Rivalry, Exclusion, and Coalitions

This paper analyzes a model where groups can attain exclusive ownership of a resource by means of a contest. We show that more concave production technologies and more egalitarianism within groups induce higher levels of social conflict. We then study endogenous coalition formation. Under cooperative exploitation of the resource, the grand coalition is the efficient partition but there exists a strong tendency toward bipartisan conflicts. Under noncooperative exploitation, conflict can ex ante Pareto dominate peaceful access and it becomes more difficult to support the grand coalition as a stable structure.     

On the social efficiency of conflict

In sharp contrast with the economic literature on conflict, this paper shows that confrontation may be efficiency enhancing. Conditions are derived under which a contest over the exclusive control of a resource Pareto dominates peaceful access.     

Endogenous group formation in experimental contests

We experimentally study endogenous alliance formation and contest effort choices in a generic three-player contest. Differences in intrinsic or extrinsic incentives to expend effort cause self-selection. Weakly motivated players have an incentive to enter into an alliance and to free-ride on strongly motivated players; hence, strong players prefer to stand alone. Self-selection has direct consequences for effort in endogenously formed alliances. But we also find evidence of an effort stimulating effect if players endogenously form an alliance, which is in line with theories of in-group favoritism. The experimental evidence on self-selection is in conformity with a theory analysis of the game.     

Giants, pygmies, and the social costs of fundamental research or price revisited

Social resource and opportunity costs of fundamental science are explored utilizing a model which integrates a) the determinants of the talent distribution of the cadre of fundamental scientists, b) the relationship of individual scientific productivity to scientific talent, c) the scientific value of aggregate scientific product, and d) the value of scientific personnel in nonscientific pursuits. On this basis, total, average, and marginal resource and opportunity costs of varying degrees of realization of “scientific potential” are derived. This comparative- static analysis is then applied to the United States over the period 1940 to 1975–1985, suggesting a four- to fivefold increase in the marginal resource cost and a five- to tenfold increase in the marginal opportunity cost of fundamental science over this period. In light of these findings and of the “free-good” aspect of the products of fundamental science, it is concluded that the level and mode of support for fundamental science must, ultimately, be determined with reference to the non- or quasiscientific contributions of fundamental scientists.     

War and peace: Third-party intervention in conflict

This paper develops a simple sequential-move game to characterize the endogeneity of third-party intervention in conflict. We show how a third party's “intervention technology” interacts with the canonical “conflict technologies” of two rival parties in affecting the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. From the perspective of deterrence strategy, we find that it is more costly for a third party to support an ally to deter a challenger from attacking (i.e., to maintain peace or acquiescence), as compared to the alternative case when the third party supports the ally to gain a disputed territory by attacking (i.e., to create war), ceteris paribus. However, an optimally intervening third party can be either “peace-making”, “peace-breaking”, or neither depending on the characteristics of the conflict and the stakes the third party holds with each of the rival parties.     

Higher cognitive ability is associated with lower entries in a p-beauty contest

“Beauty contests” are well-studied, dominance-solvable games that generate two interesting results. First, most behavior does not conform to the unique Nash equilibrium. Second, there is considerable unexplained heterogeneity in behavior. In this work, we explore the relationship between beauty contest behavior and cognitive ability. We find that subjects with high cognitive ability exhibit behavior that is closer to the Nash equilibrium.     

基于管理协同的产业技术创新战略联盟稳定性研究

近年产业技术创新战略联盟发展迅速,但普遍存在稳定性不高、效率低下等诸多问题。因此,提高联盟稳定性、改进联盟绩效是当前亟需解决的问题。基于管理协同理论,从资源协同、目标协同、知识协同、关系协同、创新协同视角,以成员信任度为调节变量,对产业技术创新战略联盟稳定性进行分析。研究结果发现,联盟成员资源协同、目标协同、知识协同对联盟稳定性存在正向影响,关系协同、创新协同对联盟稳定性存在负向影响。基于此,提出促进联盟稳定性的对策建议。     

社会网络视角下联盟成员合作关系对技术标准形成的影响

技术标准联盟已成为各行业技术标准形成与产业化工作的重要主体，而技术标准形成的各项工作主要通过联盟成员间合作得以实施。因此，基于社会网络视角探究技术标准联盟成员合作关系对技术标准形成的影响很有必要。以技术源散性为中介变量，构建联盟成员合作关系对技术标准形成的影响机制模型，提出研究假设，然后绘制闪联标准联盟专利合作网络，并通过专利合作网络拓扑指标对研究假设进行实证检验。结果表明，联盟成员合作广度与技术标准形成之间存在U型关系，联盟成员合作深度能够促进技术标准形成，技术源散性在联盟成员合作关系与技术标准形成之间存在部分中介作用。     

