Trading Volume, Information Asymmetry, and Timing Information

This paper investigates trading volume before scheduled and unscheduled corporate announcements to explore how traders respond to private information. I show that cumulative trading volume decreases inversely to information asymmetry prior to scheduled announcements, while the opposite relation holds for volume after the announcement. In contrast, trading volume before unscheduled announcements increases dramatically and shows little relation to proxies for information asymmetry. I investigate the behavior of market makers and find that they act appropriately by increasing price sensitivity before all announcements, implying that they extract timing information from their order books.     

Real Balance Effects,Timing, and Equilibrium Determination

By assuming that money balances at the beginning instead of at the end of the period provide transaction services, standard results on nominal and real determinacy in monetary models are overturned. The key is that predetermined real money balances can be a state variable. Whereas the determination of the absolute price level typically depends on fiscal policy under an exogenous interest setting, nominal determinacy is now achieved even when fiscal policy is Ricardian. Also, in contrast to the Taylor principle, the interest rate policy should respond passively to changes in inflation, thus ensuring nonoscillatory and locally stable equilibrium sequences.     

Takeover Timing, Implementation Uncertainty, and Embedded Divestment Options

We design a compound real options model, which determines the timing of takeovers and characterizes the distribution of the associated surplus. We delineate a relation between the bargaining power of the acquiring firm and the takeover incentives. The takeover threshold is decreasing as a function of the expected primary takeover gain and the embedded divestment gain. Decreased implementation uncertainty stimulates takeover activity. This uncertainty concerns the delay until either primary takeover synergies or subsequent divestment gains are realized. We demonstrate how the relation between volatility and takeover timing depends on the functional form of the profit flow with implementation uncertainty.Financial support from the Foundation for the Promotion of the Actuarial Profession and the Finnish Insurance Society to Luis H. R. Alvarez is gratefully acknowledged. Both authors acknowledge the financial support from the Yrj? Jahnsson Foundation and the Research Unit of Economic Structures and Growth (RUESG) at the University of Helsinki. The authors are grateful to Josef Zechner and two anonymous referees for their constructive comments and suggested improvements on an earlier version of this study.     

高管持股、择时披露与市场反应

基于2001至2008年间A股公司业绩预告的样本,本文研究了高管持股对择时信息披露策略的影响,以及市场对择时披露信息的反应。研究发现,A股公司在业绩预告时存在择时披露的行为:好消息①更倾向于在交易日披露,坏消息更倾向于在休息日披露。高管持股比例会显著影响择时披露策略:高管持股比例越高的公司,进行择时披露的可能性也越高。从市场反应角度看,休息日披露的坏消息与交易日披露的坏消息没有显著差异,休息日披露的好消息反而会产生更加显著的正面市场反应。本文的研究意味着,高管持股比例会显著提高上市公司进行择时信息披露的可能性,但是市场在一定程度上能够识别择时披露策略,本文的研究结果支持了"信息消化"假说。     

Timing earnings

Since the opening of China’s securities market, there have been a number of bull and bear cycles. This paper discusses how executives use the market timing approach to manage earnings in different cycles to maximize firm value. We find that Chinese listed companies choose to release more earnings during bull markets and this phenomenon is more evident in companies that are more profitable and have higher valuations. We also find that executives who do not release more earnings during bull markets are more likely to be dismissed.     

Right care, right time, right place, every time

By improving its patient flow, Intermountain Healthcare was able to increase capacity and improve resource utilization. The project's guiding principle was to remove variation from patient flow processes, increase collaboration, and enhance the quality of care. A pilot project to redesign patient flow at Intermountain Medical Center focused on patient placement and care coordination. The pilot resulted in the creation of 21 virtual beds, reduced severity-adjusted average length of stay, enhanced patient satisfaction, and improved bed turn-around time.     

财富约束、市场时机与融资行为的实验研究——优序融资和市场择时理论的行为元素提炼

本文使用实验经济学的方法研究了匿名交易市场中的融资行为,并检验了不同财富约束条件下融资啄序和市场择时理论的预测能力。在行为元素的提炼过程中,市场择时理论的预见在财富约束程度小于50%时得到了支持,此时行为人会根据市场时机选择最有利的融资方式;而融资啄序理论在财富约束程度大于50%时得到了验证。本文还发现人们的融资行为有较强的策略性合作倾向,受到收益波动程度的调节作用;融资方的二阶信念对他的风险态度与决策有部分中介效应。     

Timing,earnings management and over-reaction around pure placings

This paper provides new evidence about firms conducting pure placings in the UK. It examines their abnormal performance (stock and operating), earnings management (accrual and real activities) and abnormal growth prospects for up to three years surrounding the event. It questions whether (i) timing, (ii) earnings management and/or (iii) over-reaction hypotheses can explain these performance, earnings quality and growth paths. The results document that pure placing firms have high earnings quality and abnormally high growth opportunities at the announcement. For this reason, the market is overenthusiastic. It expects more than what is eventually fulfilled, in line with the over-reaction hypothesis. Weak evidence that placing firms may exploit market timing is noted, whilst there is no supportive evidence of earnings management. These findings distinguish the earnings quality and growth opportunities of pure placing firms from that of firms conducting open offers, firm commitment offers and other seasoned equity offerings (SEO) that are not private placements, for which prior evidence reports mainly timing and/or earnings management prior to the event. This paper facilitates a better understanding of UK SEO.     

