The Impact of Market Intervention on Quota Mobility: The Case of the Ontario Dairy Industry

We examine the relationship between farm‐level scale efficiency and quota purchases in the Ontario dairy quota market before and after the implementation of a progressive transfer assessment policy and a price cap policy. We find that scale efficiency has a positive effect on net quota purchases and that the two regulations slowed down this effect. The largest deterrent in the movement of quota from less efficient to more efficient producers occurred after the implementation of the capital asset pricing policy. If the capital asset pricing policy remains in effect, it will likely take a longer time to achieve an efficient allocation of quota across producers in the industry. Nous examinons la relation entre l'efficience d'échelle agricole et les achats de quota au sein du marché des quotas laitiers ontariens, avant et après l'implantation d'une politique d'évaluation progressive de transfert, et d'une autre de plafonnement des prix. Nous avançons que l'efficience d'échelle a un effet positif sur les achats nets de quota et que les deux politiques ont freiné cet effet. La plus grande dissuasion au sein du mouvement des quotas de producteurs moins efficients vers ceux qui le sont plus, survient après le plafonnement des prix. Si la politique de plafonnement des prix demeure en vigueur, il faudra attendre encore longtemps avant de réussir une allocation efficiente des quotas parmi les producteurs de l'industrie.     

Environmental Policy Uncertainty and Marketable Permit Systems: The Dutch Phosphate Quota Program

Tradable permits are generally considered as an efficient instrument to regulate pollution by individual producers. However, uncertainty about changes in or possible discontinuation of the program could make individual farmers reluctant to invest in tradable permits. This article uses the option approach to derive a theoretical model that shows the impact of policy uncertainty on investment in tradable quota. The empirical assessment provides weak evidence for the existence of option values due to policy uncertainty for phosphate quota in swine production in the Netherlands.     

The Simple Analytics of Transferable Production Quota: Implications for the Marginal Cost of Ontario Milk Production

Using a competitive dynamic optimization model, the difference between unused and used industrial milk quota values is shown to give an exact measure of the annual rental rate of production quota. Knowledge of the rental rate of production quota and output price can be used to impute the marginal cost of industrial milk production. However, if there is a transfer tax on production quota sales, the imputation of the equilibrium rental value of quota depends on the elasticity of demand and supply for quota as well as the level of the transfer assessment. The marginal cost of Ontario milk production is estimated for each year from 1980–81 to 1994–95, based on unused and used quota values. However, the imputed marginal cost estimates are not totally satisfactory. The results suggest that caution should be exercised in using the difference between unused and used quota prices as a measure of the rental rate of industrial milk production quota.     

The Value of Dairy Quota under a Commercial Export Milk Program

This paper argues that under a commercial export milk program, the market value of quota will be determined by the spread between the domestic market price and the export price, rather than the conventional wisdom that it is determined by the spread between the domestic milk price and the marginal cost of production. Under this new economy, it is argued that ultimately the market price of dairy quota will be priced independently of firm marginal costs, which implies that low-cost (or high-margin) producers will not hold an economic advantage in bidding for quota over higher-cost producers. Regression results are consistent with the hypothesized positive relationship between quota values and the difference between domestic and export milk price. The average export price has generally increased over time and is approximately equal to the marginal cost for an average producer. The results have implications for a World Trade Organization (WTO) challenge. New Zealand and the United States feel the domestic program acts as an export subsidy by cross-subsidizing production of commercial export milk. The results here suggest that the prices for the filled export contracts are approximately the marginal cost of production for the average producer and not lower, as suggested by the challenge. Export contracts were found to have higher price risk than domestically produced milk. The risk is compounded by the short-term nature of most export contracts. The increase in risk for the commercial export milk program (CEM) implies that it is unlikely many farmers will greatly diversify into CEM contracts unless the uncertainty is reduced.     

