中小企业财务治理研究

自改革开放以来,我国经济每年保持高速增长。其中,中小企业在我国经济体系中所占比例高、基数大,对我国国民经济的发展做出了很大的贡献。同时,中小企业也是地方财政纳税的主力军,提高地方就业岗位,在民生问题上也功不可没。但由于中国国情和历史原因,中小企业规模增长迅速的同时,也存在着生存时期短、管理混乱、治理结构不合理等缺陷。经过大量研究发现,财务治理问题是影响中小企业生存和发展的一个重要因素。本文借鉴了前人丰富、先进的研究经验和研究成果,系统详细地论述了我国中小企业发展的状况,阐述了中小企业财务治理的必要性以及财务治理的目标。     

基于公司治理视角的中小企业内部审计问题及对策

近年来,中小企业的快速发展不仅得益于国家各项支持政策的出台,更得益于内部治理结构的完善。内部审计是有效识别中小企业风险的重要方式,是对中小企业进行内部监督的重要途径。中小企业的内部审计在公司治理中发挥着监督、咨询服务和评价的作用。同时,也应当看到中小企业内部审计中存在的问题,文章通过案例对内部审计机构设置、审计权限、审计范围和审计文化中的问题进行了详细分析,最后提出了公司治理视角下中小企业内部审计的对策。     

中欧中小企业公司治理比较

公司治理从其理论渊源来说,出现在所有权与控制权分离之后,因此,中小企业公司治理被合理地忽视了。然而,由于公司治理中利益关联者的存在,公司治理的内容扩大了,中小企业公司治理也被重视起来。我国的中小企业公司治理与欧盟中小企业公司治理相比,在公司的形式、利益相关者、治理结构、外部治理等方面有鲜明的独特之处。     

浅谈中小企业治理结构问题

本文首先介绍了企业治理结构的含义,然后从几方面论述了当前中小企业公司治理结构上面存在着的问题,最后针对中小企业如何解决治理结构问题提出几点参考措施。     

中小企业财务治理问题研究

在经济高速发展的现代化社会，中小企业的财务治理结构不合理、财务治理效率低下等企业财务治理问题日益凸显。本文从中小企业的财务治理的研究意义入手，针对中小企业财务治理存在的问题结合内部和外部两方面，提出了完善企业财务治理的措施。     

家族中小企业公司治理探析

近年来,我国中小企业在国民经济建设中发挥着越来越重要作用,而家族中小企业是中小企业中常见的一种形式。许多家族企业在发展中都会遇到许多由于家族管理模式自身的弊端、家族企业治理结构的缺陷所形成的制约因素使其难以持续成长。本文对家族企业治理的特征与存在的问题等进行了分析,并对促进家族企业治理提出了一些对策。     

基于外部治理结构的中小企业会计信息不对称问题分析

本文从产品市场、经理人市场和资本市场等外部治理结构的角度,对弱化中小企业会计信息不对称的作用进行了分析,讨论了外部治理结构的缺陷及其对中小企业会计信息不对称的影响,探讨了通过完善资本市场、经理人市场、产品市场和法规体系来完善中小企业外部治理结构的策略.     

中小企业会计信息不对称的内部治理机制构建

文章从激励机制和内部监督两个维度,分析中小企业内部治理结构对弱化会计信息不对称的积极影响.提出了基于内部治理结构缺陷的中小企业会计信息不对称的治理措施,其中包括优化企业的股权结构、健全独立董事制度、明确监事会的职责和改善中小企业内部激励机制等.     

我国中小企业公司治理结构浅析

本文以我国中小企业为研究对象,结合国内公司治理的研究成果和我国中小企业的现状、特点,分析了我国中小企业公司治理中出现的种种问题,并提出改善我国中小企业治理结构的建议。     

基于公司治理视角下的绩效评价研究

本文提出了一套基于公司治理结构视角的公司业绩评价指标体系,这一指标体系的特征就在于改变过去以财务基础指标为主,改为以公司治理结构为核心,强调非财务指标,运用层次分析模型(AHP)和指数法,对上市公司治理结构的绩效进行定量综合评价。尝试为我国上市公司建立有效合理的治理结构提供评价依据与方法。     

债权治理评价、企业特征与成长性——基于中国中小上市公司的实证研究

债权治理处于公司治理体系的内核,债权治理评价是公司治理系列评价的重要受体。本文在对国内外文献进行评述的基础上,从债权治理视角构建中国中小上市公司债权治理评价指数,并籍此从偿债能力、债务融资、资产期限、债务期限四个基本纬度以及不同企业特征因素等视角对205家中小上市公司样本进行治理状况实证研究。同时,结合中小上市公司成长性评价体系,对两种评价指数进行综合相关性和回归研究。结果显示债权治理状况总体偏低,不同所有制下有较大差异,债权治理水平与公司成长性呈现倒U型关系。高偿债、低债务融资不利于公司成长,债务期限和资产期限结构的不平衡使其对成长性影响不显著。公司规模、质量和实际所得税率是影响债权治理水平和企业成长性的重要特征因素。     

Corporate Governance and Strategic Change in SMEs: The Effects of Ownership,Board Composition and Top Management Teams

This paper investigates how governance mechanisms affect the ability of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to introduce strategic change. Previous research typically assumes that governance mechanisms operate independently of each other. Building on agency theory and insights from the literature on small firm governance, we hypothesize that governance variables related to ownership, the board of directors and the top management team all affect strategic change and that it is important to examine the interaction effects of these governance mechanisms. Using a longitudinal sample of over 800 SMEs, our general logic and hypotheses are supported by the analyses. We find that closely held firms exhibit less strategic change than do SMEs relying on more widespread ownership structures. However, to some extent, closely held firms can overcome these weaknesses and achieve strategic change by utilizing outside directors on the board and/or extending the size of the top management teams. Implications for theory and management practice in SMEs are discussed. All three authors have contributed equally to the paper. Their names are listed alphabetically.     

