Initial Technical Violations of Debt Covenants and Changes in Firm Risk

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether initial technical debt covenant violations are associated with significant increases in the equity risk of violating firms. Our results indicate that first-time violations are associated with significant increases in both systematic and unsystematic risk. The increase in systematic risk is attributable primarily to rising levels of financial leverage as opposed to changes in the underlying asset beta. We also find that the change in unsystematic risk experienced by first-time debt covenant violators is a significant predictor of future exchange delisting, even after controlling for other factors typically associated with increasing financial distress.     

Agency Costs and the Short‐Run Stock Price Response to Capital Expenditures

We estimate the short‐run stock price response to unanticipated capital expenditures. We use association study methodology to avoid the self‐selection bias in event studies and to facilitate construction of a large sample of firm‐years likely to exhibit agency problems. We find that the average price response to routine capital expenditures is negative, and that commonly used agency cost measures explain fully the negative response. Subsample results support the conclusion that the market is skeptical of cash flow financed spending by low‐q firms and even capital spending by high‐q firms when the firm is large and q is only marginally high.     

On Foreign Shareholdings and Agency Costs: New Evidence from China

This article examines the impact of foreign shareholdings on agency costs of Chinese firms from 2006 to 2012. The empirical results indicate that: (1) direct foreign shareholdings, in contrast to indirect foreign shareholdings, improve asset utilization, suggesting low agency costs; (2) qualified foreign institutional investors play a significant role in firms because they are less subject to political pressure, which is consistent with lower agency costs, but this effect could be eroded by government control; and (3) foreign shareholdings reduce the cost of equity and improve firm performance. The results contribute to the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the domestic/foreign ownership structure of firms.     

Private Equity Syndication: Agency Costs, Reputation and Collaboration

Abstract:  Syndicates are a form of inter-firm alliance in which two or more private equity firms invest together in an investee firm and share a joint pay-off, and are an enduring feature of the leveraged buyout (LBO) and private equity industry. This study examines the relationship between syndication and agency costs at the investor-investee level, and the extent to which the reputation and the network position of the lead investor mediate this relationship. We examine this relationship using a sample of 1,122 buyout investments by 80 private equity companies in the UK between 1993 and 2006. Our findings show that where agency costs are highest, and hence ex-post monitoring by the lead investor is more important, syndication is less likely to occur. The negative relationship between agency costs and syndication, however, is alleviated by the reputation and network position of the lead investor firm.     

Agency Costs and Strategic Considerations behind Sell‐offs: the UK Evidence

We analyse the impact of the motivation behind the sell‐off and the use of the proceeds from the sale on the value of UK firms divesting assets during 1984–94. We find that managers do not create value when they divest assets in order to raise cash, in order to reshuffle assets without increasing corporate focus and when they do not announce the motivation behind the sale. In contrast, we find value increases for firms refocusing during the 1990s and for firms divesting loss‐making assets. Returning the proceeds from the sale to shareholders or reducing leverage were also associated with value increases, whereas reinvesting the proceeds for growth had a negative impact during the 1980s, which disappeared in the 1990s, possibly as a result of the disciplinary role of the economic downturn on the investment behaviour of firms.     

The Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs: An Empirical Investigation Using UK Panel Data

This paper empirically investigates the relationship between managerial entrenchment and agency costs for a large sample of UK firms over the period 1999–2005. To measure managerial entrenchment, we use detailed information on ownership and board structures and managerial compensation. We develop a managerial entrenchment index, which captures the extent to which managers have the ability and incentives to expropriate wealth from shareholders. Our findings, which are based on a dynamic panel data analysis, show that there is a strong negative relationship between managerial entrenchment and our inverse proxy for agency costs, namely asset turnover ratio. There is also evidence that short‐term debt and dividend payments work as effective corporate governance devices for UK firms. Finally, our findings reveal that agency costs are persistent over time. The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including varying measures of managerial entrenchment and agency costs.     

Nonlinear Effects of Debt on Investment: Evidence from Dutch Listed Firms

Abstract

Nonlinear effects of debt on investment are investigated using an unbalanced panel of 94 Dutch listed nonfinancial firms during the period 1985–2000. Evidence shows that the nonlinear relation between debt and investment can be represented by a U curve, which contradicts the financial constraints theory. One possible explanation of the U curve relation between debt and investment may be the debt capital gain in the presence of inflation.     

