The dynamics of earnings management in IPOs and the role of venture capital

We investigate the dynamics of earnings management (EM) in IPOs and the role of venture capitalist (VC) in hampering such practice. We study the behavior of EM in four phases: Pre-IPO, IPO, Lock-up and Post-lock-up. We find that VC-sponsored firms tend to do more EM in the Pre-IPO period, and less in two subsequent periods. These results are distinct for those of Wongsunwai (2013), for which, VC-sponsored firms do less EM only in the IPO period. We also find that VC and non-VC-sponsored firms do EM around the IPO in distinct fashions. Non-VC-sponsored firms inflate earnings during the IPO period and deflate in the Lock-up and Post-lock-up periods. VC-sponsored firms inflate earnings in the Pre-IPO period and deflate earnings only in the Lock-up period. Our results are robust with respect to how one measures EM and the statistical methods used.     

The exit decision in the European venture capital market

This article analyses the exit decision in the European venture capital market, studying when to exit and how it interacts with the exit form. Using a competing risks model we study the impact on the exit decision of the characteristics of venture capital investors, of their investments and of contracting variables. Our results reveals that the hazard functions are non-monotonic for all exit forms and suggest that, in Europe, Initial Public Offering candidates take longer to be selected than trade sales. Moreover our results show that, in Europe, venture capitalists associated with financial institutions have quicker exits (stronger for trade sales), and highlight the importance of contracting variables on the exit decision. An unexpected result is that the presence on the board of directors leads to longer investment durations.     

The value of ongoing venture capital investment to newly listed firms

We examine whether the market values continuing venture capital (VC) investor involvement in firms post-IPO. Compared to the US, Australian VC investors exit their investments post-IPO by on-market sales rather than distribution of holdings to their investors. Lockup periods tend to be longer and ownership thresholds for reporting trades lower. We find that the market responds positively to buy transactions, negatively to sell transactions of VC investors and negatively to the resignation of VC directors. These results are consistent with VC investors in the firm having a positive influence and creating value from which the VCs and other shareholders benefit.     

Financial contracting with strategic investors: Evidence from corporate venture capital backed IPOs

We analyze financial contracting in start-ups backed by corporate venture capitalists (CVCs). CVCs' strategic goals can economically hurt or benefit the start-ups, depending on product market relationships between start-ups and CVC parents. Empirically, start-ups receive funding from both complementary and competitive CVC parents. However, start-up insiders commonly limit the influence of competitive CVCs, awarding them lower board power, while retaining higher board representation for themselves. Second, lead CVCs receive lower board representation, indicating heightened concerns about their greater influence in start-ups' early stages. Finally, start-ups extract higher valuations from competitive CVCs, reflecting greater moral hazard problems. Overall, CVC strategic objectives affect their early inclusion in VC syndicates, their control rights and share pricing.     

Do venture capitalists imitate portfolio size?

Venture capitalists face the challenge of determining how many entrepreneurial ventures they should invest in. Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (J Corp Finance 9:521–534, 2003) develop a theoretical model based on economic factors that shows how a venture capital fund should set its portfolio size in order to achieve optimal returns. Determining the required economic inputs to this model is difficult in practice however, given the informational asymmetries, uncertainties and ambiguities present in the decision-making environment of venture capitalists. Hence, we contend that general partners of venture capital funds also use their prior venture capital fund management experience, which we refer to as social capital, to overcome the difficulties they face in solving the above optimization problem. Our results support our hypotheses that portfolio size is explained by the interplay of economic and social factors.      

Advice and monitoring in venture finance

This paper provides empirical insight into the role of contracts and legal systems for managing investor–investee relationships along two dimensions: providing advice and addressing conflict. We examine a new detailed dataset from European venture capital (VC) funds. We match very specific contractual terms in VC contracts with the effort (total time spent) and advice that VCs provide to their entrepreneurial investee firms. We also analyze VC–entrepreneur conflicts. We compare the importance of contractual versus non-contractual governance mechanisms, as well as the role of legal systems in different countries for facilitating VC–entrepreneur relationships. The data indicate VC cash-flow and control rights significantly facilitating effort and advice that VCs provide to entrepreneurs. VC–entrepreneur conflicts are closely tied to the quality of laws in which the entrepreneur resides: higher quality legal systems mitigate VC–entrepreneur conflicts. The data further indicate that non-contractual governance mechanisms significantly facilitate VC advice and mitigate VC–entrepreneur conflicts. The results provide a unique unifying look into the role of actual VC contracts and legal settings versus non-contractual governance mechanisms, risk, and success potential on VC–entrepreneur relationships in an international context.      

