Candidate stability and probabilistic voting procedures

Summary. We extend the analysis of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) on strategic candidacy to probabilistic environments. For each agenda and each profile of voters preferences over running candidates, a probabilistic voting procedure selects a lottery on the set of running candidates. Assuming that candidates cannot vote, we show that random dictatorships are the only unanimous probabilistic voting procedures that never provide unilateral incentives for the candidates to withdraw their candidacy at any set of potential candidates. More flexible probabilistic voting procedures can be devised if we restrict our attention to the stability of specific sets of potential candidates.Received: 4 February 2003, Revised: 14 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D71, D72.This is a revised version of a chapter of my Ph.D. Dissertation submitted to the Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona. I am indebted to my supervisor Salvador Barberá for his advice and constant support. I am grateful to Dolors Berga and an anonymous referee for their detailed comments and suggestions. I thank José Alcalde, Walter Bossert, Bhaskar Dutta, Lars Ehlers, Jordi Massó, Diego Moreno, Clara Ponsatí, Yves Sprumont, and William Thomson for many helpful comments and discussions. I thank the hospitality of the C.R.D.E. at the Université de Montréal and the Department of Economics of the University of Warwick where parts of this research were conducted. Financial support through Research Grant 1998FI00022 from Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca, Generalitat de Catalunya, Research Project PB98-870 from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, and Fundación Barrié de la Maza is gratefully acknowledged.     

On multiple equilibria and the rational expectations hypothesis

Summary This paper analyzes through a simple two-period model the fact that, if some agents hold inside money intertemporally, the second-period normalization matters. Thus, there are several equilibria of the second-period economy, indexed by the level of inflation. A concept of equilibrium acknowledging this fact, and requiring that agents put some weight on any of the possible second-period equilibrium price vectors is developed. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist, and is illustrated by an example.This a revised version of chapter three of my Ph.D. dissertation. I would like to thank David Cass, Atsushi Kajii, George Mailath and Shinichi Suda for helpful discussions and comments. Thanks are also due to Jean-Michel Grandmont who pointed out mistakes in a previous version. All remaining mistakes are of course my own. Financial support from a CARESS scholarship at the University of Pennsylvania is gratefully acknowledged.     

Simulation-based inference in dynamic panel probit models: An application to health

This paper considers the determinants of a binary indicator for the existence of functional limitations using seven waves (1991–1997) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The focal point of our analysis is the contributions of state dependence, heterogeneity and serial correlation in explaining the dynamics of health. To investigate these issues we apply static and dynamic panel probit models with flexible error structures. To estimate the models we use maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) with antithetic acceleration and implement a recently proposed test for the existence of asymptotic bias. The dynamic models show strong positive state dependence. Data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) were supplied by the ESRC Data Archive. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Archive bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here. Funding was provided by the ESRC award no: R000238169-Simulation-based econometric approaches to investigating the interaction of lifestyle and health. The authors would like to thank William Greene for valuable comments on an earlier draft of the paper, Roberto Leon Gonzalez for valuable programming advice, and participants at the iHEA Third International conference, York, 22–25 July 2001 and York Seminars in Health Econometrics (YSHE) for their comments.     

Banking,incentive constraints,and demand deposit contracts with nonlinear returns

Summary This paper presents two results regarding banking theory: (1) demand deposit contracts are essential in providing insurance against preferences shocks, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), if and only if the incentive compatibility conditions bind at the social optimum; and (2) for additively separable preferences with random discount factors, demand deposit contracts have the realistic feature that the interest rate paid is an increasing function of deposit balance.This paper is based on Chapter 2 of my Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of The University of Minnesota. I am indebted to Neil Wallace for his advice and guidance. I thank an anonymous refree for comments on a previous version of the paper. The comments from Edward Green, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Antonio Merlo, and Arijit Mukherji are appreciated.     

An inner core equivalence theorem

Summary We extend the notion of the inner core of a finite economy to a large economy. We prove that competitive allocations and the core coincide with the inner core.This is based on Chapter 5 of my Ph.D thesis. I am indebted to my thesis advisor, Lloyd S. Shapley, for his guidance. Discussions with Michael Balch are gratefully acknowledged. I also thank Charles Stuart, Nicholas C. Yannelis and an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions that greatly improved the paper.     

