Occupational behavior and attitudes among new RNs

A statewide survey of 2,315 (97%) RNs taking the Massachusetts licensure exam identified major reasons for selecting a nursing career, degree program, and a job. A high degree of consistency in their occupational attitudes and behaviors offers a blueprint for recruitment and insight into retention issues.     

Reproductive health,fairness, and optimal policies

We consider an overlapping generations economy in which agents differ through their ability to procreate. Ex‐ante infertile households may incur health expenditure to increase their chances of parenthood. This health heterogeneity generates welfare inequalities that deserve to be ruled out. We explore three different criteria of social evaluation in the long‐run: the utilitarian approach, the ex‐ante egalitarian criterion and the ex‐post egalitarian one. We propose a set of economic instruments to decentralize each solution. To correct for the externalities and health inequalities, both a preventive (a taxation of capital) and a redistributive policy are required. We show that a more egalitarian allocation is associated with higher productive investment but reduced health expenditure and thus, lower population growth.     

Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness

This paper considers the problem of assigning a finite number of indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., to the same number of individuals. There is also a divisible good (money) and the individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategy-proof in the strong sense that no coalition of individuals can improve the allocation for all of its members, by misrepresenting their preferences, is characterized. It turns out that given a regularity condition, the outcome of a fair and coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule must maximize the use of money subject to upper quantity bounds determined by the allocation rule. If available money is nonnegative, objects may be jobs and the distribution of money a wage structure. If available money is negative, the formal model may reflect a multi-object auction. In both cases fairness means equilibrium, i.e., that each individual receives a most demanded object. I would like to thank Tommy Andersson, Bo Larsson, Zaifu Yang and the participants of the seminars in Copenhagen and Lund for helpful comments on this paper. I will also thank an anonymous referee for very valuable comments. Financial support from The Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining.     

Institutional framing and perceptions of fairness

This paper's goal is to construct a positive theory of economic fairness. Using the theoretical schema developed by Hurwicz and others, the paper makes precise the notions of an “institution,” “fairness fraiming,” and “institutional framing.” Four fairness propositions yield an important corollary: the economic environment, the operative institution and history give meaning to the often used FORMAL PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (“equals should be treated equally, and unequals unequellay, in proportion to relevant similarities and differences”). We support these four propositions and corollary by an analysis of laboratory, survey, and anecdotal evidence. Finally we describe a number of areas for future research. The authors would like to thank Allen Buchanan, James Buchanan, Joel Feinberg, Elizabeth Hoffman, David Schmitz, Linda Schnabel Stizer, Vernon Smith, Richard Wagner, the participants in the Aspen Institute's Conference on “Local Justice and Fair Allocation”, the members of the Industrial Organization Workshop of the Department of Economics at the University of Arizona, and panel participants at the Public Choice Society Meeting for their help and comments at various stages of this paper's preparation. Responsibility for errors is the authors' alone.     

Investment behavior and the biased perception of limited loss deduction in income taxation

We use a laboratory experiment to study the extent to which investors’ choices are affected by limited loss deduction in income taxation. We first compare investment behavior in the no tax baseline to a tax control setting, in which the income from investments is taxed. We find that investors significantly reduce their risk-taking as predicted by theory. Next we compare the baseline investment choices to choices under three different types of income taxation. We observe that risk-taking is significantly increased with partial and with capped loss deduction, but is unaffected by a tax system that allows no loss deduction. Since in all these treatments the after tax outcomes of the prospects were identical, we conjecture that investors have a positively biased perception of partial and capped loss deduction that promotes their willingness to take risks.     

Compensation payments for habitat heterogeneity: Existence, efficiency, and fairness considerations

Compensation payments for voluntary conservation measures have become an important tool for biodiversity conservation worldwide. Each year substantial financial resources are spent on such measures, particularly in the context of agri-environmental schemes. In Europe, a debate has started on whether this money is spent effectively. In response to this debate it has been suggested that a portfolio of measures leading to habitat heterogeneity be implemented. Although payments for heterogeneous conservation measures have been analysed in the literature, it has never been questioned that payments can be designed in a way that encourages enough land users to carry out each conservation measure within a portfolio of measures. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that such payments do not always exist. Moreover, in cases where payments for habitat heterogeneity exist the payment scheme may require overcompensation of the land users, posing a limit to both efficiency and fairness considerations.     

Redistribution and fairness: a note

The introduction of (inequity adverse) fair agents in a simple redistributive voting game reduces the political relevance of the middle class and increases the equilibrium level of redistribution. Interestingly, some of the predictions in Meltzer and Richard [J. Polit. Econ. 89 (1981) 914–927] are affected: a rise in the income inequality between poor and middle class may not decrease redistribution, because of the additional support for redistribution provided by the fair agents.     

Multilateral tariff cooperation under fairness and reciprocity

Abstract This paper explores the impact of fairness and reciprocity on multilateral tariff cooperation. Reciprocal countries reward kind behaviour (positive reciprocity), but retaliate against countries behaving unkindly (negative reciprocity). We demonstrate that reciprocal countries that are moderately demanding from their trading partners regarding their commercial policy can support a greater degree of cooperation than self‐interested ones. However, when only very liberal import policies are considered fair, then reciprocity could have a detrimental effect on multilateral tariff cooperation.Thus, our model provides a novel perspective on the role of expectations in trade negotiations.     

The impact of fairness on bargainin

A number of bargaining experiments have raised the of what is fair or just may be sufficiently powerful to generate bel and systematically from the predictions of standard bargaining experiment designed to test whether the relative impact of different certain changes in the bargaining environment.     

On the fairness of random procedures

We consider procedures that use randomness to make a decision that involves several individuals. We asked subjects to compare the fairness of six pairs of seemingly equivalent procedures. We propose a classification of subjects into two categories: those who are “emotional” in the sense that they exhibit a systematic ranking of procedures on the basis of intuitive notions of fairness, and those who are “consequentialists” in the sense that they systematically view each pair of procedures as being equally fair. According to this classification, about 30% of the subjects are emotional while 31% are consequentialists.     

Bivariate risk attitudes,informal care and saving

The article examines choices of saving and caregiving for informal caregivers who will face uncertainty in health status of elderly parents. The caregivers have a general form of utility with two attributes: wealth and parental health. Informal care will substitute for future need of formal care when parents are in good health. The article first studies the optimal levels of saving and of caregiving and the link between them. Comparative statics results depending on partial risk aversion or correlation attitude are then presented. These results concern the effects of changes in the opportunity cost of caregiving, the share of expected bequest, the health status and the interest rate. The analysis is also extended to investigate the role of cross-prudence/imprudence in wealth when a background health risk is introduced.     

Information asymmetry,attitudes toward risk,and macroeconomic performance

Every firm in differentiated oligopoly offers a product that is different from that of rival firms. Similarly, in general, a firm interfaces with consumers and interacts with rival firms on the market. As a result, both the firm and consumers experience information asymmetry. In practice, a firm is a risk taker in its dealings with rival firms and is a risk averter in its interface with consumers. However, firms utilize intangible investments (non-price strategies) to convey the value of their product to consumers and stabilize their market share. Note that consumers are risk averse and ignore such attempts by a firm once they recognize the intrinsic value of the product. These two features explain the frequency and depth of the supply fluctuations that have not been acknowledged so far. This study offers a fundamental explanation of this phenomenon along with the steady state behavior in a synthetic manner.“With uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect knowledge of the situation, there would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control of production activity.”- Knight (1957, p.267)     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca