ECB tapering: beware of global consequences

• ? The ECB's scaling back of its QE programme in 2018 could be more disruptive to global financial markets than the Federal Reserve's ongoing balance sheet unwinding. ECB bond purchases led Eurozone private investors to inject a massive amount of funds into global debt markets over the last few years. As the ECB reduces its stimulus, Eurozone investors will gradually pare back the build‐up of their foreign debt exposures. The full unwinding of ECB QE will see investors rebalance toward domestic debt securities .
• ? We expect Eurozone investors to continue injecting funds into global debt markets as the ECB proceeds to wind down its QE, but they will do so at a much slower pace. Based on our projections, European purchases of foreign debt securities this year will total €200 billion – down by half from the average €400 billion over the last three years. Such a large reduction raises the risk of disruption in some markets.
• ? How did we get here? Spillovers from the ECB's QE were much more pronounced than during Fed's. European private investors that sold bonds to the ECB during its QE programme faced a commensurate shortage of domestic debt assets. In contrast to the US experience, ECB buying far exceeded new domestic issuance, inducing private investors to sharply increase purchases of overseas debt securities.
• ? Ultimately, we expect European investors to seek to restore the share of domestic debt securities in their portfolios to a level in line with the historical norm, after the proportion of their domestic debt holdings fell by 7pp since the programme began. The rebalancing is likely to start in earnest once the ECB stops buying (and eventually starts selling) securities. As a result, the global debt issuance boom is likely to lose steam, given the extent to which it has relied on the support of European investors.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Dollar surge brings mixed consequences

• The strengthening dollar is now becoming a significant factor for global growth and our forecasts. The tradeweighted dollar is up 2.5% over the last month and over 12% on a year ago.
• Driving the latest rise are growing expectations of US rate hikes while monetary policy in many other major economies is headed in the opposite direction.
• The beginning of ECB QE has prompted a further slide in bond yields and the euro – which at 1.06/US$ is on course to fulfill our forecast of near‐parity by year‐end. Weak data in Japan also raises the chance of a further expansion of QE there later this year.
• We remain relatively positive about the advanced economies: we forecast G7 GDP growth at 2.2% for 2015 and 2.3% next. This month we have revised up German growth for 2015 to 2.4% – a four‐year high.
• Robust US growth and a strong dollar are good news for the advanced economies. US import volume growth firmed to over 5% on the year in January, while the dollar surge potentially boosts the share of other advanced countries in this growing market.
• But for the emerging economies the picture is mixed. A stronger US may boost exports, but rising US rates are pulling capital away: there has been a slump in portfolio inflows into emergers in recent months. Emerging growth may also suffer from higher costs of dollar funding and a rising burden of dollar debt as currencies soften – the more so if US rates rise faster than markets expect.
• Moreover, emergers are also under pressure from a slowing China. Chinese import growth has been weak of late and commodity prices remain under downward pressure. A notable casualty has been Brazil, which we have downgraded again this month – GDP is expected to slump 1.1% this year.
• Emerging GDP growth overall is expected to slip to 3.7% this year, the lowest since 2009. And excluding China, emerging growth will be only 2.2% – the same as the G7 and the worst performance relative to the advanced economies since 1999.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Markets rally but risks still to the downside

