Stock Market Efficiency and the Federal Budget Deficit: Another Anomaly?

This paper investigates the efficiency of the U.S. stock market as it pertains to a number of major macrofinance variables that theory and empirical evidence suggest are important in rational stock pricing decisions. A multivariate vector autoregressive analysis is used to draw efficiency inferences. The estimated factor pricings are consistent with theory and previous empirical research. In addition, these results indicate that the stock market may be inefficient with respect to the federal budget deficit variable. Similar apparent inefficiency evidence is obtained for the term structure and risk premium variables. The authors cannot reject the efficiency hypothesis for industrial production, inflation, and base money. Using indirect causality tests, the authors find plausible intermediate information linkages connecting variables in the system. The term structure and risk premia variables consistently appear important as intermediate conduits through which information about other factors impact stock returns.     

Difference in interim performance and risk taking with short-sale constraints

Absent much theory, empirical works often rely on the following informal reasoning when looking for evidence of a mutual fund tournament: If there is a tournament, interim winners have incentives to decrease their portfolio volatility as they attempt to protect their lead, while interim losers are expected to increase their volatility so as to catch up with winners. We consider a rational model of a mutual fund tournament in the presence of short-sale constraints and find the opposite: Interim winners choose more volatile portfolios in equilibrium than interim losers. Several empirical works present evidence consistent with our model. However, based on the above informal argument, they appear to conclude against the tournament behavior. We argue that this conclusion is unwarranted. We also demonstrate that tournament incentives lead to differences in interim performance for otherwise identical managers and that mid-year trading volume is inversely related to mid-year stock return.     

US partisan conflict uncertainty and households' access to bank credit: Evidence from UK survey data

This paper explores how US political uncertainty, stemming from partisan conflict, affects UK households' access to bank credit. Using data from a unique UK survey database and the US news-based Partisan Conflict Index developed by Azzimonti (2018), the findings document that US partisan policy uncertainty negatively affects UK households' access to loans and credit cards. Banks' increased caution on deal selection also appears to be an underlying channel through which partisan political uncertainty can affect lending activities. Further evidence suggests that this partisan uncertainty also increases loan interest rates.     

Can exchange rate volatility explain persistence in the forward premium?

The persistence of the forward premium has been cited both as evidence of the failure of the unbiasedness hypothesis and as rationale for the forward premium anomaly. This paper examines the recent proposition that forward premium persistence can be explained solely by the conditional variance of the spot rate. We provide theoretical and empirical evidence to challenge this proposition. Our empirical results are shown to be robust to the presence of structural breaks. A corollary of the results is that the ‘true’ risk premium contains a long memory component. This is non-standard and has implications for the construction of rational expectations models of the foreign exchange market.     

关系型交易对审计费用的影响——基于经营风险理论视角

关系型交易模式可能会在议价能力、关系专用性投资成本转换等方面加剧上市公司的经营风险,进而影响审计费用。已有研究主要集中于关系型交易对审计行为的影响,鲜有文献关注其中的作用机制。本文基于经营风险理论视角,选取2008~2017年沪深A股制造业上市公司的相关数据,实证分析了关系型交易对审计费用的影响,结果表明:关系型交易显著加剧了企业经营风险的集聚,进而提升审计费用,即经营风险在关系型交易对审计费用的影响中起到了中介作用。进一步研究,在区分了产权性质以及耐用品特征后,实证结果显示关系型交易与审计费用的正相关关系在非国有企业以及耐用品行业的企业中较为显著,为审计师进行合理审计定价提供了经验证据支持。     

Disagreement and Learning: Dynamic Patterns of Trade

The empirical evidence on investor disagreement and trading volume is difficult to reconcile in standard rational expectations models. We develop a dynamic model in which investors disagree about the interpretation of public information. We obtain a closed‐form linear equilibrium that allows us to study which restrictions on the disagreement process yield empirically observed volume and return dynamics. We show that when investors have infrequent but major disagreements, there is positive autocorrelation in volume and positive correlation between volume and volatility. We also derive novel empirical predictions that relate the degree and frequency of disagreement to volume and volatility dynamics.     