风险投资对创业板IPO折价影响的实证研究

本文以截至2011年6月30日在我国创业板上市的236家公司作为研究对象,研究风险投资对创业板IPO折价的影响。研究发现：（1）有风险投资参与的企业IPO折价显著高于无风险投资参与的企业,支持声誉效应假说,即风险投资机构以IPO折价来提早退出投资项目,以此来建立自己的声誉,从而吸引更多的资金流入;（2）在对有风投参股的投资公司做进一步分析后发现一一随着风投参与度的增大,IPO调整折价率并未出现明显的提升,创业板企业IPO时风险投资机构的数量、风险投资机构持股比例与调整折价率关系不显著。     

Monitoring or colluding: the role of venture capital investors in the IPO process

We argue and provide evidence that instead of playing a monitoring role, venture capital (VC) investors collude with controlling shareholders in the IPO process of Chinese non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs). We show that VC‐backed IPOs’ applications are more likely to be approved by regulators, especially in firms with excess control rights, but have worse post‐IPO performance. Through investing in firms with excess control rights, VC investors are able to make higher exit returns. We further document that VC investors’ role in the IPO process is stronger when they have political connections, hold higher ownership, and when they make pre‐IPO investment.     

中小板上市公司IPO:并购扩张还是内部成长?

本文从中小板上市公司IPO后并购及资本支出这一视角,来研究公司的IPO动因。研究证实了IPO募集资金量与资本支出的正相关关系,且公司内部投资是中小板上市公司的主要发展途径。在并购强度高的行业内,并购则成为上市公司IPO后可能选择的另一种扩张方式。此外,IPO后的股票增发及债务融资也为公司发展提供后续资本支持,可看作是公司IPO的间接动因。     

风险投资退出机制研究:来自广东的经验

股权退出机制使得风险资本能够实现循环投资,也是风险投资中潜在或外在的有关公司控制权的激励合约的组成部分之一。本文以广东为例,说明了退出机制差异造成了我国内外资风险投资机构的经营差距,而退出机制差异主要体现为国内资本市场体系不完善,进而提出了建设多层次资本市场的相关对策选择。     

The optimal portfolio of start-up firms in venture capital finance

Venture capitalists (VCs) not only finance but also add value to start-up companies. Advising firms is time consuming and creates a trade-off between intensity of advice and portfolio size. We jointly determine the optimal number of portfolio companies and the intensity of managerial advice. Diminishing returns to advice per firm call for a larger portfolio. With progressively increasing managerial effort cost, however, a larger number crowds out advice to each individual firm. As they receive less support, entrepreneurs request a larger profit share, making further portfolio expansion eventually unprofitable. Comparative static analysis shows how optimal portfolio size responds to venture returns and other parameters.     

Relational venture capital financing of serial founders

I study how often and why a serial founder receives financing for his new company from a venture capital (VC) firm that also invested in his previous company. One in 10 VC investments leads to a repeated relationship and one in three serial founders enters into a repeated relationship with any previous VC firm. A repeated relationship is more likely when the relational VC firm has acquired more private information about the founder, but less likely if the founder’s new venture has a bad fit with the VC firm’s geographic or industry focus. My findings add to the literature on relational financing by showing that the preservation of information is an important motivation for relational financing when screening and monitoring costs are high. Yet, repeated relationships are discontinued because investors also respond to information problems by specializing in certain types of firms. Finally, I find evidence of non-relational investments being passed onto trusted VC syndication partners.     

When U.S. venture capital ventures abroad

Older, more experienced and smaller U.S. venture capital firms are most probable to sacrifice proximate distance for new opportunities in foreign, and mostly mature, portfolio companies. These companies are treated differently than the domestic ones, as U.S. venture capital firms collaborate with and delegate monitoring to foreign partners, rather than stage or syndicate. Successful outcomes mostly occur in more mature, non‐hi‐tech, portfolio companies that receive more financing per round. Our results are robust to the investee country's openness and industry classification, stage of the investment and possible sample selection problems.     