The distribution of money and prices in an equilibrium with lotteries

Summary. We construct a tractable fundamental model of money with equilibrium heterogeneity in money balances and prices. We do so by considering randomized monetary trades in a standard search-theoretic model of money where agents can hold multiple units of indivisible tokens and can offer lotteries on monetary transfers. By studying a simple trading pattern, we can analytically characterize the monetary distribution. Interestingly, such distributions match those observed in numerically simulated economies with fully divisible money and price heterogeneity.Received: 16 April 2003, Revised: 11 February 2004JEL Classification Numbers: D30, D83, E40.A. Berentsen, G. Camera, C. Waller: The paper has benefitted from insightful comments of two anonymous referees, whom we thank. We also thank participants at the conference Recent Developments in Money and Finance, held at Purdue University in May 2003, and the EPRI/University of Western Ontario Money Conference held in October 2003. Correrspondence to: G. Camera     

Is Kreps-Porteus utility distinguishable from intertemporal expected utility?

Summary In a Lucas (1978) model, with a Kreps-Porteus (1978) nonexpected utility, the following property of equilibrium holds generically in the space of finite-state, Markov output growth rate processes: equilibrium price of equity is distinct from that implied by any intertemporally additive expected utility satisfying specified regularity conditions. In that sense the more general utility functions are observationally distinguishable from the standard expected utility specification.I would like to thank Larry G. Epstein for posing to me the problem studied in this paper and for many suggestions and comments. I am also grateful to Darrell Duffie for helpful suggestions. I am responsible for errors. This papers is part of my Ph.D. thesis at University of Toronto.     

IS THERE A (DOWNWARD SLOPING) DEMAND CURVE FOR VOLUNTEER LABOUR?

ABSTRACT * * I would like to thank the Indiana University Center on Philanthropy and the Irwin Foundation for financial support for my dissertation, which led to many of the ideas contained in this paper, as well as my dissertation advisors at Boston College. I would also like to thank my colleagues at John Carroll University and at the Mandel Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Case Western Reserve University, for their advice and comments on previous versions of this paper. All errors, however, remain my own responsibility.
: Are organizations that use volunteers content to accept all of the volunteer labour offered to them, or do they make some sort of demand-side decision as to how much volunteer labour to use? This paper looks for evidence of such a demand curve for volunteer labour in data collected by the Urban Institute in the early 1980s. Evidence is found that organizations are consistent over time in their use of volunteer labour.     

Three brief proofs of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Summary. Arrows original proof of his impossibility theorem proceeded in two steps: showing the existence of a decisive voter, and then showing that a decisive voter is a dictator. Barbera replaced the decisive voter with the weaker notion of a pivotal voter, thereby shortening the first step, but complicating the second step. I give three brief proofs, all of which turn on replacing the decisive/pivotal voter with an extremely pivotal voter (a voter who by unilaterally changing his vote can move some alternative from the bottom of the social ranking to the top), thereby simplifying both steps in Arrows proof. My first proof is the most straightforward, and the second uses Condorcet preferences (which are transformed into each other by moving the bottom alternative to the top). The third proof proceeds by reinterpreting Step 1 of the first proof as saying that all social decisions are made the same way (neutrality).Received: 9 July 2001, Revised: 2 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D7, D70, D71.John Geanakoplos: I wish to thank Ken Arrow, Chris Avery, Don Brown, Ben Polak, Herb Scarf, Chris Shannon, Lin Zhou, and especially Eric Maskin for very helpful comments and advice. I was motivated to think of reproving Arrows theorem when I undertook to teach it to George Zettler, a mathematician friend. After I presented this paper at MIT, a graduate student there named Luis Ubeda-Rives told me he had worked out the same neutrality argument as I give in my third proof while he was in Spain nine years ago. He said he was anxious to publish on his own and not jointly, so I encourage the reader to consult his forthcoming working paper. The proofs appearing here appeared in my 1996 CFDP working paper. Proofs 2 and 3 originally used Mays notation, which I have dropped on the advice of Chris Avery.     

