不对称雇主学习、外部选择与雇员谈判力

本文在非合作博弈（策略式）单边不对称信息讨价还价框架下,按照外部约束（而不是威胁点）的思路来模型化外部雇主的竞争,以分析不对称雇主学习的程度对处于信息劣势的通用性雇员谈判力的决定作用。本文提出的框架弥补了已有文献的一些不足,同时为不对称雇主学习这一劳动经济学概念提供了一个讨价还价理论基础。     

Testable Implications of Pareto Efficiency and Individualrationality

This paper investigates the testable implications of Pareto efficiency and individual rationality on finite data sets in exchange economies with finitely many commodities and agents. Efficiency alone provides no restrictions other than a trivial “no waste”-condition. Efficiency together with individual rationality implies robust restrictionsI appreciate the comments of Don Brown, Truman Bewley and Charles Steinhorn. I also thank seminar participants at Yale, Zuerich and Mainz, as well as conference participants at the 12th European General Equilibrium Workshop in Bielefeld. The generous support of the Cowles Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The paper also benefited greatly from the comments of an anonymous referee     

A Model of Product Recalls with Asymmetric Information

This paper presents a model of involuntary product recall in which a firm has private information on its ability to produce safety. The ex post regulation of safety is motivated through a parametric imperfection in the product liability system which results in a firm under internalizing expected liability expenses. We treat the problem as one of mechanism design, where the regulator designs a recall procedure. This framework illuminates the point that recall is an interesting blend of ex ante and ex post regulation. We characterize a perfect recall procedure, contrast this with real world imperfect procedures, and study the interaction of the recall and the liability systems. Further, we analyze the interaction between optimal recall policy and product market structure.     

Reinforcement-Based Adaptive Learning in Asymmetric Two-Person Bargaining with Incomplete Information

The sealed bidk-double auction is a mechanism used to structure bilateral bargaining under two-sided incomplete information. This mechanism is tested in two experiments in which subjects are asked to bargain repeatedly for 50 rounds with the same partner under conditions of information disparity favoring either the buyer (Condition BA) or seller (Condition SA). Qualitatively, the observed bid and offer functions are in agreement with the Bayesian linear equilibrium solution (LES) constructed by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). A trader favored by the information disparity, whether buyer or seller, receives a larger share of the realized gain from trade than the other trader. Comparison with previous results reported by Daniel, Seale, and Rapoport (1998), who used randomly matched rather than fixed pairs, shows that when reputation effects are present this advantage is significantly enhanced. A reinforcement-based learning model captures the major features of the offer and bid functions, accounting for most of the variability in the round-to-round individual decisions.     

Asymmetric Equilibria in a Model with Costly Voting

Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where “similar” voters make “similar” voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy equilibrium every two individuals who have the same preferences and participate in elections, would vote for the same candidate. However, this result does not hold for mixed strategies equilibria.     

Testable implications of transferable utility

Although the Transferable Utility (TU) assumption is widely used in micro theory, little is known about its testable consequences, and in particular how one can, from the observation of a group's demand, test whether the TU assumption is satisfied within this group. We derive a set of necessary and sufficient conditions on demand that characterize the TU context. The conditions are of two types. First, TU requires the group to behave as a single decision maker. Secondly, within the unitary setting, the representative utility generated by a TU framework must be of the Generalized Quasi-Linear (GQL) form. We derive testable properties of the demand function that fully characterize GQL utilities. These additional restrictions only involve specific prices - namely, those of the goods that are publicly consumed within the group.     

Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory

I show that the predictive content of the hypothesis of subjective expected utility maximization critically depends on what the analyst knows about the details of the problem a particular decision maker faces. When the analyst does not know anything about the agent's payoffs or beliefs and can only observe the sequence of actions taken by the decision maker any arbitrary sequence of actions can be implemented as the choice of an agent that solves some intertemporal utility maximization problem under uncertainty.     

专用性人力资本投资与工资合约——引入不对称信息的敲竹杠模型

经典的不完全合约理论认为,当事人的专用性投资会引发敲竹杠行为从而导致专用性投资的无效率。本文通过在经典的敲竹杠模型中引入关于雇员能力的不对称信息,构建一个新的模型来分析企业工资合约的刚性与灵活性,以解决敲竹杠所导致的专用性人力资本投资不足。分析表明:从保护雇佣双方专用性人力资本投资方面看,固定工资合约优于灵活工资合约;且在固定工资合约下,雇员虽然仍可能面临敲竹杠风险,但敲竹杠未必妨碍专用性人力资本投资效率。     

有限理性、信息不对称与企业并购模型

本文基于有限理性与信息不对称框架，建立了一个企业并购的一般性信号博彝模型。模型表明，股权并购交易价格受目标企业资产质量、造假成本、并购企业调查成本、并购市场调查效率及买卖双方机会成本等因素的共同影响。建立高效、公平的市场体系，大幅度提高造假成本或建立完备而高效的信用体系，具有显著而理想的效果；足够大的造假成本或市场调查的高效率不仅可以保证市场配置资源的效率而且可以保证最好的交易公平性；但在一个不具有高效而完备信用体系且对造假者缺乏严厉惩处机制的市场里。改进并购市场调查效率或小幅提高造假成本反而可能对市场配置资源的效率形成伤害。     

An Asymmetric Information Model of Lockouts

This note proposes an asymmetric information model of collective bargaining where the firm has the bargaining power and the union the private information. Results show that the firm may use lockouts to induce the union to reveal its private information.     

