The Economics of Retailing Formats: Competition Versus Bargaining

We set up a merger game between retailing stores to study the incentives of independent stores to form a big store when some consumers have preferences for one‐stop shopping. Such one‐stop shopping creates complementarity between products, leading in turn to lower prices after a big store is formed but may also lead to an improvement in the bargaining position vis‐à‐vis producers through the creation of an inside option that small stores do not have. We find that big stores will not be formed when the stores' ex ante bargaining power vis‐à‐vis producers is high. Otherwise, an asymmetric situation occurs with only one big store created when one‐stop shoppers are abundant.     

Proper Treatment of Buyer Power in Merger Review

In this paper, we assess the appropriate treatment of buyer power in merger review. We conclude that, for changes in bargaining outcomes due to a buyer merger to create efficiencies, it must be the case that, post-merger, the parties are able to arrive at a more optimal price schedule, perhaps due to reduced transactions costs. Empirical tests will be important to the evaluation of such efficiencies. We further conclude that, under certain conditions, powerful buyers may be able to prevent higher prices from a merger of suppliers. Once again, empirical tests should guide the evaluation of this merger defense.     

The agency and wholesale models in electronic content markets

I analyze a model of dynamic competition between retail platforms in the presence of consumer lock-in. Two different revenue models are considered, one in which platforms set final retail prices and one in which the suppliers set final retail prices. Platforms have long-term (or strategic) pricing incentives but suppliers do not, which implies that the inter-temporal price path faced by consumers depends on the revenue model in place. When suppliers set prices instead of platforms, prices may be higher in early periods but lower in later periods, suggesting that appropriate antitrust enforcement ought to consider more than initial price changes when an industry shifts to the agency model. Indeed, consumers may (but need not) prefer the agency model even when prices increase in initial periods. A potential downside of the agency model is that it may align the incentives of suppliers and platforms and thereby encourage platforms to lower the competitiveness of the supplier market, harming consumers; no such incentives exist under the wholesale model. I relate my results to events in the market for electronic books.     

PRICES AND ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURE IN OFFICE SUPPLY SUPERSTORES*

We consider the relationship between prices and market structure for office supply superstores in the U.S. which was central to the Federal Trade Commission's opposition to the merger of Staples and Office Depot. Due to potential biases in a standard regression, we employ a two‐stage approach in which a model of endogenous market structure provides correction terms for a second stage price regression. Using a cross‐section of data on market structures and Staples' prices, we find that excluding the correction term substantially distorts the importance of competitors as the two‐stage model yields stronger negative relationships between prices and market structure variables.     

Control of intellectual assets in client relationships: implications for innovation

This empirical study of business‐to‐business service firms examines the determinants and effects of control rights to intellectual assets in a property rights theoretic framework. Regression analyses using survey data suggest that service suppliers that retain control over their intellectual output are more innovative. In long‐term relationships, service firms' clients may thus be better off balancing their need to control outsourced activities with the suppliers' incentives to invest in learning and innovation. Additionally, and aligned with property rights theoretic predictions, service suppliers' bargaining power and their indispensability in service projects are positively associated with their ability to retain control rights. In contrast, innovation capabilities are not very significant in determining control rights allocation between service suppliers and their clients. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Buyer power and exclusion in vertically related markets

Suppliers and consumer organizations have become increasingly concerned by the build-up of buyer power of retailers in many markets. A major concern is that strong retailers will abuse their power to exclude products and rival retailers from the market to be able to increase prices to consumers. As a consequence, remedies to limit buyer power are discussed and implemented in many countries. In this paper we compare the incentives for exclusion, and the effect on consumers prices, under both buyer and seller power. We study a model with a dominant upstream manufacturer and a competitive fringe of producers offering their products to two differentiated downstream retailers. We compare the equilibrium outcome of this model when i) the dominant supplier holds all the bargaining power, and (ii) the retailers have all the bargaining power. We show that full or partial exclusion of either the competitive product or downstream retailers occurs when inter and intrabrand competition are strong. This is true both under seller and buyer power. However, in contrast to the received literature, we find that buyer power weakly enhances welfare compared to seller power because buyer power will lead to both more product variety (less exclusion) and lower retail prices.     

Why Do Suppliers Charge Larger Buyers Lower Prices?

The phenomenon of input suppliers charging larger buyer firms, relative to smaller buyer firms, lower prices is commonly explained in terms of supplier economies of scale, supplier competition for larger buyers, and the larger bargaining power of larger buyers. This paper provides an alternative explanation, and shows that the observed direction of differential pricing can benefit the supplier by lowering the level of tacit collusion its buyers can sustain in their output market. This result also provides a new mechanism through which a ban on price discrimination by input suppliers may lower consumer welfare.     

