The horse has bolted: revisiting the market reaction to going concern modifications of audit reports

This paper examines what value is added by an audit report through an investigation of the information content for first‐time going concern modifications (GCMs). Consistent with prior research, we find no evidence of a short‐term market reaction to the public announcement of a first‐time GCM. We document a significant adverse medium‐term market reaction in the 12 months prior to a first‐time GCM announcement, but find no evidence of a persistent market underreaction in the 12 months following the announcement. These results are consistent with an audit opinion fulfilling an attestation function and confirming the deteriorating financial condition of a firm.     

The market reaction to auditor resignations

Under UK company law, external auditors who resign must warn shareholders and creditors of any matter that ought to be brought to their attention. Auditor resignations and the subsequent change in auditor are informative corporate events. Resignation from office is likely to be a costly signal for the audit firm, particularly when the client is a quoted company. Our analysis of daily data suggests that there is a negative reaction to the auditor resignation on the date of the resignation letter, even though very few auditors indicate there were problems of which the shareholders and creditors should be made aware. This provides backing for the statutory rules on disclosure of the auditor resignation. We also find that the extent of the market reaction on the day of the resignation is related to the size of the resigning audit firm.     

The fading stock market response to announcements of bank bailouts

We analyze the effects on bank valuation of government policies aimed at shoring up banks’ financial conditions during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Governments injected into troubled institutions massive amounts of fresh capital and/or guaranteed bank assets and liabilities. We employ event study methodology to estimate the impact of government-intervention announcements on bank valuation. Using traditional approaches, announcements directed at the banking system as a whole were associated with positive cumulative abnormal returns, whereas announcements directed at specific banks with negative ones. Findings are consistent with the hypothesis that individual institutions were reluctant to seek public assistance. However, when we correct standard errors for bank-and-time effects, virtually all announcement impacts vanish in Europe, whereas they weaken in the United States. The policy implication is that the large public commitments were either not credible or deemed inadequate relative to the underlying financial difficulties of banks.     

The market reaction to corporate governance regulation

This paper investigates the market reaction to recent legislative and regulatory actions pertaining to corporate governance. The managerial power view of governance suggests that executive pay, the existing process of proxy access, and various governance provisions [e.g., staggered boards and Chief Executive Officer (CEO)-chairman duality] are associated with managerial rent extraction. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that reduce executive pay, increase proxy access, and ban such governance provisions are value-enhancing. In contrast, another view of governance suggests that observed governance choices are the result of value-maximizing contracts between shareholders and management. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that regulate such governance choices are value destroying. Consistent with the latter view, we find that the abnormal returns to recent events relating to corporate governance regulations are, on average, decreasing in CEO pay, decreasing in the number of large blockholders, decreasing in the ease by which small institutional investors can access the proxy process, and decreasing in the presence of a staggered board.     

The CDS market reaction to restatement announcements

I investigate the credit market's reaction to restatement announcements through changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads. I document an overall positive association between CDS returns and restatement announcements. Specifically, I find that more positive CDS returns are associated with restatements (1) involving fraud and (2) affecting more accounts. Moreover, these reactions are sensitive to the underlying entities’ credit ratings and the market‐wide investor sentiment. Next, I compare CDS and stock market reactions and find that more negative stock returns are associated with restatements (1) involving fraud and (2) decreasing reported income.     

银行与股票市场越走越近

西方一位营销专家、曾经这样描述过五六十年代西方商业银行传统业务的繁荣景象：“主管信贷的银行高级职员，面色呆板地把客户安排在大写字台前比自己低得多的觉子上，居高临下，颐指气使。阳光透过窗子照在孤立无援的贷款者身上，他正在对银行的高级职员叙述着自己的贷款理由，而冰；争的银行大楼则宛如希腊神殿．让人不寒而粟。”     

The reaction of bank stock prices to the international debt crisis

In this paper we develop a cross-sectional regression approach to estimate the impact of foreign loan exposure on the pricing of U.S. bank stocks. A new approach is required because news about foreign loan problems may arrive incremently over time, rather than reaching the market on a few specific dates the way earnings and dividend announcements do. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that foreign loan exposure had a significant impact on the pricing of U.S. bank stocks during the years 1982 and 1983, but that the stock prices adjusted continually over the two-year period rather than jumping on a few particular days.     

The role of regulatory credibility in effective bank regulation

This paper develops a model of regulated Brownian motion with an endogenous profit term to analyze the role of regulatory credibility on the stability and productivity of the banking system. We show that when regulatory intervention is perfect and costless, the volatility of the system can be substantially reduced with no loss of productivity. In fact, perfect credibility can actually reduce the volatility of intrinsically risky banking systems below the volatility of intrinsically less risky systems as banks anticipate intervention and mitigate their investment behaviour accordingly. However, when the credibility of the regime is weakened because of increased uncertainty stemming from regulation, such as random costs or imperfect timing of regulatory intervention, both the stability and productivity of the financial system are impaired. Importantly, we find that in the presence of regulatory costs and imperfect credibility, there is no universal optimal intervention policy rule. The optimal regulatory system depends on the regulator’s level of absolute risk aversion.     

The large-small bank dichotomy in the federal funds market

Despite the central importance of the federal fund market, little research has been undertaken on the micro-decision making of individual market participants and their interactions. This paper demonstrates that there are asymmetries of information between federal funds' lenders and borrowers that can only be resolved through frequent and continuous trading. Smaller banks are constrained in their ability to borrow federal funds due to their size and location. It is shown that information asymmetries and resulting adverse selection problems may be resolved through the use of implicit multi-period contracts.     

