ELECTRIC POWER DEREGULATION: BACKGROUND AND PROSPECTS

The incentive failures of rate-of-return regulation are well known and thus raise the question of whether to deregulate electric power. The development of long-distance transmission and of alternative power sources in networks has spawned several institutions that would or could allow markets to substitute for such regulation. These include long-term contract sales, spot power exchange, contract power pooling, shared facility ownership, and economic dispatch. Because of the current surplus of power, the existence of such institutions has caused increasing competition in the electric power market and has catalyzed the movement to deregulate generators from state authority and to restructure utility assets. By encouraging this movement, regulators can further the discipline that markets already exert on prices and costs. By making counterproposals to the utilities, regulators can influence asset restructuring so that some of the capital gains inherent in such restructuring can be shared with consumers in the form of rate relief. Finally, for the future, the cotenancy agreement—which is antitrust supervised and competitively ruled—has promising possibilities for deregulating transmission and distribution.     

PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND PRIVATIZATION

During the past two decades, the Singapore economy has performed remarkably well. Its achievement has often been cited as an economic miracle for a 600-square kilometre city nation without resources except its three million inhabitants. Public enterprises have contributed much to this achievement. They have been so successful in competing with the private sector that there have been some criticisms against the dominance of government in business. Several major government companies have been privatized and listed on the local stock exchange. Preparations have been made for commercially viable statutory boards to become private enterprises. The government will play a catalytic and supportive role and refrain from local competition. Its new emphasis will be on internationalizing the economy through joint ventures in informational technology and telecommunication industries where the local private sector lacks the resources.     

放松管制与规制重建—中国基础部门引入竞争后的政府行为分析

随着基础部门逐渐引入竞争,政府在放松管制的同时,为确保有效竞争的实现,还需要重建规制。规制重建包括两大方面,一是规制机构本身的重建,重点是要实现政企分开和保持规制机构的独立性;二是规制内容体系的完善,重点是要建立包括激励性规制、不对称规制、反垄断规制与社会性规制在内的“四位一体”的规制体系。     

AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism whereby the privatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs (landings at two airports) and two types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. We show that the outcome in which both airports are privatized is always an equilibrium, whereas that in which no airport is privatized is an equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large. We also discuss airport congestion problems within the model framework.     

SYNCHRONISING DEREGULATION IN PRODUCT AND LABOUR MARKETS

Deregulation typically comes with redistribution of rents and thus with opposition from the losing interest groups. We show that, by exploiting complementarities, synchronising deregulation across markets makes this opposition lower. Indeed, a particular deregulation may reduce rents for one interest group, but may result in gains for another interest group. Synchronising reforms can therefore offer a way out of the ‘sclerosis’ of especially European markets. For this effect, we build a microeconomic model based on two assumptions: Cournot competition à la Vives in the product markets and firms hiring workers in accordance with an efficiency wage in the labour markets. As being particularly relevant for European economies, we focus on product market regulation that determines the degree of market integration and labour market regulation that determines the degree of employment protection.     

PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION: COSTS AND BENEFITS IN THE PRESENCE OF WAGE-BARGAINING

ABSTRACT ** :  The most important economic motive for privatization and liberalization is to reduce costs, which are believed to be higher in a public monopoly for several reasons, including internal rent capture. We assume that there is wage-bargaining both before and after privatization and liberalization. Wages are then in most cases reduced by liberalization but not by privatization as such. Social welfare may increase after liberalization with decentralized wage-bargaining if many firms enter, if the employees' bargaining strength is high and if there is no need of vertical separation. However, the social costs of privatization and liberalization are more likely to dominate despite free entry if sunk costs are high, and will always dominate under central wage-bargaining or vertical separation.     