Incidence of the 1996 Canada–U.S. Softwood Lumber Agreement and the Optimal Export Tax

Our partial-equilibrium analysis suggests 63% of the Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Agreement's export tax is absorbed by Canadian consumers. Still, sufficient surplus was extracted from U.S. consumers for the agreement to be in Canada's national interest. In fact, the agreement was suboptimal from a Canadian perspective in that a higher tax rate would have raised national welfare, at least in the short run. Although the agreement decreased U.S. welfare, the net loss for the combined U.S. and Canadian economies is modest, about 5% of the bilateral softwood lumber trade value according to our baseline estimates. This suggests the agreement's tariff rate quota scheme is a reasonably efficient mechanism for redistributing economic surplus from U.S. consumers to producers. Still, a better policy may be to enlarge the softwood lumber market via a research and promotion program funded by a modest (say, 5%) tax on Canadian exports.     

Hidden action,risk aversion and variable fines in agri‐environmental schemes*

This note analyses the design of agri‐environmental schemes for risk‐averse producers whose input usage is only observable by costly monitoring. The scheme penalises producers in proportion to input use in excess of a quota. A striking result is that if the scheme is designed in such a way that producers always comply with the quota, risk aversion is not relevant in determining the level of input use.     

THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF NITROGEN LIMITATION POLICIES

The effects of nitrogen limitation policies on the UK fertiliser market are considered. Using a simulation model which incorporates some structural aspects of the UK fertiliser industry, the extent and distribution of the welfare effects of nitrogen tax and quota policies are estimated. The results show that, while farmers lose from both policies, the main fertiliser manufacturers may gain in the short run from a quota policy, while profits would be reduced with a nitrogen tax policy.     

Structural Change and Policy Reform in the UK Dairy Sector

Estimation of a cost function for a representative sample of UK dairy producers allows future re‐structuring of the industry to be simulated using a model which incorporates producers' differential costs and milk prices. Consideration is also given to reductions in producer prices and to the introduction of an A/B quota system. The results indicate that, despite the history of quota trading in the UK, there is considerable scope for further restructuring in the industry to take advantage of differential incentives between producers. It is also projected that UK milk supply would increase if quota restrictions were removed.     

The Economics of a Blend Mandate for Biofuels

A biofuel blend mandate may increase or decrease consumer fuel prices with endogenous oil prices, depending on relative supply elasticities. Biofuel tax credits always reduce fuel prices. Tax credits result in lower fuel prices than under a mandate for the same level of biofuel production. If tax credits are implemented alongside mandates, then tax credits subsidize fuel consumption instead of biofuels. This contradicts energy policy goals by increasing oil dependency, CO₂ emissions, and traffic congestion, while providing little benefit to either corn or ethanol producers. These social costs will be substantial with tax credits costing taxpayers $28.7 billion annually by 2022.     

Explaining Differences in Milk Quota Values: The Role of Economic Efficiency

This article explores the relationship between milk quota values and economic efficiency in order to analyze government interventions in quota allocations among producers. For this purpose, we estimate quota values using a panel of Spanish dairy farms. Quota values are then decomposed into economic efficiency, price, and scale effects in order to assess the relative influence of these factors. We find that efficiency is important in explaining quota values but is uncorrelated with observable farm characteristics. This casts doubts on the government's ability to allocate quotas to efficient farms.     

Incidence of Russian log export tax: A vertical log-lumber model

In 2007, Russia imposed an ad valorem tax on its log exports that lasted until 2012. In this paper, we use a Muth-type equilibrium displacement model to investigate the market and welfare impacts of this tax, utilizing a vertical linkage between log and lumber markets and considering factor substitution. Our theoretical analysis indicates that, without considering the vertical linkage, the negative effects of log export tax on equilibrium price for log producers is underestimated when logs and processing services are gross substitutes, and the direction of bias is uncertain when they are gross complements. Empirical simulations show that the burden of Russian log export tax is shared almost equally between foreign log buyers and domestic log producers and that the tax increases domestic lumber production. Further, the marginal effect of the log export tax on domestic lumber production decreases as Russian domestic demand share of logs increases. Overall, the welfare gains for Russian lumber consumers, lumber producers in the form of quasi-rents to processing services, and tax revenue exceed the loss in its logging sector.     

