Financing entrepreneurship: Bank finance versus venture capital

This paper examines the entrepreneur's choice between bank finance and venture capital. With bank finance, the entrepreneur keeps full control of the firm and has efficient incentives to exert effort. With venture capital finance, there is a two-sided moral hazard problem as both the entrepreneur and venture capitalist (VC) provide unverifiable effort. The entrepreneur benefits from the VC's managerial input but must surrender partial ownership of the venture, thus diluting the entrepreneur's incentive to provide effort. Venture capital tends to be preferred to bank finance when VC productivity is high and entrepreneurial productivity is low.     

An entrepreneur's choice of venture capitalist or angel-financing: A behavioral game-theoretic approach

We develop a game-theoretic model that analyzes the effects of economic and behavioral characteristics on an entrepreneur's choice of financier (venture capitalist or angel). After the entrepreneur has chosen his financier, the dyad faces double-sided moral hazard problems in the form of ex ante effort-shirking, and ex post project-expropriation. In making his choice of financier, the entrepreneur trades-off the following factors. The venture capitalist has higher value-creating abilities than the angel. However, the entrepreneur anticipates a closer, more empathetic and trusting relationship with the angel. Entrepreneur/angel empathy and trust mitigates the double-sided shirking and expropriation threats. Our model contributes to two strands of venture capitalist research; the entrepreneur's choice of financier in the face of double-sided moral hazard problems, and the effect of behavioral factors, such as empathy and trust, on the creation of ‘relational rents’.     

A theory of serial entrepreneurship

The contribution of serial entrepreneurs to entrepreneurial activity is significant: in Europe, 18–30% of entrepreneurs are serial; in the US, their contribution is about one-eighth. Yet, theories of entrepreneurship and industry dynamics presume that all firms are launched by novice entrepreneurs and firm failure is synonymous with exit from entrepreneurship. We propose a theory of serial entrepreneurship in which an entrepreneur has three occupational choices: maintain his business in operation, shut it down to enter the labor market to earn an exogenous wage, or shut it down to launch a new venture while incurring a serial startup cost. In equilibrium, a high-skill entrepreneur shuts down a business of low quality to become a serial entrepreneur, launching and subsequently closing firms until a high quality business is found; a low-skill entrepreneur shuts down a business of low quality to enter the labor market, never to become a serial entrepreneur. A decrease in the wage or serial startup cost, or an increase in the startup capital, enhances the contribution of serial entrepreneurs to entrepreneurial activity and promotes new firm formation (by increasing entrepreneurship and the number of new firms that survive), but its effect on the exit rate of new firms is ambiguous. We show the model is consistent with evidence relating to the impact of an entrepreneur’s characteristics and prior experience in entrepreneurship on the survival of his firm and his entry into and survival in entrepreneurship.     

An IT professional’s dilemma: be an entrepreneur or a consultant?

Using a simple model, this paper examines the behavior of an IT professional who faces the choice between becoming an entrepreneur or an employee. To our knowledge, this is the first formal study of the dilemma facing an IT professional. IT professionals are somewhat unique in that they embody enough labor input/intellectual property that even a single professional can deliver a viable product/service. An incentive contract is auctioned to attract the highest bid in return for partial ownership from venture capitalists. Failure to raise venture finance results in the professional seeking employment. Both venture finance and employment are uncertain. The comparative-static effects of changes in project size and VC competition are determined. We find that under certain conditions a larger project is associated with a cost-plus contract, while greater VC competition results in a fixed-price contract being offered. The agent’s effort is lower in a larger project, but non-negative under greater VC competition.     

Angel Financing and the Performance of High‐Tech Start‐Ups

In this paper, we investigate what drives the performance of high‐tech start‐ups receiving angel financing, while taking a closer look at the capabilities (i.e., experience) and investment behavior of business angels (BAs). We exploit a new data set (extracted from Crunchbase), which consists of 1,933 high‐tech start‐ups that received at least one financing round from a BA. The results indicate that the experience of BAs in early stage investments is positively associated with additional receipt of follow‐on rounds of financing and sequential capital injections from venture capitalists (VCs). Later‐stage experience is positively associated with the start‐up's success (i.e., probability to be listed or acquired), but reduces the need for new VCs to invest in the start‐up. Furthermore, we find consistent evidence that start‐ups that combine BA and VC financing experience higher levels of funding amounts, additional VC financing, and an improved likelihood of success. Finally, we find that the co‐localization of BA investors and start‐ups in the same area facilitates the attraction of VC financing.     

Angels or Sharks? The Role of Personal Characteristics in Angel Investment Decisions

We use actual negotiations between angel investors and entrepreneurs to study the impact of personal characteristics on investment outcomes. We construct a unique data set with 707 investment requests led by 1,089 entrepreneurs and find that the personal characteristics of the entrepreneur, including gender, race, and age, are correlated with requested valuations, the likelihood that an offer is received, and the implied valuation when an angel investor extends an offer. Shared personal characteristics between entrepreneurs and investors also affect the likelihood that an investor makes an offer, the entrepreneur accepts an offer, and the implied valuation when an offer is extended.     

Patents and Early‐Stage Financing: Matching versus Signaling

This paper investigates the role of patents on early‐stage financing. We consider two questions: are patents signals of quality and why do patents relate to venture capital (VC) financing but not angel financing? Analyzing data from 468 Canadian early‐stage ventures, we show that patents are not signals of quality. Instead, the data support a match‐on‐financing need hypothesis: ventures match with VCs, who have financial capacity to support their patent protection strategies.     

Venture capital financing and the growth of startup firms

This study examines the association between the presence of venture capital (VC) and the employee growth of startups. Grounded in signaling theory, it investigates the impact, if any, of VC financing events upon the growth of these companies and whether the amount of funding affects the intensity of the signal. It further explores whether VC leads to growth or, alternatively, whether growth signals the need for VC. Finally, it documents the relationship between growth in startup financial valuation and changes in the number of employees over successive rounds of financing.     

Conflicts between entrepreneurs and investors: the impact of perceived unethical behavior

This paper examines the impact of perceived unethical behavior by entrepreneurs, angel investors and venture capitalists on their conflict process. For this purpose, we use an embedded case study design to provide a diversity of perspectives on the topic at hand. From the eye of the beholder, i.e. investor, entrepreneur or both, 11 conflict situations were analyzed for any perceived unethical behavior. Based on findings from within- and cross-case analysis, we propose that perceived unethical behavior among venture partners triggers conflicts between them through increased fault attribution or blaming. Further, we propose that perceived unethical behavior affects venture partners’ choice of conflict management strategy and increases the likelihood of conflict escalation and of conflict having a negative partnership outcome such as failure or another form of involuntary exit. As such, this paper contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by addressing calls for more research on the darker sides of investor–investee relationships.     

Turning a curse into a blessing: Contingent effects of geographic distance on startup–VC partnership performance

This study aims to unravel the dynamic effect of geographic distance on startup–VC partnership performance by incorporating the possibility of accessibility improvement triggered by China's high-speed railway (HSR) during the partnership. We find that the negative effect of geographic distance is significantly weakened when HSR becomes available after the startup–VC partnership formation. We draw on the relational view to explore what types of geographically distant startup–VC partners can benefit more from HSR technology advancement. Results indicate that startup–VC partners that rely heavily on knowledge-sharing, have more complementary resources, or have more complex governance structures can better leverage the improved accessibility from HSR to transform the disadvantages of the long-distance to advantages.     

The Deal Structuring Stage of the Venture Capitalist Decision‐Making Process: Exploring Confidence and Control*

This exploratory study examines the deal structuring stage of the venture capitalist decision‐making process. Here, the primary issues of concern are investor confidence and potential control of a venture in relation to the level of financing the investor provides and the structure with which the funding is delivered. Confidence comes in support of the entrepreneur, the venture itself, or a combination of the two, prior to capital transfer, but after the initial “invest or not invest” decision has already occurred. Findings support a multicriteria perspective of the pre‐investment decision‐making process and a distinct difference between entrepreneur confidence and venture confidence in the deal structuring stage.     