• Our growth forecast for 2016 is steady this month at 2.3% but the forecast for 2017 has been cut again, to 2.7% from 2.9%.
• The near‐term growth outlook has been supported by a decent rally in financial markets. Since mid‐February, world stocks have gained around 8%, US high yield spreads have narrowed around 140 basis points and a number of key commodity prices – including oil – have also risen.
• Another supportive trend is still‐healthy consumer demand in advanced economies including the US and Eurozone. Although there has been some slippage in consumer confidence, it has been modest compared to either 2012–13 or 2008–09.
• So overall, the global economy still looks likely to avoid recession and strengthen a touch next year. But risks to the outlook remain skewed to the downside.
• Despite the recent market rally, world stocks still remain below their levels at end‐2015 and well below last May's peak. Financial conditions more broadly also remain significantly tighter than in mid‐2015, and inflation expectations somewhat lower.
• And there are still negative signals from incoming data. The global manufacturing PMI for February showed output flat while the services PMI showed only very modest growth – both were at their lowest since late 2012.
• Economic surprise indices for both the G10 and emerging markets also remain in negative territory, and our world trade indicator suggests no improvement from the dismal recent trends.
• Notable growth downgrades this month include Germany, Japan, the UK, Canada and Brazil.
• In our view, policymakers still have scope to improve the outlook. The latest ECB moves – more negative rates and more QE – will help a little. Widening of QE to corporate bonds also hints that more radical policy options are coming into view. But policies such as central bank equity purchases or money‐financed fiscal expansions will probably require global growth to weaken further before they become likely.

     

The global bond sell‐off – why and where next?

• The rise in global bond yields since mid‐April has taken markets by surprise. Our analysis suggests that, on balance, some upward correction in yields was justified – especially in the Eurozone. For the US, the evidence is more mixed.
• A variety of explanations have been advanced to explain the bond sell‐off including Eurozone reflation/inflation, looming US rate hikes and associated uncertainty, liquidity and other technical factors, Chinese reflation and a simple reversal of yields overshooting to the downside.
• Some of these explanations are more convincing than others: in our view there is some modest evidence for increased uncertainty and liquidity effects but we also think bonds have corrected from overbought levels, especially in the Eurozone.
• Using some econometric models of bond yields suggests that the recent upward correction of German yields was probably justified; markets had pushed yields too low earlier in 2015. Indeed, the model implies a further ‘corrective’ rise in yields is possible.
• For the US, different models give slightly different results – a variant of the well‐known Shiller‐Modigliani model suggests yields should still be below 2%. However, a broader error‐correction model including factors such as fiscal variables and foreign flows into US bonds suggests the recent rise in yields was broadly justified.

     

Major liquidity drain may fuel bond market vulnerabilities

• ? It is plausible that cross‐border bond purchases will average
  • ? It is plausible that cross‐border bond purchases will average $0.5trn in 2018 and 2019, a dramatic fall from $1.2trn in 2017, driven mainly by reductions in European and US purchases. This will exacerbate upward pressure on bond yields over and above those associated with traditional macroeconomic drivers. The US bond market (and the dollar) are particularly vulnerable .
  • ? This article is part of a long‐term research project, whose intricate analysis of global fixed income flows has revealed strong implications for global bond valuations that could be inconsistent with consensus expectations for the global economy.
  • ? The termination of net purchases under the ECB's asset purchase programme (APP) will have important implications for global bond markets, which may be larger than those associated with the end of the Fed's QE programme. The unwind will prompt a reversal in European investors' aggressive rotation of portfolios from domestic to foreign fixed income securities and other asset classes. This could reduce cross‐border purchases by European investors by €200bn per year.
  • ? US investors are also expected to buy fewer foreign bonds as they are likely to have to absorb an increase in the supply of domestic bonds because of (i) a larger fiscal deficit; (ii) the Fed's portfolio unwinding; (iii) corporate sector liquidation of holdings abroad; and (iv) greater financial sector issuance tied to household re‐leveraging.
  • ? Emerging markets' (EM) purchases of foreign bonds are expected to continue to be subdued in the short‐term after recent steep declines. Our baseline view is that, on the back of the return of capital flows into emerging markets, EM purchases of advanced market securities will bounce back but not by enough to offset the retrenchment of American and European investors. However, the risks to the downside are considerable given shifting global policy developments.
       

