家族企业管理层行为对企业创新绩效的影响——长期导向的中介效应与组织惯例的调节作用

家族企业在世界经济中扮演着重要角色,备受国内外学者关注。通过研究家族参与管理和CEO长期任职与企业创新绩效之间的关系,探讨了长期导向的中介效应与组织惯例的调节作用。基于浙皖家族企业样本实证分析,得出以下结论:家族参与管理和企业创新绩效之间存在倒“U”型关系;家族企业CEO长期任职对长期导向的形成有积极正向影响;长期导向在CEO长期任职与家族企业创新绩效间起中介作用;组织惯例正向调节家族参与管理对创新绩效的影响,正向调节长期导向对创新绩效的影响。通过探究管理层行为对企业创新绩效的影响,丰富了国内家族企业研究成果,也为家族企业响应不断变化的外部环境、实现可持续创新发展提供了有益启示。     

CEO的财务经历有利于缓解企业融资约束吗*

CEO的财务经历有利于其做出合理的融资决策和投资决策,从而有助于降低企业融资约束。以2000—2013年沪深A股上市公司作为研究对象,本文实证检验结果证明了笔者的这一假设。该结论在控制内生性以及采用其他指标衡量融资约束等稳健性检验之后仍然成立。进一步检验结果表明,在外部融资条件较差时,CEO财务经历对于缓解融资约束的作用更为显著;同时,CEO财务经历有助于企业提高投资绩效。这表明了具有财务经历的CEO通过提高企业外部融资能力和投资决策的合理性,从而缓解企业融资约束。本文在丰富高阶梯队理论和融资约束领域文献的同时,对于上市公司制定科学合理的CEO聘任决策以及缓解融资约束等方面有重要的启示。     

Firm age and the probability of product innovation. Do CEO tenure and product tenure matter?

This paper examines the influence that the age of a firm has on the probability of product innovation by taking into account two factors: the role of the CEO’s tenure and the lifecycle of the last product introduced. In a sample of Italian manufacturing firms (n = 2163), analysis reveals that the new entrants’ high innovative activity is mainly driven by the new CEO’s innovation propensity, which is strictly dependent on his tenure. Likewise, the lower innovation activity observed in mature firms is mostly explained by the dynamics of the product’s lifecycle and the CEO’s tenure. More generally, the existence of a negative relationship between innovation and firm age is questioned, as controlling for time-related variables that overlap during the company’s lifecycle —product age and CEO’s tenure — turns the relationship positive. Finally, the innovative behavior of incumbent companies turns out to be dependent on the renewal abilities of newly appointed external CEOs, whereas CEOs from within the family play a minor role.     

CEO技术专长与企业技术资本积累——CEO过度自信的调节效应

以2015—2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本，实证检验CEO技术专长对企业技术资本积累的直接效应及CEO过度自信的调节效应。结果显示：CEO技术专长显著促进企业技术资本积累；CEO过度自信的调节效应较为显著；规模大且CEO实施股票期权激励的企业，CEO技术专长的直接效应、过度自信的调节效应明显高于规模小且CEO实施限制股票激励的企业；与民营企业相比，国有企业CEO技术专长的直接效应、CEO过度自信的调节效应更突出。     

Determinants and value relevance of UK CEO pay slice

This paper studies the CEO pay slice (CPS) of UK listed firms during the period 2003 to 2009. We investigate the determinants of CPS. We study the links between CPS and measures of firm performance. We find that firms with higher levels of corporate governance ratings and those with more independent boards tend to have higher CPS. In addition, we find that CEOs are more likely to receive lower compensation when they chair the board and when they work in firms with large board size. We also find that higher CPS is positively associated with firm performance after controlling for the firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance variables. We get compatible results when we examine the association between equity-based CPS and firm performance. Our results remain robust to alternative accounting measures of firm performance. Our results suggest that high UK CPS levels do indeed reflect top managerial talent rather than managerial power.     

The market response to corporate scandals involving CEOs

This article examines corporate scandals of both a financial and nonfinancial nature between 1993 and 2011 which is expressly linked to a firm’s CEO. Findings suggest that in the short run, investors react adversely to such events and that recalcitrant CEOs end up costing their shareholders dearly. Such scandals are more likely to occur among large firms, firms with insiders on the board and where the value of options granted to a firm’s managers is substantial. However, firms with more cash flows are less likely to be mired in such scandals, and their stock returns are less likely to be affected. There is an increase in stock price volatility of affected firms in the days following the announcement of the scandal. A point of respite for investors is the damage being confined to the short run. The stock price performance of the firms affected by the scandals matches the performance of control firms in the long run post-announcement. However, the operating performance of the sample firms is better than their matched counterparts in the years after the scandal. We contribute to the extant literature by considering corporate scandal events that are the doings of a firm’s CEO and not necessarily financially motivated.     

