行政事业单位出租收入存在的问题及对策

随着市场经济的高速发展,为了促进国有资产的合理配置、提高国有资产的使用效率,我国鼓励各省市、地区的行政事业单位将闲置的国有资产对外有偿出租.然而由于各地区对这部分国有资产管理不规范,使得行政事业单位在有偿出租闲置的国有资产时产生了很多问题.本文主要从行政事业单位对闲置国有资产出租收入存在的问题进行分析,研究产生这一系列问题的原因,借此提出改进行政事业单位出租收入管理的一些建议.     

因子分析在城镇居民耐用品拥有量的统计应用

近年来,国民生活水平不断提高,但由于经济发展不均衡,各省之间的居民生活水平存在较大差距。本文结合实际情况,以耐用品拥有量为指标,运用多变量统计因子分析的方法对其进行定量分析,采用2012年《中国统计年鉴》数据,以SPSS19.0为工具,将各省市的耐用品拥有量的特点提取出来,客观地反映各省市的经济状况。从而总结出我国发展的平衡状况,为决策者制定宏观调控政策提供相应依据。     

收入风险对居民耐用品消费的影响

本文首次采用大型微观家庭面板数据对我国城乡居民的耐用品消费进行深入研究,主要结论包括:(1)改革进程方面,20世纪90年代中后期国企转制和员工下岗等就业体制方面的重大变革,使居民"收入风险"显著上升,进而明显抑制了城乡家庭的耐用品消费。(2)城乡对比方面,农村家庭面临更高的收入风险,其消费决策对风险因素也更为敏感,因此在当前的"新农村"建设中,建立健全农业保险和农村就业保障体系,对于提高农民消费和福利水平意义重大。(3)本文的研究结果完全支持(S,s)理论模型;同时在收入风险的度量和代理变量选取方面,文章中的一些分析方法也可以应用于汽车、住房等相关领域的研究和政策评价。     

中国住房改革对家庭耐用品消费的影响

中国的住房改革对许多城市家庭形成正的财富冲击。利用CHNS数据,我们发现：同理论预期一致,受益于住房改革的家庭消费了更多的耐用品。特别是,在住房改革的随后几年,其影响更为显著。我们还发现．住房改革对耐用品消费的次序具有影响,经历住房改革的家庭倾向于首先消费生活最必需的耐用品,然后再消费其他耐用品。通过增加家庭的耐用品消费,住房改革对扩大内需和走出当时的通货紧缩产生了积极影响。     

中国住房改革对家庭耐用品消费的影响

中国的住房改革对许多城市家庭形成正的财富冲击。利用CHNS数据,我们发现:同理论预期一致,受益于住房改革的家庭消费了更多的耐用品。特别是,在住房改革的随后几年,其影响更为显著。我们还发现,住房改革对耐用品消费的次序具有影响,经历住房改革的家庭倾向于首先消费生活最必需的耐用品,然后再消费其他耐用品。通过增加家庭的耐用品消费,住房改革对扩大内需和走出当时的通货紧缩产生了积极影响。     

论非法出租出借枪支罪存在问题及其完善

刑法典第128条规定了非法出租出借枪支罪。根据刑法规定，非法出租出借枪支罪是指依法配备公务用枪的人员或者单位，违反枪支管理规定，非法出租出借枪支，依法配置枪支的人员或者单位，违反枪支管理规定，非法出租、出借枪支并造成严重后果的行为。笔者认为，从刑法理论上来看，本罪无论在主观方面还是犯罪即遂形态方面都存在着严重问题。     

耐用品行业企业技术创新策略的产业组织研究综述

目前国内从产业组织理论的角度对耐用品行业中企业技术创新策略的研究还非常少,通过对有关研究作系统的综述,可以帮助国内研究者迅速了解国内外研究的现状。于是综述了科斯动态不一致问题及其解决办法、计划淘汰理论、耐用品特性与网络外部性的关系、计划淘汰是否促进了技术进步、耐用新产品的销售策略和定价策略、经济淘汰理论以及耐用品企业面临进入威胁时的创新策略等方面最新的文献,并在此基础上提出了一些未来可以深入研究的方向。     

我国企业销售渠道存在的问题与解决方案

我国企业销售渠道存在缺乏效率性、稳定性、厂商关系紧张以及渠道冲突严重等问题。结合新的发展形势研究选择销售渠道的制约因素,提出进行企业销售渠道创新的具体措施,显得尤为重要。     

烘焙用品网络销售存在的问题及对策分析

网络销售如今已经成为商品销售中重要的一部分,网络销售额所占商品销售总额的比例越来越大,在烘焙用品的销售中也是如此.近年来众多的烘焙用品销售商开始通过网络来进行销售,烘焙用品的网络销售在我国得到了快速的发展.然而在烘焙用品的网络销售中也出现了一些问题,这些问题对于烘焙用品网络销售的健康发展是不利的.本文分析了我国烘焙用品网络销售中存在的问题,并且针对这些问题提出了相应的对策.     

