无权代理产生的民事责任由谁承担？

代理是民法中的一项重要法律制度。我国民法通则第63条规定：“代理人在代理权限内以被代理人的名义实施民事法律行为，被代理人对代理人的代理行为承担民事责任。”这是我国《民法通则》关于代理的原则性规定。代理人以被代理人的名义从事代理活动的根据是代理权。若代理人不具有代理权而以被代理人的名义实施代理行为，既构成无权代理。在实际生活中，无权代理经常发生，其情形各不相同。一般而言，无权代理完全没有代理权而以他人名义所为的民事行为；所谓表见代理，是指行为人虽无代理权，但其表现出足以让相对人相信其有代理权的前提下所为之代理。狭义无权代理的情形，被代理人一般不承担民事责任，相关的法律责任由无权代理人自行承担。表见代理的本质虽是无权代理，但其独特之处在于无权代理人所为之代理，其结果却由“表见”显示的被代理人承担。表见代理在我国依据是《中华人民共和国合同法》第49条“行为人没有代理权、超越代理权或代理终止后以被代理人名义订阅合同，相对人有理由相信行为人有代理权的，该代理行为有效。”现实生活中还有一种特殊情形，即代理人本身为法人或其他组织的法定代表人、负责人，其超越权限进行代理行为，法律上称之为表见代表行为，表见代表在我国依据是《中华人民共和国合同法《第50条：“法人或其他组织的法定代表人、负责人超越权限订阅的合同，除相对人知道或应当知道其超越权限的以外，该代表行为有效。”本主要介绍实践中表见代理和表见代表行为如何辩析的问题。     

论缔约过失责任

缔约过失责任,是指缔约人故意或过失违反法定附随义务或先合同义务给缔约相对人所造成的损失而应依法承担的民事责任.缔约过失责任是合同法规定的一种独立的责任形式,被称为合同法的成就之一.本文在界定缔约过失责任含义的基础上,阐述了缔约过失责任的性质、构成要件.并探讨了缔约过失责任与违约责任竞合及其处理问题.     

论缔约过失责任

缔约过失责任，是指缔约人故意或过失违反法定附随义务或先合同义务给缔约相对人所造成的损失而应依法承担的民事责任。缔约过失责任是合同法规定的一种独立的责任形式，被称为合同法的成就之一。本文在界定缔约过失责任含义的基础上，阐述了缔约过失责任的性质、构成要件。并探讨了缔约过失责任与违约责任竞合及其处理问题。     

保险合同的缔约过失责任的相关关系分析

保险合同中的缔约过失责任指的是在订立保险合同的过程中因一方当事人不履行自身合同义务，而导致保险合同没有成立、被撤销或者无效，并且对对方当事人造成了经济或者声誉上的损害，应该承担的民事责任。虽然保险合同可以适用缔约过失责任，但是因为保险合同自身的特殊性，所以不能机械性的照搬适用，因此必须得根据保险合同自身的特点，在立法上和适用时加以变通以保证保险合同的效力，促进保险业的发展。     

法人民事责任的修正

法人作为一种拟制的民事主体，其同一般的民事主体一样，在取得相应权利的同时，也需要承担一定的责任，从而实现权--名--责的统一。就法人责任本身而言，其承担的是一种独立责任，即法人责任与法人成员责任是相互独立的。但随着社会经济的不断发展，传统意义上的法人民事责任已不能满足社会的需要，此时便需要对传统法人责任进行修正，即“法人人格否认”下的责任承担与法人目的外行为的责任承担。由此，本文以法人民事责任为研究主题，对现代经济发展下法人民事责任发展予以分析，从而促进该制度的发展。     

如何正确确定建设工程合同纠纷案件中的诉讼主体

在建设工程合同纠纷案件中，由于承包人受到资质等级的限制，以及建筑工程总分包和转包的关系，导致合同主体和法律关系十分复杂，也是案件的诉讼主体呈现出复杂情形的主要原因。因此，正确确定合同纠纷的诉讼主体是处理好建设工程合同纠纷案件的关键。1．借用资质证书和营业执照所签合同的诉讼主体问题。任何借用和出借资质证书和营业执照的行为均是违法的。不具有相应资质条件的第三人借用具有相应资质条件的建筑施工企业名义与发包人签订的建设工程合同无效，因此造成质量缺陷或者其他损失的，应列不具有相应资质条件的第三人和具有相应资质条件的出借人为共同诉讼主体，并对发包人承担连带责任。     

论物权异议登记侵权归责原则

在异议申请人异议侵权的场合下,是应当适用过错责任原则予以归责的.所谓过错责任原则,又称过失责任原则,是指以行为人主观上有过错为承担民事责任的充分必要条件,即行为人仅在有过错的情况下,方可承担民事责任;没有过错就不承担民事责任     

略论我国表见代理制度的完善

表见代理的构成要件为客观上有使相对人相信无权代理人有代理权的表象和理由,主观上要求相对人善意且无过失,本人承担无过错责任.为保护善意相对人的信赖利益,我国表见代理制度应赋予善意相对人对义务人的选择权,同时对该权利进行次数和时间的限制,当相对人选择主张狭义无权代理时,禁止无权代理人以其行为构成表见代理对之进行抗辩.     

