On optimal unemployment compensation

The design of an optimal unemployment compensation scheme is analyzed, using a dynamic principal-agent relationship between a risk-neutral planner (the principal) and risk-averse workers (the agents), where the planner's inability to observe workers’ job-search efforts creates a moral hazard problem. To design an implementable scheme, we require that each agent is guaranteed a minimum level of expected discounted utility, regardless of his past history. In contrast with previous studies, we find that the optimal contract is quite close to actual unemployment compensation schemes, both qualitatively and quantitatively.     

A life-cycle model of unemployment and disability insurance

A general equilibrium life-cycle model is developed, in which individuals choose a sequence of saving and labor supply faced with search frictions and uncertainty in longevity, health status and medical expenditures. Unemployed individuals decide whether to apply for disability insurance (DI) benefits if eligible. We investigate the effects of cash transfer and in-kind Medicare component of the DI system on the life-cycle employment. Without Medicare benefits, DI coverage could fall significantly. We also study how DI interacts with reforms of Social Security and Medicare and find that DI enrollment amplifies the effects of reforms.     

Disability insurance and optimal income taxation

This paper studies the design of disability insurance scheme when agents differ in their privately known productivity. We extend the Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) two period model to allow for agents differing ex-ante in their productivity and characterize the optimal nonlinear tax transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfare function when per-period earnings and age are observable while individuals’ productivity and health status are not observable. We show that the induced tax/benefit scheme should exhibit a marginal income tax that decreases with age for some agents. A marginal subsidy on the young high productive income may be desirable. While the disability scheme always involves the old low productive agents to be indifferent between working and claiming disability benefits, this result is not always true for the old high productive agents. JEL Classification H55 · H23 · E62     

Time inconsistency as a rationale for public unemployment insurance

A role for public unemployment insurance is developed based on the inability of the government to commit to a future rate of unemployment. This is illustrated using a model in which a minimum wage policy combined with unemployment insurance is welfare-improving. Unemployment insurance could be decentralized to the private sector if the government could commit to a minimum wage. However, if not, a government that acts in the interest of the workers will have an incentive to increase the minimum wage to exploit private insurers. In the absence of commitment, an equilibrium with private unemployment insurance will not exist.     

Borrowing constraints,the cost of precautionary saving and unemployment insurance

When it is costly for individuals to save or to borrow, unemployment insurance (UI) provides an alternative source of liquidity that smooths consumption over time and leads individuals to spend longer unemployed searching for a suitable job. We show in a tractable life-cycle model how the optimal unemployment replacement ratio and the fall in consumption on job loss depend on the cost of self-insurance and the cost of borrowing. This implies that the value of UI depends on age at job loss, consumption needs (such as the presence of children), discount rates, the return on saving, access to credit and the presence of other social insurance programmes. Optimal replacement rates vary substantially with plausible variation in these factors (from less than 20 percent to almost 60 percent).     

Adverse selection and moral hazard: Quantitative implications for unemployment insurance

A model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard is constructed. The model generates both qualitative and quantitative implications for the optimal provision of unemployment insurance. Qualitatively, for some agents, incentives in the optimal contract imply consumption increases over the duration of non-employment. Calibrating the model to a stylized version of the U.S. economy quantitatively illustrates these theoretical predictions. The optimal contract achieves a welfare gain of 1.94% relative to the current U.S. system, an additional 0.87% of gains relative to a planner who ignores adverse selection and focuses only on moral hazard.     

The Swedish State unemployment insurance and the reinsurance problem of the funds

