Paying to queue: a theory of locational differences in nonunion wages

Traditional theories of the effect unions have on nonunion wages are difficult to reconcile with firm and worker mobility. We show how differences in nonunion wages can persist in a two-city search model. Nonunion wage differences across cities are driven by transition rates into the union sector. Should union queues form in the nonunion sector, union power decreases nonunion wages as workers are willing to take lower wages to line up for union jobs. However, if queues are formed in the unemployed sector, union power increases nonunion wages as nonunion firms pay premiums to induce workers to leave the queue.     

Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power

We develop a game-theoretic version of the right-to-manage model of firm-level bargaining where strategic interactions among firms are explicitly recognized. Our main aim is to investigate how equilibrium wages and employment react to changes in various labor and product market variables. We show that our comparative statics results hinge crucially on the strategic nature of the game, which in turn is determined by the relative bargaining power of unions and managers.     

Labor unions and productivity: An empirical analysis using Japanese firm-level data

This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between labor union and firm performance in areas such as productivity and profitability by using data on more than 4000 Japanese firms, ranging from listed large firms to unlisted SMEs, in both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sector. The presence of labor unions has statistically and economically significant positive effects on firm productivity. Unions' effects on wages are also positive, their magnitude being slightly larger than those on productivity. The decrease in the number of employees is greater at unionized firms than at non-unionized firms. The difference in employment growth is mainly attributable to the change in the number of part-time workers. In order to enhance productivity, close cooperation between management and unions is essential.     

Monetary policy,exchange rates and labor unions in SEE and the CIS during the financial crisis

The objective of this paper is to assess whether the levels of unionization and the rigidity of exchange rates represent a constraint for the monetary policy in South-Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, with a particular focus on the recent economic crisis. Toward that end, a New Keynesian model with price and wage rigidities is used. The results show that monetary policy responded counter-cyclically during the crisis only in countries with weak trade unions and in countries with flexible exchange rates, which indicates that fixed exchange rates and strong trade unions constrain monetary policy in countries in these regions. Also, the findings show that the main driver of price inflation in these countries is not economic activity, but wages, which are affected to a large extent by trade unions. Therefore, trade unions should be active partners in the decision-making processes in these countries.     

Price Adjustment in Currency Unions: Another Dimension to the Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria?

In a rational expectations model, wages and prices should respond more to shocks in currency unions than under adjustable pegs because of the absence of exchange rate adjustment. This is an aspect of the endogeneity of the optimum currency area criteria that has been largely ignored. Empirical evidence from three currency unions tends to suggest some degree of endogeneity of price flexibility, but the rate of adjustment is slow. Self‐selection into currency unions by countries with naturally greater price flexibility does not appear to be a significant factor.     

Estimating wage differentials without logarithms

Regression models of wage determination are typically estimated by ordinary least squares using the logarithm of the wage as the dependent variable. These models provide consistent estimates of the proportional impact of wage determinants only under the assumption that the distribution of the error term is independent of the regressors — an assumption that can be violated by the presence of heteroskedasticity, for example. Failure of this assumption is particularly relevant in the estimation of the impact of union status on wages. Alternative wage-equation estimators based on the use of quasi-maximum-likelihood methods are consistent under weaker assumptions about the dependence between the error term and the regressors. They also provide the ability to check the specification of the underlying wage model. Applying this approach to a standard data set, I find that the impact of unions on wages is overstated by a magnitude of 20-30 percent when estimates from log-wage regressions are used for inference.     

Should managerial delegation contracts be made before or after union wage setting? A game‐theoretic analysis

This paper analyzes a multiple‐stage game in which, at the final stage, two (managerial) firms compete over quantities in the product market. Prior to this stage, firm‐specific unions set the workers' wages, while the owners of both firms hire managers and provide them with incentive contracts. Owners can freely decide to arrange the managerial contract before or after the (non‐managerial) wage determination stage. Hence, the endogenous choice of the incentive contract stage is derived. The possibility of multiple equilibria arises, where both owners choose managerial contracts before or after unions' wage setting, crucially depending on unions' preferences. Such results also prove to be true for a remarkable degree of asymmetry in preferences over wages vis‐à‐vis employment across unions.     