Peripheries well able to cope with wider bond spreads

• While a four‐year golden period for many peripheral Eurozone governments of rising GDP growth and falling global bond yields may be coming to an end, we doubt that we will see a sharp widening of Eurozone bond spreads in 2017.
• Although higher yields are clearly not positive news for heavily indebted peripheral governments, our view is that the pace of increase in risk‐free long‐term yields will be fairly gradual this year – we expect ten‐year Bund yields to climb to just 0.6% or so by the end of 2017. Such a development is unlikely to prompt markets to demand far higher compensation for the higher risk associated with holding peripheral debt.
• Indeed, both the Italian and Spanish governments should be able to borrow at long maturities and at rates comfortably below their average rate on their outstanding stock of debt of 3% or so, throughout this year and probably beyond, even if spreads rise.
• Meanwhile, a key factor behind the rise in bond yields – the prospect of higher inflation – will have some positive effects. Higher inflation will erode the real value of outstanding debt and make it easier for intra‐Eurozone imbalances to be resolved. At the margin, a steeper yield curve will also help to boost banks' profits on lending.
• Finally, although populists support has grown, the risk of populist governments taking power in the periphery are fairly low. Italy and Spain may hold early elections, but it is not a given that elections will be held this year. And in the event of an election, we do not attach a high chance to the election of populist parties in either economy.
• Overall, while 2017 may be a bumpy one for spreads, particularly in Italy, we see only a modest widening from their current levels, reflecting improvements in the debt sustainability positions of the peripheral governments. But even these modest gains will mean Bunds would still outperform Italian and Spanish government bonds over the next year on a total returns basis.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Emerging sell‐off to restrain global growth

• Emerging financial markets have come under renewed downward pressure since mid‐January, with evidence of a general retreat by investors.
• There have been significant currency depreciations in several countries, and interest rates have been forced up in Turkey, India, South Africa and Brazil – with further hikes likely. Emerging stocks have plunged.
• This has prompted a sequence of downgrades to our growth forecasts for the emergers. We now expect Indian growth to be 0.2% lower this year than previously, South African growth 0.6% lower and Turkish growth 1.3% lower. In China and Brazil, growth in 2015 has been cut by around 0.5%.
• Weaker emerging growth will also constrain activity in the advanced economies. Emerging markets account for a modest share of advanced economy exports, but their share in export growth is higher. For the Eurozone, heavily dependent on external demand, this share has been 30–40% since 2010.
• Meanwhile, European listed firms get almost 25% of their revenues from emergers, and US firms 15% (while exports to emergers are 10% and 5% of GDP respectively). There has also been a sharp rise in bank loans to emergers in recent years.
• The biggest risks for global growth relate to China, which dwarfs the other emergers, and where concerns about possible financial instability, especially linked to shadow banking, have risen this year.
• Thanks to robust growth in the US, Japan and the UK, we still expect global growth to pick up in 2014, but downside risks have risen over the past month. With the US Fed set to press on with ‘tapering’ asset purchases, driving up global long‐term interest rates, emergers face potential further pressures.
• US tapering will be only partially offset by more expansionary monetary policy in Japan. What could make a big difference, and reduce the downside risks from emerging weakness, would be aggressive expansion in the Eurozone. At present, however, this seems unlikely – despite lingering deflation risks.

     

A long dollar fall: likelihood and consequences

• ? The dollar has tended to move in long swings over the last forty years, raising the risk that the recent decline could extend considerably further. This is not our base case, but risks do look skewed towards additional dollar weakness. Our modelling work suggests that a large further dollar slide would have significant effects on the pattern of world growth – the US and some emerging markets would gain, with other advanced economies the main losers.
• ? There have been several large multi‐year swings in the dollar over the last four decades. We identify seven such episodes since 1971 including three long declines averaging 31%, the last being in 2002‐08. Since 2017 the dollar has fallen 10%, implying a possible further considerable drop.
• ? Our dollar strength indicator, which covers a range of economic variables associated with dollar moves in the past, does not currently point to a re‐run of the dollar weakness of the 2000s. But we do expect some further near‐term dollar losses and risks to our baseline forecast look skewed to the downside, especially given the emergence of large twin deficits in the US.
• ? Should a further large dollar slump nevertheless occur, our modelling suggests large effects on the pattern of world growth. The main gainers would be commodity‐producing emerging markets (EM) benefitting from improved terms of trade, positive balance sheet and external liquidity effects and scope to ease local interest rates. Rising US yields would erode some of these gains in later years.
• ? The main initial losers would be advanced economies outside the US which would lose competitiveness. In the case of the Eurozone and Japan, undershoots of inflation targets would be likely. There could also be some other negative consequences such as stoking protectionism and creating financial bubbles in some EMs.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: A weaker dollar and slightly faster growth

