The leverage of hedge funds

Long–short hedge funds are often very highly levered, despite the costs of leverage that became apparent during the LTCM crisis in 1998 and the more recent episode in 2008. This note explores potential market imperfections that may explain the use of leverage.     

The economics of hedge funds

Hedge fund managers trade off the benefits of leveraging on the alpha-generating strategy against the costs of inefficient fund liquidation. In contrast to the standard risk-seeking intuition, even with a constant-return-to-scale alpha-generating strategy, a risk-neutral manager becomes endogenously risk-averse and decreases leverage following poor performance to increase the fund's survival likelihood. Our calibration suggests that management fees are the majority of the total compensation. Money flows, managerial restart options, and management ownership increase the importance of high-water-mark-based incentive fees but management fees remain the majority. Investors' valuation of fees are highly sensitive to their assessments of the manager's skill.     

Synthetic hedge funds

We provide evidence on the performance and the replication success of a broad sample of 72 synthetic hedge funds from January 2009 to December 2013. Thereby, we assign the term “synthetic hedge fund” to mutual funds and exchange-traded funds with hedge fund indices as their benchmarks. Replication success is measured through different perspectives from distributional characteristics to risk-adjusted performance. We find an overall significant underperformance of synthetic hedge funds compared to an appropriate benchmark index. Furthermore, mutual funds (associated with active portfolio management) can produce return characteristics closer to hedge fund benchmarks than exchange-traded funds (associated with passive management) can. From a single strategy perspective, we find a picture of heterogeneity. Regarding the market environment, we show larger return differences for unusual market conditions than for regular ones.     

Public hedge funds

Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly under-perform funds managed by unlisted firms. The under-performance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or those managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the under-performance, listed asset management firms raise more capital, by growing existing funds and launching new funds post listing, and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.     

The performance and diversification benefits of funds of hedge funds

We examine the performance and diversification potential of 332 funds of hedge funds (FOHFs) for the period from January 1990 to May 2003. Consistent with prior studies, we find that FOHFs appear to underperform the hedge fund index on a risk-adjusted basis. However, FOHFs have characteristics that offset their apparent underperformance. Their returns do not suffer from negative skewness that is a feature of many hedge fund strategies. Relative to the hedge fund index, we find that FOHFs have lower correlations with stock indices in both bull and bear markets, making them a better diversification tool in equity portfolios. For bond portfolios, however, FOHFs have no diversification advantage over hedge fund indexing.     

The liquidity risk of liquid hedge funds

This paper evaluates hedge funds that grant favorable redemption terms to investors. Within this group of purportedly liquid funds, high net inflow funds subsequently outperform low net inflow funds by 4.79% per year after adjusting for risk. The return impact of fund flows is stronger when funds embrace liquidity risk, when market liquidity is low, and when funding liquidity, as measured by the Treasury-Eurodollar spread, aggregate hedge fund flows, and prime broker stock returns, is tight. In keeping with an agency explanation, funds with strong incentives to raise capital, low manager option deltas, and no manager capital co-invested are more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk. These results resonate with the theory of funding liquidity by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).     

Emerging market hedge funds: Do they perform like regular hedge funds?

In this study, we investigate whether the performance of emerging market hedge funds (EMHFs) follow a pattern similar to that reported for advanced market hedge funds. In contrast to the pre-2007 period, our results for the post-2006 period show that EMHFs exhibit performance patterns similar to those reported for hedge funds that focus on the developed markets. Unlike in the pre-2007 period, EMHFs in general do not exhibit significant exposure to specific asset classes in the post-2006 period. On a risk-adjusted basis, we find that EMHFs do not consistently outperform the benchmarks. The reported performance patterns may provide useful insights to both academics and portfolio managers.     

The performance of hedge funds and mutual funds in emerging markets

Use of short selling and derivatives is limited in most emerging markets because such instruments are not as readily available as they are in developed capital markets. These limitations raise questions about the value added provided by hedge funds, especially compared to traditional mutual funds active in these markets. We use five existing performance measurement models plus a new asset-style factor model to identify the return sources and the alpha generated by both types of funds. We analyze subperiods, different market environments, and structural breaks. Our results indicate that some hedge funds generate significant positive alpha, whereas most mutual funds do not outperform traditional benchmarks. We find that hedge funds are more active in shifting their asset allocation. The higher degree of freedom that hedge funds enjoy in their investment style might thus be one explanation for the differences in performance.     

The performance of emerging hedge funds and managers

This paper provides the first systematic analysis of performance patterns for emerging funds and managers in the hedge fund industry. Emerging funds and managers have particularly strong financial incentives to create investment performance and, because of their size, may be more nimble than established ones. Performance measurement, however, needs to control for the usual biases afflicting hedge fund databases. After adjusting for such biases and using a novel event time approach, we find strong evidence of outperformance during the first two to three years of existence. Each additional year of age decreases performance by 42 basis points, on average. Cross-sectionally, early performance by individual funds is quite persistent, with early strong performance lasting for up to five years.     

