Organizational mode choices of multinational banks abroad

We investigate the determinants of organizational modes adopted by multinational banks abroad using a unique database of 98 parent banks and their organizational modes in 169 countries from 2005 to 2015. Our findings reveal that multinational banks operate in various organizational modes abroad, including multiple modes in a single host country; however, subsidiaries are the dominant mode of operation, followed by branches and simultaneously operating branches and subsidiaries in the host country. Furthermore, the characteristics of multinational banks play a significant role in determining their organizational decisions in a host country. Our results indicate that less profitable banks are less likely to open representative offices and are more likely to have branches. In contrast, multinational banks with high asset growth are more likely to operate a representative office abroad and less likely to open a subsidiary. These findings suggest that parent bank profitability and asset growth are important considerations when determining the optimal organizational mode of foreign expansion. Furthermore, country characteristics (particularly openness to economic and capital flows, institutional framework, and geographical and cultural distance) between host and home countries also influence foreign bank operations in a given host country.     

Auditor Reputation Under Different Negligence Regimes

Do auditor reputation effects evolve the same way under precise negligence as under vague negligence? Or are there differences? We assume that investors update their beliefs on unobservable auditor quality when an auditor discloses an inaccurate report. We call this a reputation effect. A necessary condition for reputation effects to occur is that, ex ante, investors expect ‘good’ auditors to take more care than ‘bad’ auditors such that ‘good’ auditors are less likely to issue an inaccurate report. Consistent with empirical evidence, we assume that wealthier (‘good’) auditors tend to take more care than less wealthy (‘bad’) auditors. We find that under vague negligence, reputation effects will occur, inducing both types of auditor to increase the level of care taken. A ‘good’ auditor is likely to exert excessive care. Then, even in the absence of auditor risk aversion, a (properly defined) liability cap is necessary to induce efficient incentives. A contractual liability cap is preferable to a legally fixed liability cap. Under precise negligence, a ‘good’ auditor will exert the standard of due care. However, a ‘bad’ auditor will also do so if sufficiently wealthy. Consequently, ex ante, investors do not expect different levels of care to be taken or reputation effects to occur. A liability cap is not desirable. This paper highlights the importance of non‐legal sanctions in auditor liability. Finally, it links the ‘reputation’ and ‘deep pocket’ hypotheses, both of which have attempted separately in the past to explain the positive correlation between auditor size and auditor quality.     

Welfare implications of the transition to high household debt

Aggressive deregulation of the mortgage market in the early 1980s triggered innovations that greatly reduced indebted households’ required home equity, and a borrowing surge followed. This paper uses a calibrated general equilibrium model of lending from the wealthy to the middle class to evaluate the welfare effects of this reform quantitatively. We find that the “indirect” effects of endogenous interest rate and other relative price changes dominate the “direct” effect of relaxing the constraint. The borrowing household's welfare falls even though the reform directly relaxes a constraint on its trade. The saving household's welfare rises substantially.     

Mortality-Indexed Annuities Managing Longevity Risk Via Product Design

Abstract

Longevity risk has become a major challenge for governments, individuals, and annuity providers in most countries. In its aggregate form, the systematic risk of changes to general mortality patterns, it has the potential for causing large cumulative losses for insurers. Since obvious risk management tools, such as (re)insurance or hedging, are less suited for managing an annuity provider’s exposure to this risk, we propose a type of life annuity with benefits contingent on actual mortality experience.

Similar adaptations to conventional product design exist with investment-linked annuities, and a role model for long-term contracts contingent on actual cost experience can be found in German private health insurance. By effectively sharing systematic longevity risk with policyholders, insurers may avoid cumulative losses.

Policyholders also gain in comparison with a comparable conventional annuity product: Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we identify a significant upside potential for policyholders while downside risk is limited.     

