家族控制、支付方式与并购绩效关系的经验研究

主要从控制权稀释威胁与委托代理的视角分别研究家族控制对并购支付方式选择以及并购绩效的影响。对505家中国家族上市公司于2007-2009年发起的347起并购事件构成的研究样本进行实证检验表明:家族终极控股股东持股比例与现金支付方式的使用正相关,家族终极控股权与现金流权分离度与股票支付方式的使用正相关,控制权稀释与强化机制对并购支付方式的选择产生了显著影响;家族终极控股股东持股比例与并购绩效正相关,利益协同效应占主导地位;并购支付方式对家族上市公司的并购绩效并无显著影响。     

信息技术行业上市公司股权结构与经营绩效的关系研究

本文以信息技术行业82家上市公司2007-2011年的财务数据进行实证分析,将净资产收益率作为被解释变量构建面板数据固定效应回归模型.研究发现,第一大股东持股比例与公司绩效显著正相关;前五大股东持股比例与公司绩效呈U型关系;股权制衡Z指数与公司经营绩效呈负相关关系;法人股比例与公司经营绩效显著正相关,国有股比例与公司经营绩效显著负相关,但流通股比例对公司经营绩效不具有显著影响.     

控股股东股权质押与现金持有水平:“掏空”还是“规避控制权转移风险”

本文以2013-2015年沪深两市上市公司季度数据为研究对象,考察了控股股东股权质押是否会影响上市公司现金持有水平,实证结果发现,控股股东股权质押比例与上市公司现金持有水平呈U型关系.当控股股东股权质押比例低于临界值时,由于资金占用等原因,上市公司现金持有水平降低;当控股股东股权质押比例高于临界值时,控股股东为了规避控制权转移风险,要求上市公司持有更多现金.这说明不同质押比例水平下控股股东出于不同目的对上市公司采取不同的财务政策,从而对现金持有水平产生非线性影响.上述结论在尽可能控制内生性问题后依然成立.在进一步的分析中,本文还发现,控股股东股权质押比例与上市公司现金持有水平呈U型的关系只在非国有企业中存在,上市公司现金持有水平的降低是股权质押的控股股东“掏空”所致的,增加的现金持有是来自公司资本性支出的降低和现金分红的减少,持有更多的现金能显著降低股价触及平仓线的可能性,股权质押的控股股东对上市公司现金持有水平的干预损害了公司价值.     

控股股东股权质押、股权性质与公司绩效研究

融资需求是上市公司运行面临的重要问题,在银行信贷和大股东减持受到限制、资本市场并不活跃的情况下,股权质押以其独有的灵活性、轻资产性成为上市公司控股股东缓解融资约束的首选方式。本文实证分析2011-2015年沪深两市上市公司控股股东股权质押对公司绩效产生的影响,发现民营上市公司控股股东比国有上市公司控股股东更倾向于股权质押;控股股东的持股比例与股权质押呈负相关关系,并受到股权性质的影响,民营上市公司控股股东"对赌"意愿更加强烈,负相关关系更为显著;控股股东股权质押与公司绩效呈正向相关,这种相关性会因为股权性质不同有明显差异。     

资本结构与股权结构关系研究

本文在终极所有权、控制权理论框架下,对我国上市公司资本结构与股权结构之间的关系进行了研究。研究发现,终极控股股东控制权与所有权的分离使得控股股东倾向于获得控制权私利,从而降低了上市公司的负债水平。终极控股股东担任上市公司高级管理者并没有加剧这一现象,但除控股股东外的其他股东并没有起到监督大股东的作用。家族企业的负债水平要高于国有企业和其他企业,家族企业控股股东获取控制权私利的动机不如国家和其他类型企业强烈。     

股权结构与盈余管理——来自我国民营上市公司的数据

以2005年我国民营上市公司为样本,分析了股权结构与公司盈余管理之间的关系。研究发现,上市公司盈余管理不仅与第一大股东持股比例相关,而且与终极产权角度确定的上市公司实际控制人控制权分散度显著相关;在控制了事务所特征、董事会特征、公司规模、债务水平以及利润变动等因素的影响之后,盈余管理程度与上市公司实际控制人的控制权分散度显著正相关,与上市公司第一大股东持股比例呈倒U型关系,而与上市公司股权制衡度之间不存在显著关系。     

上市公司股权结构、资本结构与经营业绩的关系探讨

本文以泛长三角制地区A股制造业上市公司2002-2004年间的1126个样本数据为基础,分析了股权结构、资本结构与公司绩效之间的关系.研究结果表明:法人股比例、第2到第5大股东持股比例、公司的成长性与绩效正相关;流通股比例、公司规模、流动负债率和长期负债率与绩效负相关;股权集中度与公司绩效呈U型线性关系;第一大股东持股比例与公司经营绩效呈显著的倒U型关系.     