A model of public sector wage determination

The paper presents an empirical model of wage determination in the public sector that leads to the specification of a system of interrelated wage equations for municipal employees, which allows for occupational and geographic interdependence of wages. The model also considers the influence of public employee unions, municipal government form, and monopsony power of local governments on the wages of municipal employees. Several variants of the derived system of equations are estimated based upon 1967 cross-section data for 478 cities, and the policy implications of the results are discussed.     

The bargaining position of low-skilled and high-skilled workers in a globalising world

This paper extends the assessment of the impact of globalisation and technological change on the bargaining power and preferences of employees, by taking worker heterogeneity into account. In contrast with previous studies, two separate unions – representing low-skilled and high-skilled workers respectively – are considered. Using Belgian firm-level data, labour bargaining power and relative wage preference have been estimated by skill level. When these estimates are subsequently regressed on a set of potential determinants, the bargaining power of low-skilled workers appears to fall with imports and offshoring, whereas the bargaining power of high-skilled workers is only positively affected by R&D activities. In addition, a significant effect of globalisation is found on the relative preference of unions for wages over employment, indicating that the effect of globalisation on the behaviour of labour unions is more encompassing than frequently assumed.     

The distributive and welfare effects of product and labour market deregulation

This paper studies the effects of product and labour market deregulation on wage inequality and welfare. By constructing an analytically tractable model in which the level of product market competition and the wages are endogenously distributed among sectors, I show that deregulation in goods market has mixed effects on inequality: the wage variance and the Gini index are lower, but the ratio of the highest over the lowest wage paid in the economy increases. Moreover, deregulation in labour markets raises the aggregate level of employment and the average real wage but reduces the welfare of trade unions in sectors with a low level of competition.     

Wages,implicit contracts,and the business cycle: Evidence from a European panel

We study the joint behavior of hours and wages over the business cycle in a unique panel of 13 European countries, and document significant history dependence in wages. Workers who experience favorable market conditions during their tenure on the job have higher wages, and work fewer labor hours. Unobserved differences in productivity, such as varying job quality, or match-specific productivity are not likely to explain this variation. The results instead point to the importance of contractual arrangements in wage determination. In economies with decentralized bargaining practices, such arrangements resemble self-enforcing insurance contracts with one-sided commitment (by the employer). On the other hand, in countries with strong unions and centralized wage bargaining, wage behavior is better approximated by full-commitment insurance contracts. The co-movement of hours and wages further confirms a contractual framework with variable worker hours. Despite the strong prevalence of contracts in Europe, however, the elasticity of labor supply is considerably smaller compared to the U.S. labor market.     

Unions and involuntary job separations

In contrast to the extensive literature on the effects of unions on wages, productivity and voluntary job endings, the effect of unions on involuntary job endings has received relatively little attention. This article demonstrates how unions alter involuntary job separation (redundancies, temporary job endings and dismissals) rates at different tenure levels using the British Household Panel Survey data from 1991 to 2008. A novel finding is that being a union member reduces a person's redundancy probability at low‐tenure levels, relative to an employee of a non‐unionised firm, but has no significant effect at high tenure levels. Union membership and union recognition are not related to different rates of temporary job endings.     

Strategic investment and international outsourcing in unionised oligopoly

We develop an oligopoly model in which firms facing unionised domestic labour markets choose between producing an intermediate good in-house and outsourcing it to a non-unionised foreign supplier that makes a relationship-specific investment in developing the intermediate. The paper sheds light on the issue of whether international outsourcing offers a means to ‘escape’ the power of domestic unions and on the existence of intra-industry wage dispersion. We show that outsourcing typically increases marginal costs even when it lowers union wages. Despite this, more powerful unions increase the incentive to outsource.     

The diffusion of HR practices in unions

Unions, like other service industry and/or nonprofit employers, are uniquely dependent upon the performance of their human resources to ensure organizational success. Consequently, unions have much to gain from adopting a more strategic focus in the management of their vital human talent. While some unions are moving toward greater sophistication in their internal HR practices (Clark and Gray, 2005), as a whole unions have been slow to embrace a strategic outlook on human resources and adopt HR practices that could improve union effectiveness and rejuvenate the union movement. In this paper, I identify and discuss internal organizational characteristics and external environmental factors that may influence the adoption of more sophisticated HR practices by labor unions. It is hoped that the framework that is suggested here can be used to launch research directed at understanding and improving the diffusion of good HR practices among unions that could subsequently improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of unions as institutions.     