World food prices and monetary policy

How should monetary policy respond to large fluctuations in world food prices? We study this question in an open economy model in which imported food has a larger weight in domestic consumption than abroad and international risk sharing can be imperfect. A key novelty is that the real exchange rate and the terms of trade can move in opposite directions in response to world food price shocks. This exacerbates the policy trade-off between stabilizing output prices vis a vis the real exchange rate, to an extent that depends on risk sharing and the price elasticity of exports. We characterize implications for dynamics, optimal monetary policy, and the relative performance of practical monetary rules. While CPI targeting and expected CPI targeting can dominate PPI targeting if international risk sharing is perfect, even seemingly mild departures from the latter make PPI targeting a winner.     

Bank globalization and efficiency: Host- and home-country effects

Analyzing 126 countries for 1995–2013, we investigate the link between bank globalization and efficiency from the perspective of both host and home countries. We find strong and consistent evidence that foreign bank entry is associated with lower efficiency in host countries (host-country effect), while foreign expansion in the banking sector improves the efficiency of banks at home (home-country effect). We further observe that the effect of bank globalization is dependent on the regulatory and institutional regimes of the respective host (home) countries. Specifically, stringent activity restrictions, tight supervision, fewer limitations on foreign banks, lower market entry barriers, and less government interference all help mitigate the efficiency loss from foreign bank entry. Less supervision power, multiple supervisors, more restrictions on foreign banks, and a competitive banking market are all conducive to the higher efficiency gain of incumbent domestic banks from the respective country’s outward investments in the banking sector. Moreover, we find that the adverse impact on efficiency from foreign bank presence is less pronounced for less risky, more profitable, and larger banks, while banks that are more efficient, more profitable, taking on more risk, and/or smaller gain more efficiency from their country’s foreign expansion.     

Social Security with Heterogeneous Populations Subject to Demographic Shocks

In a previous paper, we showed how a pay-as-you-go social security scheme, based on voluntary contributions, can be an appropriate institution to reach an optimal sharing of risks among generations in the presence of demographic uncertainties. We study here the functioning of such schemes when there are different population strata, with different demographic shocks and wages. We show that while a collective voluntary pay-as-you-go scheme can provide efficient intergenerational risk sharing, it is likely to be destabilized by pensions funds specialized by agents' types. This is true both when there is a complete set of contingent markets, where the risk pooling capabilities of a collective fund are potentially of less interest, and when markets are incomplete. In this last circumstance, a collective fund may help the living agents to share their intragenerational risks. However, we show that the resulting allocation does not Pareto dominate the outcome of individual funds by agent types, and that there are incentives for agents to separate from any collective organization.     

International Cross‐Listings and Subsequent Security‐Market Choices: Evidence from ADRs

We study the link between the attributes of American depositary receipt (ADR)‐listed firms and their post‐listing security‐market choices. We find that developed market firms are more likely to issue equity and debt than their emerging market counterparts. Furthermore, we find that large firms are more likely to issue debt and less likely to issue equity. When we examine locations where ADR firms raise their capital, we find that firms originating from countries where the protection of minority shareholders is weak are more likely to issue debt on their home markets and less likely to issue debt on international markets (excluding U.S. markets). Furthermore, ADR firms originating from developed (emerging market) countries are more (less) likely to issue their equity on their domestic markets and less (more) likely to issue equity on international markets (excluding U.S. markets).     

Cultural influences on home bias and international diversification by institutional investors

We investigate determinants of international diversification in institutionally managed portfolios from more than 60 countries. Survey-based country-specific variables on cross-cultural behaviors help to explain both home bias and diversification among foreign equities. In particular, investment funds from countries characterized by higher uncertainty avoidance behavior display greater home bias and are less diversified in their foreign holdings. Portfolios from countries with higher levels of masculinity and long-term orientation display lower levels of home bias, and portfolios from countries with higher levels of masculinity are more diversified abroad. Portfolios from culturally distant countries invest less abroad and underweight culturally distant target markets. The economic significance of cultural variables is high and comparable in magnitude to geographical distance, a consistent influence on foreign diversification in prior studies. Culture impacts investor behavior directly and not merely though indirect channels such as legal and regulatory framework.     

