On the performance of voting systems in spatial voting simulations

We study the performance of voting systems in terms of minimizing the overall social disutility of making a collective choice in an univariate voting space with ideological voting and perfect information. In order to obtain a distribution of the performance indicator for each of the 12 systems chosen for this study—Baldwin’s Method, Black’s Method, The Borda Count, Bucklin’s Grand Junction System, Coombs’ Method, Dodgson’s System, Instant Run-Off Voting, Plurality, Simpson’s MinMax, Tideman’s Ranked Pairs, Schulze’s Beatpath Method, and Two-Round Majority—we simulate elections using an Agent-Based Computational approach under several different distributions for voters and candidates positioning, with up to 15 available candidates. At each iteration, voters generate complete and strict ordinal utility functions over the set of available candidates, based on which each voting system computes a winner. We define the performance of a system in terms of its capability of choosing among the available candidates the one that minimizes aggregate voter disutility. As expected, the results show an overall dominance of Condorcet completion methods over the traditional and more widely used voting systems, regardless of the distributions of voter and candidate positions.     

On probability models in voting theory

This paper illustrates the use of probability models to study properties of voting rules. In particular, a simple occupancy distribution and its limiting Dlrichlet form are introduced, corresponding to simplifying assumptions about voters' preferences. We use as illustrations the occurrence probability of the Condorcet Paradox, a vintage problem in social choice theory, along with the related concept of Condorcet efficiency, a measure of goodness for voting rules. Further examples include properties of a lottery rule and the vulnerability of certain voting rules to strategic manipulation. Prospects for future work are indicated.     

Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists

Stochastic models of elections typically indicate that all parties, in equilibrium, will adopt positions at the electoral center. Empirical analyses discussed in this paper suggest that convergence of this kind is rarely observed. Here we examine a stochastic electoral model where parties differ in their valences – the electorally perceived, non-policy “quality” of the party leader. It is assumed that valence may either be exogenous, in the sense of being an intrinsic characteristic of the leader, or may be due to the contributions of party activists, who donate time and money and thus enhance electoral support for the party. Theorem 1 shows that vote maximization depends on balancing these two opposed effects. Theorem 2 provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence to the electoral mean when activist valence is zero. The paper then examines empirical electoral models for the Netherlands circa 1980 and Britain in 1979, 1992 and 1997 and shows that party divergence from the electoral mean cannot be accounted for by exogenous valence alone. The balance condition suggests that the success of the Labour party in the election of 1997 can be attributed to a combination of high exogenous valence and pro-Europe activist support.     

Evidence of sophisticated voting in a committee setting: theory and experiments

This article seeks to use laboratory experimental methods in order to investigate the extent to which decision makers employ sophisticated voting strategies. Using two experimental settings that provide very different incentives for sophisticated voting behavior, the analysis turns up little evidence that participants rely on perfect foresight when confronting lengthy voting agendas. However, these experimental results point toward members using a weaker version of sophistication when anticipating complex decision settings. The findings from this article suggest that decision makers employ only limited foresight when choosing among voting strategies.     

A choice theory of spatial interaction

A general probabilistic theory is developed for modeling a variety of spatial interaction choices by individual behaving units. This theory, designated as the Choice Theory, is shown to be consistent with a wide class of empirical spatial interaction hypotheses, designated as Gravity Hypotheses. Moreover, it is shown that under certain structural conditions the Choice Theory completely characterizes this class of hypotheses. Finally, a number of explicit statistical procedures for testing the Choice Theory are developed and discussed.     

Some unresolved issues in the location theory of the firm

This paper presents a generalized location theory of the firm in linear space. Location outcomes are examined by utilizing a general as well as a particular transport rate structure for output and inputs and using a general concave production as well as a homogeneous production function, of the firm. The effect of a change in demand on the location is also investigated.     

Homeownership, dissatisfaction and voting

This article explores the relationships between homeownership, dissatisfaction with city services, and voting turnout in local elections, using original survey data. Homeowners are more likely than renters to vote, but the pure effect of ownership is not robust to either basic socio-economic controls or an instrumental variable strategy. However, dissatisfaction has a positive, significant and robust effect on likelihood of voting. When interacting homeownership and dissatisfaction, the author finds that dissatisfied homeowners are significantly more likely to vote than both satisfied homeowners and all renters. This finding is consistent with Fischel’s (2001) homevoter hypothesis.     

