Is the household demand for in-home services sensitive to tax reductions? The French case

Our paper examines the impact of tax reductions on the demand for services in the home. For that purpose, we estimate a structural model of demand for such services by using household individual data collected by INSEE (Paris) in 1996. In this model, the net hourly wage paid to the domestic employee, the household preferences for consumption of in-home services and the decision to take advantage of the tax reduction are considered as endogenous variables. Estimation of the econometric model uses the fact that some households are observed to consume domestic services and to take advantage of the tax reduction, while others either consume such services but do not take advantage of the tax reduction, or do not consume these services at all. Its identification relies on an exclusion restriction resulting from the tax credit schedule. Results show that the probability of consuming in-home services increases with age and income. A 10% increase in the tax reduction would increase from 45.9 to 50.8% the proportion of households benefiting from the tax reduction among those who consume paid in-home services. Moreover, 13.5% of households who do not actually consume such services would do so after the 10% increase in the tax reduction. These simulated variations would mainly concern high-income households.     

Tax Riots

This paper considers an optimal taxation environment where household income is private information, and the government randomly audits and punishes households found to be underreporting. We prove that the optimal mechanism derived using standard mechanism design techniques has a bad equilibrium (a tax riot) where households underreport their incomes, precisely because other households are expected to do so as well. We then consider three alternative approaches to designing a tax scheme when one is worried about bad equilibria.     

Effective Taxation of Top Incomes in Germany

We exploit a dataset that includes the individual tax returns of all taxpayers in the top percentile of the income distribution in Germany to pin down the effective income taxation of households with very high incomes. Taking tax base erosion into account, we find that the top percentile of the income distribution pays an effective average tax rate of 30.5% and contributes more than a quarter of total income tax revenue. Within the top percentile, the effective average tax rate is first increasing, then decreasing, with income. Since the 1990s, effective average tax rates for the German super‐rich have fallen by about a third, with major reductions occurring in the wake of the personal income tax reform of 2001–05. As a result, the concentration of net incomes at the very top of the distribution has strongly increased in Germany.     

Optimal mixed taxation,credit constraints,and the timing of income tax reporting

We study optimal income and commodity tax policy with credit‐constrained low‐income households. Workers receive an even flow of income during the tax year, but report their incomes and make tax payments (receive transfers) at the end of the year. They spend their disposable income on multiple commodities over the year. We show that differentiated subsidies on commodities can be optimal even if the Atkinson–Stiglitz Theorem conditions apply. When the optimal policy leaves low‐income households with binding credit constraints, it may be optimal to subsidize differentially the good that they consume in higher proportion. Uniform subsidies would also relax the credit constraint, but would be more costly to the government since they would equally benefit unconstrained households. Numerical examples suggest that commodity tax differentiation increases with basic needs and with the interest rate at which government borrows.     

Changes in household composition as a shock-mitigating strategy

This paper uses data from the Russian Longitudinal Survey that span the two recent economic recessions of 1998 and 2008 to study the effect of declining incomes on household composition. We hypothesize that individuals face a trade-off between taking advantage of economies of scale and specialization when living with others, and individual privacy. Consumption smoothing is achieved by forgoing privacy during the crisis and results in increases in household size. Our empirical results suggest that members of households that experienced negative income shocks are more likely to move in with others compared to individuals residing in households whose income remained the same or increased.     

The Redistributive Effects of a Minimum Wage Increase in New Zealand: A Microsimulation Analysis

This paper examines the potential effects on inequality and poverty of a minimum wage increase, based on a microsimulation model that captures the details of household composition and the income tax and welfare benefit system and allows for labour supply responses. Results suggest that, largely due to the composition of household incomes, a policy of increasing the minimum wage has a relatively small effect on the inequality of income per adult equivalent person, and a money metric utility measure, using several inequality indices. Hence, the minimum wage policy does not appear to be particularly well targeted, largely due to many low wage earners being secondary earners in higher income households, while many low income households have no wage earners at all. These results are reinforced when allowing for wage spillovers further up the wage distribution. Nevertheless, a minimum wage increase can have a more substantial effect on some poverty measures for sole parents in employment.     

Are Consumption Taxes Regressive?

