the degree of privatization has a nonmonotonic effect on the price, increasing it in a wide range of parameter spaces, which is in sharp contrast to the result in the OLNE or static analyses. We also find that the optimal degree of privatization is higher in the MPNE than that in the OLNE and static equilibrium. These results suggest that intertemporal strategic behavior changes the optimal privatization policy.     

THE EFFICIENCY OF THE STATE‐OWNED FIRM AND SOCIAL WELFARE: A NOTE

We consider a mixed market where a state‐owned firm competes with private firms. If the number of firms is exogenous, then a deterioration of the efficiency of the state‐owned firm might improve social welfare. This situation occurs when the state‐owned firm is inefficient and private firms are efficient. However, if the number of firms is endogenous, then a deterioration of the efficiency of the state‐owned firm must reduce social welfare.     

Does Autonomy Matter in State Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Performance Contracts in India

Empirical evidence on the effect of managerial autonomy on the performance of state‐owned enterprises (SOE) is surprisingly scant despite autonomy being a preferred reform instrument over partial privatization in many countries. Using longitudinal data on performance contracts of state‐owned enterprises in India, this paper finds that managerial autonomy is associated with significant increases in enterprise profitability and efficiency. Further, using India's unique reform experience where both managerial autonomy and partial privatization were pursued side by side, the paper finds that while the positive effects of autonomy continue post‐partial privatization, the effects of partial privatization on performance are ambiguous. Specifically, once autonomy is controlled for, partial privatization has a positive effect on SOE profitability only after it crosses a critical level of government disinvestment. The findings suggest that organizational reforms such as granting managerial autonomy can be an important policy instrument in improving SOE performance particularly in cases where governments are unable to make substantial disinvestments.     

TO LIST OR TO MERGE? ENDOGENOUS CHOICE OF PRIVATIZATION METHODS IN A MIXED MARKET

When and how to privatize a public firm? This paper suggests that a welfare‐enhancing privatization may be triggered by a negative demand shock. When the shock is relatively mild, it is optimal to privatize a public firm by means of stock market listings; when the shock is sufficiently large, a public–private‐firm merger becomes optimal. This paper also considers a government that cares about privatization revenues and about social welfare. It characterizes how the weight attached to privatization revenues and the improvement in production efficiency of the privatized public firm through a stock market listing may affect the government's choices concerning privatization.     

A public firm in a model of spatial duopoly with price discrimination

We visit the role of privatization in the location decision of firms in an industry where no firm can produce all varieties demanded. We demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, in the presence of a publicly owned firm, notwithstanding the degree of privatization.     

The choice of ownership structure: Evidence from Russian mass privatization

We use a large data set of Russian manufacturing firms to describe the ownership structure in the Russian industry at the end of the mass privatization program in 1994 and its subsequent evolution. The data shows a high, but gradually decreasing ownership stakes of firm insiders (managers and workers). We estimate the effect of a wide range of firm characteristics on the decision to privatize, the initial ownership structure after privatization, and on subsequent changes of ownership stakes. We test and find support for several predictions of the model by Aghion and Blanchard (1998). For example, collusion among workers makes them more reluctant to sell shares to outsiders. Firms in financial distress show a higher incidence of insiders selecting the option of privatization leading to high insider ownership. This can be explained by their desire to insure against unemployment in the case of restructuring by outsiders. No evidence is found of a sequencing in privatization according to the performance of firms before privatization. A methodological novelty of this paper is the application of a tobit model with sample selection to the choice of ownership stakes.     

PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA: TECHNOLOGY AND GENDER IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR

This paper examines the impact of privatization on gender discrimination in China across firms with different technology intensities. Using a comprehensive firm‐level survey, the paper identifies gender wage‐productivity differentials by directly estimating the relative productivity levels of workers from the production function of firms. The panel structure of the survey is taken advantage of by following firms that were fully state‐owned in the initial year, and distinguishing them from firms that were later privatized. The main results show that privatization was associated with an increase in relative productivity of female workers in high technology industries, and a reduction in relative productivity of female workers in low technology industries. Time varying coefficient results suggest that the improvements in gender outcomes in high technology industries may not be maintained in the long run as the relative wage and productivity ratios tend to deteriorate, potentially due to low supply of highly educated female workers. At the same time, outcomes in privatized low technology industries increase over time, lowering the wage and productivity gaps between male and female workers. (JEL J16, J31, P20)     