Reviewing the hedge funds literature I: Hedge funds and hedge funds' managerial characteristics

This paper summarizes the literature on hedge funds (HFs) developed over the last two decades, particularly that which relates to managerial characteristics (a companion piece covers the return and risk management characteristics of HFs). It classifies, the current HF literature, suggesting which critical problems have been “solved” and which problems have not been yet adequately addressed. It also discusses the effects of past financial regulation and the prospects for the effect of new financial regulation on the HF industry and its performance and risk management practices, and suggests new avenues for research. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of managerial characteristics for HF performance, and the successes and the shortfalls to date in developing more sophisticated HF-related risk management tools.     

The option CAPM and the performance of hedge funds

We evaluate the investment performance of hedge funds using an asset pricing model that is characterized by a piecewise-linear stochastic discount factor, and which we estimate using the generalized method of moments by minimizing the Hansen–Jagannathan distance. Our results show that, once non-linearities and public information are taken into account, there is only evidence of positive performance for the overall hedge fund index, equity-market neutral strategy and the global macro strategy.     

Activist hedge funds and firm disclosure

This study examines whether firms' disclosure decisions are affected by the presence of activist hedge funds. Using a large sample of firms that experienced increases in ownership by activist hedge funds, we find that firms are more likely to cease providing financial guidance or reduce the information in the guidance in the quarter subsequent to new investment by activist hedge funds. These results hold even for firms that experienced good quarters and consistently provided guidance in previous quarters. Since guidance has been shown to be beneficial to capital market participants in many ways, reduced guidance has meaningful market implications. Our findings highlight a negative and possible unintended consequence of activist hedge funds' investment in firms, which provides some counterbalance to the numerous positive consequences documented in the prior literature on hedge fund activism.     

Stochastic dominance analysis of Asian hedge funds

We employ the stochastic dominance approach that utilizes the entire return distribution to rank the performance of Asian hedge funds as traditional mean-variance and CAPM approaches could be inappropriate given the nature of non-normal returns. We find both first-order and higher-order stochastic dominance relationships amongst the funds and conclude that investors would be better off by investing in the first-order dominant funds to maximize their expected wealth. By investing in higher-order dominant funds, risk-averse investors can maximize their expected utilities but not their wealth. In addition, we find the common characteristic for most pairs of funds is that one fund is preferred to another in the negative domain whereas the preference reverses in the positive domain. We conclude that the stochastic dominance approach is more appropriate compared with traditional approaches as a filter in hedge fund selection. Compared with traditional approaches, the SD approach, not only is assumption free, but also provides greater insights to the performance and risk inherent in a hedge fund's track record.     

Strategic behavior within families of hedge funds

The paper investigates the strategic behavior of hedge fund families. It focuses on decisions to start and liquidate family-member funds. Hedge fund families tend to liquidate funds that underperform compared to other member funds, and to replace them by new ones. By choosing a launch time after a short period of superior performance by their member funds, families extend the spillover to new funds. Hedge fund families seem to be more experienced in promoting their funds and attracting fund inflow than in generating superior performance. This results in higher dollar compensation earned by managers within multi-fund families than in stand-alone funds.     

Measuring the market impact of hedge funds

Hedge funds often employ opportunistic trading strategies on a leveraged basis. It is natural to find their footprints in most major market events. A “small bet” by large hedge funds can be a sizeable transaction that can impact a market. This study estimates hedge fund exposures during a number of major market events. In some episodes, hedge funds had significant exposures and were in a position to exert substantial market impact. In other episodes, hedge fund exposures were insignificant, either in absolute terms or relative to other market participants. In all cases, we found no evidence of hedge funds using positive feedback trading strategies. There was also little evidence that hedge funds systematically caused market prices to deviate from economic fundamentals.     

Incentives and risk taking in hedge funds

We study how incentive fees and manager’s own investment in the fund affect the investment strategy of hedge fund managers. We find that loss averse managers increase the risk of the fund’s investment strategy with higher incentive fees. However, risk taking is greatly reduced if a substantial amount of the manager’s own money (at least 30%) is in the fund. Using the Zurich hedge fund universe, we test the relation between risk taking and incentive fees empirically. Hedge funds with incentive fees have significantly lower mean returns (net of fees), while downside risk is positively related to the incentive fee level. Fund of funds charging large incentive fees achieve relatively high mean returns, but with significantly higher risk as well.     

Trend-following hedge funds and multi-period asset allocation

Abstract

Selected hedge funds employ trend-following strategies in an attempt to achieve superior risk-adjusted returns. We employ a lookback straddle approach for evaluating the return characteristics of a trend-following strategy. The strategies can improve investor performance in the context of a multi-period dynamic portfolio model. The gains are achieved by taking advantage of the funds' high level of volatility. A set of empirical results confirms the advantages of the lookback straddle for investors at the top end of the multi-period efficient frontier.     

L-performance with an application to hedge funds

This paper introduces a new parametric fund performance measure, called the L-performance. The L-performance is an alternative to the Sharpe performance, which is commonly used in practice despite its inability to account for skewness and heavy tails of unconditional return distributions. The L-performance improves upon the Sharpe measure in this respect. Technically, it resembles the Sharpe measure in that it is defined as a ratio of the first- and second-order moments, which are the trimmed L-moments instead of the conventional (power) moments. The trimming parameters allow for focusing the L-performance on specific risk levels of interest, according to financial risk criteria. For illustration, a set of L-performances is computed for a variety of hedge funds. The empirical study shows the use of L-performance for fund ranking and return smoothing (manipulation) control.