An Agency Analysis of Firm Diversification: The Consequences of Discretionary Cash and Managerial Risk Considerations

Firm diversification is shown to be a function of excess discretionary cash flow and managerial risk considerations. We measure firm diversification using the concentric diversification index. The index is positively related to both the number of business units in the firm and the extent to which the business firm's segments differ. Consequently, the measure provides a proxy for how firm diversification decisions impact the risk of the firm, and the measure is found to be inversely related to both total risk and unsystematic risk. Consistent with the agency arguments of discretionary cash flow, we find the level of excess discretionary funds in the firm to be a significant positive determinant of the level of firm diversification. We also find support for both a wealth transfer hypothesis over low levels of managerial ownership, and a managerial risk aversion hypothesis over high levels of managerial ownership.     

Firm Internationalization and Capital Structure in Developing Countries: The Role of Financial Development

We investigate the relationship between internationalization and the level of debt financing for more than 18,000 firm/year observations from thirty-one developing countries in the period 1991-2006. We argue that this relationship can be affected by both country-level and firm-level factors. The results show that in developing countries with relatively higher financial development, firm internationalization corresponds with a greater level of debt when firms have more growth opportunities (which also indicate a higher level of asymmetric information). This evidence suggests that relatively developed financial markets in developing countries at least partially mitigate the effect of asymmetric information and decrease the agency cost of debt for firms with higher levels of internationalization.     

The Costs of Implementing Regulatory Changes: The Truth in Savings Act

Although the cost of banking regulation has been a controversial issue for many years, little empirical evidence is available. This study provides new evidence on the effect of the amount of required changes on start-up compliance costs, using data from a survey of the costs of implementing the Truth in Savings Act. The finding, that start-up compliance costs were insensitive to the extent of changes required to implement the regulation, has important implications for regulatory policy. It suggests that a general requirement to alter an infrequent practice may impose nonnegligible costs on all banks, not only those banks that must make substantive changes in their practices. This finding argues against a policy of making frequent minor revisions in regulations. Instead, a policy of delaying revisions until some number have been accumulated and then making infrequent major revisions of regulations may reduce implementation costs by allowing banks to exploit economies of changing practices.     

Agency Problems and the Performance of Venture-backed IPOs in Germany: Exit Strategies,Lock-up Periods,and Bank Ownership

Abstract

The agency problems for initial public offerings are well documented in the literature. The objective of this research is to investigate the potential conflicts of interest for the ‘Neuer Markt’ in Germany. Of special interest are venture-backed IPOs and those in which banks acted as venture capitalist, underwriter, and provided analyst recommendations. High initial returns and outperformance are observed over the first 6 months of trading, which decreases significantly over the subsequent 18 months. The individual performance depends on the VC's underwriter and bank affiliation, exit behaviour, and lock-up commitment. Venture capitalists, and especially banks, timed their exit well. This indicates some serious agency problems in the German IPO market.     

Debt,Agency, and Management Contracts in REITs: The External Advisor Puzzle

This study investigates why externally advised real estate investment trusts (REITs) underperform their internally managed counterparts. Consistent with previous studies, we find that REITs managed by external advisors underperform internally managed ones by over 7 percent per year. Property-level cash-flow yields are similar between the two managerial forms, but corporate-level expenses and especially interest expenses are responsible for lower levels of cash available to shareholders in externally advised REITs. We document that the higher-interest expenses are due to both higher levels of debt and to higher debt yields for externally advised REITs. We posit that compensating managers based on either assets under management or on property-level cash flows creates incentives for managers to increase the asset base by issuing debt even if the interest costs are unfavorable.     