It is often argued that a general consumption tax is necessarily regressive, particularly because households with high incomes typically save relatively more than those with low incomes. This paper uses very simple tax models to examine the combination of income and consumption taxes. It suggests that it is preferable to consider the overall impact of all taxes and transfers rather than relating payments of a single tax to gross income, instead of the relevant tax base. Insofar as savings might be relevant, attention should be given to the income tax treatment of investment income.     

中国居民家庭的收入变动及其对长期平等的影响

本文利用“中国经济、人口、营养和健康调查”1 989— 1 997年期间 4期家庭收入和家长特征的模块数据 (paneldata) ,用时间依赖定义收入变动 ,度量了全体家庭和分4种类型的家庭在上世纪 80年末至 90年后半期的收入变动。发现在总体收入分配中 ,高比例持续贫困的发生比较分散 ,并不固定在哪一类型的家庭上。平均而言 ,农村家庭的持续贫困比例稍高。与此相反 ,持续高收入的家庭集中在城市、郊区和城镇 ,农村的富裕家庭变动大 ,收入不稳定。分组家庭之间 ,农村家庭的收入变动最大。分组家庭内部 ,家长为中年和壮年人的家庭人收入景况较好 ,富裕老人家庭能否保持富裕在农村和在其它分组差别很大。总体而言 ,我国居民家庭收入分配的变动在这一时期减慢 ;收入变动在所有4个时期内都有利于分配的平等 ,2 0世纪 90年代中期后在农村和城镇家庭的作用大幅减弱 ,但对改善城市家庭的平等分配作用增强。     

Understanding Rising Income Inequality in Germany, 1999/2000–2005/2006

We examine the factors behind rising income inequality in Europe's most populous economy. From 1999/2000 to 2005/2006, Germany experienced an unprecedented rise in net equivalized income inequality and poverty. At the same time, unemployment rose to record levels, part‐time and marginal part‐time work grew, and there was evidence for a widening distribution of labor incomes. Other factors that possibly contributed to the rise in income inequality were changes in the tax and transfer system, changes in the household structure (in particular the rising share of single parent households), and changes in other socio‐economic characteristics (e.g., age or education). We address the question of which factors were the main drivers of the observed inequality increase. Our results suggest that the largest part of the increase was due to increasing inequality in labor incomes, but that changes in employment outcomes and changes in the tax system also contributed considerable shares. By contrast, changes in household structures and household characteristics, as well as changes in the transfer system only seem to have played a minor role.     

New evidence on taxes and portfolio choice

Identifying the effect of differential taxation on portfolio allocation requires exogenous variation in marginal tax rates. Marginal tax rates vary with income, but income surely affects portfolio choice directly. In systems of individual taxation – like Canada's – couples with the same household income can face different effective tax rates on capital income when labor income is distributed differently within households. Using this source of variation we find portfolio responses to taxation among more affluent households. The estimated effects are statistically significant but economically modest. In a “placebo” test, using data from the U.S. (which has joint taxation), we find no effect of the intra-household distribution of labor income on portfolios.     

Cross-border commuting and consuming: an empirical investigation

This article contributes to our understanding of cross-border activity in general and the determinants of cross-border trade in particular by focusing on the part of cross-border sales that arise due to work-related cross-border crossings of households. We analyse empirically how cross-border consumption expenditures vary across product and services categories as well as household characteristics using representative household survey data of cross-border commuters to Luxembourg. In total, these households spend an estimated 17% of their gross annual income across the border, contributing about 10% to the total household final consumption expenditure (HFCE) in Luxembourg. Cross-border expenditure is linked to individual- and household-related characteristics and to distance between home and work. Cross-border commuters systematically exploit arbitrage opportunities that arise because of existing price level (index) differences between the country of work and the country of residence.     

Optimal age‐dependent income taxation in a dynamic extensive model: The case for negative participation tax on young people

We consider optimal age‐dependent income taxation in a dynamic model where the labor‐leisure choice is the extensive margin, each household faces idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity and a pecuniary cost to work, and there is no insurance market against the shocks. We show that the well‐known property of the optimal participation tax rate in the static model continues to hold in our dynamic economy, that is, the participation tax rates for some income groups with low consumption are likely negative. In dynamic models, the optimal participation tax rate depends on age and on labor income. Our numerical simulations suggest that a negative participation tax should be restricted to young households.     

