Household bargaining and the design of couples’ income taxation

This paper studies the design of couples’ income taxation when consumption and labor supply decisions within the couple are made by maximizing a weighted sum of the spouses’ utilities; bargaining weights are given but specific to each couple. Information structure and labor supply decisions follow the Mirrleesian tradition. However, while the household's total consumption is publicly observable, the consumption levels of the individual spouses are not observable. With a utilitarian social welfare function we show that the expression for a spouses’ marginal income tax rate includes a “Pigouvian” (paternalistic) and an incentive term. The Pigouvian term favors a marginal subsidy (tax) for the high-weight (low-weight) spouse, whose labor supply otherwise tends to be too low (high). The sign and the magnitude of the incentive term depends on the weight structure across couples. In some cases both terms have the same sign and imply a positive marginal tax for the low-weight spouse (who may be female) and a negative one for the high-weight spouse (possibly the male). This is at odds with the traditional Boskin and Sheshinski results. Our conclusions can easily be generalized to more egalitarian welfare functions. Finally, we present numerical simulations based on a calibrated specification of our model. The calculations confirm that the male spouse may well have the lower (and possibly even negative) marginal tax rate.     

Convergence of the Aumann–Davis–Maschler and Geanakoplos bargaining sets

Summary. Geanakoplos [17] defined a notion of bargaining set, and proved that his bargaining set is approximately competitive in large finite transferable utility (TU) exchange economies with smooth preferences. Shapley and Shubik [26] showed that the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set is approximately competitive in replica sequences of TU exchange economies with smooth preferences. We extend Geanakoplos result to nontransferable utility (NTU) exchange economies without smooth preferences, and we extend the Shapley and Shubik result to non-replica sequences of NTU exchange economies with smooth preferences.Received: November 11, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.     

同性婚姻的宪法之纬——《Same—sex Marriage and the Constitution》述评

当同性恋不再是罪，当同性恋也不再是病，当同性恋的性权利得到了更多的支持，主流意识形态必须面对这样的问题：如果非婚同居、性交易、性乱交都是同主流道德不相吻合的，那么如果拒绝了同性婚姻，同性恋还能怎么做?     

Politicians and Preferences of the Voter Majority: Does Gender Matter?

Does the gender of political representatives affect the extent to which they adhere to the voter majority's preferences? By matching individual male and female representatives' votes on legislative proposals with real referendum outcomes on the same issues, we obtain a direct measure of divergence. We find that female and male representatives adhere equally close to the majority's preferences if party affiliations are taken into account. This suggests that observed gender differences with respect to the national majority of voters may be reduced to an ideological left–right dimension.     

Choosing Bargaining Partners—An Experimental Study on the Impact of Information About Income,Status and Gender

Ultimatum proposals and dictator donations are studied when proposers can choose the income and sex of the responder. Responder attributes generated strong effects in the selection decisions; subjects preferred to send proposals to low-income responders and female responders were much more popular than males. Hence, signals of income and sex appear to be important in deciding with whom to bargain. We also report from an experiment where both responders and proposers could select co-player based on socioeconomic status and gender. Both female responders and proposers were strongly preferred. A weaker tendency was that high status subjects were favored.JEL Classification: C90, C78, J7, D63     

Trade in goods and services: Two sides of the same coin?

This study analyzes the interrelationship between goods and services in production and trade using the most recent input–output tables for all OECD countries. It first describes the role of services in production and trade in goods. Next, it proposes two models for analyzing the impact of services trade liberalization on industrial structure. The first captures the role of trade in tasks when countries have different technology i) in production of services; and ii) in organizing production. The latter has to the author's knowledge not been analyzed in the trade literature before. Countries with superior organizational technology (e.g. Japan) will strengthen their comparative advantage in manufacturing following trade liberalization in services. The second model explores the interrelationship between intermediate goods and services i) when they are substitutes; and ii) when they are complements. In both models the gains from trade liberalization is non-linear in trade costs. Going the last mile of liberalization has a much larger impact than taking the first steps.     

Does the Gender of Top Managers and Owners Matter for Firm Exports?

How are export propensity and intensity affected by gender? Data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys (waves 2006–07, 2009–10) are used in a cross-country analysis to investigate whether export propensity and intensity differ according to the gender of top managers and entrepreneurs. Exporting is riskier than selling domestically and women, on average, tend to be more risk averse than men. Exporting entails costs, and women may have reduced access to finance compared to men. Most firms managed or solely owned by women are young and small and may have more difficulty obtaining credit. Women may self-select into routine sectors with lower mean productivity. Unlike most previous research, here the gender effect only takes into account firms where women have decision-making power. Accounting for the endogeneity of firm productivity, firm self-selection into exporting, and several factors influencing export propensity and intensity, the gender effect operates indirectly via some of those factors.     

Wage bargaining and induced technical change in a linear economy: Model and application to the US (1963–2003)

In a simple one-sector, two-class, fixed-proportions economy operating at full capacity, wages are set through generalized axiomatic bargaining à la Nash (1950). As for choice of technology, firms choose the direction of factor-augmenting innovations to maximize the rate of unit cost reduction (Kennedy, 1964, Funk, 2002). The aggregate environment resulting by self-interested decisions made by economic agents is described by a two-dimensional dynamical system in the employment rate and output/capital ratio. The economy converges cyclically to a long-run equilibrium involving a Harrod-neutral profile of technical change, a constant rate of employment of labor, and constant input shares. The type of oscillations predicted by the model matches qualitatively the available data on the United States (1963–2003). Institutional change, as captured by variations in workers’ bargaining power, has a positive effect on the rate of output growth but a negative effect on employment.     