Asymptotic theory for nonparametric regression with spatial data

Nonparametric regression with spatial, or spatio-temporal, data is considered. The conditional mean of a dependent variable, given explanatory ones, is a nonparametric function, while the conditional covariance reflects spatial correlation. Conditional heteroscedasticity is also allowed, as well as non-identically distributed observations. Instead of mixing conditions, a (possibly non-stationary) linear process is assumed for disturbances, allowing for long range, as well as short-range, dependence, while decay in dependence in explanatory variables is described using a measure based on the departure of the joint density from the product of marginal densities. A basic triangular array setting is employed, with the aim of covering various patterns of spatial observation. Sufficient conditions are established for consistency and asymptotic normality of kernel regression estimates. When the cross-sectional dependence is sufficiently mild, the asymptotic variance in the central limit theorem is the same as when observations are independent; otherwise, the rate of convergence is slower. We discuss the application of our conditions to spatial autoregressive models, and models defined on a regular lattice.     

Implementation of voting operators

We show that a theory of implementation can be developed in the Aizerman–Aleskerov framework, capturing the main ideas regarding Nash implementation in the Arrovian case. In fact we obtain the counterparts of the results of [Maskin, E., 1977. Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality. MIT, Mimeo] and [Moore, J., Repullo, R., 1990. Nash implementation. A full characterization. Econometrica 58, 1038–1100] in the new framework.     

Growth,technological interdependence and spatial externalities: theory and evidence

This paper presents a theoretical growth model which explicitly takes into account technological interdependence among economies and examines the impact of spillover effects. Technological interdependence is assumed to operate through spatial externalities. The magnitude of the physical capital externalities at steady state, which is not usually identified in the literature, is estimated using a spatial econometric specification. Spatial externalities are found to be significant. This spatially augmented Solow model yields a conditional convergence equation which is characterized by parameter heterogeneity. A locally linear spatial autoregressive specification is then estimated providing a convergence speed estimate for each country of the sample. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spatial majority voting equilibria and the provision of public goods

This paper develops general equilibrium conditions for urban areas where a pure public good is provided at a level decided upon by majority voting. Models with a property tax and a head tax and external land ownership are analyzed, and equilibrium solutions are compared using a specific form for the utility function. Optimal cities are characterized and compared to those emerging from the majority voting equilibria. Models where aggregate land rent is divided equally among the urban residents are also developed.     

An indifference trap of voting

In this paper strategic situations of voting and abstentions are analysed in a three-candidate voting model where voters are indifferent to various alternatives and candidates are interested in winning the election and seeing their most preferred alternative being realized. A specific decision problem is analysed, described by an Indifference Trap Game, with respect to, e.g., the corresponding Nash equilibria, perfect equilibria, and maximin solution. A second-best outcome is contained in the choice set of all three solutions while the Nash equilibrium concept is compatible with the Pareto efficient outcomes of the game.An alternative scenario where candidates suffer from incumbency but voters still are indifferent to some alternatives also supports the second-best outcome. Again, various solutions concepts are applied. We conclude that indifferent voters imply an eminent coordination problem for the candidates in the given voting game which, in general, ends up in inefficient outcomes. The inherent complexity of the decision situation cannot be sufficiently reduced to single out one and only one outcome.     

On the fundamental thought behind voting rules

The theme is Arrow's requirement in his theorem of 1951 on methods for group choice, that the choice be independent of irrelevant alternatives. The attention is drawn to (1) his own explanation of this requirement in 1972, which is a quite different understanding than has been discussed in the voluminous literature on the theorem, (2) that Arrow, in fact, in 1985 showed an understanding for how irrelevant alternatives might in a meaningful way influence the group choice, (3) that admittedly the border-line between irrelevant and relevant alternatives in Arrow's original statement is arbitrary, and (4) that Arrow, if he had observed the final thought in the origin of the group theory by Borda, which he admittedly did not, might have realized that Borda's method stringently estimates the relevance of each alternative for the result.The author expresses his surprise that a theoretical conclusion based on an arbitrary fundament has been admired so long.     

现代规划理论影响下的城市住区空间环境

现代城市规划理论影响了中国当代住区户外空间环境的基本特征,分析了现代住区存在的不适应当代居住需求的问题及其根本原因,指出住区环境规划设计中存在的多个"两难结构"是其制约原因,并分析了其对住区空间环境的基本特征的影响。     

On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives

Voting systems between two alternatives have been widely studied in the literature of Social Choice. One of the results given by Fishburn (The theory of social choice. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1973) allows us to characterize anonymous, neutral and monotonic voting systems by means of functions satisfying adequate conditions. From among all kinds of functions, the class of affine functions is highly interesting because from them it is possible to obtain the voting systems most used in practice. In this paper we analyze the structure of the set of these functions and we show that this set is convex and its extreme points are the functions that generate the following voting systems: simple majority, absolute majority, unanimous majority and Pareto majority. Moreover, we suggest a simple method for choosing a voting system when two alternatives are under consideration.