Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.      

Heterogeneous Preferences, Education Expenditures and Income Distribution

This paper introduces heterogeneous preferences to a growth model which incorporates human capital, accumulated through either public or private education. The implications of heterogeneous preferences for income and its distribution are the focus of the paper. Public education expenditure is determined through a voting mechanism where the median preference rather than median income household is the decisive voter. The paper extends the work of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and shows first, that heterogeneous preferences increase income inequality in the private education model and second, public education can overcome the added heterogeneity and reduce income inequality. The results strengthen the arguments for public education as a redistributive mechanism.     

Are Internet surveys an alternative to face-to-face interviews in contingent valuation?

Internet is an increasingly popular data collection mode for stated preference research in environmental economics. However, little is known about how this survey mode may influence data quality and welfare estimates. As part of a national contingent valuation (CV) survey estimating willingness to pay (WTP) for biodiversity protection plans, we assign two groups of respondents either to an Internet or face-to-face (in-home) interview mode. Our design aims to better isolate measurement effects from sample composition effects by drawing both samples from the same sample frame. We find little evidence of social desirability bias in the interview setting or satisficing (shortcutting the response process) in the Internet survey. The share of “don't knows”, zeros and protest responses to the WTP question with a payment card is very similar between modes and equality of mean WTP cannot be rejected. Results are fairly encouraging for the use of Internet in CV as stated preferences do not seem to be significantly different or biased compared to face-to-face interviews.     

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining.     

Protesting and Justifying: A Latent Class Model for Contingent Valuation with Attitudinal Data

This article develops a latent class model for estimating willingness-to-pay (WTP) for public goods using simultaneously contingent valuation (CV) and attitudinal data to identify individuals with similar characteristics, such as WTP and protest attitudes. We find evidence that the answer to the CV question influences the responses to the attitudinal questions. In our case, this influence reflects rational behavior (budget constraint issues) and justification biases related to protest reasons, such as lack of trust in institutions or fairness issues with respect to the distribution of the burden of preservation. The results from our empirical application confirm the importance of accounting for those biases.     

Reducing protest responses by deliberative monetary valuation: Improving the validity of biodiversity valuation

This paper focuses on examining the validity of biodiversity valuation methodologies. The results of a group deliberation technique (deliberative monetary valuation) are compared to those derived from a contingent valuation (CV) survey using the same environmental topic. Evidence is here presented that DMV can address some of the limitations of CV; namely a prevalence for lexicographic preference ordering due to psychological reasons and the lack of a priori or well-formed preferences. Both of these methodological shortcomings can result in protest responses which decrease the external validity of results. It is common environmental valuation methodology practice to exclude protest responses from the analysis on the grounds that they are illegitimate choices, thus the sample and consequently the environmental valuation analysis may become less representative of the population. An advantage of the DMV methodology is that it was found to significantly reduce the rate of protest responses to less than half (from 29% to 13%). Furthermore, DMV significantly increased the proportion of positive bids but not the amounts contributed. In relation to preference formation issues, we suggest rethinking the current practice of the DMV method, and propose dedicating the entire initial discussion session to introducing the good outside of a valuation context.     

Invasive species management in a spatially heterogeneous world: Effects of uniform policies

The spread of invasive species (IS) is an inherently spatial process, and management of invasive species occurs over spatially heterogeneous regions, but policy constraints can restrict management responses to be homogeneous across regions. Using a spatial bioeconomic model that includes a representation of invasive species ecology based on heterogeneous environments that are linked across space and time by human and ecological pathways, we compare optimal spatially heterogeneous policy to spatially uniform policy. We explore the magnitude and pattern of the policy differences with emphasis on the influence of different types of underlying heterogeneity across locations.     

Optimal unemployment insurance with heterogeneous agents

The framework of a general equilibrium heterogeneous agent model is used to study the optimal design of an unemployment insurance (UI) scheme and preferences for unemployment policy reforms. In a first step, the optimal defined benefit and defined replacement ratio UI systems are obtained in simulations. Then, the question whether switching to such an optimal system from the status quo would be approved by a majority of the population is explored. Finally, the transitional dynamics following a policy change are analysed. Accounting for this transition has an important influence on the support for a policy change.     

Trade in trash: A political economy approach

We study how the opportunity to trade in trash might influence the equilibrium outcome when the tax on the externality is determined by a political economy process. In our model, individuals have heterogeneous preferences for environmental quality, and there is a wastage of real resources when funds are transferred from the pressure groups to the politicians. When hard-core environmentalists and capitalists are organized interest groups while moderate environmentalists are not organized, we find that the politically chosen tax on the externality is below the optimal Pigouvian level. The opportunity to export waste in unlimited quantities, but at a price, is not the environmentalists’ panacea and does not eliminate political social tension and suboptimal results.     

Oligopsony and the distribution of wages

We propose a simple model of wage dispersion arising from oligopsonistic competition in the labor market. Our model has workers who are equally able but who have heterogeneous preferences for non-wage characteristics, while employers have heterogeneous productivity characteristics. We completely and explicitly solve for the equilibrium wage distribution and show that “inside” and “outside” forces interact in wage determination. This interaction generates spillover effects of minimum wages in a manner which is consistent with the empirical evidence.     

Competitive screening and information transmission

We consider a model in which schools and colleges compete for high-ability students, which are independently identified through a costly screening procedure. This independence creates a channel through which students' preferences affect the strategic interaction between schools: students with competing offers accept the most-preferred one, increasing the screening costs of unpopular schools. When preferences between schools are more heterogeneous, schools screen more, increasing the proportion of students with multiple offers, but paradoxically reducing the extent to which their preferences determine their outcomes. By observing the students' schools of origin, colleges can free-ride of the fierce competition that occurs during screening.     