How do Labor Unions Influence the Gender Earnings Gap? A Comparative Study of the US and Korea

Abstract

This paper provides a comparative study of the United States and Korea regarding the effects of unions on gender earnings gaps in 2004. Using datasets representative of the population of the US and Korea, this contribution shows that gender differences in the workers' observed characteristics and the unobserved component reduce gender earnings gaps in union jobs in both the US and Korea. Fringe benefits in the union sector attract women workers with higher labor market qualifications into the union sector and thereby reduce the gender earnings gap in this sector. The study finds that this self-selection process in the union sector is stronger in Korea than in the US, but the seniority-based wage system that prevails in the Korean union sector widens the gender earnings gap.     

Do focus groups and individual interviews reveal the same information for natural resource valuation?

Focus groups and individual interviews have become accepted methods used in the initial stages of valuation research. Whether focus groups and individual interviews reveal similar valuation information has not been thoroughly studied. The research tests the hypothesis that focus groups yield the same ecosystem service information as do individual interviews. The research also explores how the focus group and individual interview data might differ. The analysis shows that focus groups and individual interviews are not substitutes. They yield different information about ecosystem services and resource uses.     

Examining the relationship between academic performance and workplace position: does the glass ceiling exist among graduates from the same university?

This study examines the relationship between academic performance and workplace position. Academic performance is measured by undergraduate grade point average (GPA). A series of ordered probit regression models are estimated to isolate the impact of undergraduate GPA on the probability that female and male graduates from the same university hold middle or upper management jobs within their companies. After all potential heterogeneity and explanatory variables are controlled for, results of the pooled regression models suggest that women are less likely to hold both middle and upper management positions. Further analysis also suggests that lower GPA significantly decreases the probability that women hold these positions, while GPA seems to have no significant impact on workplace position for men. Moreover, most factors which positively impact the probability that women attain these positions also benefit men more at the highest level.     

Poverty and social exclusion: two sides of the same coin or dynamically interrelated processes?

There is growing interest in the analysis and measurement of social exclusion, to complement the static and dynamic literature on income poverty. On theoretical grounds, social exclusion and income poverty are seen as different processes, but with closely interrelated dynamics. However, our empirical understanding of the way these two processes dynamically interact at the individual level is still very limited. To shed some light on the issue, we use a dynamic bivariate probit model, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and Wooldridge (2005)-type initial conditions. Both the first- and second-order Markov dynamics are examined. We estimate the model using the Italian sample of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), waves 1–8, and find a sizable extent of state dependence in both poverty and social exclusion. Moreover, there are dynamic cross-effects implying that poverty and social exclusion are mutually reinforcing. Social policies aimed at eradicating poverty and avoiding individuals’ social and economic marginalization should take these interaction effects explicitly into account.     

Turnover costs and the wage—fringe mix

This paper examines how firms choose their compensation package to influence employee turnover. A firm will attempt to maintain a steady state of trunover consistent with its training and hiring costs. We develop a model of this relationship when the firm's ability to offer a differentiated compensation package. Both the theoretical and empirical findings of our study emphasize the importance of the link between turnover costs and the compensation mix. That is quits are negatively realted to both the share of pensions in the total compensation package and the level of wages. The influence of pensions in attracting stable workers, however, is diminishing. An important implication is that the policies which attempt to standardize worker compensation will hinder the market determination of turnover, and hence, will generate inefficiencies in the labour market.     

Building the minimum wage: the distributional impact of Germany’s first sectoral minimum wage on wages and hours across different wage bargaining regimes

The first minimum wage in Germany was introduced in 1997 for blue-collar workers in sub-sectors of the construction industry. In the setting of a natural experiment, blue-collar workers in neighboring 4-digit industries and white-collar workers are used as control groups for differences-in-differences-in-differences estimation based on linked employer–employee data. Estimation results reveal a sizable positive impact on mean wages in East Germany, but no significant effect in West Germany. Size and significance of effects are neither homogeneous across wage regimes (individual vs. collective contracts) nor across the distribution. The patterns suggest a compression in the lower part of the wage distribution and spillover effects to wages where the minimum is not binding, even in West Germany, where the bite of the MW was low. No effects on hours of work or substitution between workers of different qualification levels are found.     

Do the Hamilton and Beveridge–Nelson filters provide the same information about output gaps? An empirical comparison for practitioners

I compare the empirical performances of the recently-developed Hamilton and Beveridge–Nelson filters of nonstationary time series, using quarterly data on real gross state product in U.S. states. There is meaningful overlap between the two filters, with average correlation coefficients ranging between 0.60 and 0.97. The Hamilton filter and its more recent modification produce cycles of greater volatility and amplitude than the Beveridge–Nelson filter and appear to outperform in pseudo-out-of-sample forecasting exercises of future GSP growth and inflation (though the outperformance is not generally statistically significant). The Beveridge–Nelson filter is, however, less sensitive to realizations of new data.     

Son Preference and Gender Gaps in Child Nutrition: Does the Level of Female Autonomy Matter?

This paper examines the association between parental son preference and child anthropometric status, and the extent to which this relationship depends on the level of female autonomy. Results highlight the importance of maternal son preference and mothers' involvement in household decision making when gender gaps in child nutrition are considered. These findings have important policy implications.     

Competitiveness and the Benchmarking of Nations—A Critical Reflection

This paper provides a critical evaluation of the role and validity of indices used to measure national competitiveness. It examines the growth in the number and range of such indices and explores their growing importance in benchmarking national economic performance. It also provides a detailed critical interrogation of four of the most commonly used indices, and examines their robustness in relation to their ability to predict overall economic performance. The results indicate that the indices are poor proxies and predictors of growth and are thus potentially misleading for policy-makers. The paper concludes by reflecting on the broader benchmarking and image-making role played by competitiveness indices.