风险投资中期权衍生工具的创新设计与应用

在风险投资中.传统的投资工具存在着降低创业企业家工作积极性和增多创业企业家冒险行为两个主要缺陷.风险投资者在具体投资操作中可通过买入看涨期权、卖出看涨期权、买入看跌期权等操作,来提高风险投资的效率,实现高收益与投资资金的安全.     

证券投资收益风险与资金管理

机构投资者在证券投资中,其收益与风险不仅受到客观市场形势和主观投资水平的影响,还取决于投资者用于证券投资的资金结构.目前,中国证券市场资金的规模与结构对投资者承担风险的能力、获取投资收益的潜力等具有重要影响.设计良好的资金结构,提高投资收益、降低风险是当前市场最关心的问题之一.     

风险投资中的信息不对称与制衡机制安排

风险投资是对新创立企业的投资 ,由于信息的不对称性 ,存在很高的投资风险 ,决定了风险投资与众不同的治理安排。文章对存在于风险投资者、风险投资家、创业者之间的信息不对称 ,分析了风险投资中的制衡机制。     

个人投资技巧三谈

"天下熙熙,皆为利来,天下攘攘,皆为利往。"在商海奔涌的当今社会,个人的投资创业已不能仅仅用一笔钱、一片地、一间铺、一群人便可大功告成。个中艰苦与奥妙只有涉足其中才能体味。因为除了创业的艰苦之外还有接连不断的风险,要想成功就必须掌握一定的投资技巧。坚定的投资意识人人都想当大老板,因为投资创业便像一块巨大的磁铁,吸引着众多的投资者。然而,并不是每个想当老板的人都会在投资中获得成功的。因此,投资者必须具备强烈的投资意识,并对投资过程有足够的心理、思想准备,这些都是投资者应备的基本素质。概括起来,大概有以下几点:     

中国企业海外投资中的原住民问题及应对北大核心CSSCI

原住民这一群体的特殊性,使得他们成为在人权领域中容易被侵犯的群体,也使得投资企业可能在投资过程中面临特殊的原住民问题。传统的国际投资法主要涉及对投资企业的权益保障,而对投资过程中的第三方相对不利。与原住民相关的投资争端在投资仲裁庭中有其特殊性,仲裁庭倾向于保护投资企业的利益。中国投资企业在海外投资中面临的原住民风险有多种表现形式,如环境许可、协商机制、补偿成本等。解决海外投资中的原住民问题既需要中国企业重视与原住民有关的环境许可和社区磋商问题,也需要寻求合理的路径解决投资中的原住民问题。从国际投资的角度来看,在投资过程中解决好原住民问题既能够促进贸易和投资的自由化、便利化,也能进一步推动中国企业的对外投资。     

互联网金融投资的风险与控制思考

随着我国的经济水平的快速提高,互联网金融投资成为一种新型的产业,投资者在金融投资风险中由于自身的经验不足,存在一定程度的理财风险,因此在互联网金融投资中需要谨慎。不仅需要建立有效的互联网金融投资风险防范机制,还应该加强网络监管以及相关的法制建设。所以文章针对互联网金融投资中的风险类型进行论述,并且给出相应的风险防范控制措施和思考。     

证券投资的风险与收益

一、证券投资的风险 (一)风险的含义风险是指造成损失的可能性。证券投资的风险是指投资者不能获取预期报酬的可能性。如果投资者期望在证券投资中获得20％的报酬率,而实际上,他可能只得到10％的收益率,那么,这两者之间的差额便是该项投资中的风险实质。对一项事件将来发生的结果,按照其可预知的程度,可分为确定性、风险性和不确定性。投资者应先就这三者的意义有所了解。     

风险投资最优融资契约安排模型研究

风险投资中投资者与风险投资家之间的关系是一种委托与代理关系,投资者和风险投资家的目的都是实现收益最大化。融资契约收益的分配直接影响到风险投资家的努力水平,从而影响到最终的投资收益。因此,只有从投资者和风险投资家两个角度分析风险投资中的最优契约安排,才能给出最优契约安排的选择区间。     