AN EXAMINATION OF THE TAX SUBSIDIES TO THE DAIRY SECTORS IN CANADA,GERMANY NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES

Subsidies to agricultural producers through domestic tax and social programme policies are generally not included in producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) measures. This study examines the price induced distortions of domestic tax policy and social programmes on dairy trade between Canada, New Zealand, Germany, and the United States. The degree of tax subsidisation and the price subsidies needed to offset the tax and social programme advantages enjoyed by each country are estimated using a simulation model. Study findings suggest that current German taxation policy provides a substantial subsidy to dairy producers. Canadian and US farmers also have some trade advantages because of tax policy and social programmes.     

Decisions and tradable production quota when yield is uncertain

This article analyses optimal decisions under regulation by tradable agricultural production/marketing quotas when production is stochastic. For risk-neutral and risk-averse producers the fraction of planned production that is covered by quota is separable from input decisions when yield randomness is additive. The role of quota in protecting against the risk of production shortfall is investigated. A producer is shown to benefit from being allowed to treat as one all tranches of production quota under his control. Production decisions are invariant to this amalgamation. But when production randomness is additive normal, the qualitative impact of amalgamation on quota positions depends upon whether the ratio of rental price to the price difference that is being protected exceeds one half.     

Alternative Approaches to Compensation and Producer Rights

When policies are changed, it is not uncommon for losers to be compensated. Economic theory and quantitative analysis are useful in determining the efficiency gains/losses associated with a policy change, but are little help in deciding what the approach to compensation should be. The amount of compensation varies, depending on, in part, the political clout of the parties being negatively affected by a policy change—compensation is what politicians and the sector demanding compensation can agree on. We formulate four approaches to producer compensation within the context of the Ontario Tobacco Transition Program, where producers would have suffered losses in the absence of compensation. The approaches range from providing zero compensation to providing compensation based on the entire value of the tobacco quota. The Canadian government chose the latter and compensated producers for the termination of the tobacco quota program based on an approach that far exceeded other possible compensation approaches.     

THE COMMONWEALTH DROUGHT BOND

The operation of the drought-bond scheme is described. A special tax concession for primary producers substantially increases the yield after tax on these bonds. The expected yield is calculated for representative marginal tax rates and probabilities of drought. Some deficiencies of the present scheme are discussed and proposals are made which overcome efficiency and equity criticisms.     

MARKETING BOARDS AND QUOTA POLICIES FOR CANADIAN FARM PRODUCTS: AN APPRAISAL OF PERFORMANCE*

Since the great economic Depression, Canadian farm operators have always emphasized the need to strengthen their bargaining position in the market place. Basically, farm operators believe that the individual farmer is in no position to bargain effectively in a product market with a few large firms.
Legislators have responded to the wishes of farm operators by enacting legislation which provides for the formation of compulsory marketing boards controlled by producers. An ever-increasing number of these boards are now in operation. The granting of exclusive powers to sell particular farm products, however, is one which involves the public interest and the public is, therefore, vitally interested.
This paper focuses attention on the exercise of the powers vested in these marketing boards through their use of quotas, and their limitations to entry of new producers into particular sectors of the agricultural industry. The paper indicates that there are some positive features to the quota policies pursued by marketing boards. Some economic security has been afforded farm operators with short-term stability engendered in particular sectors of agriculture. There are certain negative consequences of these quota policies, which affect the location of production and also impair the competitive strength of particular sectors of agriculture to which they are applied. They have also interfered with the most rational utilization of resources in associated industries. These aspects of the quota policies are, therefore, inconsistent with the public interest. The study outlines principles that should form the basis of a revitalized marketing policy that may be more consistent with the public interest.     

