CEO Ownership and Discretionary Investments

Abstract:  This study investigates empirically the relationship between CEO ownership and discretionary investments such as R&D and capital expenditures. We assert that the under-investment problem is high for R&D-intensive projects, while the over-investment problem is high for capital expenditures because of differences in risk between the two types of investments. Building on the linkages between investments and investment-related agency problems, we hypothesize that the relationship between CEO ownership and investments depends on whether increasing ownership mitigates or exacerbates the under- or over-investment problem. We find a non-linear association between CEO stock ownership and R&D investments; R&D investments increase and then decline across increasing levels of ownership. Further, we find that R&D investments and CEO stock options are positively associated at high levels of option holdings. In contrast, capital expenditures do not vary with CEO ownership (stock or options). Finally, consistent with our underlying assumption, we find that the influence of R&D investments on future firm risk is significantly larger than that of capital expenditures. Our findings indicate that managerial risk aversion affects discretionary investments.     

Sorting, Firm Characteristics, and Time-varying Risk: An Econometric Analysis

We show that sorting reveals the time-varying market risk exposuresof the firm-specific investment opportunity set. Sorting onthe basis of firm characteristics uncovers information on firm-specificdistress or growth, and this leads to more efficient estimationof conditional risk sensitivity. We demonstrate the effectivenessof the sorting methodology with an empirical exercise that teststhe conditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM). When measuredproperly using sorting and firm characteristics, conditionalbetas, along with size and the book-market ratio, are significantdrivers of expected returns.     

Capital Structure and Firm Efficiency

Abstract:  This paper investigates the relationship between firm efficiency and leverage. We consider both the effect of leverage on firm performance as well as the reverse causality relationship. In particular, we address the following questions: Does higher leverage lead to better firm performance? Does efficiency exert a significant effect on leverage over and above that of traditional financial measures of capital structure? Is the effect of efficiency on leverage similar across different capital structures? What is the signalling role of efficiency to creditors or investors? Using a sample of 12,240 New Zealand firms we find evidence supporting the theoretical predictions of the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost model. Efficiency measured as the distance from the industry's 'best practice' production frontier is positively related to leverage over the entire range of observed data. The frontier is constructed using the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. Using quantile regression analysis we show that the reverse causality effect of efficiency on leverage is positive at low to mid-leverage levels and negative at high leverage ratios. Firm size also has a non-monotonic effect on leverage: negative at low debt ratios and positive at mid to high debt ratios. The effect of tangibles and profitability on leverage is positive while intangibles and other assets are negatively related to leverage.     

On Foreign Shareholdings and Agency Costs: New Evidence from China

This article examines the impact of foreign shareholdings on agency costs of Chinese firms from 2006 to 2012. The empirical results indicate that: (1) direct foreign shareholdings, in contrast to indirect foreign shareholdings, improve asset utilization, suggesting low agency costs; (2) qualified foreign institutional investors play a significant role in firms because they are less subject to political pressure, which is consistent with lower agency costs, but this effect could be eroded by government control; and (3) foreign shareholdings reduce the cost of equity and improve firm performance. The results contribute to the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the domestic/foreign ownership structure of firms.     

银行代理保险业务的洗钱风险及防范对策

近几年来,我国银行代理保险业务发展迅猛,给我国的经济金融注入了新的活力,但由于对洗钱风险认识不足,业务人员反洗钱技能不高,内控制度不健全等,使得银行代理保险业务中存在较高的洗钱风险,应予以关注。     

Auditor's Engagement Risk and Audit Fees: The Role of Audit Firm Alumni

Abstract:  This study explores the effect of the association of audit firm alumni with their alma mater on audit prices. The tests indicate that there is a moderate reduction of up to 21% in the level of audit fee when alumni (i.e., former employees) of the incumbent audit firm sit on the client board of directors which is consistent with the engagement risk theory. This suggests that there is an 'alumni effect' in the market for audit services. The findings hold only in the large company segment of the market. The results are robust to different model specifications and alternative samples. The sample comprises all executive and non-executive directors who run the UK quoted companies and are simultaneously ICAEW qualified chartered accountants. The study's implications for the accounting profession and the regulators are also discussed.     

