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1.
"This paper develops a general equilibrium framework of a two-sector economy which incorporates illegal immigration in the presence of labor unions. It demonstrates that stricter enforcement of immigration laws, by reducing the demand for or supply of illegal aliens, benefits all legal workers in the economy. The model is used to evaluate the impact of these policy changes on national income. Results indicate that national income does not necessarily fall when immigration controls are tightened. The existence of a union mitigates the negative welfare impact of a reduction in the number of illegal immigrants." 相似文献
2.
We develop a dynamic model of the world economy that jointly endogenizes individual decisions about fertility, education and migration. We then use it to compare the short- and long-term effects of immigration restrictions on the world distribution of income. Our calibration strategy replicates the economic and demographic characteristics of the world, and allows us to proxy bilateral migration costs and visa costs for two classes of workers and for each pair of countries. In our benchmark simulations, the world average level of income per worker increases by 12% in the short term and by approximately 52% after one century. These results are highly robust to our identifying strategy and technological assumptions. Sizable differences are obtained when our baseline (pre-liberalization) trajectory involves a rapid income convergence between countries or when we adjust visa costs for a possible upward bias. Our quantitative analysis reveals that the effects of liberalizing migration on human capital accumulation and income are gradual and cumulative. Whatever is the size of the short-term gain, the long-run impact is 4 to 5 times greater (except under a rapid convergence in income). 相似文献
3.
This paper presents a two-country general equilibrium model where international mobility of labor is prohibited. Illegal immigration nevertheless occurs. The probability of success at illegal immigration depends on resources allocated to border control and domestic enforcements. We examine the effects of switching resources form border control to domestic enforcement on illegal immigration and on welfare levels. We characterize the allocation of resources between the two methods of immigration control, that minimizes illegal immigration, and find that, starting from this allocation, moving resources from border control to domestic enforcement is unambiguously welfare improving for the destination country. 相似文献
4.
The paper analyzes the effects of government policy upon illegal immigration. The model used as a vehicle for this analysis is an extension of Ethier's one-small-country model of illegal immigration to a two-country context. We distinguish between the cases of capital immobility and free capital mobility, and consider illegal immigration when there are border patrols by the government and when there are internal enforcement procedures in effect. Unlike previous researchers who have assumed risk neutrality, we examine the impacts of government policy when prospective illegal immigrants exhibit risk averse and risk loving behavior. The relaxation of the risk neutrality assumption leads to the possibility of multiple and unstable equilibria. Moreover, attitudes to risk and the probability of detection are shown to have implications for some equilibrium responses to tighter surveillance. 相似文献
5.
The paper analyzes the effects of government policy upon illegal immigration. The model used as a vehicle for this analysis is an extension of Ethier's one-small-country model of illegal immigration to a two-country context. We distinguish between the cases of capital immobility and free capital mobility, and consider illegal immigration when there are border patrols by the government and when there are internal enforcement procedures in effect. Unlike previous researchers who have assumed risk neutrality, we examine the impacts of government policy when prospective illegal immigrants exhibit risk averse and risk loving behavior. The relaxation of the risk neutrality assumption leads to the possibility of multiple and unstable equilibria. Moreover, attitudes to risk and the probability of detection are shown to have implications for some equilibrium responses to tighter surveillance. 相似文献
6.
This paper revisits the puzzle of immigration policy: standard economic theory predicts that free immigration improves natives' welfare, but (with few historical exceptions) an open door policy is never implemented in practice. What rationalizes the puzzle? We first review the model of immigration policy where the policy maker maximizes national income of natives net of the tax burden of immigration. We show that this model fails to provide realistic policy outcomes when the receiving region's technology is described by a standard Cobb–Douglas or CES function. Then we describe three extensions of this basic model that reconcile theory with evidence. The first introduces a cost of integration of the immigrant community in the destination country; the second takes into account the policy maker's redistributive concern across different social groups; the last extension considers positive spillover effects of (skilled) migrants on the receiving economy. 相似文献
7.