• ? We have raised our world GDP growth forecasts this month, to 2.7% for 2017 and 3.0% in 2018 (from 2.6% and 2.9% previously). Similarly, we have lifted our inflation forecast for this year to 3.1%.
• ? Surveys continue to suggest buoyant global activity, driven by manufacturing in several countries. This, in turn, is helping pull world trade from its 2016 lows. However, this partially reflects factors such as stimulus measures in China, which is boosting construction and manufacturing and bolstering trade in the region, and also benefitting major capital goods exporters such as Germany and Japan.
• ? But there are reasons for caution given there are still underlying factors holding back demand and the likelihood that the fiscal stimulus promised by President Trump will not be as big as expected.
• ? The most important forecast change this month is that we see a weaker US dollar ahead as monetary policy tightening in the US has already been largely priced in. This means our EURUSD and GBPUSD forecasts are now $1.10 and $1.32 by year‐end, while the short‐term outlook for many EM currencies against the US$ has also firmed.
• ? We still expect the Fed to raise rates on another two occasions this year, followed by three hikes in 2018. However, we have brought forward by one quarter to Q4 2017 our forecast of when the Fed will begin to taper reinvestment of its portfolio holdings.
• ? Meanwhile, we think the ECB is still a long way from policy normalisation. We expect QE to be tapered from January until June 2018. Then, the ECB will consider lifting the deposit rate from its negative levels in the final part of 2018, and only in 2020 will it start raising the main refinancing rate.
• ? Emerging markets' prospects have improved amid a strong batch of high frequency indicators and a pick‐up in trade. Given low valuations, we see positive momentum for EM currencies and think that they may have entered a long cycle of strength.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Global deflation – a genuine risk?

• The notable decline in inflation in the Eurozone, US and UK since mid-2013 has led to suggestions that a period of widespread price deflation across the major economies is a risk. Adding to these concerns has been the trajectory of producer prices – already declining in the Eurozone and China and showing very subdued growth elsewhere.
• Our global GDP forecasts do not, in isolation, point to a worldwide deflation risk. We expect growth at 2.8% this year and 3.2% next, little changed from last month.
• But the starting point for this growth matters, specifically the gap between actual and potential output last year. Even with reasonable growth, an initially large output gap would imply downward pressure on inflation over the next two years.
• Unfortunately, the size of the output gap is very uncertain. There is a wide range of estimates for the major economies, especially Japan. Part of the problem is that it is hard to know how much potential output was (or was not) permanently lost during the global financial crisis and recession.
• Assuming substantial permanent losses, output gaps might be relatively modest now, but a more optimistic view of the supply side of the economy would suggest output gaps could be quite large – and arguably this fits better with the recent evidence from inflation.
• Overall, while we see a genuine risk of deflation in the Eurozone (with around a 15% probability) we are more upbeat about the other major economies, where growth in the broad money supply and nominal GDP do not seem to be signaling deflation risks.
• But the difficulty of measuring ‘slack’ in the economy for us underlines the case for central banks to err on the side of caution when setting monetary policy, and either not tightening too soon or easing further. This month we have built in a further ECB rate cut to our Eurozone forecast. In Japan, we have revised down growth for 2014–15 with recent data strengthening the case for additional monetary easing this year.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Global upswing delayed

