INCOME REDISTRIBUTION IN URBAN CHINA BY SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM—AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON ANNUAL AND LIFETIME INCOME

This study investigates the redistributive effect of social security reform in urban China using the nationally representative urban household surveys of 1995 and 2002. The main findings are as follows. First, public pension is the main income for the elderly in urban China. The majority of people aged 60 and over (72% in 1995 and 82% in 2002) receive a pension. Second, the social security system in urban China has increased the income of low‐income and older age groups and reduced the relative poverty rate. However, the redistributive effect did not offset the expanding income inequality, which resulted in the Gini coefficient of redistributed income in 2002 being higher than that in 1995. Third, during 1995 and 2002, both low‐income and high‐income groups received a positive net benefit from the social security system, but the net benefit increased with income. The Chinese social security system lacks progressivity in contribution, and does not favor the poor in terms of benefits. Fourth, assuming that the reformed policy was applied to public sector employees, the long‐term redistributive effect of the pension system for the working population, calculated using their lifetime income, is larger. (JEL D31, H55, I38)     

The Political Economy of Social Security in a Borrowing‐Constrained Economy

This paper introduces a three‐income class, overlapping‐generations model with borrowing constraints. The labor income tax for financing pay‐as‐you‐go social security is determined in a majoritarian voting game played by successive generations. When the interest‐rate elasticity of consumption is low, the political equilibrium might be characterized by an equilibrium where the old and the middle‐income young individuals form a coalition in favor of a higher tax rate and greater social security, while the low‐ and the high‐income young individuals favor a lower tax rate and less social security. In this equilibrium, the size of social security is decreased by the mean‐preserving reduction of a decisive voter's wage if he/she is borrowing‐constrained.     

Health spending,savings and fertility in a lifecycle‐dynastic model with longevity externalities

We investigate health spending, savings, fertility and policy implications in a lifecycle‐dynastic model with longevity externalities in annuity returns. We show that such externalities engender not only excessive health spending but also under‐saving and excessive fertility. Social security and health subsidization increase health spending and savings but reduce fertility from laissez‐faire levels. A publicly funded universal health system under labour‐income taxation raises fertility. Taxing health spending or using social security and public health together can obtain socially optimal health spending, savings, longevity and fertility. Numerical results based on US observations suggest substantial variations among these cases, especially in old‐age health spending.     

THE IMPACT OF LOW‐INCOME HOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PARTICIPATION ON HOUSEHOLD ENERGY INSECURITY

The impact of the low‐income home energy assistance program (LIHEAP), the single largest energy assistance program available to poor households in the United States has received little rigorous attention. If LIHEAP participation significantly improves low‐income household energy security, funding cuts or eliminating the program could negatively impact the poor. This article empirically estimates the impact of LIHEAP on household energy security. The results indicate participation in LIHEAP significantly increases energy security in low‐income households. Simulations suggest that elimination of the current household energy‐assistance safety net will decrease the number of low‐income energy secure households by over 17%. (JEL I38, Q48)     

The Effects of Wealth and Income on Subjective Well‐Being and Ill‐Being*

The accepted view among psychologists and, increasingly, economists is that household income has statistically significant but only small effects on measures of subjective well‐being. Income, however, is clearly an imperfect measure of the economic circumstances of households. Using data drawn from the 2002 wave of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, this paper demonstrates that wealth, which can be viewed as providing a degree of economic security, is at least as important to well‐being and ill‐being as income.     

Age‐related Optimal Income Taxation*

In most countries, average income varies with age. In this paper we investigate if and how it is possible to enhance the redistributive mechanism by relating tax payments to age. Using an OLG model where some individuals are low skilled all their life while others are low skilled when young but high skilled when old, we first show how an age dependent optimal income tax can Pareto improve upon an age independent income tax. We then characterize the optimal age dependent income tax. A tax on interest income is part of the optimal tax structure.     

Pensions,Ageing and Retirement in Australia: Long‐Term Projections and Policies

Australia's retirement income provision system, comprising the ‘three pillars’ of a means‐tested aged pension, mandatory occupational superannuation and other, voluntary long‐term savings, is at the heart of understanding the fiscal implications of ageing. While the Intergenerational Report, an account of long‐term fiscal sustainability, is celebrating its tenth birthday since the first edition was published, the Superannuation Guarantee, first implemented in 1992, turns a sprightly 20 years old. This article considers the Intergenerational Report as a prism for studying fiscal, demographic and policy developments in the Australian retirement income system over the last decade and into the future.     