Economics at the Antitrust Division: 2017–2018

This article describes some of the work of Antitrust Division economists over the past year, with a focus on modeling. It begins by illustrating the mapping from evidence to prediction using tools for assessing the effects of mergers using Bertrand, Cournot, and auction models. It then turns to two hot topics in competition policy: the implications of claims of increasing margins for merger enforcement and the validity of claims of increasing concentration. Finally, it considers how mergers affect prices in bargaining models.     

ENDOGENOUS COSTS AND PRICE‐COST MARGINS: AN APPLICATION TO THE EUROPEAN AIRLINE INDUSTRY*

This paper allows for endogenous costs in the estimation of price cost margins. In particular, we estimate price‐cost margins when firms bargain over wages. We extent the standard two‐equation set‐up (demand and first‐order condition in the product market) to include a third equation, which is derived from bargaining over wages. In this way, price‐cost margins are determined by wages and vice versa. We implement the model using data for eight European airlines from 1976–1994, and show that the treatment of endogenous costs has important implications for the measurement of price‐cost margins and the assessment of market power. Our main result is that observed prices in Europe are virtually identical to monopoly prices, even though observed margins are consistent with Nash behavior. Apparently, costs had been inflated to the point that the European consumers were faced with a de facto monopoly prices.     

Disentangling the performance effects of efficiency and bargaining power in horizontal growth strategies: An empirical investigation in the global retail industry

Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and organic growth are two common strategies to achieve horizontal growth. In this study, we disentangle two distinct sources of firm performance corresponding to different theoretical perspectives on firm size: firms' bargaining power with respect to suppliers and customers, and operating efficiency arising from scale economies. We conceptually argue and empirically show that relatively, M&A enhance bargaining power in the short term while organic growth enhances operating efficiency over the long term. In order to disaggregate these effects, we use accounting rather than financial or managerial data and test our predictions in the global retail industry over a 20‐year period. We examine implications of these results for sustainability of size‐based competitive advantages. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

QUANTIFYING THE SCOPE FOR EFFICIENCY DEFENSE IN MERGER CONTROL: THE WERDEN‐FROEB‐INDEX*

This paper introduces the Werden‐Froeb Index (WFI) to assist in evaluating merger‐specific efficiencies in horizontal mergers. The index measures the weighted average reduction in marginal costs required to restore pre‐merger equilibrium prices and quantities after the (full or partial) merger is consummated. The WFI is well defined, objective and robust, and it has relatively low information requirements. We propose to use the index as a natural complement to concentration measures such as the Hirschmann‐Herfindahl Index in the assessment of horizontal mergers.     

Cartelization Through Buyer Groups

Retailers may enjoy stable cartel rents in their output market through the formation of a buyer group in their input market. A buyer group allows retailers to commit credibly to increased input prices, which serve to reduce combined final output to the monopoly level; increased input costs are then refunded from suppliers to retailers through slotting allowances or rebates. The stability of such an ‘implied cartel’ depends on the retailers’ incentives to source their inputs secretly from a supplier outside of the buyer group arrangement at lower input prices. Cheating is limited if retailers sign exclusive dealing or minimum purchase provisions. We discuss the relevancy of our findings for antitrust policy.     

Analytical Screens for Electricity Mergers

Electricity mergers pose distinct challenges for competition policy. Electricity demand is highly inelastic in the short run, storage is limited, and transmission constraints limit the ability to substitute generation at other locations. As a result, a merger can affect prices in many different markets and even generators with small market shares may be able to exercise market power. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s approach for screening horizontal mergers, based on the concentration thresholds in the Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, can fail to identify mergers that lessen competition, and mergers that fail the FERC screen may have no significant anticompetitive effect. We propose competitive residual demand (CRD) analysis, which examines the supply curves of the markets affected by a merger and considers the ability and incentive of firms to raise prices before and after a proposed merger. CRD analysis is a relatively easy way to address the incentives for generators to exercise market power and relies on data that are often available. Vertical (convergent) mergers between electricity and gas raise additional concerns, and we propose a methodology to screen vertical mergers.     

Do Merger Efficiencies Always Mitigate Price Increases?

In a Cournot model with differentiated products, we demonstrate that merger efficiencies in the form of lower marginal costs for the merging firms (the insiders) lead to higher post‐merger prices under certain conditions. Specifically, when the degree of substitutability between the two insiders is not too high relative to that between an insider and an outsider, increased efficiencies may exert upward rather than downward pressure on the prices of the merging firms. Our results suggest that in cases where firms engage in quantity competition, antitrust authorities should not presume that efficiencies will necessarily mitigate the anticompetitive effects of the merger.     

