Fixed income conference calls

We study the determinants and the informational role of firms' fixed income conference calls, a unique form of voluntary disclosure that deviates from the traditional multi-purpose firm disclosures intended for all stakeholders. We find that fixed income calls are more likely to be held by firms that have more debt, lack credit ratings or have publicly traded equity, are foreign, or are experiencing losses. In a content analysis using a sample of public firms, we find that these calls discuss debt-equity conflict events, such as share repurchases, to a greater degree relative to a matched sample of earnings conference calls. Finally, we document that credit markets react to these calls, consistent with the calls providing investors new information. Overall, these results are consistent with fixed income calls meeting the differential informational demands of debt versus equity investors.     

Information transfer and conference calls

A long-standing literature documents intra-industry capital market co-movements around earnings releases, yet the dynamics of these information transfers remain largely unexplored. We provide evidence on both the sources and channels of information transfers by separating two distinct events within the reporting window using intra-day data and by exploring potential mechanisms of information flows. We document that the co-movement of absolute and signed stock returns over the conference call windows of announcing firms and their industry peers are statistically and economically larger than the co-movement over the corresponding earnings announcement windows. Turning to mechanisms, we find that shared analyst coverage, coverage by analysts providing industry recommendations, shared institutional ownership, and joint financial media mentions are each individually and incrementally associated with higher rate of information transfer over both the earnings announcement and conference call windows. Textual analyses reveal that peer mentions and macroeconomic discussions both significantly contribute to conference call information transfers.     

Mining the emotional information in the audio of earnings conference calls : A deep learning approach for sentiment analysis of securities analysts' follow-up behavior

In this paper, we propose a deep learning approach to extract emotional information from the audio of earnings conference calls and empirically examine the influences of these emotional variables on securities analysts' follow-up behavior. Our findings suggest that, in the statement section, positive emotional information tended to positively influence the analysts' willingness to issue rating reports, while the inverse was true for negative emotional information; non-negative emotional information in the question section had a positive influence, while negative emotional information in the response section had a negative influence. Secondly, for the specific rating of the issued reports, negative emotional information in the response section tended to result in a lower rating, and neutral emotional information might also have caused a lower rating. Thirdly, in terms of rating adjustments, non-negative emotional information in the question section tended to cause an upgrade revision, while the inverse was true for the negative emotional information in this section. Positive emotional information in the response section also caused an upgrade revision. The approach we proposed provides new insight for understanding analysts' follow-up behavior and offers practical implications for analysts, management, investors, and regulators.     

The effect of conference calls on equity incentives: An empirical investigation

Conference calls have become increasingly common in recent years, yet there is little empirical evidence regarding the effect of conference calls on executive compensation. In this study, we examine the effect of voluntary disclosures on equity incentives. We hypothesize that voluntary disclosures, as measured by conference calls, affect executive compensation contracts. Using a dataset of 6263 firm-year observations from both conference call and non-conference call firms, our results are consistent with the argument that the board of directors substitutes voluntary disclosures for more costly corporate governance mechanisms. Alternatively, in firms where CEOs have less equity incentives, the owners demand more voluntary disclosures. The results of this study should be of great importance to executives and capital market participants internationally, such as investors and analysts, since we provide evidence that conference calls affect incentive based compensation contracts, which were shown in prior studies to be value relevant.     

Say it again Sam: the information content of corporate conference calls

This paper examines information-content of corporate conference calls. It studies the determinants, and the consequences, of information production. To facilitate this study, I develop a novel measure of information-content which analyzes every word choice made by management during both sessions of the call. In a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2001 to 2012, this new measure of information-content explains cumulative abnormal returns. It shows how CEOs produce (suppress) information during the conference call. It shows how analyst participation in the call improves information production. It shows that a differential value is placed on information conditioned on the market segment of the firm. I contrast the effectiveness of this new measure to that of the conventional methodologies of tone and word-counting. I provide evidence that this new information-content measure is better suited to conference calls than are the other two.     