• This month sees our global GDP growth forecast for 2015 revised down to 2.7%, implying no improvement from 2014. At the start of the year, we expected world growth for 2015 at 2.9%.
• A key factor behind the slippage in our global forecast has been a softening of activity in the US. The balance of economic surprises (actual data versus expected) has deteriorated sharply in recent months. As a result, we now expect US growth at 2.7% this year, compared to 3.3% at the start of 2015.
• We are wary of reading too much into the most recent data, as the US and other advanced economies also went through ‘soft patches’ at the starts of both 2013 and 2014, but recovered. Also, the balance of economic surprises for the G10 is only moderately negative – and is strongly positive for the Eurozone.
• One area of concern is sluggish US consumption recently – despite lower oil prices. But with labour market conditions favourable and disposable income growing solidly, we expect this to prove a blip. And the evidence from advanced economies as a whole suggests lower oil prices have boosted consumers.
• There are nevertheless genuine drags on global growth. The strong dollar appears to be weighing on US exports and investment, and curbing profits. It is also damaging growth in some emerging markets through its negative impact on commodity prices and capital flows and via balance sheet effects (raising the burden of dollar‐denominated debt).
• Meanwhile, this month also sees a fresh downgrade to our forecast for China – GDP is now expected to rise 6.6% this year versus 6.8% a month ago. This reflects weakness in a number of key indicators and also the likely impact of a squeeze on local government finances from the property sector slump.
• With the US and China representing a third of global GDP, slower growth there will also tend to retard world trade growth. We continue to expect world GDP growth to reach 3% in 2016, but 2015 now looks like being another year of sub‐par global growth.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: A world with higher inflation

• Our world GDP growth forecasts are unchanged this month, at 2.6% for 2017 and 2.9% in 2018. But we expect a sizeable increase in inflation, to 3.3% in 2017 from an estimated 2.8% in 2016, as the effect of higher oil prices feeds through.
• Global indicators continue to point to a pick‐up in activity towards the end of last year, driven by stronger manufacturing activity. The global manufacturing PMI rose to the highest level in almost three years in December, while the composite index – which includes services – was at a 13‐month high.
• World trade should be underpinned by stronger growth in the US (2.3% in 2017 and 2.5% in 2018), bolstered by the anticipated effects of President Trump's expansive fiscal policies. That said, uncertainties around our central forecast are unusually high given the high level of uncertainty surrounding the Trump administration. Encouragingly, there are increasing signs that the tighter labour market is leading to a pick‐up in wage inflation in the US, which will support consumers.
• Given these reflationary trends, we expect two increases in the Federal funds rate this year and US bond yields are likely to continue to rise. The widening of interest rate differentials between the US and the Eurozone will drive the euro down to parity with the US dollar by end‐2017 for the first time since 2002.
• We have revised our Brexit assumptions this month. We now assume that the two‐year period of exit negotiations is followed by a transitional arrangement lasting 2–3 years. This would provide breathing space to negotiate a free trade agreement with the EU.
• Emerging market growth on the whole will improve in 2017 but performance will differ across countries: Russia and Brazil will exit recession, but countries with weak balance of payments positions, high dollar debt and exposure to possible US protectionist actions will be at risk. In China, policymakers are moving to greater emphasis on reducing financial risks and less focus on the 6.5% GDP growth target for 2017. Continued action is also likely to dampen further depreciation of the CNY.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: A recovery in trade

