The impact of restructuring and deregulation on gas rates

This article evaluates the impact of consumer choice programs, price caps, and sliding scale plans on consumer prices of gas using a custom survey of public service commissions and data from the Department of Energy. A seemingly unrelated regressions model estimates residential, commercial and industrial prices jointly, controlling for potentially endogenous demand. Consumer choice programs are estimated to lower residential and commercial prices significantly, by bringing competition to markets with smaller consumers. Prices fall even before deregulation as utilities build consumer loyalty and fight competition. Sliding scale plans are estimated to lower prices of small consumers while raising industrial prices. Price caps lead to overall higher prices, with unclear ranking across consumer classes.      

Can a decline in search cost increase prices?

This paper provides a new explanation of why a decline in consumers’ price search cost may not lead to lower prices. In a duopoly with price competition, I show that when some consumers are captive to one firm, there may be a non‐monotonic relationship between search cost and market power; firms may charge high prices with higher probability and the average price charged may be higher when consumers’ price search cost falls below a critical level. Furthermore, when firms have asymmetric captive segments, expected prices charged by each firm may move in opposite directions as search cost declines.     

Competition and petrol pricing in the smartphone era: Evidence from Singapore

This paper examines how pre-tax petrol and diesel prices in Singapore respond to changes in crude oil prices using an asymmetric error correction model. We pay particular attention to the effect increased use of smartphones may have had in altering the pattern of price adjustment as consumers become more informed about fuel prices and as search costs decline. The results suggest that increases in the use of smartphones and tablets have increased the estimated short-term response rate but only for the adjustment of retail prices to decreases in crude oil prices. We find no evidence of a smartphone effect for wholesale prices indicative of the different roles played by consumers in competition.     

Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search and the Number of Firms

We examine an oligopoly model where some consumers engage in costly non-sequential search to discover prices. There are three distinct price-dispersed equilibria characterized by low, moderate and high search intensity. The effects of an increase in the number of firms on search behaviour, expected prices, price dispersion and welfare are sensitive (i) to the equilibrium consumers' search intensity, and (ii) to the status quo number of firms. For instance, when consumers search with low intensity, an increase in the number of firms reduces search, does not affect expected price, leads to greater price dispersion and reduces welfare. In contrast, when consumers search with high intensity, increased competition results in more search and lower prices when the number of competitors in the market is low to begin with, but in less search and higher prices when the number of competitors is large. Duopoly yields identical expected price and price dispersion but higher welfare than an infinite number of firms.     

The effects of regulation and competition on the price of AT&T intrastate telephone service

Using data on AT&T intrastate toll prices, this study examines the effect of changing regulatory practices and increased competition on AT&T pricing behavior in the intrastate long-distance telecommunications industry. The results suggest that, with some qualification, the price of AT&T telephone service is lower in states which have the longest history of departure from rate-of-return regulation. Moreover, the regulatory climate has a far more significant effect on AT&T prices than does competition. The paper outlines several possible explanations for these results.     

Output and price effects of enhancing services sector competition in a large open economy

This paper studies the output and price effects of exogenous changes in the degree of competition. It is motivated by initiatives to enhance competition in services in the European Union. The paper shows that a higher degree of competition in the nontradable goods sector may have adverse implications for international price competitiveness. It highlights four channels through which enhanced competition in the non-tradable goods sector affects output and the general price level in a large, open economy (lower monopoly rents, higher wages, lower import prices, international wealth transfer) and assesses their relative importance. The conclusions suggest that the Single Market enhances output and reduces the general price level.     

A conduct parameter model of price discrimination

We consider a conduct parameter model where firms price discriminate based on the consumers’ willingness to pay. For any conduct, the average price is invariant to the extent of price discrimination. Moreover, when the number of prices goes to infinity, there is a linear relationship between market power, measured by conduct, and range of offered prices. Hence, when the firms face competition, some of the high valuation customers are charged below their valuations, which contrasts with perfect price discrimination results for a monopoly.     

Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information

We model non-cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers, assuming each consumer has private information about the intensity of her preferences for the firms' respective products and each firm has private information about its own product's quality. We characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium in which each firm's price reveals its respective product quality. We show that the equilibrium prices, the difference between those prices, the associated outputs, and profits are all increasing functions of the ex ante probability of high safety. If horizontal product differentiation is sufficiently great then equilibrium prices and profits are higher under incomplete information about quality than if quality were commonly known. Thus, while signaling imposes a distortionary loss on a monopolist using price to signal quality, duopolists may benefit from the distortion as it can reduce competition. Finally, average quality is lower since signaling quality redistributes demand towards low-quality firms.     

Price transmission and local market power: empirical evidence from the Austrian gasoline market

We analyse the impact of local market power on price margins and different dimensions of price adjustment dynamics (speed and asymmetry of price transmission) using data for a large number of individual gasoline stations in Austria. Specific attention is paid to threshold effects in price adjustment. Our results clearly suggest that the speed of price transmission between the Brent crude oil index and retail diesel prices is higher in a more competitive environment. While evidence on the relationship between local market power and asymmetries in the speed of price adjustment is mixed, our findings regarding asymmetries in price thresholds are clear: in regions where competition from neighbouring rivals is weak and/or consumers’ price elasticity of demand is low (stations located on the highway), positive thresholds significantly exceed negative ones, which corresponds to the ‘rockets and feathers phenomenon’. As expected, we observe that prices are lower in more competitive local markets.     

The impact of bargaining on markets with price takers: Too many bargainers spoil the broth

In this paper we study how bargainers impact on markets in which firms set a list price to sell to those consumers who take prices as given. The list price acts as an outside option for the bargainers, so the higher the list price, the more the firms can extract from bargainers. We find that an increase in the proportion of consumers seeking to bargain can lower consumer surplus overall, even though new bargainers receive a lower price. The reason is that the list price for those who do not bargain and the bargained prices for those who were already bargaining rise: sellers have a greater incentive to make the bargainers’ outside option less attractive, reducing the incentive to compete for price takers. Competition Authority exhortations to bargain can therefore be misplaced. We also consider the implications for optimal seller bargaining.     

INFORMATION AND PRICE DISPERSION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Limited information is the key element generating price dispersion in models of homogeneous-goods markets. We show that the global relationship between information and price dispersion is an inverse-U shape. We test this mechanism for the retail gasoline market using a new measure of information based on commuter data from Austria. Commuters sample gasoline prices on their commuting route, providing us with spatial variation in the share of informed consumers. Our empirical estimates are in line with the theoretical predictions. We also quantify how information affects average prices paid and the distribution of surplus in the gasoline market.     

The impact of the regulation of the cable television industry: the effect on quality-adjusted cable television prices

Between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, cable television rates increased substantially. Simple price comparisons over the regulated and deregulated eras are difficult as the programming changed simultaneously. Using a modified hedonic framework to allow for the lack of competition on the supply side of the industry, this paper imputes the price for regulation era cable packages using consumers’ estimated willingness to pay for individual satellite networks during the unregulated period. Then a ‘quality adjusted’ price for the cable package offered in 1985 is estimated. On average, regulation benefited consumers by keeping prices below monopolist's profit maximizing price.     

Trends in Disaggregated Import and Export Prices in Europe: Implications for the Trade and Wages Debate

We consider carefully the evidence from traded prices (as proxied by unit values) concerning the transmission of the effects of globalisation to domestic labour markets. Using standard index number techniques we decompose changes in sectoral import and export unit values into movements due to changes in pure prices of the initial bundle of goods imported or exported and changes due to upgrading of that bundle. Looking at the imports of selected European countries of textiles, clothing and footwear relative to engineering products we find evidence of strongly falling pure prices of the unskilled intensive products relative to the skilled products in the 1980s. This reinforces the view that import prices can capture the impact of globalisation in terms of falling relative prices for products produced with the intensive use of unskilled labour. However, the trends are not common across all the unskilled sectors; footwear is clearly an exception. In the absence of detailed domestic data, we look for reactions by domestic firms to increased import competition in movements in the price and composition of exports. We find evidence of stiff price competition from imports being associated with similar movements in export prices and no support for the view that import competition from low–wage countries has led to upgrading of the quality of exports.     