MASSIVE DIVESTITURE AND PRIVATIZATION LESSONS FROM CHILE

Between 1974 and 1989, the Chilean government privatized 550 state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Before 1974, all but a handful of major corporations were SOEs. About 50 of the largest enterprises privatized during the 1970s fell into government hands again, only to be re-privatized later. This was due partly to the economic and financial crisis affecting most Latin American countries during the early 1980s but also was a consequence of the privatization modes used. This paper analyzes that unique privatization experience so as to extract policy lessons. The analysis focuses on economic conditions, objectives of government policy, privatization modes, and the divestiture effects on employment, fiscal revenues, public sector wealth, spread of ownership, and capital market development.     

PRIVATIZATION AND PERFORMANCE: THE CASE OF FOUR AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the performance after privatization of institutions in Australian banking and insurance. Privatization was anticipated to improve firm performance in Australia and elsewhere, yet findings are mixed. A comparative institutional approach is taken to analyzing firm performance in the longer term which allows for further structural change. A CAMEL analysis of performance before and after privatization events is undertaken for four privatized institutions, two each from banking and insurance sectors. These are matched with private peer institutions. Privatized institutions are found to perform quite similarly to private peer institutions both before and after privatization.     

PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA: TECHNOLOGY AND GENDER IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR

This paper examines the impact of privatization on gender discrimination in China across firms with different technology intensities. Using a comprehensive firm‐level survey, the paper identifies gender wage‐productivity differentials by directly estimating the relative productivity levels of workers from the production function of firms. The panel structure of the survey is taken advantage of by following firms that were fully state‐owned in the initial year, and distinguishing them from firms that were later privatized. The main results show that privatization was associated with an increase in relative productivity of female workers in high technology industries, and a reduction in relative productivity of female workers in low technology industries. Time varying coefficient results suggest that the improvements in gender outcomes in high technology industries may not be maintained in the long run as the relative wage and productivity ratios tend to deteriorate, potentially due to low supply of highly educated female workers. At the same time, outcomes in privatized low technology industries increase over time, lowering the wage and productivity gaps between male and female workers. (JEL J16, J31, P20)     

PRIVATIZATION,EMPLOYEE SHARE OWNERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF EIRCOM

ABSTRACT: Sizeable employee share ownership plans (ESOPs) have been a unique feature of Ireland's privatization programme. Since the sale in 1999 of the national telecommunications operator, Eircom, the norm has been to allocate 14.9 per cent of equity to employees. We examine the role of the Eircom ESOP in the post‐privatization governance of the company. We find that the ESOP sought to maximize returns to employees as shareholders rather than behave in the interests of a wider set of stakeholders. This is explained in terms of the internal governance of the ESOP, namely its structure and rules, as well as the composition and motivations of the board of the ESOP Trustee.     

产权管制放松与中国经济转轨绩效

基于信息成本约束的政府放松对分散决策单位的产权管制会带来资源配置的激励机制和行为角色的重大变化。由于市场分散性决策的信息成本过高成为政府资源权利配置的约束条件,所以政府应逐渐放松对配置资源权利管制的范围,并让位于分散决策单位进行产权运用和调配。产权管制放松对经济转轨绩效的影响显著,是提高中国经济绩效的关键因素。     

FINANCIAL DEREGULATION AND RELATIVE RISK OF AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY*

In the early 1980s the Australian economy underwent a period of rapid financial deregulation and liberalisation, the key symbol of this process being the floating of the exchange rate in December 1983. It has been suggested that one effect of such regulatory change is to alter the risk characteristics of economic units most directly impacted by the changes. In this vein, Brooks and Faff (1995) examined banking industry risk and found that deregulation coincided with a stabilising of the beta risk of banks. However, financial deregulation was expected to have widespread effects across the economy. Accordingly, in this paper we further test for possible effects by examining the level and stability of the beta risk of individual stocks and portfolios in other industries in both prederegulation and post-deregulation periods. From a comparison of the two periods we find that the effects on beta levels vary across industries. However in general post-deregulation betas have become stable across a large range of key industry classifications. This provides interesting insights into the effects of financial deregulation on relative risk and why different industries may have different experiences.