Household bargaining and the design of couples’ income taxation

This paper studies the design of couples’ income taxation when consumption and labor supply decisions within the couple are made by maximizing a weighted sum of the spouses’ utilities; bargaining weights are given but specific to each couple. Information structure and labor supply decisions follow the Mirrleesian tradition. However, while the household's total consumption is publicly observable, the consumption levels of the individual spouses are not observable. With a utilitarian social welfare function we show that the expression for a spouses’ marginal income tax rate includes a “Pigouvian” (paternalistic) and an incentive term. The Pigouvian term favors a marginal subsidy (tax) for the high-weight (low-weight) spouse, whose labor supply otherwise tends to be too low (high). The sign and the magnitude of the incentive term depends on the weight structure across couples. In some cases both terms have the same sign and imply a positive marginal tax for the low-weight spouse (who may be female) and a negative one for the high-weight spouse (possibly the male). This is at odds with the traditional Boskin and Sheshinski results. Our conclusions can easily be generalized to more egalitarian welfare functions. Finally, we present numerical simulations based on a calibrated specification of our model. The calculations confirm that the male spouse may well have the lower (and possibly even negative) marginal tax rate.     

Tax reform and collective family decision-making

Traditional analysis of tax reform treats market behaviour as arising out of individual utility maximisation. In this paper, behaviour is modelled as the Pareto-efficient outcome of a family decision process. Conditions for the existence of a feasible, Pareto-improving tax change are presented and contrasted with those that obtain in the individualistic case. The consequences of treating households as a single individual are also discussed.     

On the existence of an implementable optimal income tax

Summary. This paper discusses the existence of an optimal income tax and distinguishes itself from the previous articles in two respects. In previous papers, the self selection condition was not necessarily consistent with the individual budget constraint. Furthermore, implementability in previous papers was implicit in individual ability, rather than individual income, as the basis of the tax function. We offer a different concept of the self selection conditions: Anti Normal Envy that is consistent with the individual budget constraint and that we show to be equivalent to the competitive equilibrium under a tax function based on income. We then establish the existence of an implementable optimal income tax.Received: 9 December 2000, Revised: 5 August 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: H21, C62, D59.Correspondence to: Jun IritaniThe authors are grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal whose suggestions were instrumental to our revision of the paper, and to Professors Takao Kataoka, Tomoyuki Kamo, Tetsuya Kishimoto, and Mototsugu Fukushige, and the members of the Kobe-Osaka Joint Seminar in Mathematical Economics, for their invaluable comments.     

直接税对居民收入分配影响的实证分析

直接税对居民收入分配有重要影响,是缩小居民收入差距的主要手段之一。文章基于我国城镇居民按收入七等分组的收入和支出数据,综合运用了税负累进性测度、税前与税后收入差距比较、多元回归分析等定量研究方法,对2002-2012年间我国直接税居民收入分配效应进行了实证分析,结果发现：我国个人直接税负具有一定程度的累进性,但直接税降低收入不平等的总体效果并不十分明显,这与现行直接税的内部税种结构失衡、税制要素设计不合理等因素有关。分税种来看,个人所得税调节收入分配的效果优于财产税。基于促进居民收入公平分配目标,今后一个阶段直接税改革的总体思路与基本路径为要突出“调高”主基调,加强财产持有、转让环节的税制建设,优化直接税的税种结构进一步完善以个人所得税与房地产税为核心的直接税的税制设计与税收征管。     

Capital tax competition: bane or boon

This paper reviews potential advantages and disadvantages of capital tax competition. Tax competition may introduce, mitigate, or exacerbate inefficiencies in both the private sector and the public sector. In different models, tax competition may either limit or increase public expenditures and taxes on mobile factors, with differing welfare consequences. We also discuss the implications of tax competition for redistributive policies and for policies dealing with risk, and we identify some of the possible empirical implications of tax competition.     

Public Investment and Income Taxation: Redistribution vs. Productive Performance

This paper deals with government investment in a static two-type self-selection model of optimum income taxation. It is shown that the second-best investment rule is consistent with efficient production, provided that public investment has no influence on relative factor prices. Otherwise, however, redistributive income taxation implies that optimal investment expenditures exceed (or fall below) the efficient level as long as they raise (or decrease) the wage rate of the unskilled individuals relative to the wage rate of the skilled individuals.     

