Bank equity stakes in borrowing firms and financial distress

We derive the optimal financial claim for a bank when the borrowingfirm's uninformed stakeholders depend on the bank to establishwhether the firm is distressed and whether concessions by stakeholdersare necessary. The bank's financial claim is designed to ensurethat it cannot collude with a healthy firm's owners to seekunnecessary concessions or to collude with a distressed firm'sowners to claim that the firm is healthy. To prove that a requestfor concessions has not come from a healthy firm/bank coalition,the bank must hold either a very small or a very large equitystake when the firm enters distress. To prove that a distressedfirm and the bank have not colluded to claim that the firm ishealthy, the bank may need to hold equity under routine financialconditions.     

Equity issues when in distress

We investigate the role of financial distress in the seasoned equity market. We find that distressed firms comprise about 40% of SEOs and these distressed issuers have worse abnormal announcement returns than non‐distressed issuers. Stock return volatility is an important determinant for announcement returns for non‐distressed SEO issuers but not for distressed SEO issuers. Signals of firm quality are associated with better announcement returns, larger issues, increased investment, improved operating performance, and lower likelihood of delisting for distressed SEO firms as compared to non‐distressed firms. Our findings suggest equity finance is valuable for financially distressed firms with strong growth prospects.     

DEBT FORGIVENESS AND STOCK PRICE REACTION OF LENDING BANKS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN

We provide a simple model for analyzing how debt forgiveness affects the stock price of a lending bank. Our model shows that although debt forgiveness increases shareholder wealth of a bank in healthy financial condition, it decreases shareholder wealth of a bank in unhealthy financial condition. We empirically investigate the announcement effect of debt forgiveness on bank stock prices in Japanese markets. On average, lending banks experience a significant negative announcement effect with respect to debt forgiveness. Consistent with the prediction of the model, we find a negative relation between the announcement effect and the net bad loan ratio as a proxy of the unhealthiness of the financial condition of the bank.     

Divestments and financial distress in leveraged buyouts

This paper investigates the wealth effects of 134 divestments by 41 firms that underwent leveraged buyouts in the 1980s. Stock in these companies is privately owned. Bond returns for publicly traded debt are used to measure the wealth effects of the divestment announcement. These divestments are, on average, not associated with significant wealth effects for the full sample. However, firms that experience financial distress have negative and significant abnormal returns associated with their divestments, while returns in non-event months are insignificant. In contrast, non-distressed firms gain when asset sales are announced. The losses suffered by bondholders in distressed sellers are large and significant when core assets are divested. Bondholders in these firms do not suffer significant losses when non-core assets are divested. Finally, abnormal bond returns are related to the structure of the firms' post-buyout debt. Returns are negatively related to the use of private debt in the capital structure and positively related to the use of subordinated debt.     

Bank incentives and suboptimal lending decisions: Evidence from the valuation effect of bank loan announcements in Japan

Using a sample of bank loan announcements in Japan, we examine whether or not banks have incentives to engage in suboptimal lending that results in wealth transfer from the banks to the borrowing firms. We find that abnormal returns for borrowing firms are significantly positive, but those for lending banks are sometimes significantly negative. Furthermore, the announcement returns for borrowing firms are negatively related to those for lending banks, especially when poorly performing firms borrow from financially healthy (low-risk) banks. Our results suggest that the positive valuation effect of bank loan announcements for borrowing firms is mainly due to a wealth transfer from lending banks.     

The Importance of Cash-Flow News for Financially Distressed Firms

Previous studies have shown that stock prices are moved primarily by news about discount rates (expected returns). I argue that when a firm experiences financial distress, news about cashflows becomes more dominant in driving its stock returns. Applying Campbell's (1991) variance decomposition framework to financially distressed firms supports this argument. Furthermore, I find that more bankruptcies occur after negative shocks to expected cashflows than after positive shocks to discount rates; and that stock prices of distressed firms are less sensitive than those of sound firms to changes in equity risk.     

Trade Receivables Policy of Distressed Firms and Its Effect on the Costs of Financial Distress

This paper studies the trade receivables policy of distressed firms as the trade-off between the firm's willingness to gain sales and the firm's need for cash. We find that firms increase trade receivables when they have profitability problems, but reduce trade receivables when they have cash flow problems. We also find that a firm that significantly cuts its trade receivables when in financial distress will experience an additional drop of at least 13% in sales and stock returns over the previously documented 20% average drop for financially troubled firms. Moreover, the performance decline of a firm in financial distress is significantly higher if the firm cuts trade receivables than if it does not.     

