Unemployment accounts and employment incentives

We explore the far-reaching implications of replacing current unemployment benefit (UB) systems by an unemployment accounts (UAs) system. Under the UAs system, employed people are required to make ongoing contributions to their UAs and the balances in these accounts are available to them during periods of unemployment. The government is able to undertake balanced-budget interpersonal redistributions among the UAs. At the end of their working lives, people could transfer the remaining balances on their UAs into their pensions.We present an analytical framework to analyse the incentive effects of UAs and calibrate our model for the high high-unemployment countries of Europe. Our results suggest that this policy reform would significantly change people's employment incentives and could achieve reductions in unemployment without reducing the level of support to the unemployed.     

Effect of labor market policies on unemployment when firms adapt their recruitment strategy

Firms conduct interviews to select who to hire. Their recruitment strategies affect not only the hiring rate but also job destruction rate as more interviews increase the chances of finding the right worker for the job; a link mostly overlooked in the literature. I model this recruitment behavior and investigate the effects of labor market policies on unemployment. These policies change the value of hiring the right worker, altering firms' incentives to conduct interviews. Policies further affect job creation and destruction when firms adapt their recruitment strategies. Net effect of a policy on unemployment depends on the magnitude of change in job creation versus destruction. Qualitative analysis reveals that the effect of a policy on unemployment is mostly weakened with the introduction of firms' recruitment behavior to the model. Firing taxes still increase unemployment, albeit at a lower rate. The effect of hiring subsidies on unemployment is even reversed: Unemployment increases with hiring subsidies if firms adapt. Minimum wage and unemployment insurance policies are also analyzed.     

Effects of pro-growth policies on employment: evidence of regional disparities

The main objective of our research is to study the direct impact of pro-growth economic policies on employment creation globally and regionally, as evidence has countered policy-makers’ expectation that output growth leads automatically to job creation. We innovate by using the ratio of employment to the population above 25 years as dependent variable instead of the customary employment elasticity. We apply generalized methods of moments’ econometrics on dynamic panel data models and find that growth stimulates employment creation on average across 76 countries. The policies promoting private sector credit, investments, openness, services, education spending, tertiary enrollment, and a fixed exchange rate are the ones that create employment. Larger government size undermines job creation, while policies promoting FDI and industrial development fail to stimulate employment. However, we establish that the effect of pro-growth policies on employment varies significantly across regions, with evidence of weaker links between economic policies and employment in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.     

The employment effect of reforming a public employment agency

By how much does an increase in operating effectiveness of a public employment agency (PEA) and a reduction of unemployment benefits reduce unemployment? Using a recent labour market reform in Germany as background, we find that an enhanced effectiveness of the PEA explains about 20% of the observed post-reform unemployment decline. The role of unemployment benefit reduction explains just about 5% of the observed decline. Due to disincentive effects resulting from the reform, the reform of the PEA could have had an even higher impact on unemployment reduction if there had been less focus on long-term unemployed workers.     

The beneficial effects of generous unemployment benefits on profits and employment

Theories of the labor market generally predict that high unemployment benefits put upward pressure on wages, thus diminishing the profitability of employing labor and exacerbating unemployment. It remains to be explained why firms agree to contribute to generous schemes (replacement rates for general schemes in Europe and US are in the range 50–85%) that they are often willing to supplement (with sector- or firm-specific schemes that may involve even 100% replacement and long benefit duration). An answer can be found by including in the shirking–efficiency wage model, the hypotheses that workers are risk-averse and that those discharged for misconduct are not eligible to benefits. It is then optimal for risk-neutral firms (and for employment) to introduce an insurance scheme with full income coverage and with a duration limited only by the workers' participation constraint (there is no trade-off between level and duration of benefits). The more difficult it is to detect and fire shirkers, the higher is the rent workers enjoy above the competitive wage and the longer is the benefit duration consistent with the participation constraint. This result can be interpreted as a complementarity between the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) and the duration of benefits, which seems to conform with broad patterns observed in primary vs. secondary employment and in continental Europe vs. Anglo-Saxon countries.     