基于股权集中度的我国上市公司绩效多角化研究

关于我国上市公司股权集中度与公司绩效之间的关系,已有的文献中所得出的结论并不统一。基于此,考察了我国2008年制造业上市公司的股权集中度与公司绩效的关系。实证结果表明:股权集中度和公司绩效之间并没有显著的U型或倒U型关系,而是呈现明显的正相关关系。并且本文进一步剖析了股权集中度,研究发现:第一股东为法人股东的公司,其绩效明显优于第一股东为国有股东的公司;绝对控股的公司,其绩效要优于相对控股和分散持股的公司。     

控股股东股权质押与企业投资行为——基于金融投资和实业投资的视角

本文以2007—2017年我国沪深两市非金融上市公司的半年度数据为研究对象,从金融投资和实业投资的视角,考察了控股股东股权质押对上市公司投资行为的影响。实证研究发现,控股股东股权质押比例与上市公司的金融投资水平呈U形关系,与上市公司的实业投资水平呈倒U形关系。这说明不同质押比例下控股股东出于不同的动机做出的改变和调整上市公司的投资决策,对金融投资和实业投资产生非线性影响。以上结论在尽可能控制内生性问题以及一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。进一步研究发现:产权性质、控制权转移风险以及金融资产与经营资产收益率差对控股股东股权质押比例与上市公司投资行为之间的关系具有重要的调节作用。本研究揭示了控股股东股权质押在公司投资策略方面的经济后果,低质押比例的控股股东更有可能支持上市公司,而高质押比例的控股股东更可能损害上市公司提供了增量证据。     

管理层持股对公司绩效影响的实证研究

本研究基于终极产权论理论,从终极产权角度出发研究了管理层持股与公司绩效之间的关系.实证结果表明,国有上市公司的管理层持股比例与公司绩效存在正相关关系,存在于政府间接控股的公司中的二者关系的显著性比在政府直接控股公司中的显著性更为强烈.研究还发现,在国有上市公司中,公司绩效与第一大股东持股比例存在显著正相关关系.     

政府最终控制、控股股东行为与财务报告透明度——中国A股市场上市公司的经验证据

以中国沪深两市A股上市公司2004—2006年间的2940个公司年度为样本,以财政部发布的《企业会计准则———基本准则》和FASB发布的第2号公告中的会计信息质量特征为基础,对财务报告透明度进行度量,分析政府最终控制、控股股东行为对财务报告透明度的影响。研究发现:控股股东掏空行为显著降低了财务报告透明度;国家最终控制的上市公司的财务报告更不透明,并且政府干预动机越强,财务报告透明度越低;财务报告透明度与最终控股股东的所有权比例呈U型变化,与其他股东的制衡能力呈同向变化。     

Ultimate ownership,risk-taking and firm value: evidence from China

This article investigates the relationship among ultimate ownership, risk-taking and firm value using firm-level data from Chinese companies. The results indicate that dominant ultimate controlling shareholders exacerbate the agency problem. The larger the divergence between ultimate shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights, the stronger motivation is to reduce corporate risk-taking (CRT) to safeguard private benefits. Furthermore, the presence of a dominant ultimate controlling shareholder is harmful to firm value, and the divergence between its control right and cash flow right has a significantly negative effect on firm value. Corporate risk-taking plays a significant mediating effect between ultimate controlling shareholder and firm value. Based on these results based on theory and practice, we propose a number of practical implications for managers.     

Non-family chair and corporate performance

Using a sample of Chinese family firms listed from 1999 to 2014, we investigate the relationship between non-family leadership and firm performance. We find that firms with a non-family member as board chair perform significantly worse than firms whose chair belongs to the family. Moreover, we show that the underperformance of nonfamily-chair firms is more pronounced when firms are under weaker outside monitoring and when the controlling families care less about family business longevity. The negative effect of a non-family chair is robust to a variety of endogeneity tests. We also dismiss alternative explanations other than concern for reputation. Overall, our empirical results suggest that the social norms regarding family reputation are important in shaping the controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives and firm performance.     