Staging of venture capital investment: a real options analysis

This paper uses contingent claims analysis to investigate the staging decision of venture capitalist (VC) in a principal-agent framework. Venture capital investment opportunities are modeled as real options with multiple volatilities, and the entrepreneur’s incentive is assumed to maximize the probability of getting funded in the next financing round. Two celebrated formulae in the option pricing literature are generalized to evaluate these real options. We find that staging not only gives the VC a waiting option but also mitigates the agency problem of the entrepreneur undertaking too conservative activities. Moreover, we find that the VC tends to stage her investment when the expected growth rate of the venture’s market value is lower. However, the risk-free interest rate is not an important factor in the staging decision. Our model also provides a good explanation for existing empirical evidence on the staging of venture capital investment.     

Passion for entrepreneurship or passion for the product? A conjoint analysis of angel and VC decision-making

Passion is important to venture investors, but what specifically do they want entrepreneurs to be passionate about? This study theorizes that angel investors and venture capitalists consider both entrepreneurs' passion for activities related to the product or service the venture provides (i.e., product passion) and passion for founding and developing new ventures (i.e., entrepreneurial passion). We demonstrate that both types of passion become more appealing when the investor perceives that the entrepreneur is highly open and receptive to feedback, suggesting that openness to feedback mitigates potential concerns associated with passion in its extremes. We further find that venture investors differ in their consideration of passion; angel investors and venture capitalists with more investing experience place greater emphasis on the combination of product passion and openness to feedback, whereas those with more entrepreneurial experience emphasize the combination of entrepreneurial passion and openness to feedback.     

Finding a way through the venture capital maze

Venture capital is an excellent source of funds for entrepreneurs seeking startup or expansion capital. Yet many profitable ventures never get off the ground because the entrepreneur does not know how to present the business concept so that it is most likely to be funded. The ideas presented here to help the entrepreneur are developed from practical experience and the results of a four-year study.     

Limited attention and the role of the venture capitalist

This research analyzes the venture capitalist's incentives to maximize the profits of the entrepreneurs of ventures and the limited partners of a venture fund. Venture capital is a professionally managed pool of capital invested in equity-linked private ventures. Entrepreneurs turn to venture capitalists for financing because high-technology startup firms have low or negative cash flows, which prevent them from borrowing or issuing equity. In addition, venture capitalists are actively involved in management of the venture to assure its success. This solves the problem of startup firms that do not have the cash flows to hire management consultants.Venture capital contracts have three main characteristics: (1) staging the commitment of capital and preserving the option to abandon, (2) using compensation systems directly linked to value creation, and (3) preserving ways to force management to distribute investment proceeds. These characteristics address three fundamental problems: (1) sorting the venture capital among the entrepreneurial ventures, (2) providing incentives to motivate venture capitalists to maximize the value of the funded ventures, and (3) providing incentives to motivate entrepreneurs to maximize the value of the ventures. Venture capitalists fund only about a dozen projects a year out of a thousand evaluated. Each project may receive several rounds of financing. Payoffs to VCs can be very high or be a complete loss.The typical venture capital (VC) firm is organized as a limited partnership, with the venture capitalists serving as general partners and the investors as limited partners. General partner VCs act as agents for the limited partners in investing their funds. VCs invest their human capital by placing their reputation on the line. The goal is to begin to convert the investment into cash or marketable securities, which are distributed to the partners. VC management companies receive a management fee equal to a percentage (usually 2.5%) of the capital of each fund. They also receive a percentage (15–30%) of the profits of each fund, called carried interest. Periodic reports are made by the VC firm to the limited partners. Usually these are only costs of managing the fund, and so revenues are negative. Most contracts specify the percentage of time that the VC will devote to managing the fund.The analysis of this research deals with the incentives of the VC who has limited attention to be allocated between improving current ventures and evaluating new ventures for possible funding. The analysis shows that the VC, as agent for both the entrepreneur and the general partners, does not have the incentives required to maximize their profits. The VC allocates attention among ventures and venture funds less frequently than required to maximize the entrepreneurs' and limited partners' profits. However, the VC does maximize the total profits of all ventures. Because the VC considers the opportunity cost of attention, the VC's allocation of attention is efficient. The implication of this result is that, although the entrepreneurs and limited partners could be made better off with a different allocation of the VC's time, this would be an inefficient use of the VC's time.     

