共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 46 毫秒
1.
2.
3.
Several firms have recently supported their countries’ participation in international environmental agreements where countries
commit to stricter environmental regulation. This paper analyzes the rationale of this conduct by examining equilibrium emission
standards with and without environmental treaties. We identify that more stringent environmental regulation produces two effects
on firm profits: a negative effect due to larger abatement costs, and a positive effect that arises from the amelioration
of duopoly overproduction. We describe under which conditions the positive effect dominates the negative effect, increasing
firm profits, and inducing them to support their countries’ participation in environmental treaties. 相似文献
4.
5.
Lowes RL 《Medical economics》1998,75(3):97-100, 104, 107
6.
ZONG Yi-xiang 《中国经济评论(英文版)》2007,6(6):59-62
The new rural reconstruction in China cannot develop without financial support. At present, the limitations on rural finance supply constitute one of the bottlenecks in the "Three Nongs" (agriculture, countryside and farmers) problems. The paper starts from the present situation, analyses the reasons why rural finance has current difficulties and puts forward proposals for policy reform. 相似文献
7.
Lowes R 《Medical economics》2000,77(23):77-8, 81-2, 85
8.
Pretzer M 《Medical economics》1997,74(16):47-8, 50
9.
Terry K 《Medical economics》1996,73(4):138-9, 144-6, 148-50
10.
11.
Luxenberg S 《Medical economics》1997,74(10):71, 75-71, 76
12.
Pretzer M 《Medical economics》2000,77(18):46-8, 51-4, 59-60
13.
Slomski AJ 《Medical economics》1999,76(16):52-4, 59-60
14.
Weiss GG 《Medical economics》2006,83(16):56-61, 63-4
15.
Rice B 《Medical economics》1995,72(19):42-4, 46-8
16.
Citron DC 《Medical economics》1996,73(15):173-4, 177-9
17.
Rice B 《Medical economics》1993,70(12):32-6, 38-9
18.
19.
Chesanow N 《Medical economics》2001,78(9):67-8, 72, 74
20.
Per Engström 《Applied economics》2013,45(28):3615-3625
Based on a randomized experiment, we estimate effects from notification to medical doctors of tighter monitoring of their Medical Certificates (MCs). Both the time prescribed by the doctor certificates for sick leave (prescribed sick leave) and the impact on the length of the actual sickness absence (actual sick leave) is studied. We find no effect on the total number of prescribed sick leave days. However, we do find an increase in both prescribed and actual sick leave with a 25% work inability. We also find that the notification letter causes an increase in actual sick leave (i.e. the number of reimbursed sick days). We discuss a number of potential explanations for this rather surprising result. 相似文献