International Technology Transfer and Welfare

We investigate the welfare effect of international technology transfer in a quality model. A foreign innovator with a new quality product can license its innovation to the domestic firm(s) via a fixed fee. Findings show that the foreign innovator will license exclusively to the high‐quality firm under Bertrand competition, whereas it may exclusively license to the high‐quality firm, the low‐quality firm, or non‐exclusively to both firms under Cournot competition. Non‐exclusive licensing is necessarily welfare‐enhancing whereas exclusive licensing is welfare‐reducing if the quality of the new technology is not sufficiently superior to that of the domestic ones.     

WHO GAINS FROM WHOM? SPILLOVERS,COMPETITION AND TECHNOLOGY SOURCING IN THE FOREIGN‐OWNED SECTOR OF UK MANUFACTURING

There is a growing literature explaining foreign direct investment flows in terms of ‘technology sourcing’, whereby multinational firms invest in certain locations not to exploit their firm‐specific assets in the host environment, but to access technology that is generated by host country firms. However, it is far from clear whether the literature has found significant evidence of such activity beyond a few isolated examples. This paper extends this work by allowing for the possibility of multinational enterprises (MNEs) sourcing technology not only from host country firms but also from each other within a host economy. The paper demonstrates that MNEs in the UK do indeed appropriate spillovers both from indigenous firms and from other foreign investors, but that there are also significant competition effects that act to reduce productivity in certain industries. The paper also explores which countries' affiliates gain most from technology sourcing in the UK, and which generate the greatest spillovers within the foreign‐owned sector.     

Forecasting livestock prices with individual and composite methods

We investigate the incentives of private firms to adopt new technologies. Econometric investigation is performed on a pooled sample of individual US airline firms over the period 1971 to 1986 for which extensive information on available jet aircraft technology and fleet choice have been recorded. Given the incidence of successive commercial aircraft innovations and variation in production attributes across firms, we are able to consider a wider array of ‘time-dependent’ and ‘time-independent’ adoption influences than in previous firm-level studies. To the extent that our study provides useful general insights into adoption decisions by firms, the results have implications for US global competitiveness policy. One key finding is that firms subject to increased product market competition exhibit a higher propensity to adopt technological innovations.     

Who Gains from Restructuring the Post‐Soviet Transition Economies,and Why?

To explore the mixed economic results and huge distributional changes experienced by post‐Soviet economies, I set up a series of theoretical and numerical simulation models using an approach based upon heterogeneous firms, where ‘reform’ means closure of inefficient capacity. In the presence of significant costs to new firm entry and international capital mobility, restructuring and privatisation can lead to falls in GDP and real wages, while capital is transferred abroad. This situation can occur even under perfect competition, but is worse when industrial production is concentrated and trade costs are high. By contrast, workers can gain when costs of establishing new firms are low, and/or when the inefficient industries are capital‐intensive. For countries with high costs of firm set‐up and of trade, capital controls may be justified to protect wages.     

市场和技术对企业新技术采用最优时机的影响

基于古诺模型,研究了产品的可替代程度和技术的有效性对企业采用新技术的时机的影响。结果表明:率先采用新技术的企业采用新技术的时机与产品的可替代程度呈倒U型关系;当产品的可替代性足够大且技术有效性充分小时,较晚采用新技术的企业采用新技术的时机会随市场竞争的加剧而提前;两类企业采用新技术的时机与技术的有效性均成负相关关系;面对技术有效性的同水平提高,较晚采用新技术的企业采用新技术的时机将提早得更多。     

Market structure in congestible markets

This paper analyses market structure of industries that are subject to both positive and negative network effects. The size of a firm determines the quality of its product: when network effects are positive, a larger firm is of higher quality; when the effects are negative, a larger firm's product is of lower quality. Consumers have heterogeneous preferences towards quality (firm size), and firms compete in prices. Equilibria are characterised: for example, in any asymmetric equilibrium, it must be that congestion is not too severe. One consequence of this feature is that an increase in the number of firms in the industry can raise individual firms’ profits. Two factors can bound the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium without fixed costs: expectations, and the ‘finiteness’ property (Shaked and Sutton, Review of Economic Studies 49 (1982) 3–13, Econometrica 51(5) (1983) 1469–1483) of price competition.     

Efficiency and effectiveness between open and closed innovation: empirical evidence in South Korean manufacturers

This study addresses two main questions. First, what is the best measurement of innovation performance? Second, is there a significant difference in the performance between open and closed innovation firms? We discuss new measures (‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’) and investigate any differences between open innovation and closed innovation firms by using indicators. The impact of open innovation on firm performance has been examined in existing studies. Most papers, however, employ simple indicators such as patents and financial data. This paper verifies the relationship between open innovation and performance in the Korean manufacturing industry using a new approach. The results show that both efficiency and effectiveness were statistically higher among open innovation firms than among their closed counterparts. It may thus be concluded that the acquisition of outside technology or knowledge has a positive impact on firm performance.     