Abstract

In 1901 the town of Gent appropriated a municipal grant to societies paying benefit to their members in case of unemployment. The decision was founded on a committee report principally written by the lawyer Louis Varlez. The societies should claim individual contributions of the members constituting the right to unemployment allowance under certain conditions. In order to prevent a dissipating risk selection the sphere of activity of a society should join with some society existing before. Such societies had been erected at several places as well in Belgium as in other states, in Gent as early as in 1867. In most cases they were attached to trade unions. It may thus be said that a subsidized unemployment insurance was — for the first time — introduced in Gent 1901. The principles applied are usually called the »Gentsystem». In general accordance with this system state subsidized unemployment insurance was introduced in France 1905, in Norway 1906 and in Denmark 1907. Later several states have established unemployment insurance on a voluntary basis. In modern voluntary state insurance, however, a decisivestress is laid upon the fact that the allowance shall be regulated in accordance with the general rules for public relief of unemployment. Some conditions of the insurance scheme are thus compulsorily laid down in the regulations concerning the subsidy. In some states the unemployment insurance has been wholly established on a compulsory basis. For the first time a compulsory insurance was introduced in England in 1911 covering certain occupational groups. Compulsory unemployment insurance has then been erected in Italy 1919, Poland 1924, Bulgaria 1925 and Norway 1938. In 1938 a law bearing on a change of the voluntary unemployment insurance of Belgium to a compulsory one is being prepared.     

中国城镇失业保险的供求矛盾及对策研究

失业保险是指个人在失去工作或等待就业期间能从政府或社会得到保证基本生活需要的物质帮助。我国的失业保险制度从无到有逐渐发展壮大到今天,虽然已初步形成体系,但伴随着我国失业人口的与日俱增,现行的失业保险供给远远满足不了实际需求,在政府资金缺口的约束下,这一供求矛盾还将继续存在甚至有扩大的趋势。将失业保险制度的创新与促进就业的政策措施相结合,对于解决城镇失业保险的供求矛盾,实现标本兼治有着重要的意义。     

Optimal unemployment insurance design: Time limits, monitoring, or workfare?

This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. We examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity in preferences for leisure. The analysis suggests that a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as to avoid the sanction. Therefore, the UI provider can offer a more generous UI replacement rate in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. JEL Code J64 · J65 · J68     

The design of an optimal insurance contract for irreplaceable commodities

This paper discusses optimal insurance contract for irreplaceable commodities. To describe the dual impacts on individuals when a loss occurs to the insured irreplaceable commodities, we use a state-dependent and bivariate utility function, which includes both the monetary wealth and sentimental value as two arguments. We show that over (full, partial) insurance is optimal when a decrease in sentimental value will increase (not change, decrease, respectively) the marginal utility of monetary wealth. Moreover, a non-zero deductible exists even without administration costs. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a positive fixed reimbursement is optimal if (1) the premium is actuarially fair, (2) the monetary loss is a constant, and (3) the utility function is additively separable and the marginal utility of money is higher in the loss state than in the no-loss state. We also characterize comparative statics of fixed-reimbursement insurance under an additively separable preference assumption. JEL Classification G22 · D86 The author acknowledge funding from National Science Council in Taiwan (NSC93-2416-H-130-020).     

我国中资财产保险公司的最适规模分析

在激烈的竞争条件下,产险公司如何选择适合自身条件的经营发展规模显得尤为重要。本文运用聚类分析法对目前中资产险公司进行了归类,然后运用生存技术法、利润分析法对其规模经济状况进行了检验,得到了目前我国中资产险公司最佳规模区间。     

保险公司资产组合与最优投资比例研究

保险公司收益主要来源于承保利润和投资收益,其中承保利润受政策变动、市场条件等外部环境的影响较大,而投资收益则更多地取决于保险公司的投资能力,因此保险公司如何构建资产组合、如何确定最优投资比例就是获取投资收益最大化的重要因素。本文通过理论推导得出了保险公司的资产组合模型并运用非线性规划求解出最优投资比例,进而根据保险公司的投资数据进行了实证研究,为我国保险公司的资产组合及最优投资比例提供了一个可借鉴的思路。     

Comparative advantage and unemployment

Worker heterogeneity in productivity and labor supply is introduced into a matching model. Workers who earn high wages and work high-hours are identified as those with strong market comparative advantage—high rents from being employed. The model is calibrated to match separation, job finding, and employment in the SIPP data. The model predicts a big drop in employment for workers with weak comparative advantage during recessions. But the data show that workers with strong comparative advantage also display sizable employment fluctuations, implying that aggregate employment fluctuations are not explained by the responses of workers with small rents to employment.     