Dynamic Monopoly with Nondurable Goods

A nondurable good monopolist who posts a single price will generally achieve an inefficient outcome. But is it possible that the monopolist would achieve efficiency by repeatedly posting prices before delivery? If buyers recognize the effect of current purchases on future prices, then, under complementary ideal conditions, the answer is yes. On the other hand, traditional concerns about monopoly are viable if the seller bears a small cost per buyer of market reopening.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D42, L12.     

Vertically Differentiated Monopoly with a Positional Good

We analyse positional effects in a monopoly market with vertical differentiation, comparing monopoly and social planning. The provision of quality under monopoly depends upon the relative size of positional effects and the hedonic evaluation of quality. An elitarian equilibrium where quality increases in the level of positional concern emerges under monopoly, only if the market is sufficiently rich. Under social planning, quality increases in the level of positional externality, independently of market affluency. As long as partial market coverage obtains under both regimes, the monopoly deadweight loss decreases as the positional externality becomes more relevant.     

Public Good Mix in a Federation with Incomplete Information

We analyze a model of resource allocation in a federal system in which the center transfers real resources between member states. The center is assumed to be unable to observe the precise value of the cost differences across jurisdictions that motivate the transfers. Moreover, the center cannot observe the output levels of the individual local public goods provided by the jurisdictions, but must condition its transfers on a coarse aggregate of expenditures on public goods. We find that when the jurisdiction with private information realizes a high unit cost, it is generally worthwhile for the center to allow it a level of expenditure on public goods that differs from the "first best" level. However, whether that level is higher or lower than its first best level depends on the magnitudes of demand parameters for the local public good.     

The Good Fight*

This paper is concerned with aspects of policy-making which tend to impede economic efficiency, and with steps which might enhance such efficiency. Various problems and impediments are discussed first. The paper then looks at the roles of advisers and ministers. It concludes with a somewhat speculative look at ways in which opinion, advice and policies might change.     

The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment

In this paper, the strategy method's impact on behavior in sequential bargaining games is investigated. Besides the decision procedure (hot versus cold), we varied the second mover punishment costs (high versus low). Significant impacts of both treatment variables were observed. For example, second movers punished significantly more often in the hot version of the low cost game. Furthermore, first mover behavior was significantly different in the hot and cold versions of both games. In the hot games, first mover behavior suggests an expectation of decreased rewards and/or punishments from second movers. We observed, however, no decrease in reward and an increase in punishment. The hot cold variable only informs first movers that the decision procedure used by second movers has changed. Therefore, first mover behavior must be shaped by their perceived assessment concerning how second movers make decisions. We argue that first mover behavior can be explained by the interaction of two well-known psychological effects: the consensus and positive self-image effects.     

Bargaining over a Common Good with Private Information*

Consider two agents who make sequential claims on a common good, receiving their respective claims only if these are compatible. We let the first mover be privately informed about the size of the good. Conventional theory predicts multiple equilibria, and the intuitive criterion predicts that the first player claims the entire good. Our experimental results reject the intuitive criterion. Private information reduces the claim and the profit of the first mover. However, we cannot reject that the subjects play according to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Most subjects play according to a PBE, and almost all successful coordination occurs at the even split.     

当代销售服务新动向

现代企业经营的最高目标是赢得顾客忠诚，而能否赢得顾客忠诚的关键又取决于企业所提供的服务。为提供高质量、高境界的服务，企业加强了对销售服务方式和技巧的创新，许多新兴销售服务方式相继涌现，包括零干扰服务、一对一服务、常客服务、零距离服务、绿色服务、e化服务等。     

Private Provisions of a Discrete Public Good with Voluntary Participation

This paper studies the mechanism that a profit-making principal should adopt to provide a discrete public good when the values of the consumers are their private information and their participation is voluntary. The free-riding issue is resolved through threatened nonprovision of the good by the provider. Every bidder is asked to announce his or her virtual value as defined in Myerson (1981) . The public good is provided if and only if the sum of the bidders' announced virtual values exceeds the provision cost. When a provision decision results, each bidder pays an amount that is determined by the announcement of other consumers. No one pays when a nonprovision decision results. We find that this mechanism is implementable through an all-pay auction. A restricted profit-maximizing mechanism that implements efficient allocation is also characterized. As in Gradstein (1994) , when provision is always efficient, that is, the sum of consumers' values always exceeds the provision cost, efficient allocation is achievable through a profit-maximizer. However, this is not the case when provision is not efficient.     

Why the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment with a Sales Factor*

Using a two‐country tax competition model with a multinational enterprise (MNE), this paper addresses the question of whether the European Union should replace separate accounting (SA) in corporate income taxation by formula apportionment (FA) and, if so, which apportionment factors should be used. Our main result is that FA with a sales factor may mitigate or even eliminate fiscal externalities caused by the countries' tax policy. Hence, our analysis provides a microfoundation for the sales apportionment factor. In an empirical calibration to the EU‐15 we show that the transition from SA to FA with a sales‐only formula raises average tax rates by 2% and average tax revenues by 1 billion euros or 0.1% of GDP. These effects result in an increase of welfare.