FGT Old‐Age Poverty Measures and the Mortality Paradox: Theory and Evidence

Income‐differentiated mortality, by reducing the share of poor persons in the population, leads to the “Mortality Paradox”: the worse the survival conditions of the poor are, the lower is the measured poverty. We show that FGT measures (Foster et al ., 1984 ) are, in general, not robust to variations in survival conditions. Then, following Kanbur and Mukherjee ( 2007 ), we propose to adjust FGT poverty measures by extending the income profiles of the prematurely dead, and we identify the condition under which so‐adjusted FGT measures are robust to mortality changes. Finally, we show, on the basis of data from 2007 on old‐age poverty in 11 European economies, that the effect of extending income profiles of the prematurely dead on poverty measurement varies with: (1) the fictitious income assigned to the prematurely dead; (2) the degree of poverty aversion; (3) the shape of the (unadjusted) income distribution; and (4) the strength of the income/mortality relationship.     

The political economy of public health expenditure and wait times in a public‐private mixed health care system

Abstract This paper investigates the determinants of public health expenditure in a public‐private mixed health care system, where a longer wait time for public care is the major difference between public and private sectors. Voter preferences for health care vary according to their age and by income, and public policy choices are part of a multi‐dimensional, competitive political equilibrium. We show how equilibrium public health expenditure and wait times depend on demographics and explain why they are independent of the distributions of income and political influence. We also show that population aging may not always lead to more public health expenditure.     

Old‐age Social Security versus Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision

This paper introduces an overlapping‐generations model with earnings heterogeneity and borrowing constraints. The labour income tax and the allocation of tax revenue between social security and forward intergenerational public goods are determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game played by successive generations. The political equilibrium is characterized by an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where low‐income and high‐income individuals form a coalition in favour of a lower tax rate and less social security while middle‐income individuals favour a higher tax rate and greater social security. Government spending then shifts from social security to public goods provision if higher wage inequality is associated with a borrowing constraint and a high elasticity of marginal utility of youth consumption.     

RESTRICTING EMPLOYMENT OF LOW‐PAID IMMIGRANTS: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ASSESSMENT OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL U.S. WAGE‐EARNERS

This paper builds on earlier work that used a general‐equilibrium model to show that reducing employment of unauthorized immigrants in the United States through a tighter border‐security policy lowers the average income of legal residents. Here we exploit further the detail available in the general‐equilibrium model to look at distributional effects, recognizing that the policy increases wage rates for low‐paid legal workers. We assess the social welfare effect on legal workers using a constant elasticity of substitution social welfare function. We contrast our general‐equilibrium approach to immigration analysis with the more commonly used partial‐equilibrium, econometric approach. (JEL D63, J61, C68)     

Incomes and Inequality in the Long Run: The Case of German Elderly

Abstract. We use German Sample Survey income data to examine the income distribution for elderly individuals during the period from 1978 to 2003. The elderly population, defined as people of age 55 and older, is decomposed by people resident in the Old and New Federal States. Further, we distinguish between persons receiving old‐age pensions and persons who do not. Inequality estimates are decomposed by income components, and the bootstrap method is used to test for statistical significance of results.     

MEASURING NON‐ECONOMIC WELL‐BEING ACHIEVEMENT

Income per capita and most widely reported, non‐ or non‐exclusively income based human well‐being indicators are highly correlated among countries. Yet many countries exhibit higher achievement in the latter than predicted by the former. The reverse is true for many other countries. This paper commences by extracting the inter‐country variation in a composite of various widely‐reported, non‐income‐based well‐being indices not accounted for by variations in income pre capita. This extraction is interpreted inter alia as a measure of non‐economic well‐being. The paper then looks at correlations between this extraction and a number of new or less widely‐used well‐being measures, in an attempt to find the measure that best captures these achievements. A number of indicators are examined, including measures of poverty, inequality, health status, education status, gender bias, empowerment, governance and subjective well‐being.     

MULTIPLIER EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN A TWO‐SECTOR MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

In a two‐sector model of monopolistic competition, this paper explores what impacts an expansion of government spending on public services has on national income. In the short run where entry and exit of firms are restricted, a rise in government spending on services like health care (which has only a role of substituting for market services) increases national income, but that on services like elderly care (which has not only this role but also another role of contributing to home production of services) decreases it. These results are reversed in the long run. Welfare effects of public services are also examined.     

Non‐linear finance–growth nexus

This paper revisits the question of whether the finance–growth nexus varies with the stages of economic development. Using a novel threshold regression with the instrumental variables approach proposed by Caner and Hansen (2004) to the dataset used in Levine et al. (2000) we detect overwhelming evidence in support of a positive linkage between financial development and economic growth, and this positive effect is larger in the low‐income countries than in the high‐income ones. The data also reveal that financial development tends to have stronger impacts on capital accumulation and productivity growth in the low‐income countries than in the high‐income ones. The findings are robust to alternative financial development measures and conditioning information sets.     