In this paper, we analyze how the possibility of conflict between natives and immigrants shapes income redistribution in developed democracies. This possibility can generate income redistribution towards immigrants even if they have no voting rights. We show that the threat of conflict between natives and immigrants lowers vertical income redistribution (from the rich to the poor) as the level of immigration increases. The opposite holds for horizontal income redistribution (from natives to immigrants), which increases with the level of immigration. Income inequality weakens the negative effect of immigration on vertical redistribution, but it also reduces horizontal redistribution. These theoretical predictions are consistent with the results of our empirical analysis on data from 29 European countries: larger immigrant populations are associated with more redistribution towards immigrants and lower vertical redistribution. 相似文献
8.
In many countries laws are not enforced against visibly present illegal immigrants. The visibly present illegal immigrants also tend to be concentrated in particular sectors. We explain such permissible illegal immigration in an endogenous-policy model where selective sector-specific illegality transforms illegal immigrants from non-sectorally specialized to sector-specific factors of production. Under initial conditions where no immigrants are present, the median voter opposes immigration. When, however, a population of illegal immigrants has accumulated, ongoing illegal immigration becomes an endogenous equilibrium policy, at the same time that a majority of voters opposes legal immigration and opposes amnesty that would legalize the immigrants' presence. We also establish a basis for domestic voters preferring that illegal immigrants be employed in service rather than traded-goods sectors. 相似文献
9.
Unexplored stylized facts on OECD countries suggest that plurality electoral systems are associated with higher openness to immigration. We propose an explanation based on a retrospective voting model where immigration hurts voters but benefits a rent-seeking policymaker who appropriates part of the income generated by immigrants. To be reappointed, the policymaker must distribute the compensation. With respect to proportional systems, plurality systems make it possible to compensate only a few decisive districts and leave after-compensation rents higher, therefore producing higher immigration. In our model, non-decisive districts receive no compensation at all under both electoral systems, providing a rationale for widespread anti-immigration attitudes. Notably, our results also help to explain why governments often seem more pro-immigration than do voters. Finally, our model predicts that opposition to immigration is more geographically dispersed in plurality systems. Basic evidence supports this prediction. 相似文献
10.
This paper presents empirical evidence on immigration flows into the OECD countries during the period 1990-2000. Our results indicate that network effects are strong, but vary between different groups of welfare states and between countries according to the type of immigration policy being applied. Network effects seem to be less important in the Nordic countries which also seem to attract immigrants from the lowest income level source countries. We do not find clear evidence that selection effects measured by migration flows being sensitive to differences in public social expenditures have had a major influence on the observed migration patterns until now. This may partly be explained by restrictive migration policies which may have dampened the potential selection effects. 相似文献
11.
A version of the small‐union Meade model is presented to analyze the illegal immigration problem in the context of import tariffs. Two possible host nation objectives are considered: (i) to control the level of illegal immigration to a given target; or (ii) to choose an illegal immigration level that maximizes national welfare. Available policy instruments are import tariffs/subsidies, border, and internal enforcement levels. The second‐best tariff on imports from the source nation (for illegal immigration) can be of either sign. It depends on the effect of the tariff on the wage rate and the pattern of substitutability in consumption. In scenario (ii), greater enforcement may be justified if it reduces labor inflow and thereby contracts the protected sector. If enforcement is too costly, tariff policy may substitute for it to exploit monopsony power in the labor market and to counter the distortionary effects of labor flows. 相似文献
12.
This paper presents a model to explain the stylized fact that many countries have a low ratio of migrants in their population while some countries have a high ratio of migrants. Immigration improves the income of the domestic residents, but migrants also increase the congestion of public services. If migrants are unskilled and therefore pay low taxes, and the government does not limit access to these services, then the welfare of the domestic residents decreases with the number of migrants. Visa auctions can lower the cost of immigration control and substitute legal migrants for illegal migrants. If the government decides to limit the access of migrants to public services, immigration control becomes unnecessary and the optimal number of migrants can be very large. 相似文献
13.