NGOs and the creation of value in supply chains

Research Summary: Firms and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often collaborate to establish new supply chains. With a formal model, we analyze how NGOs can alleviate market failures and improve supplier economic inclusion while strategically interacting with firms. We account for the specific goals of the NGO and the need to induce collaboration between firms and their suppliers. The analysis reveals a “valley of frustration,” when NGO efforts benefit all actors but only marginally the firm. We also show that more powerful firms might prefer to internalize NGO functions, while firms with lower bargaining power and higher investment requirements are better off collaborating with NGOs. Finally, we study NGOs-firms matching patterns and find that firms with higher bargaining power match with NGOs holding stronger capabilities. Managerial Summary: This article analyzes interactions between firms and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) aiming to improve the economic inclusion of suppliers or to promote the adoption of specific (e.g., sustainable) practices. For firm executives, this study shows the constraints and benefits associated with working with NGOs, the conditions under which integration of NGO functions is preferable as well as the types of NGOs that offer better prospects for a successful collaboration. For NGO executives, it highlights the need to provide enough economic incentives to firms and suppliers alike to ensure their collaboration and the trade-offs associated with this constraint, in particular, if NGO capabilities are limited. Overall, the study provides a comprehensive understanding of how NGO activities can influence value creation in a vertical value chain.     

Consequences of model choice in predicting horizontal merger effects

How practitioners model competition influences the predicted effects of a merger. We show how a Bertrand price setting and a second score auction model can be nested within a general bargaining framework. Through numerical simulations, we then show how the predicted merger effects vary with model choice, and that two commonly used strategies for obtaining demand parameters can yield markedly different outcomes across the models. Finally, we show how model and calibration strategy choices affect the magnitude of predicted harm in the 2012 Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews merger.     

Retail Mergers and Food Prices: Evidence from France

This paper analyzes the impact of a merger in the French supermarket industry on food prices. Using consumer panel data, we compare the changes in prices for merging and rival firms in affected and comparison markets. We use a novel definition of affected markets when some firms have a local pricing strategy and others a more centralized pricing strategy. We find that prices increase significantly following the merger, and that the merging firms lose market shares. For the rivals, the price increases are larger in local markets, in which concentration increased and differentiation changed after the merger.     

Why Do Vacant Houses Sell for Less: Holding Costs,Bargaining Power or Stigma?

This article introduces Nash bargaining into a search model to identify various channels through which vacancy affects selling price and liquidity in the resale market for houses. The model shows the various vacancy effects in the form of greater seller holding cost, lower seller bargaining power and unobserved negative attributes or stigma. We use a 20‐year data series on house transactions to test for these effects in a simultaneous model of price and liquidity, using the long data series to allow for variation across market phases. The robust vacancy effects on price and liquidity across all market phases primarily reflect greater seller holding cost and diminished bargaining power. Repeatedly, vacant houses also exhibit significant stigma effects in the rising market but not in stable or declining market phases. At the same time, vacant houses enjoy stronger shopping externality effects from surrounding houses for sale than do their occupied counterparts.     

Estimating Bargaining Effects in Hedonic Models: Evidence from the Housing Market

Bargaining is common in markets for heterogeneous goods and differences in bargaining power between buyer and seller affect the negotiated transaction price. Previous research has found systematic evidence in the housing markets that weak buyers pay higher prices and weak sellers receive lower prices for their homes. Earlier work has modeled the bargaining effect as a parallel shift in the hedonic function, implicitly assuming that attribute shadow prices were unaffected by the bargaining process. In this paper, we use a sample of home sales where the seller's bargaining power is weakened by the fact that the home is vacant at the time of sale to test whether the effect of bargaining is best captured by a shift in the hedonic constant or whether the attribute shadow prices vary as well. The question is significant for property valuation where estimation of the marginal value of an attribute is commonly used to adjust comparable sales data. We find strong confirmation that bargaining power influences the negotiated price. We also find evidence that bargaining power alters attribute prices, although we do not find a consistent pattern across markets.     

Group purchasing, nonlinear tariffs, and oligopoly

Loyalty discounts are nonlinear tariffs that condition rebates or marginal prices on meeting aggregate purchase or market share targets. These discounts are widespread, and are often the impetus for consumers to form buying groups, or group purchase organizations (GPOs). This paper models the competitive effects of the introduction of a GPO into a market within which the preferences of the GPO's members are horizontally differentiated. While nonlinear tariffs are an effective way for a monopolist to extract consumer surplus, when two suppliers compete using such schedules, the results are far more competitive in comparison to simple Bertrand–Nash competition with linear tariffs. This result holds when the product of each of the suppliers is attractive to a substantial portion of consumers. In our model, the nonlinear schedule puts all customers “in play” to a degree that contrasts sharply with the competition at the margin characteristic of constant per unit prices. Moreover, competing in nonlinear tariffs removes allocative inefficiency that can result from single price competition.