How firm capabilities affect who benefits from foreign technology

We explore how firm capabilities affect the diffusion of technology brought with foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a panel dataset on Indonesian manufacturers from 1988 to 1996, we measure how the productivity of differing domestic firms responds to the entry of multinational competitors. We find that firms with investments in research and development and firms with highly educated employees adopt more technology from foreign entrants than others. In contrast, firms that have a small “technology gap,” meaning that they are close to the international best-practice frontier, benefit less than firms with weak prior technical competency. This finding suggests that the marginal return to new knowledge is greater for firms that have more room to “catch up” than it is for already competitive firms.     

Pitfalls to avoid when measuring institutions: Is Doing Business damaging business?

Over recent years, both governments and international aid organizations have been devoting large amounts of resources to “simplifying” the procedures for setting up and formalizing firms. Many of these actions have focused on reducing the initial costs of setting up the firm, disregarding the more important role of business registers as a source of reliable information for judges, government departments and, above all, other firms. This reliable information is essential for reducing transaction costs in future dealings with all sorts of economic agents, both public and private. The priorities of reform policies should therefore be thoroughly reviewed, stressing the value of the legal institutions rather than trivializing them as is often the case. Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (4) (2007) 729–747.     

Endogenous technology and tradable emission quotas

We study an international climate agreement that assigns emission quotas to each participating country. Unlike the simplest models in the literature, we assume that abatement costs are affected by R&D activities undertaken in all firms in all countries, i.e. abatement technologies are endogenous. In line with the Kyoto agreement we assume that the international climate agreement does not include R&D policies. We show that for a second-best agreement with heterogeneous countries, marginal costs of abatement differ across countries. In other words, the second-best outcome cannot be achieved if emission quotas are tradable.     

Market Integration,Choice of Technology,and Welfare

This paper develops an international trade model where firms in a duopoly may diversify their technologies for strategic reasons. The firms face the same set of technologies given by a tradeoff between marginal costs and fixed costs, but depending on trade costs firms may choose different technologies. Market integration may induce a technological restructuring where firms either diversify their technologies or switch to a homogeneous technology. In general, market integration improves welfare. However, a small decrease of trade costs which induces a switch from heterogeneous technologies to a homogeneous technology may locally reduce global welfare. The model also shows that productivity differences lead to intra‐industry firm heterogeneity in size and exports similar to the “new–new” trade models with monopolistic competition.     

Factor Endowment,the Choice of Technology,and the Volume of Trade

Abstract

This paper studies impacts of factor endowment on international trade in a general equilibrium model in which firms choose their technologies endogenously. Although countries only differ in factor endowment ex ante, countries may also differ in their chosen technologies. If industries choose different capital-labor intensities in equilibrium, the Heckscher–Ohlin theorem, factor price equalization theorem, the Rybczynski theorem, and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem hold. If industries choose the same capital-labor intensity in equilibrium, the volume of trade is zero. None of the four theorems applies.     

Forecasting emerging technologies with the aid of science and technology databases

Short term forecasting was applied to 20 emerging technologies under the “Machine and Materials” category based on the Vision 2023 foresight study previously conducted for Turkey. This scientometric approach uses the most suitable keywords linked to the technology in question and determines the number of publications and patents in those fields for a given year. Database analysis of publications and patents in the previous 11 years indicates that while the majority of the top 20 technologies identified by the experts are indeed emerging (i.e. the number of research and/or patenting in these technologies is increasing), some of them have not actually attracted too much interest in the science and technology (S&T) community. Forecasts based on S-curves indicate steady growth in some of the selected technologies. There is a high correlation between the number of scientific publications and patents in most of the technologies investigated. The method is proposed as a simple and efficient tool to link national foresight efforts to international S&T activities and to obtain quantitative information for prioritized technologies that could be used for technology management and decision making for research funding and technology investment.     

Trade Intermediation and the Organization of Exporters

Empirical papers show that successful exporting firms either use unaffiliated foreign trade intermediaries or own foreign wholesale subsidiaries. However, conventional trade theory models assume that producers can directly access foreign consumers. We introduce intermediaries in an international trade model where producers differ with respect to productivity as well as regarding their varieties' perceived quality and tradability. Trade intermediation is prone to frictions owing to the absence of enforceable cross‐country contracts while own wholesale subsidiaries require additional capital investment. The sorting pattern of firms depends on their degree of competitive advantage; the equilibrium prevalence of intermediation in the industry depends negatively on the heterogeneity among producers, and the market‐specificity of goods, and positively on expropriation risk. Using sectoral US export data by destination country, we confirm the empirical validity of these predictions.     

