Redistribution with Unobservable Bequests: A Case for Taxing Capital Income

This paper addresses the question of the optimal taxation of labour and interest income in an overlapping generations model with two unobservable characteristics, ability and inheritance. We assume realistically that saving can only be taxed anonymously, whereas the tax on labour earnings can be individualized and made non-linear. In such a setting, we show that a withholding tax on interest income along with a non-linear tax on labour income is desirable. The role of interest income taxation is to indirectly tax inherited wealth.
JEL Classification D 63, H 2     

Taxation and household portfolio composition: US evidence from the 1980s and 1990s

This paper explores the relationship between household marginal income tax rates, the set of financial assets that households own, and the portfolio shares accounted for by each of these assets. It analyzes data from the 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998 Surveys of Consumer Finances and develops a new algorithm for imputing federal marginal tax rates to households in these surveys. The empirical findings suggest that marginal tax rates have important effects on asset allocation decisions. The probability that a household owns tax-advantaged assets, such as tax-exempt bonds or assets held in tax-deferred accounts, is positively related to its tax rate on ordinary income. In addition, the portfolio share invested in corporate stock, which is taxed less heavily than interest bearing assets, is increasing in the household’s ordinary income tax rate. Holdings of heavily taxed assets, such as interest-bearing accounts, decline as a share of wealth as a household’s marginal tax rate increases.     

Agglomeration, integration and tax harmonisation

Consideration of agglomeration reverses standard theoretical propositions in international tax competition. We show greater economic integration may lead to a ‘race to the top’ rather than a race to the bottom. Also, ‘split the difference’ tax harmonisation may harm both nations, a result that may explain why real-world tax harmonisation is rare. The key is that industrial concentration creates ‘agglomeration rent.’ The ‘core’ region can thus charge a higher tax rate without losing capital. The size of such rent is a bell-shaped function of the level of integration, so the tax gap first widens before narrowing as integration increases.     

The Optimal Rate of Inflation When Capital is Taxed

A simple ‘AK’ model of growth is developed in which consumers hold money to reduce transaction costs associated with their purchases of both consumption and investment goods. The government is constrained to choosing between an income tax and inflation as means of financing its expenditure. As a result, there is no presumption in favor of Friedman’s (1969) rule. Numerical simulations are conducted and generally find a low to moderate welfare maximizing rate of inflation.     

Worker remittances,migration, accumulation and growth in poor developing countries: Survey and analysis of direct and indirect effects

A broad but brief survey of the literature on remittances and growth shows that indirect effects are only included via interaction terms. Then, we regress data for migration, worker remittances, savings, investment, tax revenues, public expenditure on education, interest rates, literacy, labor force growth, development aid and GDP per capita growth on migration, remittances and other variables for a panel of countries with income below $1200. The estimated dynamic equations are integrated to a system used for baseline simulations. Comparison with the counterfactual policy simulations ‘only 50% remittances’ or ‘no net migration anymore’ shows that the total effect of remittances on levels and growth rates of GDP per capita, investment and literacy are positive, and that of net migration is negative for literacy and investment but positive for growth.     

Optimal taxation, global externalities and labor mobility

This paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax model. We assume that part of the labor force is mobile across countries, and that the set of tax instruments includes a nonlinear income tax and a commodity tax on the ‘dirty’ good that is causing damage to the environment. The purpose is to compare the (globally optimal) second best policy of a cooperative equilibrium with the policy implicit in a noncooperative equilibrium. We show that the commodity taxes differ between equilibria because of: (i) transboundary externalities not internalized by national governments, (ii) interaction effects between environmental and other policies, and (iii) labor mobility.     

Optimal taxes on wealth and consumption in the presence of tax evasion

This article incorporates tax evasion into an optimum taxation framework with individuals differing in earning abilities and initial wealth. We find that despite the possibility of its evasion a tax on initial wealth should supplement the optimal nonlinear income tax, given a positive correlation between initial wealth and earning abilities. Further, even if income and initial wealth are taxed optimally, it is still desirable to levy a tax on commodities, though it can be evaded as well. Thus, our result provides a rationale for a comprehensive tax system. Optimal tax rates on commodities differ in general, however for the special case of a uniform evasion technology equal rates are optimal if preferences are homothetic and weakly separable.     

Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with Habit Formation

It has recently been shown that incorporating “keeping up with the Joneses” preferences into a prototypical two‐ability‐type optimal nonlinear income tax model leads to higher marginal tax rates for both types of agents. In particular, the high‐skill type faces a positive marginal tax rate, rather than zero as in the conventional case. In this paper, agents’ utility functions are postulated to exhibit “habit formation in consumption” such that the prototypical two‐ability‐type optimal nonlinear income tax model becomes a dynamic analytical framework. We show that if the government can commit to its future fiscal policy, the presence of consumption habits does not affect the standard results on optimal marginal tax rates. By contrast, if the government cannot precommit, the high‐skill type will face a negative marginal tax rate, while the low‐skill type’s marginal tax rate remains positive.     

RATE‐CUTTING TAX REFORMS AND CORPORATE TAX COMPETITION IN EUROPE

While there is a large and growing number of studies on the determinants of corporate tax rates, the literature has so far ignored the fact that the behavior of governments in setting tax rates is often best described as a discrete choice decision problem. We set up an empirical model that relates a government's decision whether to cut its corporate tax rate to the country's own inherited tax and taxes in neighboring countries. Using comprehensive data on corporate tax reforms in Europe since 1980, we find evidence suggesting that the position in terms of the tax burden imposed on corporate income relative to geographical neighbors strongly affects the probability of rate‐cutting tax reforms. Countries are particularly likely to cut their statutory tax rate if the inherited tax is high and if they are exposed to low‐tax neighbors.     

External wealth, the trade balance, and the real exchange rate

We examine the link between the net foreign asset position, the trade balance and the real exchange rate. In particular, we decompose the impact of a country's net foreign asset position (‘external wealth’) on its long-run real exchange rate into two mechanisms: the relation between external wealth and the trade balance; and, holding fixed other determinants, a negative relation between the trade balance and the real exchange rate. We also provide additional evidence that the relative price of nontradables is an important channel linking the trade balance and the real exchange rate.     

Agglomeration and tax competition

Tax competition may be different in ‘new economic geography settings’ compared to standard tax competition models. If the mobile factor is completely agglomerated in one region, it earns an agglomeration rent which can be taxed. Closer integration first results in a ‘race to the top’ in taxes before leading to a ‘race to the bottom’. We reexamine these issues in a model that produces stable equilibria with partial agglomeration in addition to the core-periphery equilibria. A bell-shaped tax differential also arises in our model. Therefore, the ‘race to the top’ result generalises to a framework with partial agglomeration.     

Redistributive Tax and Growth in a Model with Discrete Occupational Choice

An optimal redistributive tax-subsidy formula is derived for a growth model where income inequality is endogenously driven by an adult's choice of occupation between work and management. Investment in human capital is the engine of growth. The world's stock of exploitable knowledge as well as the economy's average human capital determine the potential rate of return from investment in human capital in an economy. How much available knowledge would be exploited in the economy depends on the proportion of innovators in our model. A redistributive tax reform impacts growth as well as income inequality via its influence over the occupational choice. The optimal redistributive tax rate is path-dependent in the sense that it depends on the initial wealth distribution. The normative implication of the model is that the optimal capital income tax rate could very well be positive if the initial wealth inequality exceeds a threshold. The optimal capital income tax rate depends inversely on the initial wealth inequality.     

Environmental taxes with heterogeneous consumers: an application to energy consumption in France

This paper constructs a model with four groups of households who have preferences over labor supply, consumption of polluting (energy related) and non-polluting (non-energy) goods, and emissions. It quantifies the model for the French economy and computes its optimal tax equilibria under nine second-best tax regimes. We find that the redistributive role of environmental taxes requires the polluting goods to be taxed at a rate much below their marginal social damage. These goods may even require an outright subsidy if the society values equality ‘a lot’. Secondly, if environmental taxes that have an exclusively externality-correcting role, they benefit all types—although the gains are rather modest. The gains and losses become more substantial when environmental taxes have a redistributive role as well. Third, setting the environmental tax at its Pigouvian level, rather than its optimal externality-correcting-cum-redistributive level, benefits the high-income group at the expense of the low-income groups. Fourth, nonlinear taxation of polluting goods, and nonlinear commodity taxation in general, is a powerful redistributive mechanism. Fifth, introducing environmental taxes in the current French tax system, with its suboptimal income taxes, results in substantial welfare gains for the highest income group and a sizable loss for the least well-off persons.     

