互联网平台排他性交易的《反垄断法》规制

排他性交易是典型的垄断行为,指的是经营者对其他经营者的交易自由进行限制,以便促使自身的经济效益得到提高。排他性交易广泛存在于市场经济的各个领域,互联网行业也不例外。受互联网经济特性的影响,一旦出现排他性交易行为,将会迅速放大此互联网平台的网络效应,增大用户转移平台的成本,进而对市场秩序、消费者利益等造成严重的损害。特别是近些年来,互联网平台发展速度显著加快,需切实做好互联网平台排他性交易的反垄断规制,从而规范互联网平台的发展。     

论产品与品牌的排他性及其创造

论文从产品与服务差异、企业区别、用户特别适应三方面论述了排他性是产品与品牌核心价值之根.以著名营销学、竞争战略专家理论为指导,研究了市场经济社会中,作为产品或服务的核心价值,排他性更集中表现为品牌竞争实力;随着品牌内涵或功能的日益扩展,排他性特征及其主要内容也不断演化、丰富,更胜一筹的排他性锻造--竞争力提高成为企业永恒的努力过程.最后简略阐述了品牌排他性的维护与发展问题.     

论加强和完善农村公共服务

一、公共服务及其特点 公共服务（publicsewice）这一概念最初来源于经济学对公共物品特性的分析,在传统经济学中,经济学家以是否具有非排他性和非竞争性来区分公共物品与私人物品。本文中的公共服务是一种广义的概念,即主要由政府或其他公共部门提供的具有非竞争性、非排他性的用以满足公共需求的产品和服务。     

高技术产业中排他性合约研究——以英特尔和AMD为例

构建上游双寡头和下游多家厂商的排他性交易模型。以上游优势厂商控制的下游厂商数量为决策变量,分析了在位上游优势厂商通过控制下游厂商,导致中间产品的价格歧视,剥削下游厂商,排挤竞争对手,提高最终产品价格和不利于产业良性竞争等负面影响。     

驻店厂商代表对商店形象的影响分析

在市场力量向零售商倾斜的市场背景下,由于成本压力的加剧,零售商同样需要寻求建立与制造商之间的合作关系,驻店厂商代表就是合作的方式之一。厂商代表涉及到制造商、零售商和消费者三者之间的关系问题。如何避免厂商代表对商店形象带来的负面影响,是摆在营销理论界和企业面前的现实问题。要解决这一问题,除了要加强对厂商代表的培训和管理外,更需要从战略高度理顺和协调垂直营销中制造商和零售商之间的关系,品类管理等现代营销技术为此提供了有用的工具和手段。     

关于农村公共产品问题的研究综述

从消费特性看，农村公共产品的可分为纯公共产品和准公共产品。纯农村公共产品是指在消费过程中具有完全的排他性和非竞争性的产品。如农业基础性研究、重大高新技术研究、大江大河治理、农村生态环境保护、农村基层政府服务等，由于存在消费的非竞争性、非排他性和外溢性，如果通过市场提供就会不可避免地产生“搭便车”或导致“公地的悲剧”，出现市场失灵。所以，这一类纯农村公共产品私人提供往往缺乏效率，应由政府供给。     

营销渠道中厂商冲突的治理

零售商和制造商是商品流通过程中的两个重要的环节,但随着"零售革命"的兴起,零售商通过连锁经营实现了规模经济,其实力日益强大,对制造商采取各种不平等的交易行为;同时拥有名牌产品的制造商也利用自己的品牌优势来要挟零售商,使得双方关系日益恶化,不利于建立和谐的厂商关系.因此,本文站在制造商的角度,分析了厂商冲突的成因,并提出了相应的解决之道.     