合同无效的法律问题探悉

合同无效制度是合同法中的一项重要制度.广义的合同无效分为三大类:一是合同本身即是无效合同;二是可撤销合同被撤销后导致的合同无效;三是效力待定合同未被确认为有效.我国法律规定合同无效的三个法律后果是返还财产、赔偿损失和收归国有.返还财产依据的是物上请求权,赔偿损失的前提是缔约过失责任,收归国有的性质从民事制裁的角度看,仍属于民事责任的范畴.基于不同的原因导致不同的合同无效,对其应分别适用相应的民事责任.     

论共同侵权行为与承担民事责任

共同侵权行为的民事责任承担可分为外部责任和内部责任，外部责任即连带责任。连带责任承担以后就涉及到内部责任的分担和求偿问题，应针对不同的情况综合考虑，合理确定其承担民事责任赔偿的份额。     

Why are mortgage rates so uniform?

Conclusion Any reasonable model of mortgage lending concludes that interest rates depend on loan and borrower characteristics. In this paper, the rate is a function of the loan-to-value ratio, the parameters of the densities of future price of housing and income, deposit rate, and cost of foreclosure. Nevertheless, in practice, each lender charges only one rate to all borrowers. This is first explained by the difficulty of estimation of the parameters of the density functions. Since lenders cannot categorize their borrowers, they treat them uniformly and set minimum standards to minimize the risk of default by each borrower. Mortgage insurance, moreover, enables lenders to lend risklessly outside of the range in which they can operate risklessly on their own. Second, mortgage rate uniformity is explained by the lenders' risk aversion. Third, when borrowers are separated into discrete categories, uniform rates can result from perfect categorization of borrowers with respect to the future value of the relevant random variables. It is more likely, however, that lenders cannot categorize borrowers perfectly and that interest rates vary substantially among categories. As rates jump from one category to the next and borrowers are reluctant to gain small increases in loan size at significantly higher rates, lenders respond by offering only the basic category of loans.     

Lenders’ Response to Peer and Customer Restatements

We investigate whether restatements announced by economically related firms influence the contract terms a borrower receives from lenders. A restatement by a major customer firm increases the loan spread of a borrower by 11 basis points, on average. The contagion effects of customer restatements are higher (45 basis points) when a borrower's switching costs are high. Restatements by peer firms in the same industry also increase a borrower's loan spread, and this increase occurs regardless of restatement severity. Moreover, the sensitivity of loan spread to peer restatements is significantly greater when the restating peer firms are also in the bank's lending portfolio, suggesting that a lender's personal experience with restatements in an industry makes it more attuned to the potential implications of these restatements for the borrowing firm. Finally, our results suggest that lenders utilize information from peer restatements to anticipate future restatements by the borrowing firm.     

Mortgage Product Substitution and State Anti-predatory Lending Laws: Better Loans and Better Borrowers?

Mounting foreclosures and disclosures of abusive lending practices led many states to adopt new anti-predatory lending (APL) laws. Researchers have examined the impact of such laws on credit flows and the cost of credit. This research extends the literature by examining whether the market responded to these laws by substituting different mortgage products for those restricted by APL provisions. The evidence indicates that the laws were effective in restricting loans with targeted characteristics, and that the market substituted other product types to maintain access to credit and affordability in the face of these restrictions. The laws reduced the involvement of investor and second home purchases but appeared to impact borrower credit scores or down payments.     

Foreign bank lending and information asymmetries in China: Empirical evidence from the syndicated loan market

This paper considers whether information asymmetries affect the willingness of foreign banks to participate in syndicated loans to corporate borrowers in China. We analyze how ownership concentration, which influences information asymmetries in the relationship between the borrower and the lender, exerts an impact on the participation of foreign banks in syndicated loans granted to Chinese borrowers in the period 2004–2009. We observe that greater ownership concentration of the borrowing firm does not positively influence participation of foreign banks in the loan syndicate. We conclude that information asymmetries are not exacerbated for foreign banks relative to local banks in China.     