引进外资与国民待遇

一、国际惯例中的国民待遇原则 国民待遇指一国对外国的货物、人员、企业、商务活动,给予和本国货物、人员、企业、商务活动相同的待遇。目前,国民待遇原则主要用于国际贸易和国际投资领域。国际贸易中的国民待遇适用于国内税、运输、转口过境、商标注册、诉讼等。国际投资中的国民待遇则适用于外国投资者、投资和与投资有关的活动。我国在引进外资中,即涉及如何     

风险投资中联合投资的第三重委托代理关系研究——基于道德风险视角

本文根据风险投资中风险投资者之间的信息不对称,为研究联合投资中的道德风险问题,建立了第三重委托—代理关系下领导型和追随型风险投资者最优激励的股权比例模型,为追随型风险投资者的"搭便车"行为提供了一个分析视角,同时也为风险投资公司更好地运用联合投资策略提供了理论上的参考。     

风险投资与风险产品关系初探

在风险及其商品特性分析的基础上,第一次明确提出了风险产品的概念,并结合风险投资和交换的概念,对风险投资与风险产品之间的关系进行了比较全面的分析,指出风险投资的主要对象本身其实就是一种风险产品,风险投资运作的过程就是不断进行风险交换的过程。     

风险投资中的收益分配与激励机制探究——基于信息不对称下委托代理模型的分析

在信息不对称条件下,风险投资市场中的风险投资者与风险投资家会形成委托代理关系进而会导致逆向选择与道德风险问题的出现。从减少信息不对称和促使委托人与代理人双方收益趋向一致的角度出发,建立了一套分析风险投资者与风险投资家收益分配机制模型,根据模型分析得出收益分配的最佳方案,提出了更加完善的委托代理风险防范措施和激励机制,以解决风险投资者无法克服信息不对称所带来的逆向选择及道德风险等一系列实际问题,并在帮助风险投资者约束风险投资家的行为的基础上使自己的收益最大化,从而促进风险投资市场更加繁荣和健康发展。     

风险投资的内涵辨析及其实践意义

风险投资的内在运行机制是“合理预期高收益和合理控制高风险”。由此 ,风险投资的投资对象不是人们一般意义上所理解的“高成长的中小企业”、“高科技企业”或“风险企业” ;国内争论颇多的“创业投资”与“风险投资”并没有本质不同 ,此种译名之争 ,其实强调的是各自不同的侧面 ;为解决风险投资的退出机制 ,以过低的上市标准来设计、推出创业板是一个错误的选择。     

清洁技术产业风险投资的现状与对策

清洁技术产业已成为我国风险投资基金的热门投资领域,当前我国清洁技术产业风险投资呈现出投资增长迅速、覆盖行业全面、地域分布广泛和投资成效初显等特点,同时存在着风险投资认知度低、投资热点领域有待突破、政策风险大以及企业同质化发展等问题,如何解决这些问题成为制约清洁技术产业风险投资发展的关键。     

Concentrating Too Hard? Foreign and Corporate Venture Capital Involvement in Syndicates

We investigate the relationship between investment of corporate venture capital (CVC) and foreign venture capital (FVC), and the concentration of investors involved in a financing round. As forms of venture capital distinct from independent venture capital, CVC and FVC can offer different value to new ventures. However, having FVC or CVC investors in the syndicate can also pose additional risks to other investors. We find that a corporate venture capital or a foreign venture capital affiliation is related to lower concentration of investors. Our results suggest that the investors evaluate not only the venture but also their syndicate partners in determining their relative share of round investment.     

Structuring deals and governance after the IPO: Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in high tech start-ups

In an effort to better understand the effects of venture capital investment on selected firm governance and financing structures, we examined the post-IPO experiences of 190 biotechnology and healthcare firms (see appendix). Our study revealed that in virtually all cases, the involvement of venture capitalists reduced the role of the founder-entrepreneur in strategic decision making. This was illustrated by the larger proportion of outside directors when venture capitalists invested and the smaller proportion of entrepreneurs who remained officers or in board positions after the IPO. We also found that venture capitalists rarely invested alone, and preferred to structure deals in which venture capital partners share both risks and rewards.     