Optimal tax perturbations

The paper considers an economy with H households, N+1 commodities and M fixed factors with commodity taxes and government expenditures on goods and services. The paper studies under what conditions (small) Pareto improving tax changes exist, i.e., tax changes which increase the utility of each household in the economy. The basic analytical technique used is just the usual comparative statics apparatus, except that duality theory is used in order to simplify the computations. The paper derives both the changes in prices and in real incomes that are induced by (small) changes in exogenous tax variables (differential real income balanced budget incidence analysis).     

Redistribution and Small Coalitions of Friends

When side marketing trade is perfect, linear taxation of retradeable commodities is the only scheme that survives attempts to arbitrage. In this paper, I discuss tax schemes when side trading is imperfect in the sense that commodities can only be re-exchanged within coalitions no larger than two people. In the framework of a two-class economy, I identify coalitions which might have an incentive to form and provide a characterisation for the Pareto-efficient tax scheme. The tax formula has a very simple form and strongly resembles the formula for the no-side-trade case. In a numerical exercise, the constraints imposed on policy by an imperfect side trading process are found to be almost as tough as those imposed by perfect side trading.     

Income splitting among the self-employed

Abstract .  Under individual taxation with progressive marginal tax rates, households in which the distribution of income is unequal benefit from attributing income to the lower income household member. Self-employment provides greater potential to 'split' income in this way because of the absence of a third party reporting income. Using the Canadian experience as a case study, this paper develops a unique estimator of the incidence of illegal income splitting among self-employed couples. The results suggest that the incidence of income splitting among self-employed men in Canada is non-trivial; but no evidence is found that self-employed women attribute income to their spouses.     

Source of income effects for demand decisions and taxable consumption

The relationship between sources of income and demand decisions by the household is examined here with an eye toward the ramifications on consumption tax bases. Income sources may be important when households attach psychic and transaction costs to individual purchases or when sources are assigned via a mental accounting process. In either case, general and specific sales tax bases may be affected by changes in income composition. Empirical results indicate two important findings. First, tax exemptions can introduce significant income source effects for a general consumption tax base. Second, the importance of differential tax rates for gasoline and food-at-home strongly depends on the mix of labour, capital, retirement and non-retirement transfer pay.     

Income Taxation with Labor Responses

When incomes are exogenously given, U. Jakobsson ( Journal of Public Economics s 5 (1976), 161–168) proved that a progressive tax structure always reduces inequality. We investigate the implications for effective progression of relaxing the assumption of exogenous incomes when individuals have the same preferences but different talents. We extend the standard result and conclude that it is generally impossible to disentangle the respective contributions to inequality reduction of the tax schedule and agents' preferences. For a linear tax schedule to result in less unequally distributed incomes it is sufficient that the elasticity of labor supply be nonincreasing in exogenous income and nondecreasing in productivities. The latter condition proves to be necessary and sufficient when the tax schedule is proportional.     

Taxation and household portfolio composition: US evidence from the 1980s and 1990s

This paper explores the relationship between household marginal income tax rates, the set of financial assets that households own, and the portfolio shares accounted for by each of these assets. It analyzes data from the 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998 Surveys of Consumer Finances and develops a new algorithm for imputing federal marginal tax rates to households in these surveys. The empirical findings suggest that marginal tax rates have important effects on asset allocation decisions. The probability that a household owns tax-advantaged assets, such as tax-exempt bonds or assets held in tax-deferred accounts, is positively related to its tax rate on ordinary income. In addition, the portfolio share invested in corporate stock, which is taxed less heavily than interest bearing assets, is increasing in the household’s ordinary income tax rate. Holdings of heavily taxed assets, such as interest-bearing accounts, decline as a share of wealth as a household’s marginal tax rate increases.     

Changing the Tax Mix

A tax mix change, including a component of the Australian tax reforms, involves a net increase in taxation of consumption and a net decrease in income taxation. If the tax mix change is approximately aggregate revenue neutral and retains current vertical equity, the new income tax rate schedule must be more progressive than the current schedule. The Australian proposal involves a revenue shortfall and some erosion of vertical progressivity. For the large proportion of households who save very little, the tax mix change has negligible effects on incentives and efficiency, and on total tax paid.