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1.
《Economic Outlook》2014,38(Z4):1-43
Overview: Global deflation – a genuine risk?
  • The notable decline in inflation in the Eurozone, US and UK since mid-2013 has led to suggestions that a period of widespread price deflation across the major economies is a risk. Adding to these concerns has been the trajectory of producer prices – already declining in the Eurozone and China and showing very subdued growth elsewhere.
  • Our global GDP forecasts do not, in isolation, point to a worldwide deflation risk. We expect growth at 2.8% this year and 3.2% next, little changed from last month.
  • But the starting point for this growth matters, specifically the gap between actual and potential output last year. Even with reasonable growth, an initially large output gap would imply downward pressure on inflation over the next two years.
  • Unfortunately, the size of the output gap is very uncertain. There is a wide range of estimates for the major economies, especially Japan. Part of the problem is that it is hard to know how much potential output was (or was not) permanently lost during the global financial crisis and recession.
  • Assuming substantial permanent losses, output gaps might be relatively modest now, but a more optimistic view of the supply side of the economy would suggest output gaps could be quite large – and arguably this fits better with the recent evidence from inflation.
  • Overall, while we see a genuine risk of deflation in the Eurozone (with around a 15% probability) we are more upbeat about the other major economies, where growth in the broad money supply and nominal GDP do not seem to be signaling deflation risks.
  • But the difficulty of measuring ‘slack’ in the economy for us underlines the case for central banks to err on the side of caution when setting monetary policy, and either not tightening too soon or easing further. This month we have built in a further ECB rate cut to our Eurozone forecast. In Japan, we have revised down growth for 2014–15 with recent data strengthening the case for additional monetary easing this year.
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《Economic Outlook》2007,31(S10):1-28
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《Economic Outlook》2016,40(Z4):1-53
Overview: Forecasts steady but near‐term signals mixed
  • Our world growth forecasts are steady this month, at 2.3% for 2016 and 2.7% for 2017.
  • One factor behind the more stable outlook is the rally in financial markets since mid‐February. This rally appears to have been the result of a number of factors including a more dovish Fed and an improvement in some near‐term economic indicators.
  • The implied 12‐month ahead Fed funds rate dropped around 0.5% from its January peak to mid-February and remains around 0.35% lower now. So the Fed still apparently has the capacity to boost markets with changes in communication policy.
  • The Citigroup economic surprise indicators have also improved over recent weeks, especially for emerging markets where the indicator is back in positive territory. The G10 index nevertheless remains clearly negative.
  • Other economic signals are mixed. The latest reading of OE's world trade indicator (based on survey evidence for March) suggests a modest improvement, although again the indicator continues to signal weak world trade growth.
  • Meanwhile, there have been some warnings of potentially softer labour market conditions. Though payrolls gains have remained solid, a weighted sum of the employment subindices of the US ISM surveys has dropped sharply over recent months. A similar index for the Eurozone is more positive, although it has also softened from its late‐2015 peaks.
  • These mixed signals suggest limited likelihood of near‐term upgrades to the world growth outlook and overall we maintain our view from last month that risks look skewed to the downside – so that further monetary policy stimulus remains a possibility.
  • This assessment appears to be shared, to some extent at least, by global bond markets. US 10‐year yields have dropped back to only 1.7% since mid‐March (only 0.1% above their February lows), with German yields at just 0.1% and Japanese yields at ‐ 0.1%. So the ‘great squeeze’ on G7 bond yields is still continuing.
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《Economic Outlook》2016,40(Z1):1-54
Overview: 2016 – unhappy New Year?
  • 2016 has got off to a shaky start, with sharp declines in global equity markets and renewed jitters about China and its currency. Recent asset market trends have prompted some observers to suggest a high risk of a global recession this year.
  • A glance back at recent history suggests why. Since last May, global stocks and non‐fuel commodity prices have both dropped by 12–13%. Over the last forty years, such a combination in a similar time frame has usually been associated with recession.
  • There have been exceptions to this pattern; there were similar sell‐offs in stocks and commodities in 2011, 1998 and 1984 without associated recessions. Notably though, in at least two of these cases, expansionary US policy helped reverse market movements – but US policy is now headed in the opposite direction.
  • More heart can be taken from the relative resilience of real economy developments in many of the advanced economies over recent months. There are few signs, for instance of sharp declines in consumer or business confidence, or in property prices.