Critical Success Factors for Business Reengineering and Corporate Performance: The Case of Korean Corporations

This article briefly reviews the literature on business reengineering (BR), analyzes critical success factors (CSFs) for BR, develops a BR-CSFs model, empirically tests the model on Korean firms, and investigates the impact of BR on corporate performance in Korea. Many Korean firms are attempting to transform from Japanese- to American-style business management. As part of this process, BR has gained substantial critical mass as the first widely accepted American-born management methodology accepted in Korea. While Western-based BR methodologies provide general procedures and techniques the CSFs listed in this research focus on the key factors that Korean firms generally confront. In the present research, 20 CSFs, taken from a literature review were divided into four categories: strategic, organizational, methodological, and technological/educational. A survey was developed to assess the firm-specific importance and development of each of these CSFs. Survey responses from 162 Korean corporations indicate a positive association between the designated CSFs and corporate performance. Korean BR team leaders and CEOs/COOS rate “strategic” and “methodological” CSFs as most important while “organizational” and “technological/educational” CSFs are considered less important, a rank ordering challenged by the authors.     

International Trade with Increasing Returns in the Transportation Sector

In this general equilibrium framework, the transportation sector is modeled as a distinct sector with increasing returns. A more advanced technology has a higher fixed cost but a lower marginal cost of production. Even with both manufacturing finns and transportation firms engaged in oligopolistic competition and optimally choosing their technologies, the model is tractable and results are derived analytically. Technology adoptions in the manufacturing sector and transportation sector are reinforcing, and multiple equilibria may exist. Firms choose more advanced technologies and the prices decrease when the size of the population is larger.     

PROFIT TAX AND FIRM MOBILITY IN A THREE‐COUNTRY MODEL

We construct a three‐country model that incorporates international relocation by imperfectly competitive firms and examine both the effects of each country's profit tax reduction on the consumption and welfare of all countries, and the incentive for the countries to decrease the profit tax. In such a model, both the terms of trade and international relocation of firms offer the key to understanding the impacts of one country's profit tax policy. In particular, we note that the relocation of firms from the other two countries is positively related to the wage incomes of the third country through a shift in labour demand, and the terms‐of‐trade improvement is not only positively related to the wage incomes, but also negatively related to profit incomes through a shift in world consumption demand. We show that (i) in a three‐country world economy, regardless of the reduction's source, the profit tax reduction of each country leads to relocation of firms away from foreign countries toward its own economy and deteriorates the terms of trade of its economy and (ii) this becomes a ‘beggar‐thy‐neighbour’ policy in the sense that it lowers the welfare of the other foreign countries.     

A Noncooperative Analysis of Hotelling's Location Game

We study the location equilibrium in Hotelling's model of spatial competition. As d'Aspremontet al.have shown, with quadratic consumer transportation cost the two sellers will seek to move as far away from each other as possible. We show that the location game possesses an infinity of mixed strategy Nash equilibria. In these equilibria coordination failure invalidates the principle of “maximum differentiation” and firms may even locate at the same point.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D43, L11.     

Anonymous yes–no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval

Symmetric (3,2) simple games serve as models for anonymous voting systems in which each voter may vote “yes,” abstain, or vote “no,” the outcome is “yes” or “no,” and all voters play interchangeable roles. The extension to symmetric (j,2) simple games, in which each voter chooses from among j ordered levels of approval, also models some natural decision rules, such as pass–fail grading systems. Each such game is determined by the set of (anonymous) minimal winning profiles. This makes it possible to count the possible systems, and the counts suggest some interesting patterns. In the (3,2) case, the approach yields a version of May's Theorem, classifying all possible anonymous voting rules with abstention in terms of quota functions. In contrast to the situation for ordinary simple games these results reveal that the class of simple games with 3 or more levels of approval remains large and varied, even after the imposition of symmetry.     

Are environmental concerns drivers of innovation? Interpreting Portuguese innovation data to foster environmental foresight

The relationship between environmental concerns and innovation is analyzed in the context of Portuguese manufacturing firms, with the ultimate goal to foster measures of environmental foresight.Based on data from the Community Innovation Survey in Portugal, simple statistical tests, including Chi², t, and Levene's tests and contingency tables (adjusted standardized residuals), were used to study the relationship between firms' characteristics and the introduction of innovation aiming to reduce environmental damage. Environmental foresight is discussed based on three groups of variables that allow considering the industrial context that frames firm's actions, the economic performance of the firm and its innovation patterns.Results show that the development of innovation due to environmental concerns is positively associated with the firm's size and exports share, and negatively associated with its technological content. Moreover, it is shown that the firms that introduced innovations due to environmental concerns are likely to belong to an economic group, to have performed continuous R&D, or received public support. It is also shown that “lack of organizational flexibility” and “lack of receptivity by customers” are the two most relevant innovation barriers for these firms.     

Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart

A single principal interacts with several agents, offering them contracts. The crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside-option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or “free” agents there are. We study how such a principal, unwelcome though he may be, approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out. Two variants are considered. When the principal cannot re-approach agents, there is a unique equilibrium, in which contract provision is split up into two phases. In phase 1, simultaneous offers at good (though varying) terms are made to a number of agents. In phase 2, offers must be made sequentially, and their values are “discontinuously” lower: they are close to the very lowest of all the outside options. When the principal can repeatedly approach the same agent, there is a multiplicity of equilibria. In some of these, the agents have the power to force delay. They can hold off the principal's overtures temporarily, but they must succumb in finite time. In both models, despite being able to coordinate their actions, agents cannot resist an “invasion” by the principal and hold to their best payoff. It is in this sense that “things [eventually] fall apart”.     

The patterns of output growth of firms and countries: Scale invariances and scale specificities

This work brings together two distinct pieces of evidence concerning, at the macro level, international distributions of incomes and their dynamics, and, at the micro level, the size distributions of firms and the properties of their growth rates. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, our empirical analysis provides a new look at the international distributions of incomes and growth rates by investigating more closely the relationship between the two entities and the statistical properties of the growth process. Second, we identify the statistical properties that are invariant with respect to the scale of observation (country or firm) as distinct from those that are scale specific. This exercise proposes a few major interpretative challenges regarding the correlating processes underlying the statistical evidence.     

Information, Incentives, and Option Value: The Silicon Valley Model

This paper analyzes the Silicon Valley model as a novel economic institution in the domain of technological product system innovation. We analyze the informational relationship as well as governance relationships between venture capitalists and a cluster of entrepreneurial firms. The informational conditions that make the Silicon Valley model efficient are identified, leading to an understanding of the significance of standardized interfaces, modularization, and information encapsulation. We then examine the governance/incentive aspect by integrating the models of Aoki (Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001) and Baldwin and Clark (Design Rules—Vol. 1: The Power of Modularity, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). The paper concludes by evaluating the applicability of the model to other localities and industries. J. Comp. Econ., December 2002, 30(4), pp. 759–786. Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, and RIETI, 1-3-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0013, Japan; and Faculty of Economics, Toyo University, 5-28-20 Hakusan, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 112-8606, Japan. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D21, L23, O32, P51, P52.     

European Monetary Integration and Aggregate Relative Deprivation: The Dull Side of the Shiny Euro

Drawing on the premise that the integration of economies revises people's social space and their comparators, we quantify social stress by aggregate relative deprivation, ARD; we calculate the effect of monetary mergers on ARD; and we document the validity of the superadditivity property of ARD for successive adoptions of a common currency by European countries. One feature of monetary unification, which replaces diverse currencies with a common currency, is that it brings about a change in the comparison environment, expanding the reference space of individuals in a given country to encompass individuals from the joining countries. Overall, calculations regarding six enlargements of the Economic and Monetary Union between 1999 and 2011 reveal an increase of ARD on six occasions when we hold incomes constant, and on five when we take into consideration changes in incomes. In addition, we observe an uneven distribution of the costs and benefits from monetary integration among the participating countries when these costs and benefits are measured in terms of ARD.     

Consistent representative democracy

We study axioms which define “representative democracy” in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We call these rules “partial priority rules.” A partial priority rule can be interpreted as a rule in which each agent can “veto” certain alternatives. We investigate the implications of imposing other axioms to the list specified above. We also study the partial priority rules in the context of specific economic models.     

Influence and inefficiency in the internal capital market

I model inefficient resource allocations in M-form organizations due to influence activities by division managers that skew capital budgets in their favor. Corporate headquarters receives two types of signals about investment opportunities: private signals that can be distorted by managers, and public signals that are undistorted but noisy. Headquarters faces a tradeoff between the cost of attaining an accurate private signal and the value of the information the signal provides. In contrast to existing models of “socialism” in internal capital markets, I show that investment sensitivity to Tobin's Q is higher than first-best in firms where division managers hold equity (a result consistent with evidence presented in Scharfstein, 1998). When managers face high private costs from distorting information (equity holdings), headquarters may commit to investment contracts that place “too little” weight on private signals and “too much” weight on public signals (i.e. Q). This result has implications for managers in the design of capital budgeting processes and incentive compensation systems.     

Technology adoption and LDC firms

In a duopoly framework we show that among the set of firms competing with the technology leader, both relatively advanced and relatively backward firms will not be likely adopters of the superior technology. Instead, the firms in the “middle” will invest for adopting the superior technology. This particularly characterizes the innovation characteristic of LDC markets where backward firms exist along with technology super-powers.