This paper establishes a political support model of immigration reforms. The analysis highlights the distinction between border enforcement and employer sanction measures in that the former can be more aptly characterized as an income transfer from employer to native labor interests, whereas the latter generates deadweight losses that are borne entirely by producers. We show that while amnesty may appear to run contrary to the original intent of the immigration reform, it may nevertheless facilitate rent capture by the politician by "wiping the slate clean" and reducing the deadweight loss of employer sanction measures. 相似文献
14.
This paper builds on earlier work that used a general‐equilibrium model to show that reducing employment of unauthorized immigrants in the United States through a tighter border‐security policy lowers the average income of legal residents. Here we exploit further the detail available in the general‐equilibrium model to look at distributional effects, recognizing that the policy increases wage rates for low‐paid legal workers. We assess the social welfare effect on legal workers using a constant elasticity of substitution social welfare function. We contrast our general‐equilibrium approach to immigration analysis with the more commonly used partial‐equilibrium, econometric approach. ( JEL D63, J61, C68) 相似文献
15.
"This paper analyzes the supply-side determinants of illegal immigration using a three-sector general equilibrium model of the source country. Agricultural liberalization raises illegal immigration while liberalization of the high tech sector reduces it. In contrast, capital mobility in the source country renders trade policy ineffective for controlling illegal immigration. Paradoxically, increased enforcement (by the host country) may raise source country unskilled wages, although illegal immigration falls. Finally, under capital mobility, a rise in the source country restrictions on capital inflow raises the level of illegal immigration and reduces the effectiveness of border enforcement efforts by the host country." 相似文献
16.
Anti-globalizers are concerned, inter alia, with the effects on a developed country's real wage rate of legal or illegal immigration, as well as the outsourcing of labor-intensive activities abroad. Although a lowering of the wage rate may ensue, it is by no means a logical necessity. I show that either immigration or outsourcing of a labor-intensive fragment of production may serve to raise the wage rate of national labor in a developed country. As well, I point out how these two effects differ from each other. 相似文献
17.
This paper incorporates efficiency wages into the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The capital intensive sector pays higher wages than the other sector. One result is that tariffs to attract capital increase welfare by increasing the quality, not quantity, of jobs available. However, there are distributional effects among laborers. Some see an increase in wages, others become unemployed. The paper also investigates policies in the presence of illegal immigration. If immigration cannot be limited, a high wage country is best served by a capital outflow that eliminates the incentive for the labor inflow. Again, there are distributional effects among the workers. [F20] 相似文献
18.
This paper deals with a sanctions policy toward reducing illegal immigration. Using a single-period game, it shows that by
imposing a penalty on each apprehended illegal alien, the host country will increase the motivation of the source country
to expend money for preventing illegal immigration. It is also shown that although the sanctions are allowed to go only one
way, by increasing the efficiency of catching illegal aliens, both parties will be motivated to expend money for restraining
illegal immigration.
The author thanks Gideon Hollander, Eliakim Katz, and an anonymous referee for their valuable help. All errors are the author's
responsibility. 相似文献
19.
This paper deals with illegal immigration via two distinct activities—smuggling and trafficking of workers. A destination–source model determines economic pay‐offs and a standard labor market policy works as a deterrent. Tax paid by legal unskilled workers at the destination is determined endogenously and it finances inland monitoring against illegal immigration, holding the border patrol at a given level. The tax also finances unemployment benefit to legal workers at the destination. The number of immigrant smugglers and traffickers is also determined endogenously along with employer penalty and market wage for illegal immigrants. Higher unemployment benefits may reduce illegal wages, raise traffickers’ rent and reduce flow of illegal immigrants from the source countries. 相似文献
20.
This paper aims to assess the impacts of the temporary movement of workers on the illegal immigration. It uses a discrete time, forward-looking model with heterogeneous agents, in order to describe the decision made by illegal migrants from developing countries. Illegal migrants are supposed to accede only to the informal sector and are price takers, as they have no negotiating power. Taking into account these specifications, the theoretical model is solved analytically and illustrated numerically. It demonstrates that under some conditions, the liberalization of temporary movement of workers could lead to a decrease of illegal migration. 相似文献
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