Can a decline in search cost increase prices?

This paper provides a new explanation of why a decline in consumers’ price search cost may not lead to lower prices. In a duopoly with price competition, I show that when some consumers are captive to one firm, there may be a non‐monotonic relationship between search cost and market power; firms may charge high prices with higher probability and the average price charged may be higher when consumers’ price search cost falls below a critical level. Furthermore, when firms have asymmetric captive segments, expected prices charged by each firm may move in opposite directions as search cost declines.     

Join hands or walk alone? Evidence on lobbying for trade policy in India

Using primary evidence for 146 Indian manufacturing firms, I examine single and dual lobbying strategies for trade policy influence, and the factors driving firm's choice of these strategies. Firms can adopt a single strategy, by lobbying collectively as a group (Join Hands), or lobbying individually as a firm (Walk Alone). Firms can also adopt a dual strategy, that is, a combination of collective and individual lobbying. The choice of strategy is affected by sector concentration and by tradeoffs between lobbying intensity for sector‐wide and firm‐specific outcomes. The following findings are new for India: First, majority of Indian firms (more than 64% in the sample) use a dual strategy, suggesting the importance to better understand what drives dual strategies. Second, the likelihood of adopting a dual lobbying is higher in sectors that are characterized by low concentration (dispersion is higher), indicating a strong competition effect over free‐riding. Third, relative to the single strategy of collective lobbying, Indian manufacturing firms are likely to join hands while walking alone when targeting firm‐specific outcomes, but prefer to walk alone (single strategy of individual lobbying) when there are tradeoffs between different outcomes, to react quickly. Finally, the availability of resources and firm's perceived effectiveness of its lobbying are significant drivers for the strategy choice.     

Competition,R&D and innovation: testing the inverted-U in a simultaneous system

To address the relationship between innovation and competition we jointly estimate the opportunity, production, and impact functions of innovation in a simultaneous system. Based on Swiss micro-data, we apply a 3-SLS system estimation. The findings confirm a robust inverted-U relationship, in which a rise in the number of competitors at low levels of initial competition increases the firm’s research effort, but at a diminishing rate, and the research effort ultimately decreases at high levels of competition. When we split the sample by firm types, the inverted-U shape is steeper for creative firms than for adaptive ones. The numerical solution indicates three particular configurations of interest: (i) an uncontested monopoly with low innovation; (ii) low competition with high innovation; and (iii) a ‘no innovation trap’ at very high levels of competition. The distinction between solution (i) and (ii) corresponds to Arrow’s positive effect of competition on innovation, whereas the difference between outcomes (ii) and (iii) captures Schumpeter’s positive effect of market power on innovation. Simulating changes of the exogenous variables, technology potential, demand growth, firm size and exports have a positive impact on innovation, while foreign ownership has a negative effect, and higher appropriability has a positive impact on the number of competitors.     

Credence Goods,Misleading Labels,and Quality Differentiation

Due to differences in information disclosure mechanisms, consumer misinformation about the quality of many credence goods is more endemic at intermediate levels of the quality spectrum rather than at the extremes. Using an oligopoly model of vertical product differentiation, we examine how consumers’ overestimation of the quality of intermediate-quality products affects firms’ incentives to improve product quality. The firms non-cooperatively choose the quality of their product before choosing its price or quantity. Irrespective of the nature of second stage competition, Bertrand or Cournot, we find that quality overestimation by consumers increases profit of the intermediate-quality firm, and motivates it to raise its product’s quality. In response, the high-quality firm improves its product quality even further but ends up with lower profit. Overall, average quality of the vertically differentiated product improves, which raises consumer surplus. Social welfare increases when the firms compete in prices but falls when they compete in quantities.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN QUALITY CHOICES AND PRICE COMPETITION

We modify the price‐setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage. Our results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, whereby firms always select sequential play at the quality stage. We also investigate the mixed‐strategy equilibrium, revealing that the probability of generating outcomes out of equilibrium is higher than the probability of playing one Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In the alternative case with full market coverage, we show that the quality stage is solved in dominant strategies and therefore the choice of roles becomes irrelevant as the Nash and Stackelberg solutions coincide. With full market coverage and corner solution, the results show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, where the high‐quality firm takes the lead in the quality stage.     

Why firm size matters: investigating the drivers of innovation and economic performance in New Zealand using the Business Operations Survey

The performance of the New Zealand (NZ) economy is something of an enigma. Although ranked one (of 144 countries) for four important ‘growth fundamentals’ NZ is ‘middle of the pack’ when it comes to economic growth, productivity and process innovation. Using four iterations (2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011) of the Business Operations Survey, this research seeks to shed some new light on this conundrum by using a multivariate probit regression (mvprobit) approach applied to pooled samples in excess of 22,000 unit record observations of NZ firms. The results suggest that factors including firm size, high perceived quality, investment/research and development (R&D) capability, major technology change, application of formal IP protection and new export markets are systematically and positively related to innovation; while many external issues, such as those related to geography, market structure, business environment, have little influence. At the firm level, innovations in NZ are highly dependent on the firms’ internal ability to develop new technologies and market demand. The (very small) size of firms does matter in NZ, which lacks a major ‘home market’ or a major trade block on its doorstep, such that ultimately, government may need to be involved to maintain a viable scale for domestic R&D.     