Are CEOs Replaced For Poor Performance? Effects of Takeovers and Governance on CEO Turnover

This article analyzes the risk of CEO turnover in US firms over the period 1993–2011. There is an increase in the CEO turnover rate and a 41% decline in median tenure. Where firm performance is poor, CEOs are increasingly replaced, either by the board or in the process of the firm being taken over. US corporate governance regulations had some success in mitigating the agency problem. In the wake of those reforms, CEO turnover outcomes are more strongly associated with firm performance. The declining CEO tenure may have structural impacts on CEO pay.     

R&D Returns,Spillovers and Firm Incentives: Evidence from China

Using a new data set of 12,000 firms in China, this paper estimates the returns to R&D investment and its spillover effects, and investigates how the returns to R&D depend on firm incentives. For the firms in the sample, the results show that on average firm output increases around 0.4 yuan for each additional 1 yuan spent on R&D in the previous year, and there is high R&D return regardless of whether the endogeneity of R&D intensity is dealt with or not. Interestingly, the marginal return to R&D is significantly higher in firms whose CEOs were not appointed by the government, and lower when CEO pay is directly related to annual performance. The return to R&D is higher in relatively poor regions and for firms with worse access to finance. There are also non-trivial R&D spillover effects.     

董事会领导结构与公司治理——基于上市公司CEO更换的实证研究

本文研究了不同业绩水平下董事会领导结构与CEO更换之间的关系。研究发现,在业绩很好的公司中,CEO兼任董事长有利于避免不正常的CEO强制更换;在业绩一般的公司中,CEO兼任董事长则为业绩较低的CEO提供了保护;在经营亏损的公司中,这一保护不再发生作用。基于不同业绩水平下CEO更换的实质,本文认为,代理理论和现代管家理论在公司治理实践中是相容的,从而为研究两者的关系提供了一个新的框架。此外,本文的研究还为我国的公司治理改革提供了一些有意义的启示。     

Dragon CEOs and Firm Value

This article investigates a traditional belief of the Chinese zodiac that individuals born in the dragon year are superior and perform better. Using a sample of listed firms in China, supporting evidence is found for this pervasive superstition that CEOs born in dragon years are positively associated with firm value as measured by Tobin's Q and return on assets. This positive relationship becomes even stronger when the exact birth date of CEOs is known. Finally, the Dragon Survivors Hypothesis and the CEO Self‐fulfillment Hypothesis are examined to explain why dragon CEOs matter to firm value.     

学者型CEO更富有社会责任感吗——基于企业慈善捐赠的研究

社会公众对学者道德角色的期待、学术职业工作内容与环境的特殊性以及在长期的师德传承塑造了学者高尚的道德观念和更强的社会责任感,因此学者型CEO推动了企业实施更多利他倾向的慈善捐赠行为。以2004—2016年沪深股市A股上市公司为研究对象,本文实证检验结果为该假设提供了较为充分的证据支持。笔者发现,当CEO拥有学术经历时,其所在企业的慈善捐赠水平更高。以汶川大地震为外生事件的研究结果为本文的研究结论提供了进一步的证据。此外,笔者还从经济动机、政治动机和私利动机假说等方面排除了本文发现的其他可能解释。本文较好地丰富了高层梯队理论和慈善捐赠动机领域的文献。     

异质性、出口与中国企业技术创新

本文使用来自中国企业的大样本微观数据,运用Probit模型对影响企业创新的异质性特征从全要素生产率（TFP）因素进行了拓展,同时将所有制异质性作为“基础因子”,综合考察了多维度异质性特征、出口等对中国企业技术创新的影响。结果发现：(1)TFP因素对所有类型企业的创新倾向均具有显著的正向影响,即表现出明显的“创新自选择”效应;(2)出口参与因素显著提高了各类型企业的创新倾向,但出口密度因素对国有和民营企业的技术创新影响存在显著的倒U型关系,而对外资企业技术创新影响的非线性关系并不明显;(3)其他影响因素如企业规模、人力资本等异质性特征在不同类型企业的创新决策中表现各异。     

Measuring and Explaining Innovative Capability: Evidence from Southeast Asia

What causes firm‐level product innovation in developing economies? This paper answers this question by emphasizing the role of process improvements that are influential in product innovation. We construct a firm‐level innovative capability score using novel, broad‐based, but detailed data on various process improvement practices obtained from firms in Southeast Asia. We then investigate the factors that may affect innovative capability. We also estimate the effect of the innovative capability score on product innovation controlling for research and development intensity and other firm characteristics. Our empirical investigation identifies a chief executive officer (CEO)'s past experience at a foreign or large firm, and buyer pressure to adopt international standards as key determinants of innovative capability. Novel and unique findings from our examination include: (i) the impact of a CEO's past experience at a foreign or large firm on the innovative capability is larger for local enterprises and small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises; (ii) the impact of share of foreign workers in the upper managerial levels only appears to be significant in foreign firms and larger firms; and (iii) buyer pressure is a more likely contributor to innovative capability compared with capital tie‐ups with multinational enterprises or joint venture buyers that capture vertical technology transfers. Finally, our empirical results show that a firm in Southeast Asia is more likely to achieve product innovation if the firm has had a higher innovative capability.     

Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps

Should a firm favor insiders (handicap outsiders) when selecting a CEO? One reason to do so is to take advantage of the contest to become CEO as a device for providing current incentives to employees. An important reason not to do so is that this can reduce the ability of future CEOs and, hence, future profits. The trade-off between providing current incentives and selecting the most able individual to become CEO is the focus of this paper. If insiders are good enough (better or nearly as good as outsiders), incentive provision to insiders typically dominates and it is optimal to handicap outsiders, sometimes so severely that they have no chance to win the contest. However, if outsiders are sufficiently better than insiders, selection dominates and it is the insiders who are severely handicapped. This finding is in sharp contrast to the existing literature which has so far ignored this trade-off. In all, our model provides useful insight into contests to become CEO and rationalizes empirical regularities in the source of CEOs chosen by firms. In particular, our analysis helps to explain the lower tendency of firms in more heterogeneous industries and firms with a product or line of business organizational structure to select an outsider as CEO.     

The “sugar rush” from innovation subsidies: a robust political economy perspective

The governments of most advanced countries offer some type of financial subsidy to encourage firm innovation and productivity. This paper analyzes the effects of innovation subsidies using a unique Swedish database that contains firm level data for the period 1997–2011, specifically informa tion on firm subsidies over a broad range of programs. Applying causal treatment effect analysis based on matching and a diff-in-diff approach combined with a qualitative case study of Swedish innovation subsidy programs, we test whether such subsidies have positive effects on firm performance. Our results indicate a lack of positive performance effects in the long run for the majority of firms, albeit there are positive short-run effects on human capital investments and also positive short-term productivity effects for the smallest firms. These findings are interpreted from a robust political economy perspective that reveals that the problems of acquiring correct information and designing appropriate incentives are so complex that the absence of significant positive long-run effects on firm performance for the majority of firms is not surprising.     

Corporate social irresponsibility,CEO overconfidence,and stock price crash risk

This study examines whether and how corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) influences stock price crash risk for firms with overconfident CEOs. We find that the positive association between CEO overconfidence and stock price crash risk as shown in prior studies is significantly weakened when firms have higher CSI concerns. As a result, our intriguing findings demonstrate that investors are less surprised at the negative news hoarded by overconfident CEOs of CSI firms, possibly because they are already aware of and have previously reacted to the socially irresponsible behavior in their daily operations.     

CEO power and firm opacity

This paper examines the association between CEO power and firm opacity. We discuss the entrenchment and managerial power theories to develop a coherent hypothesis that captures a negative relationship. To investigate the relationship, we use CEO pay slice (CPS) and opacity index as proxies for CEO power and information environment, respectively. With alternate model specifications, we consistently find that firm opacity is positively associated with CPS. With the findings, we conclude that powerful CEOs pursue greater firm opacity–leading to poorer information environments–to hide, if any, agency issues or poor firm performance.     

制度理论与高阶理论整合视角下创业制度环境如何影响企业创新绩效

转型经济下企业创新绩效差异不仅来源于创业制度环境,而且受到高层管理者心智模式的影响。为探讨创业制度环境对企业创新绩效的作用机制,对制度理论和高阶理论进行整合,引入创业导向作为中介变量,CEO自恋作为调节变量。运用问卷调查法对北京、吉林、甘肃、重庆、山西和福建等地385家高新技术企业进行实证分析,结果表明：在创业制度环境对企业创新绩效的影响过程中,创业导向起显著中介作用;CEO自恋在创业制度环境与创业导向之间发挥正向调节作用,并正向调节创业导向在创业制度环境与创新绩效之间的中介作用。相关结论丰富了制度理论和高阶理论研究成果,可为企业提升创新绩效提供借鉴。     

On the irrelevance of insider trading for managerial compensation

We examine changes in the compensation of CEOs of German firms after the prohibition of insider trading (IT) in 1994 to test whether IT is a relevant compensation device. While we find that the performance elasticity of explicit CEO pay slightly increases subsequent to the IT law adoption for non-financial firms indicating an incentive-substitution effect, the overall change in levels seems modest. We explore the hypothesis that compensation for forgone IT profits in general is small because typically, firms lack at least one of the two necessary conditions for profitable IT: the existence of a liquid stock market imposing low costs of transactions and the presence of a small number of co-insiders, preventing the information rent to be competed away. Based on a difference-in-difference estimation, we indeed find that explicit pay increases more strongly for intensely traded firms and decreases for non-financial firms and insurance companies with a higher number of co-insiders. The combined effect is relatively small except for firms with the most liquid shares.     

CEO调节焦点、绿色创新与企业绩效研究

在国内外研究的基础上,构建了特质—行为—绩效关系模型。选取227位CEO为研究对象,通过构建结构方程模型,实证分析了CEO调节焦点、绿色创新与企业绩效之间的关系。结果表明,CEO促进型焦点对企业绩效具有正向影响,而预防型焦点具有负向影响;绿色产品创新、绿色工艺创新对企业绩效均有显著正向促进作用;绿色产品创新、绿色工艺创新在促进型焦点对企业绩效的影响中起部分中介作用。