Consumption dynamics under information processing constraints

This paper studies how “rational inattention” (RI)—a type of information processing constraint proposed by Sims [Sims, C.A., 2003. Implications of rational inattention, Journal of Monetary Economics 50 (3), 665–690]—affects the joint dynamics of consumption and income in a permanent income model with general income processes. Specifically, I propose an analytical approach to solve the multivariate permanent income model with RI and examine its implications for optimal consumption, saving, and welfare. It is shown that RI can affect the relative volatility of consumption and provide an endogenous propagation mechanism that disentangles the short-run and long-run responses of consumption to exogenous income shocks. I also explore how aggregation reduces the impact of the RI-induced endogenous noise on consumption and thus increases the smoothness of aggregate consumption. Finally, I compare RI with four alternative hypotheses (habit formation, signal extraction, robustness, and inattentiveness) by examining their implications for the joint behavior of consumption and income.     

The international potential of traditional resource systems in marginal areas

Marginal areas of the world, including tropical highlands, tropical coastal zones, and arid lands, are problematical for development. They are ecologically special areas, often of vital consequence to the stability of more populated regions nearby. Commonly, their peoples are culturally distinct. To develop marginal areas it is suggested that “transformational” development may be appropriate. Transformational development recognizes the importance of equity and of working with existing resource systems already ecologically and culturally appropriate to the area. In marginal areas, a special application of transformational development could include incremental changes in existing systems and their connection to modern international systems so as to benefit the inhabitants of marginal areas and to supply commodities and goods demanded in the rest of the world. By rethinking ideas about resources, an exploratory framework for such transformation is examined. This framework uses the concept of “resource system”, a concept which might play an important part in the application of equitable future global development efforts.     

A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures

This note considers a two-sided multi-issue bargaining problem in which players that belong to the same “side” may have conflicting priorities regarding the different negotiated issues. The note examines different bilateral bargaining procedures and shows the different equilibrium settlements that they yield. In particular the note examines the possibility that group heterogeneity (conflicting priorities) may be exploited in order to gain a better settlement. The different potential outcomes that are implied by the different procedures explain why we often observe such intense negotiation over bargaining procedures. Moreover, the conflict over procedure can be substantial, among parties with common interest as well as between opposing players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7.     

“Constitutionalizing” the corporation

To become effective instruments in the attainment of a sustainable society, corporations should have their constitutional status settled. Thus far, mainly by Supreme Court decisions, corporations have an uncertain status. They are “persons” under the Constitution and have certain rights; but unlike natural persons, they do not have concomitant constitutional duties. Corporations should be viewed as “private” governments exercising substantial power in society. They are, however, considered to be associations of individuals rather than divisions of society. The need is to legitimate their governing power by “constitutionalizing” them. That can be done by corporations accepting, or having imposed upon them, two principal constitutional duties. First, means should be developed whereby corporate officers routinely take the general good into account. That duty could be implemented by making “social impact statements,” analogous to but broader than the familiar environmental impact statements, before making important corporate decisions. Secondly, as “sociological communities,” corporate officers wield considerable power over members of those communities. A bill of rights similar to the Constitution's Bill of Rights is recommended so as to make corporate power that is necessary for achievement of societal goals as tolerable and decent as possible. Acceptance of those duties would make corporations parts of, not separate from, the greater corporation called society. They would be private, profit-making entities with a definite public function. Preferably, the duties should be voluntarily accepted. Congress, however, has undoubted constitutional power to impose both, should it so desire.     

Compensation measures for alliance formation: A real options analysis

This paper presents a real options model of alliance formation between two firms for entry into a new market. We analyze how different compensation measures affect the alliance timing and option values. Generally, when profit structures of the two firms before and after an alliance are different, their individually optimal alliance timings do not coincide. Therefore, achieving an agreement on a common alliance timing becomes an important issue. To promote alliance formation, we examine two feasible compensation measures provided by one firm to the other: share adjustment (flow compensation) and subsidy (lump-sum compensation). We find that subsidy induces an earlier alliance, although share adjustment is Pareto optimal in terms of the joint option value.     

Group-contests with endogenous claims

Before group members individually decide their efforts in a contest to set a policy, groups are allowed to make some concessions to their opponent by choosing a less controversial policy to lobby for. When valuations over the set of policies follow a linear function, we show that concessions are never profitable when the contest success function is homogeneous of degree zero but they are when it is of difference form. Surprisingly, concessions might be detrimental for the members of the group that does not make them. Comparing this situation with another where efforts are decided collectively at a group level allows us to identify the effect of positive externalities of effort as the key cause of this damage.     