How do banks resolve firms’ financial distress? Evidence from Japan

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate how banks resolve firms?? financial distress in Japan. Our results show that distressed firms that have more unsecured bank debt are more likely to restructure debt successfully out of court. Second, private debt restructuring is conducted during the year in which a financially distressed firm would be compelled to report negative net worth because of substantial accounting losses if no debt restructuring plans were implemented. Third, firms that are already in a negative net worth situation are more likely to receive debt forgiveness and/or debt-for-equity swaps. Finally, both the 1-year-lagged total liabilities-to-assets ratio and accounting losses are positively related to the private workout level. These results suggest that banks resolve firms?? financial distress in shareholders?? and creditors?? interests. We argue that, along with bankruptcy laws, the stock exchange rules and the fact that banks are allowed to hold shares in these firms affect the resolution of firms?? financial distress.     

Hostile bank takeover offers : Analysis and implications

A comparison of the financial characteristics of banks involved in hostile takeover bids with a control group of nonhostile bank mergers indicates: (1) hostile targets experience abnormal returns that are significantly greater than for the targets of nonhostile bank mergers; (2) hostile bidders experience negative abnormal returns that are insignificantly different than for bidders involved in nonhostile bank mergers; (3) hostile bank acquisition announcements produce positive net wealth effects which are larger than the wealth effects of nonhostile acquisitions; (4) a Logit regression model using financial ratios, stock price data, and ownership data is able to distinguish between hostile and nonhostile targets.     

The valuation effects of bank mergers

This paper examines the valuation effects of a sample of 558 bank mergers from 1980–1997. The overall results indicate that bank mergers create wealth. On average over a 36-day (−30, +5) event window, targets gain over 22%, bidders break even, and combined firms gain 3%. The results further indicate that mergers in the 1990s, which have not been extensively studied in prior work, have positive effects. In the 1990s over the 36-day window: target gain significantly, bidder returns are positive and statistically larger than the mid-1980s, and combined firm returns are significantly positive. These results are consistent with the notion that bank mergers occur for synergistic reasons and are not the result of empire building. However, bidder returns are sensitive to the event window implemented. Examining returns over an 11-day (−5, +5) window, target returns remain significantly positive, while bidder returns are statistically negative, and combined firm returns are statistically positive. Results over both windows indicate that overall wealth effects from bank mergers are positive over time, particularly in the 1990s.     

Decoupling the distressed banks and their clients,and coupling the distressed firms and their lending banks

This paper simultaneously investigates the responses of stock prices of the related banks and the client firms when one of them is in distress. Two effects are examined. The distressed bank effect, which claims that the stock price of client firms are coupled to that of their related distress banks, and the distressed firm effect, which claims that the related banks are negatively affected when their client firms are in distress. We collect the detailed information of individual transaction loan data to find the relationship between banks and their client firms. Asymmetric responses are reported in this paper. Our results reject the distressed bank effect but, by contrast, cannot reject the distressed firm effect. We propose the fund diversification hypothesis and the leverage hypothesis, and argue the decoupling effect of the distressed bank and their listed firms, owing to the diversified choice of clients' financing channel.     

Accounting for distress in bank mergers

Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.     

Bondholder Wealth Effects in Mergers and Acquisitions: New Evidence from the 1980s and 1990s

We examine the wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions on target and acquiring firm bondholders in the 1980s and 1990s. Consistent with a coinsurance effect, below investment grade target bonds earn significantly positive announcement period returns. By contrast, acquiring firm bonds earn negative announcement period returns. Additionally, target bonds have significantly larger returns when the target's rating is below the acquirer's, when the combination is anticipated to decrease target risk or leverage, and when the target's maturity is shorter than the acquirer's. Finally, we find that target and acquirer announcement period bond returns are significantly larger in the 1990s.     

Do Bank‐Affiliated Analysts Benefit from Lending Relationships?

