The effect of disclosure committees on non-GAAP reporting quality

I examine whether company-implemented disclosure committees help to improve non-GAAP reporting quality. I find that firms with disclosure committees provide higher quality non-GAAP performance metrics and that the exclusions used to calculate their non-GAAP numbers are less persistent for future operating income and operating cash flows. Moreover, I find that firms with disclosure committees are less likely to receive SEC comment letters about non-GAAP disclosure. For firms that receive comment letters about non-GAAP reporting, disclosure committees can help to improve non-GAAP reporting quality. Comparing the influence of audit committees and disclosure committees, I find that audit committee financial experts have stronger monitoring effects than those on disclosure committees. Meanwhile, legal experts on disclosure committees provide similar monitoring compared to audit committees’ financial experts. Finally, the interaction between audit committee financial experts and disclosure committee legal experts produces the strongest effect on non-GAAP reporting quality. In sum, my analyses suggest that disclosure committees can provide important monitoring of non-GAAP reporting.     

A comparison of voluntary and mandated climate change-related disclosure

This study draws on legitimacy theory to investigate the relationship between mandatory disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions by companies that are subject to specific environmental legislation (the Australian National Greenhouse Energy Reporting Act 2007) and the level of voluntary environmental disclosures. Using a sample of 535 observations, we find that i) Overall, legislation-affected companies increase their disclosures compared with non-affected companies, ii) As many companies reduce their disclosures as increase them, iii) there is an increase in the level of emissions volume disclosures in legislation-affected companies compared with the same company pre-implementation, iv) legislation-affected higher emitters have higher levels of voluntary disclosures. These findings are consistent with legitimacy theory, which predicts differential disclosures in circumstances to avoid scrutiny.     

The price of carbon risk: Evidence from China’s bond market

Using a 2009–2019 sample of Chinese bond issuers, we examine the effect of carbon risk on bond financing costs. Relative to low carbon risk issuers, high carbon risk issuers have substantially larger bond credit spreads, mainly because their credit risk is greater and they invest the funds in non-green projects. This positive relationship is more pronounced for issuers with financing constraints, those not making a green transition and those in cities with stringent environmental regulations. We find a reversed effect during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, China’s carbon peak and carbon neutral goals have renewed the focus on carbon risk. Carbon risk also causes bond issuers to scale back production and negatively affects their likelihood of receiving long-term financial support. Our findings suggest that investors consider carbon risk and charge a corresponding risk premium.     

The Disciplinary Role of Financial Statements: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions of Privately Held Targets

This study examines whether requiring the disclosure of audited financial statements disciplines managers’ mergers and acquisitions (M&As) decisions. When an M&A transaction meets certain disclosure thresholds, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires the public acquirer to disclose the target's audited financial statements after the merger is completed. Using hand‐collected data, I find that the disclosure of private targets’ financial statements is associated with better acquisition decisions. Furthermore, I find that this disciplining effect of disclosure is more pronounced when monitoring by outside capital providers is more difficult and costly, and when other disciplining mechanisms are weaker. Finally, these findings are robust to several alternative explanations, such as monitoring from blockholders and voluntary disclosures. In sum, the evidence suggests that the ex post mandatory disclosure of private targets’ accounting information disciplines managers’ acquisition decisions and improves acquisition efficiency.     

Novel approaches to the regulatory control of financial services providers: The importance of cultural context

This study investigates the effectiveness of a public sector financial management initiative. Specifically, the powers awarded to the Irish Financial Services Ombudsman (FSO) in 2013 to name and shame malfeasance by financial service providers (FSPs) in its annual reports. As the first country to award such powers to its public sector financial ombudsman, Ireland represents a novel setting in which to test the impact of regulatory disclosure as a way to promote accountability and transparency. Our results show that the number of complaints lodged against malfeasants dropped in the immediate aftermath of this and, following a one-year lag, so did the percentage of complaints lodged that proceeded to a full investigation and legally binding finding. Despite the failure of such strategies in some jurisdictions, the Irish experience indicates that regulatory disclosure can, in line with Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory and consistent with the accounting and accountability literature, have considerable impact where and when contextual preconditions are met. These findings have important implications for the operationalisation of regulatory disclosure as an accountability enhancing measure in other jurisdictions.     

The Department of Justice as a gatekeeper in whistleblower-initiated corporate fraud enforcement: Drivers and consequences

We examine drivers and consequences of U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) oversight of whistleblower cases of corporate fraud against the government. We find that the DOJ is more likely to intervene in and conduct longer investigations of cases that have a higher chance of victory and yield greater monetary proceeds, indicating that DOJ enforcement is influenced by its performance measures. DOJ intervention also affects the firm- and aggregate-level fraud environment. Firms subject to DOJ intervention improve their employee relations, internal controls, and board independence, and experience lower future whistleblowing risk. Whistleblowers avoid courts and agencies with low DOJ intervention rates. In contrast, we do not find that cases pursued by whistleblowers alone affect firms' or whistleblowers' behavior, suggesting that public enforcement through DOJ intervention has a greater deterrent effect on fraud than private enforcement by whistleblowers acting alone.     

Mandatory IFRS adoption and management forecasts: The impact of enforcement changes

We examine how concurrent enforcement changes affect the positive relationship between mandatory IFRS adoption and firms’ voluntary disclosure. We show that the increase in the issuance of management forecasts after IFRS adoption is smaller for firms from IFRS-mandating countries with concurrent enforcement changes than for those from countries without such changes. We find no difference in the increase of forecast informativeness between firms from IFRS-mandating countries without concurrent enforcement changes and firms from non-IFRS-mandating countries; however, firms domiciled in IFRS-mandating countries with concurrent enforcement changes exhibit a significantly smaller increase in forecast informativeness. Our findings suggest that better IFRS enforcement distinctly weakens (strengthens) the positive effect of IFRS adoption on voluntary (mandatory) disclosure.     

A Tale of Two Segmented Markets in China: The Informative Value of Corporate Environmental Information Disclosure for Foreign Investors

Focusing on the unique setting of two segmented stock markets in China and using a sample of Chinese listed firms issuing both A-shares and B-shares during the period of 2007–2014, this study examines the influence of corporate environmental information disclosure on foreign share discount, and further investigates the moderating effect of globalizing the board. The findings show that environmental information disclosure is significantly negatively related to foreign share discount, suggesting that environmental information disclosure provides valuable and incremental information to mitigate information asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors, and thus reduces foreign share discount. Moreover, globalizing the board reinforces the negative relation between environmental information disclosure and foreign share discount. These findings are robust to alternative measures of environmental information disclosure and foreign share discount, and further, these conclusions are still valid after controlling for the endogeneity problem.     

Why Do Politicians Intervene in Accounting Regulation? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests

Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests helps explain these interventions. However, many accounting rules have broad economic or social consequences, such as their effects on income distribution or private sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician's ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and explains a politician's stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent U.S. political debates about fair value accounting and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bailouts and top management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, connections to special interests remain the dominant force.