组织学习与模块化嵌入的产学研合作联盟研究

知识经济时代,学习型组织模式构建对于推动产学研协同创新发展意义重大。首先,应用资源依赖理论解析了面向产学研合作联盟的组织学习内涵问题。其次,引入模块化理论探讨了合作联盟组织学习调节机制设计问题。在此基础上,采用多案例研究方法比较了我国家电产业的3个代表性合作联盟运行机制,并着重分析了合作联盟组织学习特征及问题。结果表明：①保持资源互依关系有利于联盟成员间开展知识交互和知识创新;②模块化不但有利于实现“背靠背”的合作创新,还可以作为合作联盟组织学习调节机制;③组织学习对联盟绩效具有积极影响,更是促进产学研合作联盟演化的重要推手。最后,针对我国产学研合作联盟存在的主要问题提出对策建议。     

Influence and inefficiency in the internal capital market

I model inefficient resource allocations in M-form organizations due to influence activities by division managers that skew capital budgets in their favor. Corporate headquarters receives two types of signals about investment opportunities: private signals that can be distorted by managers, and public signals that are undistorted but noisy. Headquarters faces a tradeoff between the cost of attaining an accurate private signal and the value of the information the signal provides. In contrast to existing models of “socialism” in internal capital markets, I show that investment sensitivity to Tobin's Q is higher than first-best in firms where division managers hold equity (a result consistent with evidence presented in Scharfstein, 1998). When managers face high private costs from distorting information (equity holdings), headquarters may commit to investment contracts that place “too little” weight on private signals and “too much” weight on public signals (i.e. Q). This result has implications for managers in the design of capital budgeting processes and incentive compensation systems.     

The effect of strategic alliances on firm productivity in South Korea

Using a rich firm-level data set from South Korea, this article analyses the impact of strategic alliances on firm performance, focusing on how firm productivity is affected by alliance types such as joint venture, joint technical development, technical alliance, joint marketing and coproduction as well as alliance structures such as intra- and inter-industry alliances. Total factor productivity (TFP) is estimated through the semi-parametric method suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). In addition, a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) method is applied to reduce the potential endogenous problem between productivity and strategic alliance choices. The empirical results found in this article indicate that the engagement in joint ventures positively affects firm productivity and that the formation of international intra-industry alliances has a positive impact on firm productivity.     

战略联盟伙伴选择、知识搜索与联盟创新绩效关系

战略联盟伙伴选择作为联盟形成的源头,既是管理联盟企业关系的关键,又是提升联盟绩效的核心。为从源头剖析联盟创新绩效影响因素,依据资源依赖理论,从战略导向视角出发,以长三角地区战略联盟企业调研数据为实证依据,构建并验证了战略联盟伙伴选择、知识搜索与联盟创新绩效间的理论框架。研究结果表明:①战略联盟伙伴选择的二元导向性（关系导向的联盟伙伴选择与市场导向的联盟伙伴选择）对联盟创新绩效有显著正向影响;②知识搜索（搜索宽度与搜索深度）在战略联盟伙伴选择与联盟创新绩效关系中起部分中介作用。该研究结果有助于厘清战略联盟伙伴选择二元导向性影响联盟创新绩效的作用机理,并为我国企业基于战略整体性选择合适的联盟伙伴提供理论依据与实践指导。     

The “greening” of trade unions and the demand for eco-taxes

By embedding labour market bargaining considerations in an influence-seeking framework, we show how a union's stance on environmental policy depends on the exposure of their members to the risk of job loss. With a risk of unemployment, unions lobby with employers to resist stricter environmental policies. When employment is secure, unions may support policies that reduce employment opportunities for nonunion workers. “Environmentalism” can therefore arise without explicit environmental concerns among workers. Consequently, pollution taxes may yield a negative welfare dividend in the form of inefficiently high unemployment.     

Endogenous Destruction in a Model of Armed Conflict: Implications for Conflict Intensity,Welfare, and Third‐Party Intervention

This paper employs a contest approach to study a class of territorial conflicts in which conflict‐related arming is (endogenously) destructive of the contest prize. Of particular focus is the effect of endogenously destructive conflict arming upon conflict intensity and utility levels among primary parties to conflict. Also of interest are implications of endogenous destruction upon third‐party welfare effect in conflict. As compared to the case of a fixed‐prize conflict, we find starkly different arming and welfare outcomes in the case of an endogenously destructive conflict. We also find stark differences in third‐party effect under this distinct setting.