  • Policy settings also remain expansionary in the Eurozone, Japan and China – where broad money and growth has moved higher in recent months.
  • Industry remains the problem area, both for commodity price‐sensitive extractive sectors and manufacturing. The global manufacturing PMI continues to suggest very subdued output growth.
  • Services output remains more robust, and should be supported during 2016 by tightening labour markets – December's strong US payrolls release was encouraging in this regard.
  • But there are downside risks to services, too, should stock price declines hit consumer spending. Our Global Economic Model suggests a 15% fall in world stocks may cut global GDP by 0.4–0.7%.
  • As a result, there is a real danger that our global growth forecast of 2.6% for 2016 proves too optimistic with growth instead slipping below last year's already‐modest 2.5% reading.
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《Economic Outlook》2016,40(Z2):1-54
Overview: World growth cut as financial woes persist
  • This month sees our world GDP forecast for 2016 cut to 2.3%, from 2.6% previously. Our new forecast implies this year will be the weakest for the world economy since 2009.
  • Our 2016 growth forecast was over 3% in mid‐2015. But the economic backdrop has worsened markedly since, with steep drops in stock markets, slumping commodities and widening credit spreads.
  • We flagged the risks from the financial market sell‐off last month and conditions have improved little since. Worse, there are some signs that weakness in the real economy may be broadening.
  • This month's global downgrade partly reflects familiar factors such as worsening emerging markets: we now expect even deeper recessions in Brazil and Russia.
  • The US forecast has also been downgraded again, to 2% from 2.4% last month. This in part reflects a soft Q4 GDP reading, one worrying detail of which was a weaker performance by consumer spending.
  • Signs of a slowdown in services were also visible in the PMI surveys for January in the US and Eurozone. Partly as a result, our Eurozone growth forecast has been cut this month to 1.6% from 1.8%.
  • With world industry already stagnant, signs of weakness spreading to services are unwelcome. We are particularly concerned that the financial market slump will create a negative global credit and confidence shock.
  • Another concern is that the collapse in world stock prices is starting to have ‘negative wealth effects’. For most consumers, wealth effects are more likely to be generated by house price moves. In this respect, there is some room for optimism – house prices are still growing in most of the main economies.
  • But housing is weakening in some emerging countries and world house and stock prices have tended to move together since 2007.
  • Pressures on policymakers to act remain strong and are increasingly focused on using negative interest rates – as in Japan and Sweden in the last month.
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《Economic Outlook》2017,41(Z1):1-37
Overview: A world with higher inflation
  • Our world GDP growth forecasts are unchanged this month, at 2.6% for 2017 and 2.9% in 2018. But we expect a sizeable increase in inflation, to 3.3% in 2017 from an estimated 2.8% in 2016, as the effect of higher oil prices feeds through.
  • Global indicators continue to point to a pick‐up in activity towards the end of last year, driven by stronger manufacturing activity. The global manufacturing PMI rose to the highest level in almost three years in December, while the composite index – which includes services – was at a 13‐month high.
  • World trade should be underpinned by stronger growth in the US (2.3% in 2017 and 2.5% in 2018), bolstered by the anticipated effects of President Trump's expansive fiscal policies. That said, uncertainties around our central forecast are unusually high given the high level of uncertainty surrounding the Trump administration. Encouragingly, there are increasing signs that the tighter labour market is leading to a pick‐up in wage inflation in the US, which will support consumers.
  • Given these reflationary trends, we expect two increases in the Federal funds rate this year and US bond yields are likely to continue to rise. The widening of interest rate differentials between the US and the Eurozone will drive the euro down to parity with the US dollar by end‐2017 for the first time since 2002.
  • We have revised our Brexit assumptions this month. We now assume that the two‐year period of exit negotiations is followed by a transitional arrangement lasting 2–3 years. This would provide breathing space to negotiate a free trade agreement with the EU.
  • Emerging market growth on the whole will improve in 2017 but performance will differ across countries: Russia and Brazil will exit recession, but countries with weak balance of payments positions, high dollar debt and exposure to possible US protectionist actions will be at risk. In China, policymakers are moving to greater emphasis on reducing financial risks and less focus on the 6.5% GDP growth target for 2017. Continued action is also likely to dampen further depreciation of the CNY.
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