Stock market reaction to policy interventions

ABSTRACT

We analyse stock price reactions to the announcements of monetary and fiscal policy actions in 12 stock exchanges worldwide between 1 June 2007 and 30 June 2012. While past papers have analysed the effect of policy interventions focusing on monetary policy actions (e.g. Ricci 2015), our paper focuses on stock indices either capturing the whole stock market or various industries. By estimating abnormal stock reactions around the announcement date, we show that (1) stock industry indices react to policy interventions in a different manner than the broad stock index does; (2) stock returns react negatively to restriction measures for general and non-banking sector indices; and (3) stock reaction to expansionary measures was stronger at the beginning of the financial crisis.     

Firm strategy and market reaction to earnings

We examine whether a firm's strategy affects the information content of the firm's earnings announcement. A cost leadership strategy is characterized by low sales margins coupled with large sales volumes, economies of scale and major investments in plant and physical assets, whereas a differentiation strategy involves high sales margins achieved through product quality and branding realized by investments in intangibles such as R&D and advertising. These characteristics of the strategies result in differential impact on investor reactions to new information that is revealed about firms. Our results show that firms pursuing a cost leadership strategy have earnings announcements that are more commonly interpreted and result in a greater change in the average belief about stock price. On the other hand, earnings announcements of firms pursuing a differentiation strategy result in more heterogeneous interpretation accompanied by a smaller change in the average belief about stock price. This paper advances our understanding of the cross-sectional variation in the market's reaction to earnings announcements. In addition, the paper demonstrates a predictable instance of divergence in the price reaction and trading volume reaction to an earnings announcement.     

The role of regulatory capital in international bank mergers and acquisitions

When investigating the role of regulatory capital in bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) we finds that US targets are better capitalized than their acquirers and non-acquired peers and that US banks maintain higher capital levels than European banks. Thus, US banks strategically raise their capital levels to avoid regulatory scrutiny. Furthermore, more value is created for targets with high excess capital and in M&As involving targets with considerably higher excess-capital ratios than their acquirers. Thus, the excess regulatory capital hypothesis is supported. Finally, market prices reflect the influence that capital has on the probability of the merger's regulatory approval.     

Interbank market liquidity and central bank intervention

We develop a simple model of the interbank market where banks trade a long term, safe asset. When there is a lack of opportunities for banks to hedge idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks, the interbank market is characterized by excessive price volatility. In such a situation, a central bank can implement the constrained efficient allocation by using open market operations to fix the short term interest rate. It can be constrained efficient for banks to hoard liquidity and stop trading with each other if there is sufficient uncertainty about aggregate liquidity demand compared to idiosyncratic liquidity demand.     

Local product market competition and bank loans

We investigate the influences of local product market competition on the cost of private debt. Our evidence suggests that the cost of bank loans is significantly higher for firms headquartered in states with greater local product market competition measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for resident industries. To establish causality, we examine the recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and firm relocations to identify exogenous shocks to local product market competition. We find that the cost of bank loans is lower for firms facing less intense local product market competition after the adoption of IDD and higher for firms relocated to states with more competitive product markets. The results imply that banks value the characteristics of a firm's local product market when approving loan contracts.     

Monetary policy under alternative bank market structures

The purpose of this paper is to derive and compare the short-run effects of monetary policy under both perfectly and imperfectly competitive banking markets. Within the context of a general equilibrium framework which emphasizes the demands for and supplies of financial assets, it is demonstrated that the structure of banking markets can have a bearing on the appropriate choice of policy targets and instruments. Specifically, the Federal Funds rate is shown to be a potentially ineffective target/instrument for policy under a competitive banking system, although it can be used to produce conventional short-run effects when banking markets are imperfect. In contrast, the level of currency and unborrowed reserves can be utilized as an effective target/instrument under either form of bank market structure.     

The impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings: A cross-country analysis

We use country level data and bank level data from 71 countries and 857 banks to investigate the impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings. The results indicate that less cost efficient banks, with higher than average levels of provisions relatively to their income, and lower liquidity tend to have lower ratings. Larger and more profitable banks tend to obtain higher ratings. Higher equity to assets ratio results in higher ratings only when we do not control for bank supervision and regulations. Capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities, official disciplinary power, explicit deposit insurance scheme, higher deposit insurer power, liquidity and diversification guidelines, entry requirements, fraction of entries denied, and economic freedom have a significant impact on ratings in all of our specifications. Disclosure requirements and foreign banks entry have a significant impact on ratings only when we simultaneously control for the regulatory environment and the market structure, while auditing requirements have a significant impact only when we control for the regulatory environment alone. Finally, banks in developed countries are assigned higher ratings. However, this impact disappears when we include the regulatory and supervision variables in the models.     

The reaction of bank stock prices to news of derivatives losses by corporate clients

From March through May of 1994, several large nonfinancial firms announced millions of dollars in losses from derivatives deals, especially those arranged by Bankers Trust. Accompanying these announcements and related news stories were allegations that Bankers Trust had either misrepresented, lied, or deceived its clients. Using SUR methods, we investigate how these announcements affected Bankers Trust and three portfolios of banks: dealers, nondealers, and nonusers. Our results indicate significant cumulative abnormal returns of −12.14% (Bankers Trust), −5.56% (13 dealer banks), and −2.45% (32 nondealer, user banks). The evidence suggests an intra-industry, information-transfer effect consistent with rational pricing. The replacement cost of derivative contracts is an important factor in explaining the variation in abnormal returns across banks.