Debt,Agency, and Management Contracts in REITs: The External Advisor Puzzle

This study investigates why externally advised real estate investment trusts (REITs) underperform their internally managed counterparts. Consistent with previous studies, we find that REITs managed by external advisors underperform internally managed ones by over 7 percent per year. Property-level cash-flow yields are similar between the two managerial forms, but corporate-level expenses and especially interest expenses are responsible for lower levels of cash available to shareholders in externally advised REITs. We document that the higher-interest expenses are due to both higher levels of debt and to higher debt yields for externally advised REITs. We posit that compensating managers based on either assets under management or on property-level cash flows creates incentives for managers to increase the asset base by issuing debt even if the interest costs are unfavorable.     

Directors' Recommendations in Takeovers: An Agency and Governance Analysis

Abstract:   This paper evaluates whether directors of target companies make response recommendations in takeovers which are consistent with the interests of shareholders, by examining the relationship between target director recommendations and associated takeover characteristics and ownership and corporate governance characteristics of target companies. The findings suggest that response recommendations appear to be more closely associated with the self‐interest of directors rather than shareholders' concerns, and that common governance initiatives aimed at aligning the interests of shareholders and managers are ineffective in resolving this agency problem. The results suggest the need for legislative or judicial reforms in Australia to encourage takeover activity and reduce takeover hostility.     

Firm Internationalization and Capital Structure in Developing Countries: The Role of Financial Development

We investigate the relationship between internationalization and the level of debt financing for more than 18,000 firm/year observations from thirty-one developing countries in the period 1991-2006. We argue that this relationship can be affected by both country-level and firm-level factors. The results show that in developing countries with relatively higher financial development, firm internationalization corresponds with a greater level of debt when firms have more growth opportunities (which also indicate a higher level of asymmetric information). This evidence suggests that relatively developed financial markets in developing countries at least partially mitigate the effect of asymmetric information and decrease the agency cost of debt for firms with higher levels of internationalization.     

Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and the Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis

This paper analyses the agency explanation for the cross-sectional variation of corporate dividend policy in the UK by looking at the managerial entrenchment hypothesis drawn from the agency literature. Consistent with predictions, a significant U-shaped relationship between dividend payout ratios and insider ownership is observed for a large (exceeding 600 firms) sample of UK companies and two distinct periods. These results strongly suggest the possibility of managerial entrenchment when insider ownership reaches a threshold of around 30%. Evidence is also presented that non-beneficial holdings by insiders can lead to entrenchment in conjunction with shares held beneficially.     

Waiving Technical Default: The Role of Agency Costs and Bank Regulations

Abstract:  This paper examines whether the characteristics of banks and borrowers are associated with banks' decisions to waive violations of debt covenants. The findings suggest that banks possess sufficient private information about firms, and they use this information in their waiver decisions. Banks' decisions to waive violations vary with the borrowers' agency costs, debt features, the banks' characteristics and regulatory circumstances, and the bank-firm business relationship. There is no evidence that syndicated loans, bank structure, and adverse economic conditions are significant determinants of the waiver decision. Research findings offer valuable insight into the theoretical and practical implications of debt covenants and agency costs.     

Risk Exposures and International Diversification: Evidence from iShares

Abstract:   We examine the newly developed international diversification instruments–iShares traded on the American Stock Exchange. Given the fact that iShares can be created and redeemed at will, the daily price of an iShare is expected to be equal to the daily portfolio value of the underlying assets in the home‐country market. Therefore, theoretically, iShare pricing should be influenced by the risk from the iShare's home‐country market and not the risk from the US market, per se . We evaluate the risk exposure of iShare prices to the US market (non‐fundamental effect) as well as the home‐country market (the fundamental effect). We find that most iShare returns are significantly influenced by and sensitive to the US market risk. Moreover, the US market appears to be the key permanent driving factor and the home‐country market is a pronounced transitory driving force for iShare prices. These findings indicate the presence of limits of international arbitrage for iShares. As a result, the international diversification benefits of iShares become questionable.     

银保协作视角下担保信用风险分散的机理与路径研究

构建中小企业信用担保机制是解决中小企业融资瓶颈的重要途径,作为金融市场的重要组成部分,中小企业信用担保市场承担着重要的金融功能.一方面,文章从金融经济学视角分析了商业银行与担保机构风险分担理论,并提出应建立商业银行与担保机构的外部协作机制,来实现担保信用风险的外部分散目标.另一方面,通过金融创新,建立基于担保投资理论的风险内部分散机制,来实现担保信用风险的内部分散目标.本研究对于构建完备有效的中小企业信用担保体系,切实有效地发挥中小企业信用担保机构在中小企业融资中的作用,具有很好的理论指导和现实意义.     