The Effects of Ownership and Governance on SMEs’ International Knowledge-based Resources

Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play an important role in today’s global economy. However, there are significant differences in how they respond to the opportunities and threats in international markets. This study␣suggests SMEs’ ownership and governance systems significantly influence the development of knowledge-based resources necessary for internationalization. Using a sample of 384 US SMEs, we find a positive relationship between both the equity held by top management team members and venture capitalists and the development of these important resources. This positive association is further accentuated by the presence of independent outside directors on SMEs’ boards, supporting their monitoring and enterprising roles.      

Governance mechanisms, investment opportunity set and SMEs cash holdings

This study analyses the effect of firm characteristics and governance mechanisms on cash holdings for a sample of UK SMEs. The results show that UK SMEs with greater cash flow volatility and institutional investors hold more cash; whereas levered and dividend paying SMEs with non-executive ownership hold less cash. We also find that ownership structure is significant only in explaining the cash holdings for firms with high growth investment opportunities, and leverage is only significant in explaining the cash held by firms with low growth investment opportunities. Our findings suggest that internal governance mechanisms are more effective for SMEs with high growth investment opportunities, while external governance mechanisms, such as capital market monitoring, are more effective for firms with low growth investment opportunities.     

基于社区治理的人口治理

社区治理的视角对人口治理具有非常重要的理论意义。在讨论人口社区治理的内涵和特征的基础上,分析了人口社区治理主体和治理结构,提出了构建我国人口社区治理机制的对策。     

The Effect of Governance Mechanisms on Small and Medium‐Sized Enterprise Cash Holdings: Evidence from the United Kingdom

This paper investigates the impact of governance mechanisms on small and medium‐sized enterprise (SME) cash holdings from 2000 to 2009, employing static and dynamic panel data analyses. We find no evidence that firm governance index and insider ownership affect cash holdings. This might indicate that governance mechanisms in SMEs are relatively weak. We also report that chief executive officer compensation has a positive effect on cash holdings. Firm‐specific factors such as firm size, leverage, and liquidity negatively affect cash holdings, whereas the research and development ratio and operating risk are positively associated with them. Finally, SMEs have target cash holdings and adjust to these.     

公司治理质量与外部独立审计效率

本文主要考察了公司治理质量对外部独立审计效率的影响。运用主成分分析技术构建公司治理指数,并以此作为公司治理质量的衡量指标,考察了公司治理质量对审计师的选择、审计收费和审计意见的影响。我们发现,公司治理质量越高的公司,越倾向于选择高质量的审计师;同时,也愿意支付更高的审计费用;但在其他条件一定的情况下,相对于公司治理质量高的公司,公司治理质量差的公司更容易获得标准无保留的审计意见,从而影响审计独立性和审计质量的提高。     

公司内部治理与公司价值——来自制造业上市公司的经验数据

通过筛选并构建上市公司内部治理水平的评价指标体系,将其作为解释变量;以反映公司价值的指标作为被解释变量,运用典型相关分析的方法对上市公司内部治理与市场价值的关系进行实证研究,结果表明,公司治理与公司价值之间呈显著相关关系。管理费用率、股权集中度和董事会规模是影响公司价值的主要因素。要提升企业价值。企业必须合理规划股权结构,控制消费开支。而适当扩大董事会规模也可以提升公司的价值。     

The Link Between Small Business Governance and Performance: The Case of the Ghanaian SME Sector

ABSTRACT

The present study set out to examine corporate governance practices of SMEs in Ghana and whether there is any linkage between these governance practices and financial performance. We employed two levels of interaction to achieve our objectives: The first is an interview for a general understanding of governance issues in the SME sector and the subsequent design of a questionnaire for an exploration of the linkages between governance issues and firm financial performance by employing a linear model. The study reveals that governance structures in SMEs are jointly influenced by credit providers and business ethical considerations. The regression results show that board size, size of audit committees, corporate ethics and the proportion of outsiders on the audit committees have negative impact on financial performance while independence of the board and the presence of audit committees enhance firms' financial performance. The findings have some policy implications in that it shows that exporting SMEs are relatively profitable. It is recommended that in an attempt to promote exports, the legal and regulatory environment should be conducive for these firms.     

Governance Systems in Family SMEs: The Substitution Effects between Family Councils and Corporate Governance Mechanisms

The main objective of this paper is to explore the role of family councils vis‐à‐vis corporate governance mechanisms. Particularly, the paper explores whether family councils perform only their distinctive family governance role or if they also substitute for the roles performed by corporate governance control mechanisms. Based on a sample of 243 Italian family SMEs, our research findings show that the family council partially substitutes the shareholders' meeting and the board of directors in playing their respective corporate governance roles of ownership and monitoring. These findings are interpreted in the light of both agency and relational perspectives.