IPO Market Timing

I develop a model of information spillovers in initial publicofferings (IPOs). The outcomes of pioneers’ IPOs reflectparticipating investors’ private information on commonvaluation factors. This makes the pricing of subsequent issuesrelatively easier and attracts more firms to the IPO market.I show that IPO market timing by the followers emerges as anequilibrium clustering pattern. High offer price realizationsfor pioneers’ IPOs better reflect investors’ privateinformation and trigger a larger number of subsequent IPOs thanlow offer price realizations do. This asymmetry in the spillovereffect is more pronounced early on in a hot market. The modelprovides an explanation for recent empirical findings that illustratethe high sensitivity of going public decision to IPO marketconditions.     

IPO时机选择研究

本文将IPO股票根据IPO时的市场环境分成"冷市"、"普市"和"热市"三类,并从上市交易开始追踪股票5年的日收益率,最后从收益和风险两个角度刻画股票IPO之后的长期绩效并分析业绩变化路径。通过实证分析表明:"冷市"与"普市"中IPO股票的长期业绩较为稳定,"热市"发行的股票存在长期表现不佳的特征;"热市"发行的股票除IPO之后第1年内的业绩能够胜过"冷市"与"普市"发行的股票业绩之外,IPO之后第2年其业绩便迅速下降,到IPO之后第5年,其持有收益率分别落后于"普市"和"冷市"中IPO股票26.01%和32.80%;我国股票市场长期低迷是IPO时机选择的必然结果。     

Benefit Incidence, Public Spending Reforms, and the Timing of Program Capture

Assessments of the distributional effects of public spendingreforms have generally been based on average rates of programparticipation by income or expenditure group. This practicecan be deceptive because the socioeconomic composition of participantscan change as a social program expands or contracts. The geographicvariation found in 1993–94 household survey data for ruralIndia is used to estimate the marginal odds of participatingin schooling and antipoverty programs. The results suggest earlycapture of these programs by the nonpoor. It is shown that conventionalmethods for assessing benefit incidence underestimate the gainsto the poor from higher public outlays and underestimate thelosses from cuts.     

Profit Warnings and Timing

We find that profit‐warning announcements elicit a strong negative market response that is not sensitive to timing the warning in advance of the earnings announcement. Share prices begin to adjust about five days before a profit warning, and the market response is not complete until about five days after the warning. The accumulated response over the 11‐day period ending five days after the announcement is ?21.7%. The profit warning effect over the two‐day announcement period is 32 times the valuation effect upon subsequent release of the actual earnings. There is no evidence of a reversal after this period, and therefore no sign that the market response is excessive.     

On Timing and Selectivity

The dichotomy between timing ability and the ability to select individual assets has been widely used in discussing investment performance measurement. This paper discusses the conceptual and econometric problems associated with defining and measuring timing and selectivity. In defining these notions we attempt to capture their intuitive interpretation. We offer two basic modeling approaches, which we term the portfolio approach and the factor approach. We show how the quality of timing and selectivity information can be identified statistically in a number of simple models, and discuss some of the econometric issues associated with these models. In particular, a simple quadratic regression is shown to be valid in measuring timing information.     

Market Timing and Capital Structure

It is well known that firms are more likely to issue equity when their market values are high, relative to book and past market values, and to repurchase equity when their market values are low. We document that the resulting effects on capital structure are very persistent. As a consequence, current capital structure is strongly related to historical market values. The results suggest the theory that capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market.     

接下来 是雪茄时间

是什么？在轻启的唇齿间缭绕,吞进一团柳絮般的柔云,吐出一缕轻烟般的薄雾。是什么？在手指的缝隙里燃烧,安安静静,从黄叶幻化成灰烬,炙热却不张扬。     

Share Issuance and Factor Timing

We show that characteristics of stock issuers can be used to forecast important common factors in stocks' returns such as those associated with book‐to‐market, size, and industry. Specifically, we use differences between the attributes of stock issuers and repurchasers to forecast characteristic‐related factor returns. For example, we show that large firms underperform after years when issuing firms are large relative to repurchasing firms. While our strongest results are for portfolios based on book‐to‐market (i.e., HML), size (i.e., SMB), and industry, our approach is also useful for forecasting factor returns associated with distress, payout policy, and profitability.