Non-family chair and corporate performance

Using a sample of Chinese family firms listed from 1999 to 2014, we investigate the relationship between non-family leadership and firm performance. We find that firms with a non-family member as board chair perform significantly worse than firms whose chair belongs to the family. Moreover, we show that the underperformance of non-family-chair firms is more pronounced when firms are under weaker outside monitoring and when the controlling families care less about family business longevity. The negative effect of a non-family chair is robust to a variety of endogeneity tests. We also dismiss alternative explanations other than concern for reputation. Overall, our empirical results suggest that the social norms regarding family reputation are important in shaping the controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives and firm performance.     

Media Coverage and Firm Valuation: Evidence from China

Drawing on both a managerial discipline perspective and an information intermediary perspective, we explore how media coverage of a firm’s controlling shareholder influences firm valuation in corporate China. Using 366 listed family firms in China from 2003 to 2006, we find that firms in which controlling shareholders receive more neutral media reports enjoy higher valuation, whereas negative media reports on controlling shareholders impose adverse effects on firm valuation. Interestingly, favorable media coverage of the controlling shareholders does not enhance firm value. Further analyses reveal that ownership structure and audit quality moderate the relationship between media coverage and firm valuation. Our study complements the emerging literature on the monitoring role of the media on the stock markets.     

Impact of entrenched ultimate owners’ self-dealing on SEO methods choice and discounts of private placements––Evidence from listed companies in China

This study investigates how ultimate owners' self-dealing motivations can affect seasoned equity offering (SEO) methods using the data on listed companies in China during 2006–2015. We find that public equity offerings conduce to enhanced ultimate owner's control and preserve the control structure of the issuers. Moreover, there is a significant positive relation between controlling shareholder's control margin and the likelihood of choosing a private placement. A firm is more likely to choose public offerings in the presence of multiple large shareholders. Further tests show that self-dealing motivations significantly affect price discounts of private placements.     

治理环境、终极股东控制与公司并购绩效

文章以2007—2009年我国非金融上市公司扩张性并购事件为研究对象,对治理环境、终极股东控制与公司并购绩效的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现,终极股东的两权分离度及政府控制性质与公司并购绩效负相关;治理环境的改善在提高公司并购绩效的同时,还能抑制两权分离对公司并购绩效带来的负面影响;终极控制股东的政府控制属性会弱化治理环境的这种治理效应。     

控制权收益与企业融资方式选择——基于Myers-Majluf模型的分析框架

将控制权收益引入Myers-Majluf模型中,本文建立了一个企业融资方式选择模型。模型预测,由于控股股东和外部投资者的利益冲突,选择股权融资的上市公司存在过度投资行为,而选择负债融资的企业一般不存在过度投资行为;进一步的研究表明,控股股东的控制权收益加剧了企业股权融资偏好和过度投资行为。     

Corporate governance,ownership and firm value: Drivers of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism

This study analyses the role of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism. We study cross-national differences between companies with different level of investor protection. In addition, we account for the type of owner (young family vs. non-young family businesses) and the owner’s relationship with a second significant shareholder (monitoring vs. collusion). When the main owner has effective control over the firm (i.e., absolute control or less than absolute control but without the control of a second significant shareholder), the relation between ownership concentration and firm value is U-shaped. Our findings also suggest that the conflicts between majority and minority shareholders are weaker for companies with higher investor protection and young family-owned businesses.     

Donate Money,but Whose? An Empirical Study of Ultimate Control Rights,Agency Problems,and Corporate Philanthropy in China

Using empirical evidence gathered from Chinese listed companies, this article explores the relationship between micro-governance mechanisms and corporate philanthropy from a corporate governance perspective. In China’s emerging market, ultimate controlling shareholders of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are reluctant to donate their assets or resources to charitable organizations; in private enterprises (PEs) marked by more deviation in voting and cash flow rights, such donations tend to be more likely. However, the ultimate controllers in PEs refuse to donate assets or resources they control or own, which implies that corporate philanthropy by PEs comes at the cost of others, through assets or resources owned by minority shareholders. Even after devastating natural disasters such as the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, the controlling shareholders continue to express reluctance to donate any assets they control. Despite widespread evidence that corporate philanthropy boosts corporate growth and profitability, these ultimate controllers indicate no intention to donate their own money as a means to improve corporate performance.