Egalitarian wage policies, unemployment and skill-biased technological change

A popular explanation for the rise in European unemployment during the past decades is that relative wages failed to adjust to changes in relative productivities. Many economists reject this hypothesis on the ground that the ratios of low- to high-skill unemployment did not increase. Building on a search model, I argue that relative unemployment rates are affected by skill-neutral, as well as skill-biased shocks; hence stable ratios are theoretically consistent with a mix of skill-biased and skill-neutral shocks. Yet, numerical exercises confirm that wage rigidity in the face of skill-biased shocks probably did not explain much of the European unemployment experience.     

Inequality,unemployment, and endogenous growth in a political economy with a minimum wage

This paper presents development of an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous households and political determination of the minimum wage. We investigate the interaction of inequality, unemployment, and economic growth. First, the arguments in this paper show that a positive correlation exists between inequality and unemployment, Second, the interaction between inequality and economic growth is shown to be a positive relation if high inequality pertains in a society. It is a negative relation if low inequality pertains.      

Employment effects of stabilization policies

This paper studies the effects of a stabilization program based on a reduction in the devaluation rate in an optimizing model with capital controls, minimum wages for unskilled labor, an informal sector, and public production of intermediate inputs. Perfect mobility across sectors of the unskilled labor force prevents the emergence of unemployment for that category of labor, but skilled unemployment prevails in equilibrium. The analysis highlights the role of endogenous labor market segmentation in assessing the wage and employment effects of stabilization policies.     

International commodity taxation in the presence of unemployment

In this paper, we evaluate the impact of commodity tax competition on welfare and employment under the destination and origin principles, when the labor market is imperfectly competitive owing to a binding fixed wage. Our main finding is that commodity taxation causes an employment externality whose signs may be opposite under the two principles. While tax competition leads to inefficient tax rates under both principles, we also prove that the origin principle guarantees lower unemployment and higher welfare when the fixed wage is high. Finally, we show that the employment externality still exists in a standard union model of wage determination.     

Tariffs,trade and unemployment in a disequilibrium model: issues and policies

This paper studies the disequilibrium transition process engaged by increased openness to trade, and the effect of institutions, market behaviors and economic policies on that transition. The issue is analyzed with a simple two country (north and south), two goods model, amended in order to take into account the time dimension of both the production and the decision processes. Investigating the consequences of a tariff decrease by means of numerical simulations, we show to what extent wage and price setting, and the degree of tightness of monetary policy affect the outcome of the disequilibrium process. The main result is that capturing the gains associated with international trade requires market behaviors and economic policies, which are rather different from what is usually prescribed.

Redistribution,inequality, and efficiency with credit constraints: Implications for South Africa

We develop a model that jointly determines the distribution of income and the aggregate macrodynamics. We identify multiple channels through which alternative public policies such as transfers, consumption and income taxes, and public investment will affect the inequality-efficiency trade-off. Income tax and transfers have both a direct income and an indirect substitution effect; a consumption tax has only the latter. We present extensive numerical simulations motivated by the South African National Development Plan 2030, the objective of which is to reduce soaring inequality and increase per capita GDP. Our results illustrate how the judicious combination of social grants and a consumption tax may help achieve these targets. The simulations also suggest that the sharp decline in the private-public capital ratio, coupled with a high degree of complementarity between public and private capital may help explain the persistence of market inequality in South Africa during the last two decades.     

The fading 1990s in Japan: Driving forces behind the unemployment upsurge

This paper sheds new light on the causes of the unemployment upsurge in Japan during the “fading 1990s”, an unprecedented period of structural crisis. We estimate a labor market model and identify the main macroeconomic determinants of labor demand and labor supply decisions in the last decades. We then conduct dynamic simulations and assess the relative contribution of these determinants to the evolution of unemployment from 1990 to 2002. Beyond the leading role exerted by the decline in productivity growth, we find the active and expansionary measures undertaken by the government had an overall negative effect on the labor market.     

