Counterparty credit risk and the credit default swap market

Counterparty credit risk has become one of the highest-profile risks facing participants in the financial markets. Despite this, relatively little is known about how counterparty credit risk is actually priced. We examine this issue using an extensive proprietary data set of contemporaneous CDS transaction prices and quotes by 14 different CDS dealers selling credit protection on the same underlying firm. This unique cross-sectional data set allows us to identify directly how dealers' credit risk affects the prices of these controversial credit derivatives. We find that counterparty credit risk is priced in the CDS market. The magnitude of the effect, however, is vanishingly small and is consistent with a market structure in which participants require collateralization of swap liabilities by counterparties.     

On the exposure of insurance companies to sovereign risk—Portfolio investments and market forces

A sovereign debt crisis can have significant knock-on effects in the financial markets and put financial stability at risk. This paper focuses on the transmission of sovereign risk to insurance companies as some of the largest institutional investors in the sovereign bond market. We use a firm level panel dataset that covers large insurance companies, banks and non-financial firms from nine countries over the time period from 1 January 2008–1 May 2013. We find significant and robust transmission effects from sovereign risk to domestic insurers. The impact on insurers is not significantly different from that on banks but larger than for non-financial firms. We find that systemically important insurers are more closely linked to the domestic sovereign. Based on European data, we show that risks in sovereign bond portfolios are an important driver of insurer risk, which is not reflected in current insurance regulation (incl. Solvency II in Europe).     

Corporate Hedging in the Insurance Industry

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the extent to which insurance companies utilize financial derivatives contracts in the management of risks The data set we employ allows us to observe the universe of individual insurer transactions for a class of contracts, namely, those normally thought of as off-balance-sheet (OBS) We provide information on the number of insurers using various types of derivatives contracts and the volume of transactions in terms of notional amounts and the number of counterparties. Life insurers are most active in interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives, while property/casualty insurers tend to be active in trading equity option and foreign exchange contracts Using a multivariate probtt analysis, we explore the factors that potentially influence the existence of OBS activities. We also investigate questions relating to whether certain subsets of OBS transactions (for example, exchange traded) are related to such things as interest rate risk measures, organizational form and other characteristics that may discriminate between desired risk/return profiles across a cross-section of insurers. We find evidence consistent with the use of derivatives by insurers to hedge risks posed by guaranteed investment contracts (GICs), coilater-alized mortgage obligations (CMOs), and other sources of financial risk     

Insurance Market Effects of Risk Management Metrics

We extend the classical analysis on optimal insurance design to the case when the insurer implements regulatory requirements (Value-at-Risk). Presumably, regulators impose some risk management requirement such as VaR to reduce the insurers’ insolvency risk, as well as to improve the insurance market stability. We show that VaR requirements may better protect the insured and improve economic efficiency, but have stringent negative effects on the insurance market. Our analysis reveals that the insured are better protected in the event of greater loss irrespective of the optimal design from either the insured or the insurer perspective. However, in the presence of the VaR requirement on the insurer, the insurer's insolvency risk might be increased and there are moral hazard issues in the insurance market because the optimal contract is discontinuous.     

Designing feasible and effective health plan payments in countries with data availability constraints

Risk equalization schemes, which transfer money to/from insurers that have above/below average risks, are a fundamental tool in regulated health insurance markets in many countries. Risk sharing (the transfer of some responsibility for costs from a plan to the regulator or the overall insurance market), are an additional method of insulating insurers who attract higher-than-average risks. This paper proposes, implements and quantifies incorporating risk sharing within a risk equalization scheme that can be applied in a data-poor context. Using Chile's private health insurance market as case study, we show that modest amount of risk sharing greatly improves fit even in simple demographic-based risk equalization. Expanding the model's formula to include morbidity-based adjustors and risk sharing redirects compensations at insurer level and reduces opportunity to engage in profitable risk selection at the group level. Our emphasis on feasibility may make alternatives proposed attractive to countries facing data-availability constraints.     

Engineered nanomaterials: risk perception,regulation and insurance

Concerns surrounding the health risk of engineered nanomaterials, effective regulation and the lack of specifically tailored insurance products for the nanotechnology sector are putting the industry’s long-term economic viability at risk. From the perspective of the underwriter, this article speculates on the relationship between risk perception, regulation and insurability. In the nanotechnology sector, regulators are currently failing to keep pace with innovation, and insurers generally lack guiding principles for underwriting occupational risk from nanomaterial exposure. Such vulnerabilities when combined with misguided risk perceptions can lead to the overpricing of risk transfer and ill-conceived regulatory initiatives, thus potentially exhausting resources and stifling innovation in the sector. In the absence of well-developed regulatory protocols, the insurance industry has, and will continue, to occupy a key role as an effective lobby in terms of improved risk management practice. We suggest that the insurance industry will increasingly rely on control banding frameworks and ‘risk mitigation at source’ methods developed in conjunction with their clients to manage severe acute diversifiable risks. Long tail risk will continue to represent a serious challenge to insurers and regulators. In the meantime, insurers will have to bridge their current needs with improvised solutions. As an example of one possible solution, we outline a framework that utilizes financial instruments to hedge an insurer’s exposure to uncertain estimates of these long-term risks.     