Does tax competition make mobile firms more footloose?

We examine a two‐period regional model with evolving economic geography, potentially creating incentives for firm relocation between periods. We argue that tax competition makes firms more footloose, but that this increases efficiency relative to the laissez‐faire outcome. We establish that: (i) tax competition leads to efficient investment outcomes and (ii) firm mobility is greater with tax competition than with a laissez‐faire regime. When relocation is costly, there can be too little mobility over time, as firms do not take into account the impact of FDI on social welfare in each country. With lump‐sum taxes or transfers, firms capture these benefits and internalize them, such that tax competition leads to the efficient outcomes. When more time periods are examined, tax competition induces firm relocation sooner than in its absence.     

Does trade stimulate product quality upgrading?

This paper investigates whether increased import competition leads firms to engage in incremental innovation reflected in product quality upgrading using Chilean manufacturing firm‐product data and measuring product quality with unit values (prices). We identify causal effects of import competition using an effective trade barrier measure – transport costs – as instruments for import penetration ratios across industries. Transport costs have a negative and significant effect on product quality. The evidence suggests that estimated unit value increases capture product quality upgrading, imports’ competition effects drive quality upgrading, and benefits depend on firms’ industrial specialization. Easier access to intermediate inputs also fosters quality upgrading.     

Oligopolistic Competition and New Technology Adoption under Uncertainty

The paper examines the adoption of a new technology in oligopoly, where there is ex ante uncertainty about variable costs of the new technology. Each firm can either adopt the new process by bearing some up-front investment or may continue to use the old one, after which firms play a Cournot market game. If in equilibrium both technologies are employed, more uncertainty about the new technology increases (decreases) the number of innovating firms and decreases (increases) the product price if the up-front investment is large (small). Our model applies readily to vertical integration if integrated firms neither buy nor sell the intermediate good on the market. However, if buying and selling is allowed, the number of integrated firms is independent of input price uncertainty.     

FREE VERSUS SECOND‐BEST ENTRY IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLIES WITH FIRM‐SPECIFIC NETWORKS

This paper endogenizes the number of firms in an industry with positive network effects, complete incompatibility, and firms that compete in quantity. To this end, we compare two possibilities: free entry and second‐best number of firms (the one that maximizes social welfare). We show that with business‐stealing competition, free entry yields, in general, more firms than the socially optimal solution. In addition, we find that by the nature of the industry with firm‐specific networks, total production may be greater or lower under free entry than with a regulator; moreover, some industries attain their maximum social welfare with a monopoly.     

INTERNATIONAL WELFARE AND EMPLOYMENT LINKAGES ARISING FROM MINIMUM WAGES*

We formulate a two‐country model with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms to reconsider labor market linkages in open economies. Labor market imperfections arise by virtue of country‐specific real minimum wages. Abstracting from selection of just the best firms into export status, standard effects on marginal and average firm productivity are reversed in our model, yet there are significant gains from trade arising from employment expansion. In addition, we show that with firm heterogeneity an increase in one country’s minimum wage triggers firm exit in both countries and thus harms workers at home and abroad.     

TARIFF POLICY AND WELFARE IN AN INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY WITH CONSUMER‐FRIENDLY INITIATIVE

The purpose of this paper is to explore how strategic tariff policy and welfare are affected by the consumer‐friendly initiative of foreign exporting firms. We define a firm that is consumer‐friendly or non‐profit‐based if it considers both its own profit and consumer surplus. This paper extends Brander and Spencer by taking the consideration of consumer‐friendly firms into an international duopoly, and within such context examining the tariff policy and welfare. The consumer‐friendly initiative that leads to trade liberalization is a ‘Win‐Win‐Win’ solution in the sense that it is not only beneficial for foreign exporting firms, but also for the government and consumers of the importing country.     

When green isn't mean: economic theory and the heuristics of the impact of environmental regulations on competitiveness and opportunity cost

The conventional neoclassical economic wisdom argues that the opportunity costs of environmental regulations are high, with negative implications for costs and profits and, by implication, for growth and per capita gross domestic product (GDP). The minority view that environmental controls induce cost offsets that minimise such opportunity costs is marginalised by the conventional wisdom, which assumes that economic agents are x-efficient in production. A behavioral model of the firm is presented in this paper, whereby x-inefficiency in production prevails even in a world of perfect product market competition that is dominated by rational economic agents. In this model, environmental regulations affect both the level of x-efficiency and the extent of technological change and greener firms can be cost competitive and profitable. However, private economic agents cannot be expected to adopt ‘Green’ economic policy independent of regulations since, in this model, there need not be any economic advantage accruing to the affected firms in becoming greener.