我国风险投资业存在的问题及其对策

作者从风险投资机构 (风险投资者 )的角度 ,阐述了风险资本在其循环过程的四个环节中存在的问题 ,并提出相应的对策 ,旨在促进风险投资业的健康发展 ,在中国建立一个繁荣且规范的风险投资业。     

Specialization versus diversification as a venture capital investment strategy

Much important work has informed us of rates of return earned by venture capitalists, the importance of venture capitalists to the “going public” process, and the criteria venture capitalists use to evaluate deals. This paper seeks to add to the literature by testing hypotheses, based upon both the finance and strategic management literature, regarding certain venture capitalist investment practices.Venture capitalists seek to control or manage risk (Driscoll 1974; MacMillan, Siegel, and SubbaNarasimha 1985). Financing structure and investment strategy provide several means for venture capitalists to do this. Tools available to the venture capitalist include portfolio diversification to spread risk across different industries, firms, or hot/cold IPO markets to minimize unsystematic or investment-specific risk. Information sharing, networking, and specialization can also be used to control unsystematic risk.Several hypotheses are developed from these conflicting perspectives. Data used to test the hypotheses are derived from responses to a survey of venture capitalists. Three hundred surveys were mailed to venture capitalists; 98, or 32.7%,returned usable responses.Portfolio diversification is a well-known means to control risk exposure by reducing unsystematic or specific risks. However, Bygrave (1987, 1988), as well as financial intermediation theorists, argues that maintaining a high degree of specialization is useful for controlling risk as well as for gaining access to networks, information, and deal flow from other venture investors. The analyses of this paper build upon Bygrave's work. We construct more rigorous tests to resolve the conflict between the diversification and information-sharing hypotheses. Our hypothesis tests were usually resolved in favor of the information-sharing view. For example, venture capitalists in the sample that were heavily involved in seed round financing were diversified across fewer numbers of firms and industries.Further evidence in favor of information sharing is seen in investment patterns across different financing stages. Diversification would imply maintaining a portfolio of investments across the different investment stages. The information sharing/specialization view would argue that it is best to stay focused on a single stage or several “connected” stages. The empirical evidence from the sample once again favors the specialization perspective.This research provides information of use to venture capitalists, as they seek information on how best to control risk; to entrepreneurs, as they learn of the factors venture capitalists consider in determining their investment strategy; and to academicians, as such studies provide insight to general industry practice and thus help to form the basis of classroom discussion and future research endeavors.     

The relationship between governance structure and risk management approaches in Japanese venture capital firms

This paper attempts to understand what drives Japanese venture capital (JVC) fund managers to select either active managerial monitoring or portfolio diversification to manage their firms' investment risks [J. Bus. Venturing 4 (1989) 231]. Unlike U.S. venture capitalists that use active managerial monitoring to gain private information in order to maximize returns [J. Finance 50 (1995) 301], JVCs have traditionally used portfolio diversification to attenuate investment risks [Hamada, Y., 2001. Nihon no Bencha Kyapitaru no Genkyo (Current State of Japanese Venture Capital), Nihon Bencha Gakkai VC Seminar, May 7]. We found that performance pay is positively related to active monitoring and that management ownership is positively related to active monitoring and negatively related to portfolio diversification. The managerial implication of our study is that venture capitalists should be as concerned about the structure of their incentive systems for their fund managers as they are for their investee-firm entrepreneurs. Agency theory says that contingent compensation is a self-governing mechanism for individual effort that is difficult to measure and verify. When properly applied, equity ownership and performance-based pay can have powerful influencing effects on the strategic choices of managers.     

风险资本退出时机和退出方式的确定原理

风险企业或者其部分股份能否高价出售 ,让风险资本带着丰厚的利润退出是风险投资的关键。风险资本退出的两个基本问题是何时退出和怎样退出 ,即退出时机和退出方式问题。理论上 ,风险投资周期由项目边际增加值和项目边际成本共同确定。实际上 ,风险资本退出时机和退出方式还受到风险企业其他投资者、交易双方信息不对称、风险资本家的管理能力、预先签定的投资协议和市场形势影响。