Perturbations of Matrices: A theorem on the perron vector and its applications to input-output models

This is a much revised version of my paper The Effects of Errors in Matrices on the Perron Vector: An Application to Input-Output Models, which was presented at the 1987 European Meeting of the Econometric Society, held in Copenhagen. I would like to thank Gerard Sierksma and Albert E. Steenge for valuable discussions and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

Auctioning incentive contracts: The common cost,independent types case

Laffont and Tirole (1987) analyzed the problem of a regulator that wants to select one ofn firms to carry out a single indivisible project when the firms have private and independent costs and have the possibility of an ex-post investment in (non-observable) effort to reduce the (observable) cost.This paper generalizes the analysis to a model of common costs, unknown at the bidding stage, while keeping the assumption of independent types. I show that the main characteristics of the private costs model are kept in a common cost framework. I provide two mechanisms that may be used to implement the optimal contract.This is a much revised version of a part of chapter one of my Ph.D. dissertation. I would like to thank Drew Fudenberg, Oliver Hart, and two anonymous referees for their comments. I am especially indebted to Jean Tirole, who suggested this problem to me. I have also benefited from presentations at MIT and the EARIE 93 Meeting. Financial support from INVOTAN (grant 3/88/PO) is gratefully acknowledged. Remaining errors are my own.     

Nash and Walras equilibrium via Brouwer

Summary. The existence of Nash and Walras equilibrium is proved via Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, without recourse to Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem for correspondences. The domain of the Walras fixed point map is confined to the price simplex, even when there is production and weakly quasi-convex preferences. The key idea is to replace optimization with “satisficing improvement,” i.e., to replace the Maximum Principle with the “Satisficing Principle.” Received: July 9, 2001; revised version: February 25, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I wish to thank Ken Arrow, Don Brown, and Andreu Mas-Colell for helpful comments. I first thought about using Brouwer's theorem without Kakutani's extension when I heard Herb Scarf's lectures on mathematical economics as an undergraduate in 1974, and then again when I read Tim Kehoe's 1980 Ph.D dissertation under Herb Scarf, but I did not resolve my confusion until I had to discuss Kehoe's presentation at the celebration for Herb Scarf's 65th birthday in September, 1995. RID="*" ID="*"Correspondence to: C. D. Aliprantis     

Sectoral and Aggregate Technology Shocks:Is There a Relationship?

We analyze sector-specific shocks in productivity and demand in 19 manufacturing sectors of the Austrian economy. Based on a structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR) with long-run restrictions developed by Galí (1999) we extract technology and non-technology shocks from sectoral and aggregate data. We study their patterns and relationship by means of a principal components analysis and find a close association of sectoral and macroeconomic non-technology shocks but only a very weak association for technology shocks. Impulse response analysis indicates that for almost all manufacturing sectors as well as the aggregate Austrian economy productivity growth rates experience an immediate increase due to positive technology shocks while hours worked decline. Thereby we confirm Galís results on the level of Austrian manufacturing industries. From regression analysis, we find that our shocks are closely associated to employment growth and output growth but not to investment growth and that the reaction is different for the aggregate economy and manufacturing industries.JEL codes: D24, E23, E32, O30We thank Werner Müller and the participants of the 2004 conference of the Austrian Economic Association (NOeG) for helpful comments. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for many helpful comments that led to a substantial improvement of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies. This research project was supported by a research Grant (Project Nr. 9800) of the Jubiläumsfonds der Österreichische Nationalbank (OeNB).     

Treatment effects of selection behavior in managed care plans: evidence from Medicaid

This paper tests whether capitated payments to Medicaid managed care plans induce to plans strategic undercutting of treatment for specific diagnostic groups. I focus on treatment (measured by length of stay and cost) in acute care hospitals in Massachusetts. I use a differences-in-differences-in-differences approach, where the third differences compare treatment patterns between managed care plans that receive capitated payments with those that do not. I find that the first reduce treatment significantly more to mental health patients than to patients in other disease groups, whereas the latter reduce hospital resource use more uniformly across disease groups. These results highlight the importance of using payment mechanisms in public programs that reflect the variability in costs of beneficiaries.Received: September 2002, Accepted: May 2003, JEL Classification: I11I thank Randall Ellis, Kevin Lang and Thomas McGuire and anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. I also thank seminar participants at The Brookings Institution and Harvard/MIT/BU Health Economics Seminar. The Portuguese National Science Foundation (B.D. 5910/95) and NIMH (NIMH R01 MH59254) provided financial support. I am indebted to the Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy for kindly providing the data to me for this project. I am responsible for any errors that may remain.     