The diligent effect of investor relation officers in conference calls: Evidence from China

This study explores the determinants of investor relations (IR) officers’ diligence in conference calls and the impact of their diligence on capital markets. We apply IR officers' attendance in conference calls as a proxy variable for their diligence. We find that the age, gender, salary, and tenure of IR officers and the start time of conference calls are determinants of IR officers' diligence in conference calls. Their diligence significantly increases institutional ownership and reduces returns volatility. Further analysis shows that IR officers' diligence facilitates the growth of domestic institutional investors' ownership significantly more than that of foreign institutional investors. In addition, information transparency significantly facilitates the relationship between IR officers' diligence and return volatility. Finally, the change in institutional ownership and return volatility also varies with firm size and state ownership. In conclusion, we find that IR officers' diligence plays a positive role in IR management, as it significantly improves firms' institutional ownership and lowers return volatility.     

Earnings conference calls and stock returns: The incremental informativeness of textual tone

Quarterly earnings conference calls are becoming a more pervasive tool for corporate disclosure. However, the extent to which the market embeds information contained in the tone (i.e. sentiment) of conference call wording is unknown. Using computer aided content analysis, we examine the incremental informativeness of quarterly earnings conference calls and the corresponding market reaction. We find that conference call linguistic tone is a significant predictor of abnormal returns and trading volume. Furthermore, conference call tone dominates earnings surprises over the 60 trading days following the call. The question and answer portion of the call has incremental explanatory power for the post-earnings-announcement drift and this significance is primarily concentrated in firms that do not pay dividends, illustrating differences in investor behavior based on the level of cash flow uncertainty. Additionally, we find that a context specific linguistic dictionary is more powerful than a more widely used general dictionary (Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial).     

Short-term earnings guidance and accrual-based earnings management

Motivated by recent practitioners’ concerns that short-term earnings guidance leads to managerial myopia, we investigate the impact of short-term earnings guidance on earnings management. Using a propensity-score matched control sample, we find strong and consistent evidence that the issuance of short-term quarterly earnings guidance is associated with less, rather than more, earnings management. We also find that regular guiders exhibit less earnings management than do less regular guiders. Our findings hold using both abnormal accruals and discretionary revenues to measure earnings management and after controlling for potential reverse causality concerns. Furthermore, in a setting where managers have particularly strong capital market incentives to manage earnings, we corroborate these findings by documenting that earnings guidance either has no impact on or mitigates earnings management. Overall, our evidence does not support the criticism from practitioners that short-term earnings guidance leads to more earnings management.     

Quarterly earnings guidance and real earnings management

We examine if quarterly earnings guidance induces real earnings management. Quarterly guidance may cause myopia and inefficient decision-making, if managers become overly concerned with setting and beating short-term earnings targets. We test these associations on a large sample of US firms. Our evidence suggests that quarterly guidance is informative and lowers myopic incentives. However, our analyses also reveal endogenous associations exist between guidance and real earnings management. In contrast with existing concerns over frequent guiders, we find that guidance appears problematic in infrequent guiders, and in firms that issue good news earnings guidance and that operate in settings where earnings pressures are high.     

Consistency in meeting or beating earnings expectations and management earnings forecasts

This paper provides evidence that firms that have consistently met or beaten analysts’ earnings expectations (MBE) provide more frequent “bad news” management forecasts than firms with no established string of MBE, particularly when existing analyst forecasts are optimistic. This suggests that firms with a consistent MBE record are more likely to guide analysts’ expectations downward to avoid breaking the consistency. Subsequent analyst forecast revisions following bad news management forecasts issued by these firms are dampened, implying that analysts suspect that these forecasts may be opportunistic. The relation between management forecasts and MBE consistency is stronger after Regulation FD.     

Causal disclosures on earnings and earnings management in an IPO setting

We examine the association of earnings management and narrative impression management as reflected in properties of causal explanations of reported earnings in the prospectus of Chinese IPO firms. Anticipated earnings management concerns are argued to be a significant incentive for causal disclosures on earnings in order to rationalize and legitimize earnings outcomes. We find evidence of close alignment of a firm’s earnings management propensity and its use of tactical causal disclosures. Stronger earnings management is associated with more intense assertive causal disclosure. On the other hand, firms exhibiting stronger earnings management tend to avoid the use of explicit defensive causal disclosure tactics. These findings are consistent with the strong background expectations of managerial agency and control that pervade an IPO setting. Our evidence holds after controlling for endogeneity within the context of an opportunistic disclosure position.     