An Experimental Analysis of Modifications to the Centralized Milk Quota Exchange System in Quebec

Using experimental economics, this paper tests the potential impacts of modifying the centralized quota exchange system in Quebec with the intent of decreasing the quota price while minimizing negative impacts on auction effectiveness. Two separate treatments are applied to a uniform price auction similar to that employed in Quebec. The first treatment is an exclusion (5% or 15%) of the highest buyer bids and seller offers. The second is a tax (2% or 10%) on all units offered for sale that remain unsold. Various combinations of the two treatments are also tested. The results suggest that exclusion of the highest bids and offers can decrease the price of the quota and that a 15% exclusion rate is more effective than a 5% rate. The tax alone has little impact on quota price. The combination of the two treatments generates a more marked reduction in both the number of exchanges and the price of the quota than when the tax or the exclusion is applied individually. However, the combination of treatments results in a greater loss of economic efficiency. In all cases, relatively small market price reductions are realized at the expense of substantial losses in economic efficiency. La présente étude teste de manière expérimentale la capacité d'une modification au système centralisé de vente du quota à faire diminuer le prix du quota laitier au Québec tout en minimisant les impacts négatifs des changements sur l'efficacité de l'enchère. Cette modification consiste à appliquer deux traitements sur l'enchère de prix uniforme où s'échange le quota. Le premier traitement consiste en une exclusion (5% ou 15%) des mises les plus élevées des acheteurs et des vendeurs. Le second traitement est une taxe (2% ou 10%) appliquée aux unités que les vendeurs mettent en marché et ne réussissent pas à vendre. Différentes combinaisons de ces deux traitements sont également testées. Les données générées permettent de conclure que le mécanisme d'exclusion des mises les plus élevées permet de faire diminuer le prix du quota, l'exclusion de 15%étant plus efficace que celle de 5%. Pour sa part, la taxe seule a peu d'impact sur le prix du quota tandis que la combinaison des deux traitements entraîne une diminution du nombre de transactions et du prix du quota plus marquée que lorsque les traitements de taxe et d'exclusion sont appliqués individuellement. Cela a comme corollaire d'entraîner une perte d'efficacitééconomique plus importante. Dans tous les cas, des baisses de prix de marché relativement modestes sont réalisées au coût d'importantes pertes d'efficacitééconomique.     

U.S. sweeteners: Combating excess consumption with an excise tax?

Obesity is a public health problem in the United States that has been linked to excess sweetener consumption. The American Heart Association (AHA) recommends no more than 6–9 teaspoons/capita/day, while the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recommends 200 calories/capita/day of caloric sweetener consumption. Both recommendations are well below the reported 2016 sweetener consumption levels. We quantify the input tax rates needed to reduce the current excess sweetener consumption level to the AHA and FDA recommended standards. We calculate the joint tax in the United States on two major sweeteners, sugar and High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS), to be 31 and 24 cents per pound, respectively, based on the AHA standard, and 19 and 17 cents per pound, respectively, using the FDA standard. These taxes would be roughly the magnitude of the existing sugar and HFCS prices. In both cases, the tax incidence on producers is much smaller than on consumers. Our focus is very different from past studies in that it deals with the effect of taxes on inputs to meet the recommended target rather than a selective tax (sugar‐sweetened beverage tax). If a sweetener tax were implemented, U.S. sugar and HFCS producers would lose US$398–US$489 and US$683–US$844 million per year, respectively.     

EFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH AGRICULTURAL NITRATE POLLUTION STANDARDS

Non-point pollutants such as nitrates are difficult to monitor and hence control. This paper considers nitrate abatement policies for the Tyne catchment in northern England. The analysis is based on an aggregate-level LP model which predicts producers' production decisions and estimates the resulting spatial distribution of nitrogen applications and nitrate emissions. The policy evaluation compares a catchment-level nitrate emission quota, a catchment-level nitrogen input quota and nitrogen input quotas targeted at individual land classes as alternative measures to achieve nitrate concentration standards. The results indicate that targeted nitrogen input quotas provide a feasible and relatively efficient abatement policy when a lack of information on individual farms prevents the use of the least cost emission tax.     

The Effects of a Federal Flat Tax on Agriculture

This study examines the impact of a federal flat tax on agriculture by determining the tax liability under the current and flat tax systems using actual farm records. The study considers the linkages between agriculture and the rest of the economy by examining the impact of a flat tax on interest rates and capital investment and how those changes would affect agriculture. Results indicate that roughly 63% of agricultural producers would benefit from a flat tax in terms of lowering taxes paid. Under the flat tax, larger farms and more profitable farms would be relatively better off.