Are IPO investors rational? Evidence from closed-end funds

Why buy a closed-end fund at IPO, when it is likely to trade at a discount in a few months’ time? One theory suggests that buying a new fund is justified by an initial period of investment outperformance. A second theory is that new funds are launched to provide access to assets that are temporarily illiquid and to exploit the subsequent liquidity gain while a third theory asserts that buyers of new issues are not fully rational but are influenced by time-varying sentiment. This paper tests the three theories using data from UK-traded closed-end equity-fund IPOs over 1984–2006. The empirical results provide strong support for the influence of sentiment but provide little or no support for the two other theories.     

Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review

I review recent empirical research documenting offer premiums and bidding strategies in corporate takeovers. The discussion ranges from optimal auction bidding to the choice of deal payment form and premium effects of poison pills. The evidence describes the takeover process at a detailed level, from initial premiums to bid jumps, entry of rival bidders, and toehold strategies. Cross-sectional tests illuminate whether bidders properly adjust for winner's curse, whether target stock price runups force offer price markups, and whether auctions of bankrupt firms result in fire-sale discounts. The evidence is suggestive of rational strategic bidding behavior in specific contexts.     

行为金融学对我国企业资本结构研究的借鉴作用

行为金融学在资本结构研究方面的主要成果包括市场时机理论和非理性经理人的管理模式。行为金融学的理论发展对我国企业资本结构的研究在理论依据、研究方法以及研究视角方面都具有重要的借鉴作用,它引导研究者利用案例、理论模型和实证检验等研究方法,分析我国的融资案例和投资行为,同时也为我国决策管理层合理预期资本市场形势制定有效管理政策提供依据。     

Measuring the costs and benefits of regulation: Conceptual issues in securities markets

This paper reviews the economic theory of regulation and surveys the empirical evidence on its application to past and recent changes in U.S. securities regulation. The theory provides multiple potential motives for regulation and cautions the empirical researcher against naïve modeling of the costs and benefits of regulatory change. Moreover, the nature of the regulatory process compounds the standard pitfalls of empirical analysis such as endogeneity and confounding events. Productive empirical techniques include the development of cross-sectional predictions of the effects of regulation as well as the use of unregulated control samples. An important avenue for future research is a more refined estimation of the extent to which regulation has unintended consequences.     

"Marking-to-Market" and Treasury-Bill Futures Prices: Some Empirical Evidence

Financial economists have not found empirical evidence of a “marking‐to‐market” effect in Treasury‐bill futures contracts, despite a firm theoretical basis for its existence. Therefore, we speculate that confounding effects, possibly due to liquidity preferences, influence futures‐forward price spreads. By using an empirical specification that allows for both effects, we present empirical evidence that Treasury‐bill futures‐forward price spreads are sensitive to the volatility of the underlying commodity in ways predicted by the theory of the marking‐to‐market effect.     

Heterogeneity of agents and exchange rate dynamics: Evidence from the EMS

We develop and estimate a dynamic heterogeneous agent model for the EMS period. Our empirical results suggest that the existence of heterogeneous interacting agents is indeed a possible explanation for the dynamics of exchange rates during the EMS. We find strong evidence of heterogeneous boundedly rational beliefs, and the fact that agents switch between these beliefs. Moreover, we show that the dynamic heterogeneous agent model outperforms the random walk and the static heterogeneous agents’ model in out-of-sample forecasting in the large majority of country-horizon combinations.     

Housing-Price Cycles and Prepayment Rates of U.S. Mortgage Pools

Empirical mortgage prepayment models generally have trouble explaining differences in mortgage-prepayment speeds among pools with similar interest rates on the underlying mortgages. In this article, we model some of the sources of termination heterogeneity across mortgage pools, particularly the role of regional variations in housing prices in generating atypical prepayment speeds. Using a sample of Freddie Mac mortgage pools from 1991 to 1998, we compare two classes of empirical models: a rational option-pricing model using a backward-solving pricing algorithm and an empirical hazard model. In both empirical estimation strategies, we find evidence that differences in house-price dynamics across regions are an important source of between-pool heterogeneity. This finding is then shown to be robust to alternative ways of parameterizing pool heterogeneity in mortgage termination models.     