“适应性学习”下人民币汇率的货币模型

传统的汇率货币模型建立在理性预期基础上,无法解释现实中的汇率波动。本文放松了理性预期的假定,并引入适应性学习来考察汇改后人民币汇率的货币模型。结果表明:在适应性学习引入之前,货币模型预测能力比不上简单的随机游走模型;而在引入之后,其预测能力大幅改善,很好地模拟了汇率实际波动。因此传统的货币模型并没有完全失效,引入适应性学习后仍然适宜于刻画汇改后人民币汇率的短期走势。     

Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory

I show that the predictive content of the hypothesis of subjective expected utility maximization critically depends on what the analyst knows about the details of the problem a particular decision maker faces. When the analyst does not know anything about the agent's payoffs or beliefs and can only observe the sequence of actions taken by the decision maker any arbitrary sequence of actions can be implemented as the choice of an agent that solves some intertemporal utility maximization problem under uncertainty.     

A Model of Economics Learning in the High Schools

The effectiveness of the Developmental Economic Education Project (DEEP) of the Joint Council of Economic Education (JCEE) and the International Paper Company Foundation (IPCF) awards program for teaching economics is evaluated in this article. The effects these programs have on achievement in economics (ACH), attitudes towards economics as a subject (ATE), and economic attitude sophistication (EAS) are observed. The authors' study shows that DEEP schools had a positive effect on students in these three areas. The results of the IPCF program are less encouraging with students actually showing less economic understanding as a consequence of being taught by an award winning teacher.     

Asymmetric Oligopoly and Foreign Direct Investment: Implications for Host-Country Tax-Setting

We present a duopoly model with heterogeneous firms that vary in cost-efficiency, each of which can choose to serve a foreign market by either exporting or local production. We do so to analyse the effects of a host-country corporate profit tax on both the scale and composition of FDI, and find that: strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms provides for a pattern of FDI that favours cost-inefficiency to the detriment of host-country welfare; and the host-country tax rate can be optimally used to avoid such patterns of FDI and instead promote direct investment by a relatively cost-efficient firm.     

基于空间维度的组织学习理论——组织从内部学习的模型

基于组织学习时空理论的空间维度,认为组织内部是组织学习的重要来源,探索了组织从内部学习的相关问题。建立了组织从内部学习的模型——包括从内部纵向学习和从内部横向学习两个方面,并提出命题。认为:组织从内部学习会产生不同的结论,获得独特的优势,加大学习资源的广度和深度;组织从内部学习的主要方法是知识资源的分享、交换和传播;采取半隔离化子群结构和适当程度的跨群连接两种机制可在更长的时间跨度上达到更佳的学习效果;组织从内部学习类似于某种社会化过程,受到知识资源特征、组织制度政策、个体及环境等的影响;组织从内部学习受到组织内社会网络特征的影响;自我反思、行动学习和情景规划是组织从内部学习的重要方式;要将组织从内部学习与组织从外部学习相结合。该理论模型为未来研究提供了方向。     

基于空间维度的组织学习理论——组织从外部学习的模型

基于组织学习时空理论的空间维度,提出了组织从外部学习的模型。研究内容包括两个方面:一方面,基于外部组织类型的视角,以企业为例,探讨了组织向外部不同类型组织的学习——具体包括组织向政府、供应商、顾客、竞争者和合作者的学习,组织在向外部不同类型组织的学习中获取知识的维度和方式,知识的整合以及从外部学习与从内部学习的结合;另一方面,基于组织嵌入网络的视角,进一步探讨了组织与外部其他组织建立的网络,网络连带的强度、网络密度和组织在网络中所处的位置对组织从外部学习的影响,网络结构的决定因素,以及组织在网络中的权力和地位。最后总结了理论和实践贡献,并指出了存在的不足和未来的研究方向。     

基于时间维度的组织学习理论——组织从当前现状中学习的模型

基于组织学习时空理论的时间维度,提出组织从当前现状中学习的模型。该模型包括4个方面:"知",以组织面临的现状、机会和挑战为出发点,运用行动学习的方法,通过团队形式的讨论、反思和质疑、实践的循环,从当前现状中获得知识;"行",将学习到的知识运用于实践,改进自身方案和采取适当行动;知与行的转化,包含知与行的循环;从知和行两个维度评估学习的有效性。最后,总结了理论和实践贡献,并指出存在的不足和未来的改进方向。     

基于时间维度的组织学习理论——组织从过去经历中学习的模型

从经历中学习是组织学习的重要方面。从科学、严谨的研究范式出发,结合东方传统的阴阳哲学思想,基于时间维度提出了包含学习主体、经历样本、成功失败经历集、学习主体特征、知和行等要素的组织从过去经历中学习的模型,并对相关问题进行了探究。具体包括:学习主体从经历中学习的认知特性;不同类型经历对应的不同学习方法,成功经历和失败经历对学习效果的差异性影响,经历集影响知和行的7种自动的和有意的学习方式;知与行相互转化及其触发机制;客观世界从时间和空间两个维度客观展开的观点等。该系统模型为未来研究提供了理论框架和实证检验方向。