关于收入分配若干问题探析

在经济快速发展的同时,我国居民收入分配格局发生重大变化,收入分配不公的问题日益凸显。特别是新世纪以来,收入分配差距急剧拉大,收入分配不公已成为制约我国社会和谐稳定以及经济持续发展的突出问题。面对我国日趋严峻的收入分配不公现象,有许多问题值得深入分析和思考。收入差据拉大不能简单等同于收入分配不公,导致收入差距不断拉大的原因比差距拉大本身更值得关注;我国的收入分配不公以不同的形式表现在初次分配环节和再分配环节,初次分配环节的严重不公制约了再分配的公平。制约税收调节收入差距不力的因素不仅仅限于税收的立法与执法,而是有更深刻的根源。行政垄断、腐败等原因形成的收入差距税收杠杆是无效或低效的,政府收入不规范导致税收的公平分配力度偏弱。     

Sharing the Burden? Empirical Evidence on Corporate Tax Incidence

This study investigates the direct incidence of the corporate income tax (CIT) through wage bargaining, using an industry‐region level panel dataset on all corporations in Germany over the period 1998–2006. For the first time we account for employment effects which result from tax‐induced wage changes. Workers share in reductions of the CIT burden; yet, the net effect of wage bargaining on the corporate wage bill, after an exogenous €1 decrease in the CIT burden, is as little as 19–28 cents. This is about half of the effect obtained in prior literature focussing on wages alone.     

Identifying optimal contingent fiscal policies in a business cycle model

Optimal fiscal policy is indeterminate in a dynamic and stochastic environment. The complete characterization of the fiscal policy requires the use of identification constraints. In the literature either capital taxes or debt have been restricted to be not contingent on the state of nature. We propose a different type of identification constraints to have both policy variables state-contingent. Three alternative identification conditions are considered: (i) restrictions on the dynamic and stochastic behavior of the debt path; (ii) an exogenous debt path, and (iii) an exogenous belief function. The main result indicates that the optimal capital tax is zero and constant over the business cycle for any of the identification conditions used, suggesting that is optimal for the government to use debt return as a shock absorber, keeping capital taxes constant. The result is quite different from the previous literature, which obtains very volatile capital taxes. JEL Classification: E62, H21. We are grateful to Alfonso Novales, Víctor Ríos-Rull, Javier Vallés and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. We acknowledge financial support from Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (Ruiz and Pérez: BEC 2003-039; Manzano: BEC 2002-01995). Baltasar Manzano also acknowledges support from Xunta de Galicia (PGIDIT03PXIC30001PN, PGIDIT03CSO30001PR).     

Taxing Nothing – Tax Arbitrage and the Vanishing Revenue from Capital Income Taxation

In a one-period model the implications of the German tax code, concerning capital taxation, onto the capital market equilibrium are examined. Therefore, we model a corporation sector subject to the corporation tax and private investors liable to private income taxation. We show that there neither exist any possibilities for local tax arbitrage nor tax clienteles. Extending the model for stocks and derivative financial instruments, the tax base for private capital income taxation vanishes and the tax revenue drops to zero.revised version received September 3, 2003     

Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? And Should They?

The article surveys some main results in the theory of capitalincome taxation in the open economy; reviews recent trends ininternational taxation and discusses alternative blueprintsfor fundamental capital income tax reform from the perspectiveof an open economy faced with growing mobility of capital incometax bases. (JEL code: H21, H25)     

企业所得税征管:问题与对策

我国企业所得税征管环节存在不少亟待解决的问题,如税源监控不到位,服务意识待提高;汇算清缴制度不规范;纳税评估流于形式等.因此,应对纳税人科学分类,加强日常监控;核实税基;优化服务以降低纳税成本;规范企业所得税征管环节的各项管理;强化纳税评估,提高信息化程度,为企业营造出公平的纳税环境.     

Asking for Individual or Household Willingness to Pay for Environmental Goods?

The aggregate welfare measure for a change in the provision of a public good derived from a contingent valuation (CV) survey will be higher if the same elicited mean willingness to pay (WTP) is added up over individuals rather than households. A trivial fact, however, once respondents are part of multi-person households, it becomes almost impossible to elicit an “uncontaminated” WTP measure that with some degree of confidence can be aggregated over one or the other response unit. The literature is mostly silent about which response unit to use in WTP questions, and in some CV studies it is even unclear which type has actually been applied. We test for differences between individual and household WTP in a novel, web-administered, split-sample CV survey asking WTP for preserving biodiversity in old-growth forests in Norway. Two samples are asked both types of questions, but in reverse order, followed by a question with an item battery trying to reveal why WTP may differ. We find in a test between samples that the WTP respondents state on behalf of their households is not significantly different from their individual WTP. However, within the same sample, household WTP is significantly higher than individual WTP; in particular if respondents are asked to state individual before household WTP. Our results suggest that using individual WTP as the response unit may overestimate aggregate WTP. Thus, the choice of response format needs to be explicitly and carefully addressed in CV questionnaire design and further research in order to avoid the risk of unprofitable projects passing the benefit-cost test.

---