An efficiency and welfare classification of rationing by waiting in the presence of bribery

Governments often allocate commodities at low prices and on a first-come-first-served basis (rationing by waiting), while bureaucrats who distribute the commodities usually take bribes. A model is developed to classify the efficiency implications of bribery, and socially optimal pricing schemes in rationing by waiting. If the rationed good and individual income spent on other goods (‘other’ income) are ‘complements’, then bribery may enhance allocative efficiency, and a ‘dual pricing’ scheme can augment social welfare. However, if the rationed commodity and ‘other’ income are ‘substitutes’, then bribery may not improve allocative efficiency, and distributing the rationed commodity free is socially optimal.     

WEALTH AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME: PERMANENT AND TRANSITORY EFFECTS

This paper examines the permanent and transitory effects of changes in wealth, the top federal marginal income tax rate, and capital gains tax rate on the distribution of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). This paper establishes the importance of wealth in determining the distribution of AGI, and results here suggest that its effects can negate the permanent effect of a change in both tax rates. Of the two tax rates, the capital gains tax rate is the most important for AGI distribution. The marginal income tax rate is notably less important for long run behavior, but does have short run impacts.     

The Institutionalist Perspective on Recent Theories of Direct Foreign Investment: A Comment on McClintock

This article holistically addresses the effective (relative) income tax contribution of a given income (or, wealth) group. The widely acclaimed standard in public policy is the absolute benefaction of a given income group in filling up the fiscal coffers. Instead, we focus on the ratio of the average income tax rate of an income group divided by the percentage of national income (or wealth) appropriated by the same income group. In turn, we develop the Fiscal Inequality Coefficient which compares the effective percentage income tax payments of pairs of income (or wealth) groups. Using data for the United States, we concentrate on pairs such as the Bottom 90% versus Top 10%, Bottom 99% versus Top 1%, and Bottom 99.9% versus Top 0.1%. We conclude that policy makers with a strong social conscience should re-evaluate the progressivity of the income tax system and make the richest echelons of the income and wealth distributions pay a fairer and higher tax.     

Optimal Income Taxation with Risky Earnings: A Synthesis

We study optimal nonlinear income taxation when earnings can differ because of both ability and luck, so the income tax has both a redistributive role and an insurance role. A substantial literature on optimal redistribution in the absence of risk has evolved since Mirrlees's original contribution. The literature on the income tax as a social insurance device is more limited. It has largely assumed that households are ex ante identical so unequal earnings are due to risk alone. We provide a general treatment of the optimal income tax under risk when households differ in ability. We characterize optimal marginal tax rates and interpret them in terms of redistribution, insurance, and incentive effects. The case of ex ante identical households and the no‐risk case with heterogeneous abilities come out as special cases.     

FIRST‐BEST FISCAL POLICY WITH SOCIAL STATUS*

This paper examines the first‐best fiscal policy in a stochastic, infinite‐horizon representative agent model that exhibits consumption‐enhanced as well as wealth‐enhanced social status in the household utility. We show that the first‐best labour tax rate is a positive constant that is used to correct negative consumption externalities. The first‐best tax rate on capital income is also positive in order to overturn agents' status‐seeking capital over‐accumulation. Moreover, we find that in sharp contrast to a conventional automatic stabilizer, the first‐best capital tax rate moves in the opposite direction with shocks to firms' production technology, thus exacerbating the business cycle.     

The optimal taxation of risky capital income: An elasticity rule

Should risky capital income be taxed like safe income or should tax rates be differentiated? The question is analyzed in a 2-assets model of portfolio choice. Flat tax rates are chosen in order to maximize the investor's expected utility from terminal wealth subject to an expected tax revenue constraint. If lump-sum taxes are not available, optimal tax rates are characterized by an elasticity rule: The relative change in the risk remuneration should be equal to the inverse of the product of two elasticities. One is the output elasticity of capital. The other is the demand elasticity for risky investments with respect to a revenue preserving tax variation.     

On the optimal income taxation: Some further numerical results

Using numerical calculations we show in the optimal income tax model that a realistic value for the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure (?=0.5) leads to conclusions different from some of those drawn by Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson (1973). The marginal tax rates are not so low and the shape of the tax schedule is for a great majority of the population substantially nonlinear. A new feature in our calculations is that both results come out without going to maximin, as done by Atkinson (1973). We study in special cases the locality of the zero limit of the marginal tax rate at the upper end of the ability distribution and we achieve a very definite conclusion: this result is really very local. We also present an interesting approximation result concerning the relationship between the level of the government revenue and the marginal tax rate for individuals with high ability. An important methodological remark analogous to Sen's critique on the ethical measures of inequality is made on the interpretation of optimal income tax calculations.