This paper investigates whether private information from lending activities improves the forecast accuracy of bank‐affiliated analysts. Using a matched sample design, matching by affiliated bank or borrower, we demonstrate that the forecast accuracy of bank‐affiliated analysts increases after the followed firm borrows from the affiliated bank. We also find that the increase in forecast accuracy is more pronounced for borrowers with greater information asymmetry and bad news, and for deals with financial covenants. Last, we find that the informational advantage of bank‐affiliated analysts exists only when the affiliated banks serve as lead arrangers, not merely as participating lenders. Overall, our evidence suggests that information flows from commercial banking to equity research divisions within financial conglomerates.     

Firms’ financial and real responses to credit supply shocks: Evidence from firm-bank relationships in Germany

We investigate the importance of firm-bank relationships for the international transmission of bank distress to the real economy. Using a large panel of matched financial statements of firms of all sizes and their relationship banks in Germany, we find that banks with losses from proprietary trading activities during the 2007/8 financial crisis decreased their lending, and that their firm customers responded by reducing real investment and employment. We document how different types of firms partially offset reduced credit supply by resorting to alternative financing sources.     

Wealth effects of convertible bond and convertible preference share issues: An empirical analysis of the UK market

We examine the wealth effects of the announcement of issues of different types of convertible securities by UK firms and find significant negative effects on shareholder wealth. We however, also find that when the sample is partitioned by method of issue, privately placed convertible bonds, in contrast to previous research, exhibit a negative impact on firm wealth. Further, we also find negative wealth effects for firms that issue convertible securities to refinance previous debt or finance specific acquisitions. However announcements of convertible bond issues, for the purpose of financing capital expenditure schemes, show significant positive wealth effects. Finally, we find mixed support for testable predictions of the main theoretical models relating cross-sectional firm characteristics of convertible bond issuers to abnormal returns.     

THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF TRACKING STOCK RESTRUCTURINGS

We provide a comprehensive examination of the post‐issue wealth effects of 29 completed tracking stock restructurings. We document that for the parent stock and for the combined firm, tracking stock restructurings lead to insignificant long‐term excess returns. However, we find that shareholders of tracking stocks realize significant post‐issue wealth losses. Unlike spin‐offs and carve‐outs, announcements of tracking stock restructurings are preceded by negative one‐year excess returns, and unlike the positive post‐issue long‐term excess returns to spin‐off stocks and the insignificant long‐term excess returns to carve‐out stocks, tracking stocks experience negative long‐term excess returns.     

Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of firms

We investigate the impact that bankers on the board have upon a firm's debt ratio, debt to total capital, 1 year subsequent to their appointment. We find that the presence of lending bankers on a firm's board negatively affects the debt ratio, while the impact of non-lending bankers varies with the firm's probability of financial distress. The results suggest that non-lending bankers provide expertise and certification for distressed firms while exercising a monitoring role for non-distressed firms. In contrast, the results suggest that lenders on the board exercise a monitoring role independent of the firm's financial distress. When combined with established findings in the literature, we conclude that there may be two ways to avoid conflict between a board-appointed banker's fiduciary responsibility and the interests of her bank. When the potential for conflict is high, lenders may forgo board positions, while non-lending bankers may merely alter their role on the board.     

Can investors restrict managerial behavior in distressed firms?

In this article, we show that only distressed firms not identified as distressed by creditors are able to transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders. Using the number of years to future bankruptcy as a proxy for genuine distress and measures based on observable firm characteristics as proxies for perceived distress, genuinely distressed firms incorrectly perceived as healthy cut payouts to shareholders more slowly and invest more aggressively as uncertainty increases than correctly identified distressed firms. Consistent with the idea that incorrectly identified distressed firms actively hide their troubles, we show that they tend to follow more aggressive accounting policies and often resort to earnings misstatements. We also show that they are often not restricted by covenants and can borrow further debt capital at affordable rates, suggesting that a lack of monitoring by creditors allows them to transfer wealth to shareholders.     

The effects of bank relationships on firm private debt restructuring: Evidence from an emerging market

Our paper seeks to examine the direct benefit of bank relationships for a distressed borrower by assessing its influence on the success of firm private debt restructuring. We find that a distressed firm with a stronger bank relationship has a greater probability to successfully restructure its debt through private renegotiation. Accordingly, an analysis of credit rating recovery provides complementary evidence on the factors of successful debt restructuring. A duration analysis of the length of time needed for a debt restructuring to be completed is fully consistent with our documented results. We conclude that in a bank dominated financial system like Taiwan's where firms are heavily bank-dependent, the bank-firm relationship is of crucial importance to the success of financially distressed firms in private debt restructuring.