Equilibria in a multi-object uniform price sealed bid auction with multi-unit demands

Summary In many existing markets demanders wish to buy more than one unit from a group of identical units of a commodity. Often, the units are sold simultaneously by auction. The vast majority of literature pertaining to the economics of auctions, however, considers environments in which demanders buy at most one object. In this paper we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a set of bidding strategies to be a symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium to a uniform price sealed bid auction using the first rejected bid pricing rule in an independent private values environment with two-unit demands. In any symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium, all bidders submit one bid equal to their higher valuation and one bid lower than their lower valuation. We characterize the equilibrium and derive the exact amount of underrevelation in the lower bid.This article is based on chapter 2 of the author's Ph.D. thesis. I would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Clarence Hicks Memorial Fellowship, the California Institute of Technology and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. I also thank D. Roderick Kiewiet, Richard McKelvey, Charles Plott, David Porter, Annemieke Tromp, participants in the Tinbergen Institute Seminar Series, an anonymous referee and especially John Ledyard for countless enlightening comments.     

Predation and reputation acquisition in debt markets

This paper presents a model of predation based on reputational differences between the entrant and an incumbent. While the incumbent has an established reputation in the debt market, the entrantss quality is not yet known in the debt market. We show that the incumbent may have incentives to prey in order to interfere with the reputation acquisition of the entrant.Received: June 2002 , Accepted: December 2002, JEL Classification: C72, D82, G3, L1I am grateful to one anonymous referee for very valuable comments. In addition, for helpful comments on previous versions of this paper, I thank Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole, António Pires, Soumodip Sarkar, and seminar participants at M.I.T., Boston University and Western Ontario University.     

Non-cooperative games with a continuum of players whose payoffs depend on summary statistics

Summary. We consider static non-cooperative games with a continuum of small players whose payoffs depend on their own actions and finitely many summary statistics of the aggregate strategy profile. We prove the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies without any convexity restrictions on payoffs or the common action space. We show that this result applies to a broad class of monopolistic competition models. Received: April 13, 2001; revised version: December 18, 2001 RID="*" ID="*" The result in this paper generalizes a result in my PhD dissertation supervised by M. Ali Khan and Joe Harrington. I thank them for support and encouragement. I also thank Sung Kim, Bruce Nanney, Ashvin Rajan, Kali Rath, and an anonymous referee for comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Sequential bargaining and competition

Summary This paper studies a sequential bargaining model of a decentralised market. A main objective is to explore the conditions under which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the market game approximates the Walrasian outcome of the market. The three main messages that emerge from our results are as follows. First, contrary to conventional wisdom, frictionless markets need not be Walrasian. Second, the relative magnitudes of frictions can have a profound impact on the market outcome even in the limit as the absolute magnitudes of the frictions become negligible. And third, the relative magnitudes of certain types of frictions may have to be significantly large in order for markets to be Walrasian, reflecting that certain types of frictions are needed in the market in order to induce the Walrasian outcome.This paper is based on a chapter of my Ph.D. thesis. I would like to thank Ken Binmore, David Canning, Partha Dasgupta and Frank Hahn for their helpful comments. I owe special thanks to Ariel Rubinstein for his comments, remarks and encouragement. The comments and suggestions of an anonymous referee have significantly improved the exposition at several places.     

The optimal intertemporal decision on industrial production and harvesting a renewable natural resource

This paper grew out of a research project financially supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) in its program Economics of Natural Resources. This support is gratefully acknowledged. I also thank H. Wacker for helpful discussions. I also thank two anonymous referees for valuable comments on an earlier draft.     

Dynamic costly state verification

Summary. I study a model of dynamic risk sharing with costly state verification (CSV). In the model, a risk neutral agent enters an infinitely repeated relationship with a risk averse agent. In each period, the risk averse agent receives a random income which is observed only by himself, unless the risk neutral agent engages in costly monitoring. I provide a set of characterizations for the optimal contract, and I show that CSV has interesting effects on the long run distribution of the agents expected utilities.Received: 19 February 2003, Revised: 11 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D8.This research was initially joint work with Bruce Smith. I thank Bruce for the inspiration. I thank Fernando Alvarez, Narayana Kocherlakota, Steve Spear, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. I also thank seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon University, Federal Reserve Banks of Minneapolis, Federal Reserve bank of Richmond, Duke University, SUNY Buffalo, University of Rochester, University of Pittsburgh, University of Western Ontario, the 1998 Econometric Society winter meeting, the 1999 SED meeting, and the 1999 SITE workshop at Stanford University for discussions.