排他性与非排他性策略下创新授权契约机制研究

分析了不完全信息下,拥有提高产品质量技术的创新企业,在（非）排他性授权策略下,向进行Cournot竞争生产低质量产品的生产企业技术授权的契约优化问题。研究表明,在排他性授权策略下,双重收费契约下信息不完全能使接受授权生产企业赢取更多的创新企业特许权补贴;在非排他性授权策略下,不完全信息能够削弱创新企业通过双重收费契约设计对产品间接市场的垄断程度。在排他性授权交易下,信息不完全使特许权收费契约优于固定收费契约成为可能,这不同于Li and Wang的研究结论。基于提高社会创新能力视角,政府应鼓励创新企业更多采用特许权收费授权契约,削弱信息不对称的影响,赢取更多研发投资利润回报。     

谁是卓越航空

一家来自北京的民营企业,再次上演了"蛇吞象"式的国际化并购。7月9日,美国老牌公务机制造商豪客比奇宣布深陷债务危机,已与一家中国企业进行收购谈判,目前已经签订排他性协议,进入为期45天的排他性谈判。随着谈判的展开,又一家民营航空制造企业浮出水面——北京卓越航空工业有限公司(Superior AviationBeijing,以下简称"卓越航空")。其老板成身棕也逐渐为人所知。"不太知名的中国公司卓越航空提出的17.9亿美元收购价格对豪客比奇是‘很大一笔钱’,但卓越航空同时承诺将保留豪客比奇在美国的工作岗位,值     

高技术产业链中下游企业数量对排他性交易的影响研究

以高技术产业链为背景,构建了上游双寡头和下游垄断竞争的排他性交易模型,分析了上下游企业排他性交易博弈过程。模型显示,大联盟的上游高技术主导企业能够利用下游企业的数量及其转换成本,形成中间产品的价格歧视、市场封闭和进入壁垒等市场势力,从而获得超额利润。研究结果表明,下游企业数量及其转换成本对市场结构及上下游企业的产出和利润产出均有关键的影响,应鼓励新的下游企业进入市场以促进高技术产业的均衡发展,并降低转换成本以促进高技术产业的公平竞争。     

The foreclosure argument for exclusive dealing: The case of differentiated retailers

I analyze a cooperative characteristic-form game between two differentiated producers and a downstream retail sector. When there is a single downstream retailer, the game always has a nonempty Core, involving the retailer being a common dealer. Each producer can at most earn his increment to the collusive industry profit. This result is similar to what is obtained in the literature in an extensive-form noncooperative formulation of the game. When there are two differentiated downstream retailers, the Core is empty when products and retailers are too homogeneous. For sufficient product and retailer differentiation, the Core is nonempty. In these cases the retailers are always common dealers for both products.     

Pricing decisions in a dual channels system with different power structures

This paper investigates the effect of product substitutability and relative channel status on pricing decisions under different power structures of a dual exclusive channel system where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer but two goods are substitute. A linear demand based on the utility function of a representative consumer is assumed, and three game scenarios(Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelbeg and Vertical Nash) are examined under symmetric and asymmetric related channel status. It is shown that no power structure is always the best for the entire supply chain though all members on supply chain have incentive to lead the Stackelberg game. Meanwhile, the vertical Nash game is an equilibrium for the members, however, a Prisoner's dilemma necessarily incurs for the entire supply chain because the Retailer Stackelberg or the Manufacturer Stackelberg can gain the better performance than that in vertical Nash for the entire supply chain when the product substitutability is moderate or higher and the asymmetric relative channel status is moderate, while consumers always get the most welfare from the vertical Nash game.     

从极端到综合:独占交易理论新进展

本文通过文献解读和分析阐述独占交易理论的新进展,重点讨论了独占交易对竞争的影响、与共同代理的权衡、独占交易的完全排他与部分排他等三个问题。近年来关于独占交易理论的研究显得比较"中立"很多,不再从一个极端走向另一个极端。独占交易可能是反竞争的,也可能是社会有效的,要根据具体情况分析和综合考虑。经济文献中的线性价格模型夸大了独占交易的影响,现实中还需要综合考虑市场圈定效应和投资增进效应。独占交易契约的签订会对第三者产生负外部性,从第三者那里抽取的剩余会按照契约里的规定在签约双方进行分配。     