Become Independent! The Paradoxical Constraints of France's “Auto‐Entrepreneur” Regime

The Law on Economic Modernization of August 4, 2008, introduced a new form of individual entrepreneur, the “auto‐entrepreneur,” the goal being to enhance the competitiveness of the French economy by promoting entrepreneurial spirit. This paper proposes to discuss the “auto‐entrepreneur” model with reference to the fundamentals of the theory of the firm and the legal variants of the “auto‐entrepreneur.” The argument will be structured around the criterion of independence, and its various interpretations, which will be used to put the auto‐entrepreneur model to the test. Three forms of autonomy are given precedence: productive, concerning the availability of sufficient financing and material to provide professional services; managerial, which measures the ability to assume the risks inherent to business, regarding both interested and third parties; and financial, or the chances of earning enough money to subsist upon. The result, highlighted in the conclusion to this paper, is that the “auto‐entrepreneur” regime is contrary to every referenced approach to the firm. This business model appears best adapted as a means of supplementing income from another, unrelated activity or in retirement.     

Governance and resource interaction in networks. The role of venture capital in a biotech start-up

This paper examines venture capital (VC) governance in innovation processes. The VC literature often presents the relationship between a VC firm and a start-up as dyadic and analyzes it with agency theory. In contrast, this paper deploys the resource interaction framework presented in Håkansson and Waluszewski (2002) to governance and innovation in networks. The paper reports an in-depth case study of Pyrosequencing, a Swedish biotech firm financed with VC. The results from this study reveal how the relationship between a VC and a start-up company is embedded in a wider network and how the governance of the VC spreads in the surrounding network and influences a start-up's possibilities to develop organizational and technical resource interfaces to critical counterparts such as suppliers and customers.     

The internationalization process of Brazilian software firms and the born global phenomenon: Examining firm,network, and entrepreneur variables

This paper examines the born-global phenomenon in the context of an emerging country, Brazil. A literature review was conducted in order to develop an integrative model of the phenomenon under study. Three sets of internal variables were identified in the literature which seemed to explain why a firm would follow a born global, rather than a traditional, internationalization process: firm, network, and entrepreneur variables. The final conceptual model was tested in a Brazilian sample of 79 software firms, of which 35 followed the born-global process of internationalization and 44 followed the traditional process. Logistic regression was used to test the research hypotheses. Results showed that certain firm and entrepreneur variables seemed to be associated to the type of internationalization process chosen by these firms. Network variables did not significantly differentiate the two groups.     

Signaling by early stage startups: US government research grants and venture capital funding

Entrepreneurship researchers have documented that early stage startups rely on signals to demonstrate the transitions in their identities that they must make when they cross organizational life cycle thresholds. However, early stage startups in emerging industry contexts tend to have few good signals upon which to rely. Public agencies can play a valuable role in this process, but prior research has not sufficiently examined how startups effectively leverage this support. In this paper, therefore, we develop a framework to investigate the role that signals can play for early stage startups when they win prestigious government research grants. We test this framework in the setting of the emerging U.S. clean energy sector and find that in comparison to a matched sample of clean energy startups that have not won prestigious research grants, startups with these grants were 12% more likely to acquire subsequent venture capital (VC) funding. Another significant result is that the value of this signaling is greater for startups that have fewer patents. The important contribution of this finding is that it shows that signaling has the potential to redistribute benefits rather than just provide an additional accrual of advantages to the already high status actors. Together these results highlight the advantages for startups in emerging industries of pursuing signaling strategies with public agencies when they attempt to make important transitions through the stages of their organizational life cycles.

Entrepreneur opportunity costs and intended venture growth

This study investigates how entrepreneur opportunity costs influence the intended future size of new ventures. In particular, using a survey of nascent entrepreneurs in the process of starting a venture, this paper examines how intended future sales revenue is influenced by entrepreneur current household income, education, and managerial experience. Consistent with opportunity cost and human capital arguments, it is found that individuals with higher current household income and greater supervisory experience have higher levels of intended firm size in 5 years time. While this study finds that entrepreneur stated preferences for growth also influence intended future sales of the venture, the association between nascent entrepreneur opportunity costs and venture scale is complementary to these stated preferences.