• ? Our world GDP growth forecasts are unchanged this month, at 2.6% for 2017 and 2.9% in 2018. Similarly, our outlook for inflation has remained stable and we expect consumer price inflation to accelerate to 3.3% in 2017 owing to the effect of higher oil prices. Despite the multi‐year highs shown by global surveys, we remain cautious about further upgrades to our growth forecast, as we believe that the they may be overstating the pace of growth .
• ? Global indicators continue to point to a pick‐up in activity, driven by stronger manufacturing. The global manufacturing PMI remained at its highest level in almost three years in January, while the composite index – which includes services – was at a 22‐month high. Underpinned by stronger manufacturing activity, global trade is also recovering, with trade volumes rising a strong 2.8% on the month in November.
• ? After a disappointing 2016, we expect US growth to rise to 2.3% from an estimated 1.6%, bolstered by the anticipated effects of President Trump's expansive fiscal policies. However, uncertainties around our central forecast are unusually high given the major doubts about the new president's policies. The first days of the Trump administration have shown that he does not intend to tone down his rhetoric and we believe there is risk of a general underestimation of the economic risks derived from protectionism and his anti‐immigration stance.
• ? We still expect two increases in the Federal funds rate this year and US bond yields are likely to continue to rise. Despite some recent dollar weakness, the widening of interest rate differential between the US and the Eurozone, where rates are likely to remain unchanged, will drive the euro down to parity with the US dollar by end‐2017.
• ? Emerging market growth overall will improve in 2017, but performance will differ across countries. Countries with weak balance of payments positions, high dollar debt and exposure to possible US protectionist actions will be at risk. Our research shows that Turkey, South Africa and Malaysia are most at risk from potential financial turmoil.

     

Revisiting the Eurozone Phillips curve

• In a recent speech, ECB chief economist Peter Praet emphasised the importance of the Phillips curve ‐ the inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation ‐ when addressing concerns that disinflation (or even deflation) could become a longer‐term problem in the Eurozone. Praet argued that a scenario of a sustained period of disinflation is only realistic if the link between economic slack and inflation is broken. In this article, we revisit the Phillips curve in the Eurozone with the aim of gauging whether there has been a change in the relationship following the global financial crisis and how uniform the curve is among major Eurozone economies.
• We conclude that the Phillips curve is still valid in the Eurozone, although our analysis indicates a weakening of the link in the post‐crisis period. On the whole, our analysis shows that the Phillips curve relationship has been robust in the Eurozone since the creation of the currency union. However, in replicating the analysis for just the pre‐crisis period, we have noticed that the relationship between slack and inflation for the Eurozone was stronger (i.e. the slope of the curve was steeper) before the crisis rather than over the whole sample, since the introduction of the Euro.
• We find that there is considerable heterogeneity in the strength of the link between inflation and slack across the Eurozone economies, which adds to our existing body of work on their different responses to same shocks. Moreover, in contrast to the Eurozone overall, we find that in Spain and Italy the responsiveness of inflation to slack appears to have actually increased since the crisis; this might reflect the effectiveness of the structural reforms undertaken in both countries in order to reduce the rigidity of their economies.
• From 2014 onwards, very low inflation in the Eurozone has led to fears of sustained disinflation and even a deflationary spiral. Our view has always been that these fears were overblown; proving that the key structural relationship needed for ECB to meet its mandate is still in place corroborates our stance. Our forecast is for headline inflation to rise to 0.7% in 2016 (under the assumption that oil prices average US$37pb) and then to 1.7% in 2017 ‐ in line with ECB's target of “close to, but below, 2%”. The Phillips curve we have derived for the Eurozone tells a similar story. However, renewed weakness in oil prices at the start of 2016 presents a downside risk to our forecasts.
• Our bottom‐up CPI inflation model indicates that inflation might average just 0.2% this year if oil remains at around US$30pb. Furthermore, the prospect of external demand weakness derailing the Eurozone recovery poses another risk. This has raised the possibility of further expansion of the ECB's QE programme. However, as we continue to see resilient domestic demand in 2016, our baseline case still remains that the ECB will make no additional substantial adjustments to its QE programme in the near term.

     

Weak world trade could spark competitive devaluations

• World trade growth has slowed sharply in 2015, with our forecast for growth just 1% for the year. High frequency indicators suggest a stagnant picture, with trade in key emerging markets (EM) especially weak. Import growth in the US and Eurozone remains positive and is holding up world trade, but there are downside risks here also. Very slow world trade growth risks incentivising competitive depreciations and depressing global bond yields.
• In August our OE export indicator fell to its lowest level since late‐2012 –; the point when the US announced ‘QE3’. Its weakness is corroborated by other indicators such as container trade and air freight.
• The main drag to world trade is from emerging markets, especially the BRIC‐4 whose import volumes contracted sharply in H1 2015, cutting more than 1 percentage point from annual growth in goods trade.
• US and European import growth looks stronger and should be supported in 2016 by firming GDP growth. This is an important support for world trade, but the latest data suggest some downside risks here also.
• The weaker world demand growth is then the more that trade will appear like a zero‐sum game where a country can benefit only at the expense of its competitors. This has potentially important implications for asset prices: in particular, countries may turn to competitive depreciation, adding further to global deflationary pressures and holding down global bond yields.