The use of credit default swaps by bond mutual funds: Liquidity provision and counterparty risk

Corporate bond mutual funds increased their selling of credit protection in the credit default swaps (CDS) market during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. This trading activity was primarily in multi-name CDS, greater among larger and established funds, and directed toward counterparty dealers in financial distress. Funds that sold credit protection during the crisis experienced greater credit market risk and superior post-crisis performance, consistent with higher expected returns from liquidity provision. Funds using Lehman Brothers as a counterparty experienced abnormal outflows and returns of –2% immediately following Lehman's bankruptcy, suggesting that funds’ opportunistic trading in CDS exposed investors to counterparty risk.     

Compensating Financial Experts

We propose a labor market model in which financial firms compete for a scarce supply of workers who can be employed as either bankers or traders. While hiring bankers helps create a surplus that can be split between a firm and its trading counterparties, hiring traders helps the firm appropriate a greater share of that surplus away from its counterparties. Firms bid defensively for workers bound to become traders, who then earn more than bankers. As counterparties employ more traders, the benefit of employing bankers decreases. The model sheds light on the historical evolution of compensation in finance.     

Trader see,trader do: How do (small) FX traders react to large counterparties’ trades?

We show that information about the counterparty of a trade affects the future trading decisions of individual traders. The effect is such that traders tend to reverse their order flow in line with the better-informed counterparties. Informed traders primarily incorporate their own private as well as publicly available information into prices, whereas uninformed traders mainly magnify the effect of the informed. This pattern of interaction among traders extends to different order types: traders treat their own and others’ market orders as more informative than limit orders.     

How Does the Use of Credit Default Swaps Affect Firm Risk and Value? Evidence from US Life and Property/Casualty Insurance Companies

This study uses a unique credit default swap (CDS) transaction data set of insurers to examine the effects of CDS usage on the risk profile and firm value of US insurance companies for the period 2001‐2009. Applying a Heckman two‐stage model to adjust for the potential endogeneity of CDS usage with respect to firm risk and firm value, we find consistent evidence that the utilization of CDS for income generation purposes is associated with greater market risk, deterioration of financial performance, and lower firm value, for both Life and Property/Casualty insurers.     

Hedge funds and financial stability: Regulating prime brokers will mitigate systemic risks

We review key characteristics of the hedge fund industry, and identify conditions under which this sector can pose a threat to financial stability. Direct regulation of hedge funds that increases transparency does not appear feasible, may create a moral-hazard problem, and may reduce market liquidity. Indirect regulation by prime brokers and market discipline by creditors, counterparties, and investors have been effective in limiting the risks from the hedge fund sector. To reduce systemic risks, more regulation of prime brokers is warranted to avoid competitive dynamics from undermining counterparty risk management practices.     

Optimal reinsurance and portfolio selection: Comparison between partial and complete information models

We consider partial and complete information models to investigate how partial information has a unique quality over complete information for insurers. We find that optimal reinsurance and investment strategies for the partially informed insurer depend on prior beliefs, whereas those for the completely informed insurer do not. In addition, information quality can affect insurer behaviour, mainly through the relative difference between risk-adjusted market premium and risk-adjusted insurance premium projected on the financial markets. Numerical results indicate that partial information increases the conservativeness of insurer strategies.     

The effect of predation risk on cash holdings: Empirical evidence from the U.S. property‐liability insurance industry

Corporate cash holdings play a significant role in the U.S. property‐liability insurance industry yet the topic of insurer cash holdings policy has largely been overlooked by prior empirical research. While a number of studies have investigated firm‐specific factors related to cash holdings in the insurance industry, prior research has not examined how market concentration and potential predation risk impact cash holdings. We propose a new measure of market concentration and provide evidence in support of the predation risk theory. Specifically, we show that insurers exposed to more concentrated markets tend to hold more cash. Furthermore, the relation between market concentration and cash holdings is influenced by access to internal capital. While unaffiliated insurers without access to internal capital hold greater levels of cash in more concentrated markets, group insurers with access to internal capital do not hold greater levels of cash to mitigate predation risk.     