Do lenders who redline make more money than lenders who don’t?

While it is widely recognized that racial minorities and residents of distressed urban communities experience relatively greater difficulty in obtaining mortgage loans, there is little consensus on the causes of such lending patterns. This study examines the relationship between lender profitability and the percentage of their loans and loan dollars that are invested in Milwaukee’s central city and to racial minorities throughout the metropolitan area. Findings suggest that to understand broader industry-wide patterns, it is important to focus on the characteristics of lending institutions themselves, particularly those that yield discriminatory lending patterns, and not solely on the income, credit rating, and other socioeconomic characteristics pertaining to the risk and profitability associated with various population groups and community areas. Policy and research implications that will lead to a more comprehensive understanding of, and more effective solutions for, urban credit availability or redlining problems are discussed.     

Borrower Targeting under Microfinance Competition with Motivated Microfinance Institutions and Strategic Complementarity

We examine how increased competition among motivated microfinance institutions (MFIs) impacts the poorest borrowers' access to microfinance. We find that competition depends on inequality, technology, and the possibility of double‐dipping (borrowing from several sources). Without competition, even a motivated MFI may lend to the not‐so‐poor in preference to poor borrowers. If double‐dipping is feasible, competition may encourage lending to the poor. The presence of double‐dipping is critical for MFI competition to have a positive effect. When double‐dipping is feasible, MFI coordination may worsen borrower targeting whenever inequality is intermediate. We discuss policy implications dealing with double‐dipping, MFI coordination, and competition.     

Bagehot for beginners: the making of lender‐of‐last‐resort operations in the mid‐nineteenth century1

In this article we develop new tools to survey the development of lending‐of‐last‐resort operations in the mid‐nineteenth century. One finding is that free lending and extensive liquidity support against good collateral developed gradually after 1847, and was already a fact of life before Bagehot published Lombard Street. Another is that the extension of the Bank of England's lender‐of‐last‐resort function went along with a reduction of its exposure to default risks, in contrast with accounts that have associated lending of last resort with moral hazard. Finally, we provide a new interpretation of the ‘high rates’ advocated by Bagehot. We suggest they were meant to prevent banks from free‐riding on the safety offered by the central bank, and were aimed at forcing them to keep lending during crises so as to maintain a critical degree of liquidity in the money market.     

Measuring Transparency in the Dutch Mortgage Market

Summary This paper is an empirical study of pricing in the Dutch mortgage market. For a narrowly defined set of endowment mortgages (with a fixed lending rate of 10 years), we find that the price dispersion within lenders is larger than the dispersion across lenders. Prices remain dispersed across lenders, even after controlling for characteristics of the borrower, the municipality and the government bond rate. Apparently, the mortgage market is not fully transparent, which impedes competition in the mortgage market. We also find that the price dispersion for mortgages sold by banks is smaller than that for mortgages sold by other lenders. A likely explanation is that lenders using middlemen have higher agency costs. We wish to express our gratitude to the National Mortgage Guarantee (Nationale Hypotheek Garantie) in Zoetermeer, in particular Karel Schiffer and Hans Mersmann, for providing us access to their data as well as for their hospitality. We are grateful to Wim van Assenbergh, Harry Garretsen, Ralph de Haas, Jan Lemmen, Clemens Kool, Job Swank and two anonymous referees of this journal for their comments on previous versions of this article.     

RATIONING, SPILLOVER, AND INTERLINKING IN CREDIT MARKETS: THE CASE OF RURAL PUNJAB

A parallel market structure may exhibit extensive rationingin the regulated segment, and hence spillover of unsatisfieddemand into the unregulated segment of the market. In the lattersegment, the borrower can choose to bundle loan contracts withoutput marketing through the lender. Using data on Punjabi cultivators,econometric estimation of such a structure yields three principalfindings: (i) most borrowers and non-borrowers were rationedin the regulated market; (ii) demand for credit was fairly inelasticwith respect to the interest rate; (iii) a contractual provisiontying credit to output marketing made informal lenders willingto advance much bigger loans. One pana and a quarter is the lawful rate of interest per monthon one hundred panas, five panas for purposes of trade, tenpanas for those going through forests, twenty panas for thosegoing by sea. For one charging or making another charge a ratebeyond that, the punishment shall be the lowest fine for violence,for witnesses, each one of them, half the fine. If, however,the King is unable to ensure protection, the Qudge) should takeinto consideration the usual practice among creditors and debtors.The Kautiliya Arthasastra (a fourth century BC work on kingshipand statecraft).