     

How would Eurozone equities respond to a bond sell‐off?

• We have developed a new model to measure the impact on Eurozone equities of a global bond sell‐off as the Fed starts to tighten its monetary stance later this year. We show that the most affected countries would be Greece, Finland and Portugal: the cumulated equity loss compared to the baseline ranges from between 35% to more than 50% in the case of Greece at the end of 2017. Under this scenario, Belgium, Ireland and Austria are less impacted by the global re‐pricing of risk.
• In light of global risk being skewed to the downside (China, Greece, risk‐off), it is essential to have a framework that is able to generate consistent responses of Eurozone stock indices to global macro shocks in stress test scenarios. The approach assesses first the co‐movements of Eurozone stock indices and aims to explain them with macro variables such as the US S&P index, the oil price, the euro/dollar exchange rate and short‐ and long‐term interest rate differentials between the Eurozone and the US.
• We find a high degree of co‐movement in Eurozone equity returns. This matters from an asset management perspective, as it reveals limited potential for diversification benefits of an equity portfolio invested across Eurozone countries.

     

Are central banks really breaking the (policy) rules?

• ? Looking at the strength of the global economy, it's no surprise that simple policy rules suggest that interest rates in some advanced economies are much too low and/or that several rate hikes would be needed in 2018 to avoid falling further behind the curve. Nonetheless, we expect central banks to respond cautiously and we see a slower pace of tightening than the consensus view .
• ? Policy rules, such as the Taylor Rule, have long been considered a useful guide to the potential path for policy rates. But while it suggests that current US, Eurozone and Australian central bank rates are broadly appropriate, it signals that UK, Canadian, and Swedish rates should be substantially higher. Based on our economic forecasts, Taylor Rules suggest that the central banks in the US, Eurozone, Canada and Australia will all need to raise intertest rates by around 100bps by end‐2018.
• ? However, there are several reasons not to draw strong conclusions from such point estimates. First, the Taylor Rule requires estimates of two unobservable variables – the output gap and the natural rate of interest – which cannot be estimated precisely.
• ? Second, using models that were designed to predict US policy responses in the 1990s to forecast central banks' behaviour today is likely to be misleading. Meanwhile, inferring central banks' reaction functions from recent policy rate moves to assess the future policy path is fraught with difficulties. Not only have interest rates been broadly unchanged for the bulk of the post‐financial crisis period, but policymakers have provided other forms of policy support.
• ? Third, outside the US at least, Taylor Rules have historically pointed to persistently different policy rates from those observed, yet inflation has been well anchored.
• ? The upshot of all this is that we expect central banks in the advanced economies to err on the side of caution and anticipate interest rates rising less quickly than the consensus amongst economists.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: US acceleration brings a positive start to 2014