The role of foreign and domestic venture capital in innovation: evidence from China

This paper analyses the different effects of foreign venture capital (FVC) and domestic venture capital (DVC) on innovation for IPOs. Using patent counts to measure innovation, the results indicate that FVC-backed firms are less innovative than DVC-backed firms. Our findings are robust after controlling for the sample selection bias using a propensity score matching approach. One possible underlying mechanism through which FVCs nurture less innovation is their inferior geographic proximity to investment targets.     

The role of venture capital in SME loans in China

We examine the role of venture capital (VC) in small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) loans through samples on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations (NEEQ) in China. We find that VC backup can effectively improve SMEs’ access to bank loans, especially short-term loans, at lower costs, and loans without collateral. VC backed loans are also less likely to default and positively related to SMEs’ performance. Our findings further suggest that VC backup reduces the information asymmetry between banks and SMEs through both “hard” information of better-quality financial statement and “soft” information of SMEs’ creditability. Evidenced by enhanced SME financing conditions and bank efficiency in loan allocation, the combined debt-equity financing scheme can be a meaningful new ingredient in the financial infrastructure of the largest emerging market.     

UK IPO underpricing and venture capitalists

We analyze the nature and causes of short-run underpricing for a unique sample of 591 Initial Public Offers (IPOs) issued on the London Stock Exchange for the period 1985–2003. We find significant differences between the 1998–2000 bubble years and the rest of the sample. Venture capitalists and reputable underwriters played a certification role in the latter period but not during the bubble years. These years featured significant increases in underpricing, money left on the table, and a decline in operating quality. The combination of venture capitalists and prestigious underwriters was increasingly associated with the highest underpricing witnessed during 1998–2000, which provides indirect support for the spinning hypothesis.     

Investor abilities and financial contracting: Evidence from venture capital

Using a large, new database of contractual provisions governing the allocation of cash flow rights in venture capital (VC) financings, we investigate how contract design is related to VC abilities to monitor and provide value-added services to the entrepreneur. We find that more experienced VCs, who have superior abilities and more frequently join the boards of their portfolio companies, obtain weaker downside-protecting contractual cash flow rights than less experienced VCs. Several pieces of evidence suggest that this relation is unlikely to be driven by selection effects. The results suggest that VCs with better governance abilities focus less on obtaining downside protections, which entail risk-sharing costs, and more on other aspects of the contract (such as obtaining board representation) during negotiations with entrepreneurs. The results also imply that previous estimates of the amount entrepreneurs pay for affiliation with high-quality VCs are overstated.     

Should I stay,or should I go? – How fund dynamics influence venture capital exit decisions

We investigate the determinants of venture capital (VC) exit behavior after the lockup expiry in initial public offerings (IPOs) by considering insights from prospect theory and behavioral finance for the first time. Hereby, the paper concentrates on the under-researched relationship between fund managers and the limited partners investing in these funds. The results from a proprietary dataset of 292 U.S. VC-backed IPOs from 1991 to 2008 imply that VC firm characteristics and fund dynamics have a significant influence on the exit extent after the lockup expiry and may not always be in line with limited partners' interests, hinting at the relevance of behavior grounded in prospect theory. In particular, first-time funds keep their shares longer after an IPO, whereas funds satisfied with current fund performance cash out soon after the end of the lockup period.     

The effects of private equity and venture capital on sales and employment growth in small and medium-sized businesses

We study the effects private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) financing have on small and mid-sized single entity business establishments from 1995 to 2009. We focus on single entity establishments to cleanly examine the impact of PE and VC financing on establishments’ organic growth. This study reveals that PE and VC financing have positive impacts on single entity business establishments’ net sales and employment growth. The impact of PE financing on establishments’ growth is slower and smaller than VC financing. However, we find that the benefit of PE financing lasts longer than VC financing. We also find that ethnic minority, female, and foreign business owners are less likely to receive PE and VC financing. Finally, we find evidence that although establishments with government contracts are more likely to receive PE and VC financing, those contracts fail to produce marginal post-funding growth and employment benefits.