商事代理概念重构：法经济分析的视角

传统法学对“商事代理”概念的界定具有一定的缺陷,以至于商事代理概念仅停留在法学理论研究层面而不能指导我国司法实践。作为方法论的创新,本文引入法经济分析方法,剖析商事代理交易的内在经济含义及经济特征,提出具有司法可适用性的商事代理概念,为我国民法典编纂与商事法律制度完善奠定理论基础。     

From Financial Repression to External Distress: The Case of Venezuela

Recent work suggests a connection between domestic debt and external default. We examine potential linkages for Venezuela, where the evidence reveals a nexus among domestic debt, financial repression, and external vulnerability. The financial repression tax (as a share of GDP) is similar to OECD economies, in spite of higher debt ratios in the latter. The financial repression “tax rate” is higher in years of exchange controls and legislated interest rate ceilings. We document a link between domestic disequilibrium and a weakening of the net foreign asset position via private capital flight. We suggest these findings are not unique to Venezuela.     

Consequences of Debt Forgiveness: Strategic Default Contagion and Lender Learning

I use a unique data set of loans to small business owners to examine whether lenders face adverse consequences when they grant debt forgiveness to borrowers. I provide evidence consistent with borrowers communicating their debt forgiveness to other borrowers, who then more frequently strategically default on their own obligations. This strategic default contagion is economically large. When the lender doubles debt forgiveness, the default rate increases by 10.9% on average. Using an exogenous shock to the lender's forgiveness policy, my findings suggest that as the lender learns about the extent of borrower communication the lender tightens its debt forgiveness policy to mitigate default contagion.     

The Sensitivity of the Loss Given Default Rate to Systematic Risk: New Empirical Evidence on Bank Loans

We verify the existence of a relation between loss given default rate (LGDR) and macroeconomic conditions by examining 11,649 bank loans concerning the Italian market. Using both the univariate and multivariate analyses, we pinpoint diverse macroeconomic explanatory variables for LGDR on loans to households and SMEs. For households, LGDR is more sensitive to the default-to-loan ratio, the unemployment rate, and household consumption. For SMEs, LGDR is influenced by the total number of employed people and the GDP growth rate. These findings corroborate the Basel Committee’s provision that LGDR quantification process must identify distinct downturn conditions for each supervisory asset class.

Delinquency and Default in Arms: The Effects of Protected Equity and Loss Aversion

This paper extends the extant literature in understanding the effects of equity and debt on delinquency and default by focusing on a variant of borrower equity where part of equity is “protected”. The CPF scheme in Singapore stipulates that the refund of borrower’s retirement funds utilized for property purchase prior to September 2002 takes priority over loan obligations. A decision to utilize CPF for property purchase actually increases ex post delinquency and default risk as it effectively reduces cash equity commitment. In particular, any erosion in house value that places protected equity at risk translates into potential wealth reduction or financial liability for the borrower. While loss aversion is evident for non-distressed sellers, the effect of equity losses for distressed borrowers is not as clear. Our research suggests that averting losses in committed equity may be a secondary consideration for borrower subject to income shocks, recognizing that delinquency and default are precursors to foreclosure. Interestingly, we find that the borrowers are strongly averse to incurring protected equity-induced wealth loss or financial liability. This study suggests that the first-lien “anomaly” associated with CPF refund may reduce delinquency and default risks for mortgage backed securities.

Managerial Ownership and Agency Conflicts: A Nonlinear Simultaneous Equation Analysis of Managerial Ownership, Risk Taking, Debt Policy, and Dividend Policy

This paper uses a nonlinear simultaneous equation methodology to examine how managerial ownership relates to risk taking, debt policy, and dividend policy. The results have implications for our understanding of agency costs. We find risk to be a significant and positive determinant of the level of managerial ownership while managerial ownership is also a significant and positive determinant of the level of risk. The result supports the argument that managerial ownership helps to resolve the agency conflicts between external stockholders and managers but at the expense of exacerbating the agency conflict between stockholders and bondholders. We further observe evidence of substitution-monitoring effects between managerial ownership and debt policy, between managerial ownership and dividend policy, and between managerial ownership and institutional ownership.     

Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus

We study a credit market in which multiple lenders sequentially offer financing to a single borrower under moral hazard. We show that restricting lenders to post single offers involves a loss of generality: none of the equilibrium outcomes arising in this scenario survives if lenders offer menus of contracts. This result challenges the approach followed in standard models of multiple lending. From a theoretical perspective, we offer new insights on equilibrium robustness in sequential common agency games.