• A series of positive data releases in the US has led us to revise upwards our growth forecasts for 2014. We now expect US GDP to rise by over 3% this year, compared to 2.7% forecast a month ago.
• A key factor changing the US outlook is a more confident consumer. In the three months to November, real consumption rose at an annualised pace of 5%, the strongest in four years. This has been partly financed by a reduced saving rate – but the saving rate has been much lower in the recent past and steady employment gains should support both income and consumer sentiment in the year ahead.
• Also supporting growth this year in the US and the broader global economy will be wealth gains. In recent years, global stock prices at the end of a given year have been a reasonable predictor of economic growth in the following year, and global equities were up over 20% on the year at the end of 2013.
• Nevertheless, the global growth outlook remains patchy. An optimistic picture in the US, UK and Japan contrasts with a rather mixed picture the Eurozone – where some economies are still contracting and where there is a risk of deflation.
• The picture is also subdued in the key emergers. In contrast to the developed economies, emerging market stocks are down 10% on the year as higher US yields draw capital away. Weak currencies, inflation and high interest rates are weighing on growth in markets such as India, Brazil and Turkey.
• These factors are likely to wane only slowly as the year proceeds and could even worsen if tapering in the US is faster than expected. A stronger US economy may not fully offset this – the US's strong competitive position could direct more of rising US demand to US products than in previous upturns.
• As a result, we expect emerging growth to firm only modestly this year, to 4.5% from 4.1% in 2013 – well below pre‐crisis levels of around 7%. Global growth too will remain below par at 2.9%, from 2.2% in 2013, but improving to over 3% next year.

     

World trade forecasts upgraded,but headwinds from Asia

• ? Most leading indicators of world trade point to growth remaining robust in the next few months, but there are some headwinds, especially from Asia. Overall, we expect trade growth to decelerate this year, yet the outlook has improved since August. We see world trade rising by 6.1% in 2017 and by 4.8% this year, up from our previous forecasts of 5.7% and 3.8%, respectively .
• ? The latest trade volume data for the major economies support our forecasts, as does our survey‐based export indicator, which leads trade by around three months. This indicator and the main measure of global freight volumes are consistent with world trade continuing to grow by around 6% y/y in the near term.
• ? World trade growth is likely to be supported by emerging markets (EMs), which made a large contribution to the trade recovery last year. Another factor that may be supportive – especially for EMs – is the slippage in the US dollar last year, as there is some evidence of a negative correlation between dollar strength and world trade.
• ? The recovery of demand in the Eurozone and expected fiscal stimulus in the US add to the positive constellation of factors supporting world trade growth. Business sentiment indicators remain positive and imply upside risks to our forecasts. Yet it is not obvious that they have a strong leading relationship with trade – and the statistical relationship has become weaker since 2007–2009. This reinforces our view that there has been a structural change in the relationship between world trade and world GDP.
• ? The main near‐term downside risks to world trade come from Asia. Freight indicators for Shanghai and Hong Kong have slowed markedly, as have semiconductor billings. Although Chinese activity indicators have also moderated, China's trade volume growth remains surprisingly strong.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Are we entering another global ‘soft patch’?

• Global growth has tended to hit ‘soft patches’ at the start of recent years and some indicators are again pointing in that direction at present.
• In the US, we expect GDP growth at around 2% annualised in Q1 based on recent indicators which have included subdued jobs growth and some slowdown in housing.
• Meanwhile, the latest readings for the export orders components of key manufacturing surveys – which are good predictors of world trade growth – suggest some pullback after a modest upturn in the final months of 2013. Trade growth remains especially subdued in Asia, including Japan and China.
• The crisis in Ukraine also poses some downside risks, should it escalate further – in particular the danger of a sharp rise in European gas prices which could harm the still fragile Eurozone economy.
• Overall, we regard most of these factors as temporary and continue to forecast a strengthening global economy over the coming 18 months. US data at the start of this year have been partly dampened by climatic factors, while underlying domestic demand growth in Japan remains robust and the Eurozone outlook has continued to improve slowly.
• As a result, our world GDP growth forecasts are little changed from last month, at 2.8% for 2014 and 3.2% for 2015.
• This forecast is partly underpinned by a renewed pickup in world trade. But there are some risks to this assumption, including the possibility that emerging market countries will have to rapidly improve their current account positions due to the more restrictive external financing conditions associated with US tapering.
• Such an adjustment could put a significant dent in our forecast for world trade growth. For ten large emergers, shifting current account balances to our estimates of their sustainable levels would mean an adjustment of around US$280 billion – around 40% of the increment to world trade that we forecast for 2014.