Land prices and unemployment

We integrate the housing market and the labor market in a dynamic general equilibrium model with credit and search frictions. We argue that the labor channel, combined with the standard credit channel, provides a strong transmission mechanism that can deliver a potential solution to the Shimer (2005) puzzle. The model is confronted with U.S. macroeconomic time series. The estimation results account for two prominent facts observed in the data. First, land prices and unemployment move in opposite directions over the business cycle. Second, a shock that moves land prices also generates the observed large volatility of unemployment.     

In-work benefits and unemployment

In-work benefits are becoming an increasingly relevant labour market policy, gradually expanding in scope and geographical coverage. This paper investigates the equilibrium impact of in-work benefits and contrasts it with the traditional partial equilibrium analysis. We find under which conditions accounting for equilibrium wage adjustments amplifies the impact of in-work benefits on search intensity, participation, employment, and unemployment, compared to a framework in which wages are fixed. We also account for the financing of these benefits and determine the level of benefits necessary to achieve efficiency in a labour market characterized by search externalities.     

政策性农业保险补贴的最优边界与方式探讨

政策性农业保险补贴具有动态性和多维性的最优边界,补贴的不足和过高均会减少福利。本文将消费者剩余和外部性结合起来构建了农业保险的福利经济学模型,探讨了最优补贴边界的决定标准;从保户和保险机构两方面分析了直接补贴原保险相对低效率的原因所在,提出了涵盖运作主体、基金运作方式、费率和再保险责任限制方式等要素的以再保险补贴为核心的最优补贴方式的构想。相对于直接补贴原保险的做法,这种构想更有利于实现农业风险的分散,减少信息不对称,提高转移支付的效率,进而实现农业保险供给的扩张。     

Portfolio insurance and prospect theory investors: Popularity and optimal design of capital protected financial products

Portfolio insurance strategies are used on both the institutional and the retail side of the asset management industry. While standard utility theory struggles to provide an explanation, this study justifies the popularity of portfolio insurance strategies in a behavioral finance context. We run Monte Carlo simulations as well as historical simulations for popular portfolio insurance strategies and benchmark strategies in order to evaluate the outcomes using cumulative prospect theory. Our simulation results indicate that most portfolio insurance strategies are the preferred investment strategy for a prospect theory investor. Moreover, the analysis provides insights into how portfolio insurance products should be designed and structured to meet the preferences of prospect theory investors as accurately as possible.     

On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard

We analyze the design of optimal medical insurance under ex post moral hazard, i.e., when illness severity cannot be observed by insurers and policyholders decide for themselves on their health expenditures. The trade-off between ex ante risk sharing and ex post incentive compatibility is analyzed in an optimal revelation mechanism under hidden information and risk aversion. The optimal contract provides partial insurance at the margin, with a deductible when insurers’ rates are affected by a positive loading, and it may also include an upper limit on coverage. The potential to audit the health state leads to an upper limit on out-of-pocket expenses.     

基于随机微分博弈的保险公司最优决策模型

本文研究了基于保险公司与自然之间二人-零和随机微分博弈的最优投资及再保险问题。假设保险公司具有指数效用,自然是博弈的虚拟对手,通过求解最优控制问题对应的HJB I方程,得到了保险公司的最优投资和再保险策略以及最优值函数的闭式解。结果显示,在完全分保时(即自留比例为零),保险公司应该将全部财富购买无风险资产,即风险资产投资额为零;在不完全分保时保险公司将卖空风险资产,且卖空数量及保险自留比例都随保险公司盈余过程与风险资产间的相关性的提高而增大,随终止时刻T的临近而增加,但随市场中无风险资产回报率的增加而减少。     

Wage aspirations and unemployment persistence

We use panel data to examine the empirical determinants of the reservation wage- in particular the influence of previous wages- and consider what this implies for the evolution of the natural rate of unemployment. We find that previous wages have a significant but relatively small effect on reservation wages (an elasticity between 0.15 and 0.47). We also find considerable differences across genders with previous wages being more important for men and market wages being more important for women. Overall our results suggest that the reservation wage will adjust quite quickly to shocks.