Instrument instability and short-term monetary control

The literature on instrument instability tends support to a policy of smoothing interest rates: it contends that rigid adherence to a monetary rule would bring about explosive interest-rate movements. This contention is examined using a simple model which incorporates rational expectations; the results suggest that instrument instability is associated with interest-rate smoothing rather than with short-term control of the money supply. Furthermore, policy that attempts to stabilize interest rates may itself account for empirical findings which have hitherto been viewed as evidence that instrument instability would occur if the money supply were closely controlled.     

Agency theory,performance evaluation,and the hypothetical construct of intrinsic motivation

Cognitive evaluation theory and its hypothetical construct of intrinsic motivation are enjoying increasing popularity in the fields of business administration and economics. Consequently, intensifying skepticism towards performance incentives and agency theory is postulated. According to cognitive evaluation theory, it is argued that performance pay may undermine an agent's intrinsic motivation. In contradiction to agency theory, the principal might be worse off when providing an incentive contract to the agent than without doing so. Since the contention is substantiated by empirical evidence, it seems worrying enough for further investigation. Restricting attention to performance pay in business corporations, the scope of this article is to evaluate whether agency theory faces an urgent need to incorporate the construct of intrinsic motivation and its ‘hidden costs of reward' as postulated by supporters of the concept. The subsequent analysis reveals good and bad news for agency theory. The bad news is that hidden costs of reward do indeed exist. The good news is that the empirical evidence on undermining effects cannot be interpreted as being contradictory to agency theory. In particular, the antecedents for such effects not only seldomly prevail in business corporations, they are also easily avoidable.     

Estimating the Euler equation for output

New Keynesian macroeconomic models have generally emphasized that expectations of future output are a key factor in determining current output. The theoretical motivation for such forward-looking behavior relies on a straightforward generalization of the well-known Euler equation for consumption. In this paper, we use maximum likelihood and generalized method of moments (GMM) methods to explore the empirical importance of output expectations. We find little evidence that rational expectations of future output help determine current output, especially after taking into account the small-sample bias in GMM.     

Central bank intervention and the intraday process of price formation in the currency markets

We propose a novel theory of the impact of sterilized spot interventions on the microstructure of currency markets that focuses on their liquidity. We analyze the effectiveness of intervention operations in a model of sequential trading in which i) a rational Central Bank faces a trade-off between policy motives and wealth maximization; ii) currency dealers' sole objective is to provide immediacy at a cost while maintaining a driftless expected foreign currency position; and iii) adverse selection, inventory, signaling, and portfolio balance considerations are absent by assumption. In this setting, and consistent with available empirical evidence, we find that i) the mere likelihood of a future intervention—even if expected, non-secret, and uninformative—is sufficient to generate endogenous effects on exchange rate levels, to increase exchange rate volatility, and to impact bid-ask spreads; and ii) these effects are exacerbated by the intensity of dealership competition, the extent of the Central Bank's policy trade-off, and the credibility of its threat of future actions.     

Volatility increases subsequent to stock splits: An empirical aberration

This paper analyzes the empirical behavior of stock-return volatilities prior to and subsequent to the ex-dates of stock splits. The evidence demonstrates rather unambiguously that there is, on the average, an approximately 30% ‘arbitrary’ increase in the return standard deviations following the ex-date. The increase holds for both daily and weekly data, and it is not temporary. No explanatory confounding variables, such as institutional frictions affecting price observations, have been identified. We view the findings as being essentially inconsistent with the notion of ‘rational pricing’.     

Corporate governance,shareholder rights and firm diversification: An empirical analysis

Grounded in agency theory, this study investigates how the strength of shareholder rights influences the extent of firm diversification and the excess value attributable to diversification. The empirical evidence reveals that the strength of shareholder rights is inversely related to the probability to diversify. Furthermore, firms where shareholder rights are more suppressed by restrictive corporate governance suffer a deeper diversification discount. Specifically, we document a 1.1–1.4% decline in firm value for each additional governance provision imposed on shareholders. An explicit distinction is made between global and industrial diversification. Our results support agency theory as an explanation for the value reduction in diversified firms. The evidence in favor of agency theory appears to be more pronounced for industrial diversification than for global diversification.