消费者寻求多样化与企业定价竞争

消费者寻求多样化的购买行为会对寡头企业之间的价格竞争和经济效率产生重要影响。文章研究发现,针对消费者寻求多样化的购买行为,企业会对忠诚的消费者给予价格优惠,而对新顾客索取高价;消费者寻求多样化购买行为弱化了企业两期价格竞争,导致"默契合谋";而以两期统一定价为基准的经济效率分析显示,歧视定价机制促进了企业间竞争,导致消费者剩余增加,企业利润减少。     

China wage inequality: the role of trade and technology

This article empirically investigates the impact of international trade and technical change on skill premia for a panel of 28 manufacturing sectors in China over the period 2002–2011. The results find that the effect of changes of the share of SOEs is twofold. First, the contraction of SOEs promoted productivity growth, and the promoting effect was skill-biased, which tended to increase the skill premia in China. Second, the drop of product prices resulting from falling SOEs share was more magnificent in skill-intensive industries, which helped to mitigate wage inequality through product prices. The accounted-for portion of price changes by productivity growth was skill-biased, significantly raising skill premia through product prices. However, the portion of price changes accounted for by foreign price was unskill-biased, and world price competition diminished the growing income disparity in China.     

Price search and spatial competition

In this paper we study a model where two spatially scattered sellers face a population of consumers dispersed over a given geographical area; they have to incur a transaction cost to place their purchase order. Moreover these consumers have imperfect knowledge of prices, but obtain full information about prices at the first shop they solicit. We study price competition between these firms. The main outcomes of our analysis are as follows. First we show that whenever a price equilibrium exists for given locations of firms, it will necessarily display price dispersion. Second we study location configurations which ensure the existence of a price equilibrium. Furthermore we show that when it exists, a price equilibrium is unique. Finally we analyze firms revenues when merchants anticipate the consequences of their locational choice on subsequent price competition. Then we find that there is an incentive for a firm to get as close as possible to its competitor.     

VERs and Price Undertakings under the WTO*

Under the rules of the WTO, governments are prohibited from negotiating voluntary export restraints (VERs) but may negotiate price undertakings (i.e. import price minima). While these two policies can have identical effects in models of perfect competition, they can have very different economic consequences with imperfect competition. The model presented here shows that in a model of international Bertrand duopoly, a VER can result in lower domestic prices and profits than a price minimum regime. This suggests that price undertakings should also be prohibited under the WTO.     

China's price stability: Its meaning and distributive consequences

The Chinese government stabilized the price level and the basic cost of living quite soon after its rise to power. This accomplishment did not preclude variations in the price structure, but the method of cost-of-living control complicated the relations between the prices paid to producers and the prices charged to consumers. In the end, subsidies were made available for the production of grain and of other basic foods in order to redistribute income from the nonagricultural to the agricultural sector. The paper explores the relationship between changes in the price structure and changes in the pattern of income differentiation. It also considers the limits to the future practice of this policy.     

我国航空运输服务业的市场结构及价格竞争策略分析

我国航空运输服务业从宏观上分析具有寡头垄断的市场结构特点,从航线运营的角度分析却具有垄断竞争的特点,因此我国航空运输服务市场还处在重要的发展变革阶段。在我国空运市场特定的经济环境下,旅客的购买决策受到多种因素的影响,航空公司的价格竞争主要表现为不同价格的子舱位数量的决策,并且具有复杂的价格体系。在同一航线上经营的不同企业一方面要针对价格需求弹性大和时间需求弹性大的旅客采取强硬的价格竞争策略;另一方面也要注重差异化价格竞争策略, 避免恶性竞争的发生。     

Equilibrium pricing in a (partial) search market: The shopbot paradox

Price competition is explored when consumers costlessly learn product prices but not ancillary fees and have greater disutility to paying these fees. There is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium price between the competitive (Bertrand) and monopoly (Diamond) prices.