The employment effects of sustainable development policies

This paper argues that it is time for ecological economists to bring the employment impacts of sustainable development policies to the forefront of the research agenda. Important conservation efforts continue to founder because of their perceived employment effects. The paper examines the evidence on the employment impacts of sustainable development policies and argues that maintaining or even increasing employment depends critically on appropriate policy design and attention to the political economy of implementation of policies. The paper concludes that a better understanding of these issues, fair labour market and structural adjustment programs, and especially forward planning to anticipate problem areas, must replace the piecemeal, ‘knee-jerk’ reactions to environmental issues, such as were evident in Australia during the last federal election.     

再分配倾向的决定:对既有文献的考察

本文对再分配倾向决定领域的既有文献进行详尽考察,认为从内在动力角度来理解各种决定因素才是根本,归纳提炼了再分配倾向决定的四大动机:经济利益动机、风险规避动机、公平信念动机和声誉理想动机。再分配倾向决定的四大动机通过不尽相同的理论逻辑机制和多种实证影响因素对人们的再分配倾向产生影响,四大动机的框架为实证研究中的因素筛选提供了有力的工具。对于该领域进一步的研究,本文提出应用实验手段的重要性,并应注意宏观变量对再分配倾向的内生性影响。     

Testing for cointegration with threshold effect between unemployment and stock prices

Under the dominant role of a belief function, Farmer argues that the stock market is the Granger cause of the unemployment rate, which implies that the natural rate hypothesis is an outdated idea. This article provides some new empirical evidence supporting this view using threshold cointegration and asymmetric error correction models. The results show that these models can assess asymmetric dynamics between unemployment and the stock market. Moreover, regime switches of the momentum threshold autoregressive adjustment specification are highly consistent with recessions in the US economy during the last 60 years.     

Conceptualizing Un employment in a Period of Atypical Em ployment: A Critical Realist Perspective

An adequate conceptualization and measurement of unemployment should express the reality of employment. Designing theoretical concepts that adequately express reality requires appropriate methodological foundations. This paper uses critical realism to demonstrate that the deductive method encourages the construction of theoretical concepts in such a way as to reduce the multidimensional, qualitative reality of employment and unemployment to the quantitative, single dimension of variables, whereupon they cease to be adequate expressions of the reality they are designed to investigate. Part-time employment is used to exemplify atypical employment and to illustrate how the latter differs from typical employment in a number of dimensions, most of which are qualitative in nature.     

Redistributive policies with heterogeneous social preferences of voters

There is growing evidence on the roles of fairness and other-regarding preferences as fundamental human motives. Call voters with fair preferences, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), fair-voters. By contrast, traditional political economy models are based on selfish-voters who derive utility solely from “own” payoff. In a general equilibrium model with endogenous labor supply, a mixture of fair and selfish voters choose optimal policy through majority voting. First, we show that majority voting produces a unique winner in pairwise contests over feasible policies (the Condorcet winner). Second, we show that a preference for greater fairness leads to greater redistribution. An increase in the number of fair voters can also lead to greater redistribution. Third, we show that in economies where the majority are selfish-voters, the decisive policy could be chosen by fair-voters, and vice versa. Fourth, while choosing labor supply, even fair voters behave exactly like selfish voters. We show how this apparently inconsistent behavior in different domains (voting and labor supply) can be rationalized within the model.     

Union games: technological unemployment

Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, C72. Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper.     

Finance and unemployment: new panel evidence

The effect of credit market imperfections on unemployment is largely investigated in the context of financial crises. This paper shifts the focus toward financial development and structure in a panel of advanced and developing countries. Some important findings emerge. Unemployment increases with financial development and concentration in banking markets but decreases with market orientation, the effect is stronger in magnitudes for young workers than female ones. More rigid market regulation increases unemployment. These findings are particularly pronounced for countries with higher income, better developed financial sectors, lower income inequality, greater trade openness, higher democracy, and common-law systems.     

Business regulation and labor market performance around the world

Using data from 74 industrial, developing and transition countries for the years 2000–2003, this paper analyzes empirically whether and to what extent anticompetitive business regulations affect the performance of the labor market. According to the regression results, they appear to increase unemployment rates and lower employment rates. It seems that they particularly worsen the employment situation of young people. Our results are robust to variations in specification.