Borrowing from government owned banks & firm's liquidation risk

Government Owned Banks (GOBs) have other explicit or implicit objectives apart from profit maximization. In this paper, I study whether this affects the liquidation risk of firms borrowing from GOBs. Using the natural experiment of securitization reform in India that increased firms' liquidation risk, I find that the firms borrowing exclusively from GOBs did less reduction in secured debt usage compared to other firms. In the cross-section, the effect is more substantial in the subsample of firms that are more likely to face financial distress. These results suggest that borrowing from GOBs have less liquidation risk.     

The Political Economy of Government-Issued Longevity Bonds

This article explores the trade‐offs associated with government issuance of longevity bonds as a way of stimulating private annuity supply in the presence of aggregate mortality risk. We provide new calculations suggesting a 5 percent chance that aggregate mortality risk could ex post raise annuity costs for private insurers by as much as 5–10 percentage points, with the most likely effect based on historical patterns toward the lower end of that range. While we suspect that aggregate mortality risk does exert some upward pressure on annuity prices, evidence from private market pricing suggests that, to the extent that private insurers are accurately pricing this risk, the effect is less than 5 percentage points. We discuss ways that the private market can spread this risk, while emphasizing that the government has the unique ability to spread aggregate risk across generations. We note factors that might hamper such an efficient allocation of risk, including potential political incentives for the government to shift more than the optimal amount of risk onto future generations, and the possibility that government fiscal policy might allocate risk less efficiently within each generation than would private markets. We also discuss how large‐scale longevity bond issuance might affect government borrowing costs, as well as political economy aspects of how the proceeds from such a bond issuance might be used.     

The impact of international portfolio composition on consumption risk sharing

Recent empirical work has shown that ongoing international financial integration facilitates cross-country consumption risk sharing. These studies typically find that countries with high equity home bias exhibit relatively low international consumption risk sharing. We extend this line of research and demonstrate that it is not only a country's equity home bias that prevents consumption risk sharing. In addition, the composition of a country's foreign asset portfolio plays an important role. Using panel-data regression for a group of OECD countries over the period 1980–2007, we show that foreign investment bias has additional explanatory power for consumption risk sharing.     

“Social Security-Adequacy,Equity, and Progressiveness: A Review of Criteria Based on Experience in Canada and the United States,” Robert L. Brown and Jeffrey Ip,January 2000

Abstract

We consider an optimal dynamic control problem for an insurance company with opportunities of proportional reinsurance and investment. The company can purchase proportional reinsurance to reduce its risk level and invest its surplus in a financial market that has a Black-Scholes risky asset and a risk-free asset. When investing in the risk-free asset, three practical borrowing constraints are studied individually: (B1) the borrowing rate is higher than lending (saving) rate, (B2) the dollar amount borrowed is no more than K > 0, and (B3) the proportion of the borrowed amount to the surplus level is no more than k > 0. Under each of the constraints, the objective is to minimize the probability of ruin. Classical stochastic control theory is applied to solve the problem. Specifically, the minimal ruin probability functions are obtained in closed form by solving Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations, and their associated optimal reinsurance-investment policies are found by verification techniques.     

Does Fair Value Reporting Affect Risk Management? International Survey Evidence

We survey CFOs from 36 countries to examine whether and how firms altered their risk management policies when fair value reporting standards for derivatives were introduced. A substantial fraction of firms (42%) state that their risk management policies have been materially affected by fair value reporting. Firms are more likely to be affected if they seek to use risk management to reduce the volatility of earnings relative to cash flows and if they operate in countries where accounting numbers are more likely to be used in contracting. We document a substantial decrease in foreign exchange hedging and in the use of nonlinear hedging instruments. Finally, firms that take active positions are more likely to be affected by fair value reporting. Taken together, our evidence indicates that requirements to report derivatives at fair values have had a material impact on derivative use; while speculative activities have been reduced, sound hedging strategies have been compromised as well.     