零售商买方势力一定会导致通道费吗？--基于纵向市场结构的合作博弈分析

关于通道费的研究,有一种观点认为通道费是零售商买方势力的体现。但是现实经济中有些具有买方势力的零售商收取通道费,而另一些却不收取通道费,买方势力的观点不能对这一现象作出解释。针对此,构建双边双寡头的纵向市场结构模型,并在模型中引入零售商的价格竞争和服务竞争,在合作博弈的框架下分析研究了零售商买方势力与通道费之间的关系。研究发现买方势力并不是出现通道费的充分条件,而只是必要条件,通道费的出现与否除了与零售商买方势力有关外,还与其他的市场环境因素有关。最后,通过线性需求函数的特例对这一结论进行了验证,并在此基础之上提出了相应的规制政策建议。     

Upstream Market Power and Wasteful Retailers*

We provide a novel explanation for the wasteful product disposal by retailers. In our model, after purchasing a quantity of a product from the manufacturer, the retailer exerts a costly effort to sell the product to the final users. The manufacturer’s production cost and the outside opportunity associated with it is private information. We show that, when the manufacturer has the upstream market power, the retailer sells all units purchased from the manufacturer. However, when the retailer has the market power, it might deliberately purchase more than it sells to the final users (thus wasting the unsold amount).     

Manufacturers and retailers in the global economy

We develop a model with multi‐product retailers acting as intermediaries between manufacturers and consumers. We show that the rise in retailer product assortment, the rise of up‐front payments in many retail markets and the observed shift in employment from manufacturing to retailing may be the consequence of the global integration of product markets. We also identify a novel benefit from market integration consisting of efficiency gains in the vertical distribution chain.     

Brand price differentials in retail distribution: product quality and service quality

A theoretical model is proposed to disentangle the contribution of brand quality and retailer service quality in explaining brand price differentials across retailers. Two testable hypotheses emerge: (i) for each brand type, price differences across retailers are independent of brand quality differentials and (ii) at a given retailer, price differences between different brand qualities are independent of service quality differentials. Our empirical analysis, for a sample of the U.K. grocery retailer prices, discloses that retailers that offer higher service quality sell same quality brands at higher prices. In particular, service quality premia amount to 6% for national brands and are in the range of 9–15% for low-quality store brands. Besides, at a given retailer, the price premia paid for the national brand are very large: around 150% between national brands and low-quality store brands, and around 40% between national brands and high-quality store brands. Also, the price differential between the national brand and the low-quality store brand does not increase with service quality.     

Firm Dynamics in Retail Trade: The Response of Canadian Retailers to Exchange Rate Shocks

We use comprehensive firm‐level data to estimate the responses of heterogeneous Canadian retail firms to real exchange rate movements. Our analysis focuses on a period characterized by large fluctuations in the Canadian dollar, providing an opportunity to quantify both intensive and extensive margin responses in retail industries to real exchange rate shocks and to examine how those responses differ across firms, locations, and sub‐industries. Our results indicate that a real Canadian currency appreciation significantly reduces a retailer's sales, employment, and profits. The strength of this negative effect is decreasing in the distance of a retailer from the US‐Canada border. We do not find evidence of a strong relationship between real exchange rate movements and the number of operating firms nor the probability of firm survival. These findings are consistent with the view that a real Canadian dollar appreciation increases cross‐border shopping by Canadians, resulting in a negative demand shock for Canadian retailers, and the dominant response by firms to such a shock is through the intensive margin.     

The strategic value of partial vertical integration

We investigate the strategic incentives for partial vertical integration, namely, partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when retailers privately know their costs and engage in price competition with differentiated goods. The partial misalignment between the profit objectives within a partially integrated manufacturer–retailer hierarchy implies a higher retail price than under full integration. This ‘information vertical effect’ translates into a ‘competition horizontal effect’: the partially integrated hierarchy's commitment to a higher price induces the competitor to increase its price, which strategically relaxes competition. Our analysis provides implications for vertical merger policy and theoretical support for the recently documented empirical evidence on partial vertical acquisitions.