Priorities and sequencing in privatization: Evidence from Czech firm panel data

While privatization of state-owned enterprises has been one of the most important aspects of the economic transition from a centrally planned to a market system, no transition economy has privatized all its firms simultaneously. This raises the question of whether governments privatize firms strategically. In this paper we examine the determinants of the sequencing of privatization. To obtain testable predictions about the factors that may affect sequencing, we investigate the following competing government objectives: (i) Maximizing efficiency through resource allocation; (ii) maximizing public goodwill from the free transfers of shares to the public; (iii) minimizing political costs; (iv) maximizing efficiency through information gains; and (v) maximizing privatization revenues. Next, we use firm-level data from the Czech Republic to test the competing predictions about the sequencing of privatization. Consistent with the hypotheses of a government priority on revenues and public goodwill, we find strong evidence that more profitable firms were privatized first. The sequencing of privatization is also consistent with maximizing efficiency through information gains. Our results indicate that many empirical studies of the effects of privatization on firm performance suffer from a selection bias.     

The impact of privatization on efficiency and profitability

Over the past three decades, China has undergone tremendous economic and social change as a consequence of the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. This paper examines a key feature of this transition – the privatization of the state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) – through both a theoretical model and empirical analysis. Using newly collected primary data from a variety of sources, we study how privatization of listed SOEs affects employment, wages, profits and other aspects of economic performance at the firm level. Our major finding is that privatization results in substantial downsizing of employment, increased labour productivity and rising profitability.     

企业改制模式和改制绩效——基于企业数据调查的经验分析

本文以上世纪90年代后半期的企业调查数据为基础,通过建立经济计量模型来研究公有企业的改制绩效,通过相应的技术处理消除企业的各种先天因素或改制前固有的优势,试图测试改制是否能够确实激发出显著的效率效应。分析发现,向私有产权方向改制的企业效率得到显著提高;不同的改制模式是改制绩效的重要决定因素,经营者持大股从效率上来讲是最优的改制方式,而平均分配的股份合作制的改制方式则具有较差的业绩效果。我们还讨论了其原因,以及为什么中国现阶段特定制度环境下最优的公司治理结构是大股东控股。我们认为给定当前制度背景下,最佳的改革方案之一是股权向经营者集中,股权合理定价。因为只有市场的初次分配是有效率的,才能得到收入再分配的源泉。在此基础上,国家可通过各种税收设计,进行较为公平合理的收入再分配。     

国企民营化与企业创新效率：促进还是抑制?

文章基于混合所有制改革的背景，从创新效率的视角考察了微观创新主体民营化前后创新行为的变化。研究发现，民营化抑制了企业的创新效率，企业的专利数量显著减少，这种影响在缺乏原国有大股东制衡、无系族的上市公司以及外部产权保护较弱的地区更加显著，而且相对于创业型企业，民营化企业的创新效率更低。进一步研究发现，民营化抑制企业创新效率的一个重要途径是关联交易显著增加、投资显著减少，民营化后非国有大股东更多地表现出掏空动机，减少了创新活动，降低了创新效率。文章的研究结论为理解民营化企业的效率提供了新视角，有助于我们正确认识和理解新兴转轨经济体的民营化行为，而且对于监管层如何推进混合所有制改革具有重要的政策启示。     

Political Connections and Firm Performance in Chinese Companies

This study uses panel data analysis to examine the relationship between political connections and firm performance in Chinese firms from 2004 to 2008. We define firm‐level political connections and demonstrate a robust result for the positive relationship between political connections and firm performance. In addition, we integrate the effects of ownership structure, related‐party transactions and political connections into our analysis and continue to show a positive relationship. We show that political connections dampen the negative effect on firm value of related‐party transactions. Finally, we demonstrate channels through which the benefits of political connections are realized in terms of greater cash holdings, larger long‐term loans, lower financing costs, larger sales and lower sales costs. Our results indicate that state‐owned and non‐state‐owned enterprises use political connections equally effectively to enhance performance.