Global Investment Environment of the Post‐Quantitative Easing World: The ‘new‐old’ and ‘new‐new’ Normal

Global markets since late 2007 are not ‘normal’, where normal means market conditions we would expect to observe going forward in the absence of any new economic shocks. Financial markets have been dominated by extraordinary central bank policies that were created to deal with challenging market conditions reflecting heightened risk aversion and illiquidity. Markets in the future will have some characteristics that look more like the market conditions observed in the pre‐crisis period, which I call the ‘new‐old normal’ and other conditions that differ from the past, which I call the ‘new‐new normal’. I first review what happened during the financial crisis in terms of developments in three asset classes, equities, fixed income and currencies, to place the forward‐looking view in proper context. Then the transition period from the quantitative easing (QE) era of exceptional monetary policy to post‐QE markets is discussed. Post‐transition, we will see some features of the post‐QE world that will resemble pre‐crisis market conditions, the ‘new‐old normal’ with higher policy interest rates, wider cross‐country interest differentials, lower cross‐asset return correlations and a resurgence of the importance of cross‐country differences in fundamentals in international investing. However, some features of the post‐QE investment environment will be unlike anything observed in the past: the ‘new‐new normal’ with reduced liquidity and more days of exceptionally large volatility and asset price moves due to regulatory effects resulting in a reduced ability of market‐makers to provide inventory buffers for counterparties and electronic trading venues that shut down trading in high volatility periods; low inflation; flatter yield curves; and emerging markets providing less opportunity for diversification gains as they converge to developed financial market characteristics.     

Income or Consumption: Which Better Predicts Subjective Well‐Being?

The positive relationship between income and subjective well‐being has been well documented. However, work assessing the relationship of alternative material well‐being metrics to subjective well‐being (SWB) is limited. Consistent with the permanent income hypothesis, we find that a consumption‐based measure out‐performs (surveyed) income in predicting subjective well‐being. When objective measures of consumption are combined with self‐assessments of a household’s standard of living, income becomes insignificant altogether. We obtain our result utilizing household‐level data from Statistics New Zealand’s New Zealand General Social Survey which contains measures of income, SWB and a measure of material well‐being called the Economic Living Standard Index that combines measures of consumption flows and self‐assessments of material well‐being.     

Positive arithmetic of the welfare state

This paper argues that social security enjoys wider political support than other welfare programs because: (i) retirees constitute the most homogeneous voting group, and (ii) the intragenerational redistribution component of social security induces low-income young to support this system. In a dynamically efficient overlapping generation economy with earnings heterogeneity, we show that, for sufficient income inequality and enough elderly in the population, a welfare system composed of a within-cohort redistribution scheme and an unfunded social security system represents the political equilibrium of a two-dimensional majoritarian election. Social security is sustained by retirees and low-income young; while intragenerational redistribution by low-income young. Unlike unidimensional voting model, our model suggests that to assess how changes in inequality affect the welfare state, the income distribution should be decomposed by age groups.     

A Note on α‐Gini Measures

This note provides a characterization of α‐Gini inequality measures. These measures generalize the standard Gini index by including one sensitivity parameter α, which captures different value judgments. The α‐Gini measures are shown to be weakly decomposable and unit consistent. Weak decomposition provides within‐group and between‐group inequalities. Unit consistency keeps unchanged the ranking of two income distributions when the income units vary. It is shown that the α‐Gini measures are relevant with either “leftist” or“rightist” views.     

Industrial development in Malaysia and Singapore: Empirical analysis with multiple‐cone Heckscher–Ohlin Model

This paper employs the multiple‐cone Heckscher–Ohlin model to analyze industrial development in Malaysia and Singapore. In particular, we focus on industrial upgrading along with capital accumulation as a key determinant for the cross‐country difference in production technology and income. By pooling two countries’ data on factor endowment and sectoral output in manufacturing from 1990 to 2008, we estimate the common industrial development paths of the two‐cone Heckscher–Ohlin model, the Rybczynski linear relationship between capital–labor ratio and sectoral output per capita. Our results demonstrate that, after controlling for quality of workers (by educational attainment), the two countries resided in different cones during our sample period, implying that Singapore succeeded in accumulating capital steadily with the support of foreign investment and upgrading its industry mix to make it more capital‐intensive. The separation of cones is also consistent with the observed gap in gross domestic product per capita between the two countries. Furthermore, we implement a factor‐augmenting productivity test to see the gaps in efficiency of capital and human‐capital‐augmented labor and confirm no significant difference between the two countries.