Decision making and trade without probabilities

This paper studies trade in a first-price sealed-bid auction where agents know only a range of possible payoffs. The setting is one in which a lemons problem arises, so that if agents have common risk preferences and common priors, then expected utility theory leads to a prediction of no trade. In contrast, we develop a model of rational non-probabilistic decision making, under which trade can occur because not bidding is a weakly dominated strategy. We use a laboratory experiment to test the predictions of both models, and also of models of expected utility with heterogeneous priors and risk preferences. We find strong support for the rational non-probabilistic model.     

Macroeconomic implications of dynamically inconsistent preferences

Despite the widespread use of models of intertemporal choices in economics, previous studies have assumed that intertemporal preferences are dynamically consistent. This paper provides a fresh perspective on propagation mechanisms of a typical macroeconomic shock in a model with dynamically inconsistent preferences. To this end, I develop a prototypical neoclassical model that features dynamically inconsistent preferences to explore dynamic responses of key macro-aggregates, discounted cumulative effects and some characteristics of aggregate fluctuations in response to a technology shock. The main findings reveal that (a) consumption and investment in the proposed model show a larger increase than those in a standard neoclassical model; (b) unlike the standard model, the proposed model yields a short-run decline in labor, which is corroborated by previous studies; (c) all of these dynamic responses in the proposed model deliver smaller cumulative output effects; (d) the proposed model does a reasonably good job of matching key characteristics of aggregate fluctuations with the counterparts observed in the postwar U.S. data. The present-bias and sophistication effects are the linchpin of these main results. Various analyses on a set of different parameter values are also discussed.     

Beliefs and Public Good Provision with Anonymous Contributors

We analyze a static game of public good contributions where finitely many anonymous players have heterogeneous preferences about the public good and heterogeneous beliefs about the distribution of preferences. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, the only individuals who make positive contributions are those who most value the public good and who are also the most pessimistic; that is, according to their beliefs, the proportion of players who most like the public good is smaller than it would be according to any other possible belief. We predict whether the aggregate contribution is larger or smaller than it would be in an analogous game with complete information and heterogeneous preferences, by comparing the beliefs of contributors with the true distribution of preferences. A trade‐off between preferences and beliefs arises if there is no individual who simultaneously has the highest preference type and the most pessimistic belief. In this case, there is a symmetric equilibrium, and multiple symmetric equilibria occur only if there are more than two preference types.     

Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability

We consider a political economy model of country whose citizens have heterogeneous preferences for a national policy and some regions may contemplate a threat of secession. The country is efficient if its breakup into smaller countries leads to an aggregate utility loss. We show that in an efficient country whose citizens' preferences exhibit a high degree of polarization, a threat of secession cannot be eliminated without inter-regional transfers. We also demonstrate that if majority voting is used to determine the redistribution schemes within the country, then a high degree of polarization yields the full-compensation scheme as the unique political equilibrium.     

Modelling unobserved heterogeneity in contingent valuation of health risks

Human preferences for alternative levels of health risks can be heterogeneous. In this paper a flexible distribution approach to model health values elicited with the dichotomous choice contingent valuation method is considered. Rigid parametric structures cannot model sample heterogeneity while imposing strong assumptions on the error distribution. A mixture of normal distributions is considered which can approximate arbitrary well any empirical distributions as the number of mixtures increases. The model is applied to data on willingness to pay for reducing the individual risk of an episode of respiratory illness. The mixture distribution model is compared with the rigid probit model using a Bayes factor test. The results show that the mixture modelling approach improves performance while allowing for the consideration of alternative groups of individuals with different preferences for health risks.     

Public Policy with Endogenous Preferences

Public policy may influence norms and preferences. By altering the payoffs associated with different preferences, public policy may influence the distribution of these preferences in the population. Such interdependence between policy and preferences may limit (or enhance) the effectiveness of different policies. We demonstrate this idea with a simple model of subsidizing contributions to a public good. While the short‐run effect of such a subsidy will be an increase in the overall contribution, the subsidy triggers an endogenous preference change that results in a lower level of contribution to the public good, despite the explicit monetary incentives to raise that level.     

Public goods and the value of product quality regulations: the case of food safety

The paper examines preferences for product quality regulations. Our premise is that preferences for product quality regulations derive from preferences for both private and public goods. The model is used to explain public attitudes toward a referendum measure to eliminate pesticide residues on food. Results from a survey of consumers are consistent with the conceptual model and show that preferences for public goods influence support for the product quality regulation. The results help explain why consumption behavior is a poor predictor of political behavior, and have implications for methods that use voting and market behavior to value public goods.     

A Joint Latent-Class Model: Combining Likert-Scale Preference Statements With Choice Data to Harvest Preference Heterogeneity

In addition to choice questions (revealed and stated choices), preference surveys typically include other questions that provide information about preferences. Preference-statement data include questions on the importance of different attributes of a good or the extent of agreement with a particular statement. The intent of this paper is to model and jointly estimate preference heterogeneity using stated-preference choice data and preference-statement data. The starting point for this analysis is the belief that the individual has preferences, and both his/her choices and preference statements are manifestations of those preferences. Our modeling contribution is linking the choice data and preference-statement data in a latent-class framework. Estimation is straightforward using the E-M algorithm, even though our model has hundreds of preference parameters. Our estimates demonstrate that: (1) within a preference class, the importance anglers associate with different Green Bay site characteristics is in accordance with their responses to the preference statements; (2) estimated across-class utility parameters for fishing Green Bay are affected by the preference-statement data; (3) estimated across-class preference-statement response probabilities are affected by the inclusion of the choice data; and (4) both data sets influence the number of classes and the probability of belonging to a class as a function of the individual’s type.