Housing tenure and labor market impacts: The search goes on

We develop two search-theoretic models emphasizing firm entry to examine the Oswald hypothesis, the idea that homeownership is linked to inferior labor market outcomes, and compare their predictions to three extant theories. The five models have surprisingly different predictions about the labor market at both the aggregate and micro levels. Using a suitable instrumental variable strategy, we estimate both micro and aggregate level regression models of wages and unemployment and compare the estimates to those predictions. We find that while homeowners are less likely to be unemployed, they also have lower wages, all else equal, compared to renters. In addition, higher regional homeownership rates are associated with a greater probability of individual worker unemployment and higher wages. The outcome of a horserace between our new search-theoretic models is mixed—the wage-posting model predicts observed unemployment impacts while a bargaining variant does a better job explaining observed wages and aggregate labor market outcomes. Overall, we conclude that firm behavior is important for understanding the labor market impacts of homeownership. Because this is the case, regional homeownership rates are not good instruments for individual tenure choice in empirical work. And while individual homeowners may have inferior labor market outcomes as compared to renters, from the viewpoint of society, higher homeownership rates may result in greater job creation and overall production, among other benefits.     

Seniority Profiles in Unionized Workplaces: Do Unions Still have the Edge?*

The focus of this study is to distinguish the different paths seniority earning profiles follow depending on whether the individual is employed in a workplace where trade unions and collective bargaining are present, or not. Within this framework, two propositions are set. In the union sector seniority should be an important determinant of wages, while in the non‐union sector productivity, proxied by occupational experience, should have a key role on earning profiles. The empirical analysis verifies both propositions. Seniority earning profiles appear to be steeper in the union sector, while occupational expertise is estimated to have a more significant role in non‐union jobs.     

Foreign ownership,human capital,and the structure of wages in Japan

We examine the differences in the structure of wages between domestic and foreign-owned establishments in Japan. We use high-quality datasets from the Japanese government and construct a large employer–employee matched database consisting of 1 million workers in 1998. Our results confirm that foreign-owned establishments in Japan pay higher wages. We estimate that one percentage increase in foreign-ownership share of equity raises wages by 0.3%. We surmise that this foreign-ownership wage premium can be explained, at least in part, by compensating wage differentials. Workers in foreign-owned establishments are not protected by lifetime employment. They receive higher compensation for being exposed to higher risk and forfeiting their employment security. We also find that in foreign-owned establishments, wages are determined more by general skills, and less by firm-specific skills. These effects become more pronounced among establishments with a higher share of foreign ownership. The gender wage gap is considerably smaller among foreign establishments. Given the lack of long-term prospects for women in the Japanese labor market, foreign-owned establishments may be one source of ‘brain drain’ for highly skilled women there.     

浅谈新形势下如何开展职工思想政治工作

随着油田企业改革的深入开展,职工的思想状况随这呈现出多元化和复杂化,通过加强有力的思想政治工作渗透到职工的工作、学习和生活中,强化人本理念,才能不断提高企业核心竞争力,拓宽企业生存和发展空间。     

Taxes on labour and unemployment in a shirking model with union bargaining

This paper studies the impact of a cut in labour taxes in a model that combines two explanations for equilibrium unemployment: employee shirking and union bargaining. It is shown that if the ratio of unemployment compensation to the net-of-tax wages is kept fixed, a tax cut leads to higher unemployment. When the unemployment benefits are fixed in real terms, the effect of a tax cut on unemployment is ambiguous. Adverse employment effects are ruled out if unions are powerless or the labour share is constant.     

Wage bargaining,union membership,and the organization of unemployment insurance

The paper offers a theoretical analysis of a labor market institution known as the Gent system, which is a system where unions run unemployment insurance (UI) through government-subsidized UI funds. This system is practiced in four Nordic countries with comparatively very high unionization rates. The analysis shows that the Gent system is more conducive to unionization than a compulsory UI system if the Gent system is heavily subsidized by the government or if workers are strongly risk averse. Moreover, a rise in the share of benefits financed by union members is likely to reduce wages as well as union membership.