The decision game: a serious game approach to understanding environmental risk management decisions

Abstract

Here we describe the implementation of an experimental research tool called the Decision Game that we used to collect data on household flood risk management decisions. Participants using this tool play an interactive game that involves making household decisions about place of residence and a variety of household expenditures, including spending on flood insurance and private flood risk mitigation. Participants also answer survey questions before and after playing the game; the pre-game survey collected demographic information, and the post-game survey collected information about participant experiences with flooding and flood mitigation. Online and face-to-face participants showed similar engagement with the experiment, and most participants appeared to have made deliberate and considered decisions about risk mitigation. Online study participants had similar responses to those who participated in person, although face-to-face participants seemed slightly more likely to mitigate against risk. Overall, participants in this research were younger, more educated and more likely to rent a home than the average Canadian. Serious games may be useful for augmenting existing data gathering strategies used in understanding environmental decision making, particularly for rare catastrophic events for which stated preference surveys may be less informative. Serious games allow for sharing a mixture of information with study participants, including maps, video clips, text and even immersive 3D experiences, and can be administered online to increase participation levels. Future research will consider longer duration online experiments and more immersive interaction frameworks.     

The world price of home bias

Theoretical arguments suggest that as the degree of a country's home bias increases, the global risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors will reduce and thereby increase the country's cost of capital. Consistent with this prediction, we find international differences in the cost of capital to be strongly and positively related to varying degrees of home bias for 38 markets. This finding is robust to different cost of capital proxies, different control variables, alternative home-bias measures, international tradability of stocks, and alternative specifications. Therefore, the overall evidence implies that countries may enjoy a significantly lower cost of capital by reducing the extent of their home bias and hence, increasing global risk sharing.     

Interenterprise Credit and Adjustment during Financial Crises: The Role of Firm Size

Small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) suffered a sharp contraction in their borrowing from banks during the Great Recession. Analyzing a large firm‐level database for European countries, the paper shows that trade credit amplified the liquidity squeeze on SMEs, with adverse effects on their real activity. SMEs sharply increased their net trade credit and thus transferred financial resources to larger firms. Given the large weight of SMEs in the economy of European countries, the liquidity squeeze of SMEs likely contributed to the depth of the output fall and the slow recovery in Europe during the Great Recession.     

Transmission Effects of ESG Disclosure Regulations Through Bank Lending Networks

This paper studies whether and how environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure regulations imposed on banks generate transmission effects along the lending channel. I use a setting of U.S. firms borrowing from non-U.S. banks and exploit the staggered adoption of ESG disclosure regulations in banks’ home countries. I find that exposed borrowers of affected banks improve their environmental and social (E&S) performance following the disclosure mandate. Consistent with banks enhancing both their engagement and selection activities, affected banks impose more environmental action covenants in loan contracts, and they are more likely to terminate a borrower with bad E&S records following the regulation. Further evidence shows that the transmission effects are stronger when a disclosure regulation is well-enforced (as indicated by a greater increase in banks’ disclosure) and among borrowers with greater switching costs. Collectively, the findings document the role of lending relationships in transmitting the real effect of ESG disclosure regulations from banks to borrowing firms.     

Taxation and House-Price Uncertainty: Some Empirical Estimates

Purchasing a home involves a large and localized investment that leaves many families exposed to volatile house prices and at risk of losing their home equity. Price movements are typically not synchronized across cities, suggesting the potential for efficiency gains through risk sharing across households. In this paper, we consider the possibility of risk sharing through capital gains taxation. When full loss offset is permitted, potential gains and losses are reduced at the household level by taxation and distributed nationally, thereby allowing the tax authority to diversify away the local risks associated with owner-occupied housing. We simulate the effect of a capital gains tax with full loss offset on tenure choice and housing demand using micro-level data from the American Housing Survey, spanning ten years, from 1985 to 1995, and measures of time varying risk and return.     

A unified model of entrepreneurship dynamics

We develop an incomplete-markets q-theoretic model to study entrepreneurship dynamics. Precautionary motive, borrowing constraints, and capital illiquidity lead to underinvestment, conservative debt use, under-consumption, and less risky portfolio allocation. The endogenous liquid wealth-illiquid capital ratio w measures time-varying financial constraint. The option to accumulate wealth before entry is critical for entrepreneurship. Flexible exit option is important for risk management purposes. Investment increases and the private marginal value of liquidity decreases as w decreases and exit becomes more likely, contrary to predictions of standard financial constraint models. We show that the idiosyncratic risk premium is quantitatively significant, especially for low w.