Stock Market Reactions and Information Transfer Due to Financial Instability in the Life Insurance Industry

ABSTRACT: This study examines the stock market reactions and information transfer effects due to financial instability for four life insurance companies that eventually failed or were taken over by regulators. The four companies were First Executive Corporation, First Capital Holdings Corporation, Monarch Capital Corporation, and Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company. In general, significant negative capital market responses were found after a company released an announcement regarding financial instability. Information transfer effects of a negative announcement by one insurer were not found to have a significant impact on the other insurers. This study complements past studies of contagion effects within the insurance industry.     

The Value of Central Clearing

I study a contracting innovation that suddenly insulated traders of hedging contracts against counterparty risk: central clearing counterparties (CCPs) for derivatives. The first CCP was created in Le Havre (France) in 1882, in the coffee futures market. Using triple difference-in-differences estimation, I show that central clearing changed the geography of trade flows Europe-wide, to the benefit of Le Havre. Inspecting the mechanism using trader-level data, I find that the CCP solved both a “missing market” problem and adverse selection issues. Central clearing also facilitated entry of new traders in the market. The successful contracting innovation quickly spread to other exchanges.     

Two Classroom Simulations in Financial Risk Management and Insurance

ABSTRACT: Few classroom experiences provide as much educational value as a simulation exercise. A properly structured simulation provides students with the motivation to learn, the opportunity to explore strategies in an environment conducive to experimentation, and the immediate instructional benefit of watching their decisions affect the outcome of the collective simulation experience. This article describes the procedure and relative success of two classroom simulations for students in introductory and intermediate risk management and insurance courses. The first simulation replicates the risk management function of futures contracts through the use of hypothetical traders in the corn market with different risk management needs. The corn futures trading simulation achieves several goals for an introductory course in risk management and insurance: (1) students learn the importance of capital market risk management mechanisms; (2) students understand the transfer of risk among hedgers and speculators; and (3) students receive exposure to the concept that risk management is both possible and necessary for both speculative and pure risks. The second simulation mimics the operation of the market for homeowners insurance. By dividing students into consumer groups and insurer groups, participants experience the effect of chance events and insurance purchase decisions on their wealth. Small groups of upper‐level students act as insurers, and must price, package, and sell their product with a limited amount of surplus. Introductory students serve as consumers with limited resources who must survey the market and decide what product to buy and from whom. The competitive element and relatively unregulated market provide students with the incentive to innovate in a market for a common type of insurance and also demonstrates the need for some amount of insurance regulation. These simulations supply a simple way to enhance students' understanding of important basic concepts in a format that provides a welcome break from the traditional lecture format.     

Multilayer networks in the frequency domain: Measuring extreme risk connectedness of Chinese financial institutions

We propose multilayer networks in the frequency domain, including the short-term, medium-term, and long-term layers, to investigate the extreme risk connectedness among financial institutions. Using the conditional autoregressive value at risk (CAViaR) tool to measure the extreme risk of financial institutions, we construct extreme risk networks and inter-sector extreme risk networks of 36 Chinese financial institutions through the proposed approach. We observe that the extreme risk connectedness across financial institutions is heterogeneous in the short-, medium-, and long-term. In general, the long-term connectedness among financial institutions rises sharply during times of financial stress, such as the 2015 Chinese stock market turbulence and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, we note that the insurers are key players in driving the inter-sector extreme risk networks, because the inter-sector systemic importance of insurance institutions is dominant. Finally, our conclusions provide valuable information for regulators to prevent systemic risk.     

The Organizational Structure of Insurance Companies: The Role of Heterogeneous Risks and Guaranty Funds

We examine a market with observably heterogeneous risks and a government sponsored guaranty fund and consider whether it is optimal to form a single insurer or separate insurers for each consumer type. Given the economic environment, pooling never dominates the formation of separate insurance companies. This result provides an incentive for the phenomenon of insurance fleets.     

论投保人缴纳保费或保险公司签发保单附条件条款的法律效力

我国保险实践中普遍将投保人缴纳保费或者保险公司签发保单作为保险合同的成立、生效或者保险责任开始的条件。但该条件不是新《保险法》规定的附条件保险合同所指的条件。同时该附条件条款赋予了保险公司对要约进行承诺时或者履行合同义务时不受时间限制的权利,该附条件条款因不具有合理性应为无效合同条款。     

Economic links and credit spreads

Counterparty risk is an important determinant of corporate credit spreads. However, there are only a few techniques available to isolate it from other factors. In this paper we describe a model of financial networks that is suitable for the construction of proxies for counterparty risk. Using data on North American supplier–customer network of public companies, we find that, for each supplier, counterparties’ leverage and option implied volatilities are significant determinants of corporate credit spreads in the period after the 2008–2009 U.S. recession. Our findings are robust after controlling for several idiosyncratic, industry, and market factors.