农村信用社一级法人社管理模式分析--以陕西省为例

在大量实地调查的基础上,按照我国农村信用社新一轮改革的目标,提出了陕西省农村信用社一级法人社组建成功以后的管理模式,即省联社管理模式、县一级法人社管理模式与信用社基层社管理模式,并论述了各级管理模式的关键环节与主要内容,这一设计思路可以为推进陕西农村信用社管理模式转变提供依据。     

中国农业企业汇率风险应对行为的实证研究——基于企业竞争力视角

本文提出了一个涉外企业汇率风险应对行为的分析框架,并利用352家涉外农业企业调查数据与多元Logit模型,从企业竞争力视角实证检验中国农业企业汇率风险应对行为的影响因素。研究发现,企业竞争力对中国农业企业避险策略选择至关重要,且表征企业竞争力的诸多变量对汇率风险应对行为的影响各不相同:融资能力越强、在技术方面越有优势的农业企业越倾向于使用运营策略规避汇率风险,而国际化程度越高的农业企业越倾向于使用金融衍生工具管理汇率风险;同时,农业企业汇率风险应对行为存在较为明显的地区差异。在此基础上,本文提出中国涉外农业企业应对汇率风险、扩大出口的若干政策建议。     

关联交易对企业价值的影响——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

关联交易可以降低交易成本和交易风险,提高企业价值,但也可能成为控股股东对上市公司或中小股东进行利益侵占的手段,对企业价值造成负面影响。通过实证分析的方法检验我国A股上市公司关联交易对企业价值的影响,结果显示,在全部关联交易类型中,购买商品、销售商品、资产重组、提供或接受劳务、担保抵押、许可协议、其他计入收入方的交易这7类对企业价值具有负面影响,且关联交易总体的发生也降低了企业价值。为抑制非公允关联交易的发生,建议优化上市公司的股权结构、完善独立董事和监事会制度、完善关联交易的信息披露制度等。     

制度化养老的意外后果及其风险分配——基于纵向多案例研究

论文采取多案例研究方法,分析为规避养老风险的制度可能存在的风险性问题,其中有养老制度本身所造成的直接风险,也有其他政治、经济、文化和社会制度所造成的间接风险。从多主体合作互补风险治理以及风险均衡分配角度,分别阐述和修正了多个主体的养老风险承担和养老责任,以达到符合社会正义原则的目的。     

经营者股权激励与企业价值——基于内生性视角的理论分析与经验证据

本文首次从内生性视角研究中国上市企业经营者股权激励的影响因素及与企业价值相关性的问题。遵循内生性的研究思路,选取高科技上市企业2001—2004年均衡的平行数据为研究样本,通过研究发现:各种企业可观测特征和不可观测因素对经营者股权激励水平有显著影响。在此基础上,以托宾Q值表示企业价值时,我们发现,对高科技企业来说,即使考虑到内生性影响,经营者股权激励与企业价值之间仍然存在强烈的区间效应,即经营者股权激励水平与企业价值之间存在倒U型关系。大力加强经营者股权激励的程度,将有助于高科技企业价值的提升。     

Market Valuation and Equity Ownership Structure: The Case of Agency Conflict Regimes

This paper provides further evidence on the link between the firm's performance and the distribution of the common shares between insiders, blockholders and institutions. We endogenize the functional form of the market valuecommon equity structure relationship by using a switching regression methodology. This allows us to observe four distinct ownership structure types that constitute different agency conflict regimes. We provide evidence that supports the notion that investors recognize the existence of such regimes and assess market values differently depending on the type of agency regime the firm operates in. We find that firms with low insider stakes and low blockholder stakes and firms with high insider stakes and high blockholder stakes have the highest agency costs of free cash flow. We also find that the effect of the ownership variables on market values differs across regimes and that there are differences in the monitoring effectiveness of institutional holders and blockholders.     

The Level and Stability of Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwan

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of shareholding stability of institutional investors on firm performance. We analyze 647 sample companies listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2009 using the coefficient of variance of institutional holding proportion as the measure for ownership stability. The empirical results show that increasing stability of institutional holdings is related to better firm performance. The low-risk and younger firms with higher CEO incentive compensation, larger insider holdings, and higher growth usually have better performance. Furthermore, when the long-term institutional shareholdings, particularly of foreign institutions, are higher, the firm performance is better.