Timing earnings

Since the opening of China’s securities market, there have been a number of bull and bear cycles. This paper discusses how executives use the market timing approach to manage earnings in different cycles to maximize firm value. We find that Chinese listed companies choose to release more earnings during bull markets and this phenomenon is more evident in companies that are more profitable and have higher valuations. We also find that executives who do not release more earnings during bull markets are more likely to be dismissed.     

The role of disaggregation of earnings in stock valuation and earnings forecasting

This paper compares and contrasts two accounting information systems, the aggregate earnings system and the disaggregated cash flow/accrual system, examining their relative performance in stock valuation and in forecasting of earnings. It finds, in general, that the forecasts of earnings and predicted market values from the cash flow and accrual system have smaller forecasting errors than those from the aggregate earnings system. The adjusted R-squareds from the disaggregated system are in the main higher than those from the aggregated system when considering the explanatory power of the model-predicted values. The results also show that the cash flow and accrual system forecasts dominate the aggregate earnings system forecasts in a large majority of industries.     

Model-based earnings forecasts vs. financial analysts' earnings forecasts

Existing accounting-based forecasting models of earnings either do not fully consider information that is contained in stock prices or use an ad hoc specification that is not based on rigorous valuation theory. In this paper, we develop an earnings forecasting model built on the theoretical linkages between future earnings and stock prices as well as a number of accounting fundamental variables. We find that our model-based forecasts of earnings are in general less biased and more accurate than both existing model-based forecasts and analysts' consensus forecasts, at both shorter and longer horizons. We also show that the accuracy of both model-based forecasts and financial analysts' forecasts depend on firm-specific characteristics such as firm size and industry membership.     

Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence

This paper examines the relation between annual report readability and firm performance and earnings persistence. I measure the readability of public company annual reports using the Fog index from the computational linguistics literature and the length of the document. I find that: (1) the annual reports of firms with lower earnings are harder to read (i.e., they have a higher Fog index and are longer); and (2) firms with annual reports that are easier to read have more persistent positive earnings.     

Rewriting earnings history

Research on the usefulness of financial information generally focuses on the innovation in the information examined, such as an earnings surprise or cash flow growth. Consequently, prior research sheds little light on the role of the rich historical record of financial information in users’ decision-making. Using a sample of published restatements of earnings, we show that the revision of the historical pattern of earnings, distinct from the magnitude of the restatement and its impact on current earnings, significantly affects investors’ decisions and predicts class action lawsuits. Specifically, we find that restatements that eliminate or shorten histories of earnings growth or positive earnings have significantly more adverse effects for investor valuations and the likelihood of lawsuits than other restatements. This evidence about the value-relevance of refreshing the historical record of earnings is pertinent to the FASB’s recent cautious expansion of the scope of circumstances that require a restatement of financial information in FAS 154.

Team earnings forecasting

While brokerage houses use both teams of sell-side analysts and individual analysts to conduct earnings research, there is no empirical research examining whether teams and individuals differ with regard to their forecasting performance or purpose. We first examine the most-often researched dimension of forecasting performance, earnings forecast accuracy, and show that teams are less accurate than individual analysts in general and their own individual team members in particular. We conjecture that teams focus their efforts on an alternative dimension of forecasting performance, timeliness, and show that team forecasts are timelier than those of individual analysts in general and their own individual team members in particular. Consistent with the notion that teams trade-off forecast accuracy for timeliness to comply with a market research demand, we show that team forecast revisions are associated with larger market responses than those of individuals. Finally, we illuminate the nature of team assignments by documenting that the firms that teams follow are in greater financial distress and larger in size.     

Sources of earnings variability and their effect on earnings forecasts

Previous research shows that analysts’ forecasts of earnings do not fully incorporate information contained in reported earnings variability. This study investigates whether the inefficient forecast is because of a failure to incorporate observable information on two components of earnings variability: variability in operating performance and income smoothing. Our results show that analysts’ forecasts fully incorporate information contained in earnings variability for firms with high income smoothing and for firms with low operating variability. A smaller serial correlation of forecast errors is observed for firms with low operating variability, which suggests that analysts recognize the permanence in earnings for such firms.