流动性、流动性资产和流动性过剩

本文厘正了若干流动性过剩认识误区,阐释了流动性、流动性资产和流动性过剩的本质与定义,测算了近年来中国流动性过剩的规模和程度.得出了近年来中国流动性过剩并不严重、流动性过剩与经济过热之间不存在因果关系,以及2007年和2008年上半年中国宏观经济调控政策取向值得反思等若干结论.     

Correlated risks and the value of information

A decision maker faces two correlated risks and can obtain information on only one of them. Intuition suggests that the existence of a high correlation (in absolute value) between the risks should increase total information value. Indeed in such a case information about one risk induces a relevant information on the other one. Using a simple example, we show that this intuition is often correct, but that it can also be mitigated by other factors.     

Liquidity and asset prices in rational expectations equilibrium with ambiguous information

The quality of information in financial asset markets is often hard to estimate. Reminiscent of the famous Ellsberg paradox, investors may be unable to form a single probability belief about asset returns conditional on information signals and may act on the basis of ambiguous (or multiple) probability beliefs. This paper analyzes information transmission in asset markets when agents?? information is ambiguous. We consider a market with risk-averse informed investors, risk-neutral competitive arbitrageurs, and noisy supply of the risky asset, first studied by Vives (Rev Financ Stud 8:3?C40, 1995a, J Econ Theory 67:178?C204, 1995b) with unambiguous information. Ambiguous information gives rise to the possibility of illiquid market where arbitrageurs choose not to trade in a rational expectations equilibrium. When market is illiquid, small informational or supply shocks have relatively large effects on asset prices.     

Speculative trade and the value of public information

In environments with expected utility, it has long been established that speculative trade cannot occur and that the value of public information is negative in economies with risk-sharing and no aggregate uncertainty. We show that these results are still true even if we relax expected utility, so that either Dynamic Consistency (DC) or Consequentialism is violated. We characterize no speculative trade in terms of a weakening of DC and find that Consequentialism is not required. Moreover, we show that a weakening of both DC and Consequentialism is sufficient for the value of public information to be negative. We therefore generalize these important results for convex preferences which contain several classes of ambiguity averse preferences.     

Imperfect common knowledge and the information value of prices

Summary. When economic agents have diverse private information on the fundamentals of the economy, prices may serve as a poor aggregator of this private information. We examine the information value of prices in a monopolistic competition setting that has become standard in the New Keynesian macroeconomics literature. We show that public information has a disproportionate effect on agents’ decisions, crowds out private information, and thereby has the potential to degrade the information value of prices. This effect is strongest in an economy with keen price competition. Monetary policy must rely on less informative signals of the underlying cost conditions.Received: 6 November 2003, Revised: 19 November 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: E31, E32, E58.This paper supersedes the discussion in the first half of our longer paper that circulated under the title “Public and Private Information in Monetary Policy Models”. We thank Andy Filardo, Marvin Goodfriend, Nobu Kiyotaki, John Moore, Stephen Morris and Lars Svensson for advice and comments at various stages of the project, and to Herakles Polemarchakis, Roko Aliprantis and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and guidance. The views are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the BIS. The second author acknowledges support from the U.K. ESRC under grant RES 000220450. Correspondence to: H.S. Shin     

Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information

Summary. The paper constructs a theoretical framework in which the value of information in general equilibrium is determined by the interaction of two opposing mechanisms: first, more information about future random events leads to better individual decisions and, therefore, higher welfare. This is the ‘Blackwell effect’ where information has positive value. Second, more information in advance of trading limits the risk sharing opportunities in the economy and, therefore, reduces welfare. This is the ‘Hirshleifer effect’ where information has negative value. We demonstrate that in an economy with production information has positive value if the information refers to non-tradable risks; hence, such information does not destroy the Blackwell theorem. Information which refers to tradable risks may invalidate the Blackwell theorem if the consumers are highly risk averse. The critical level of relative risk aversion beyond which the value of information becomes negative is less than 0.5. Received: May 14, 2001; revised version: March 5, 2002     

Liquidity and Liquidation

The manager of a firm that is selling an illiquid asset has discretion as to the sale price: if he chooses a high (low) selling price, early sale is unlikely (likely). If the manager has the option to default on the debt that is collateralized by the illiquid asset, the optimal selling price depends on whether the manager acts in the interests of owners or creditors. We model the former case. In equilibrium the owner will always offer the illiquid asset for sale at a strictly higher price than he paid, and will default if he fails to sell. As a result, upon successful sales the illiquid asset changes hands at successively higher prices. We also consider a generalization of the model which permits sellers to finance sales using either debt or preferred stock, or both. This allows derivation of an optimal capital structure. We are indebted to seminar participants at the University of California, Los Angeles; University of California, Santa Barbara; Utah State University; University of Miami; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. We have received helpful comments from Tom Cooley.     

The value of information for auctioneers

An auctioneer wants to sell an indivisible object to one of multiple bidders, who have private information about their valuations of the object. A bidder's information structure determines the accuracy with which the bidder knows her private valuation. The main result of the paper is that the auctioneer's revenue is a convex function of bidders' information structures. One implication is that assigning asymmetric information structures instead of symmetric information structures to bidders is always revenue-enhancing. This paper generalizes a result of Bergemann and Pesendorfer [D. Bergemann, M. Pesendorfer, Information structures in optimal auctions, J. Econ. Theory 137 (2007) 580–609], who show that revenue-maximizing information structures are asymmetric.     

Social value of public information re-examined

As an extension of Hirshleifer's horse race example into a competitive exchange market framework, this paper quantitatively re-examines the condition under which social value of public information can be positive. For a prototype economy of two risk averse traders, we prove that their discordance of beliefs makes the social value of a certain class of inconclusive information either positive or negative depending on whether their endowments are or are not predominantly associated with states they regard as more probable, whereas it has been known that information acquisition is always socially wasteful under concordant beliefs.     

The social value of public information with costly information acquisition

In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information.     

Bitcoin price and its marginal cost of production: support for a fundamental value

This study back-tests a marginal cost of production model proposed to value the digital currency Bitcoin. Results from both conventional regression and vector autoregression (VAR) models show that the marginal cost of production plays an important role in explaining Bitcoin prices, challenging recent allegations that Bitcoins are essentially worthless. Even with markets pricing Bitcoin in the thousands of dollars each, the valuation model seems robust. The data show that a price bubble that began in the Fall of 2017 resolved itself in early 2018, converging with the marginal cost model. This suggests that while bubbles may appear in the Bitcoin market, prices will tend to this bound and not collapse to zero.     

The Austrian theory of the marginal use and of ordinal marginal utility

Conclusion The Austrian theory of the marginal use raises almost as many problems as it has solved. We list here a few of these unsolved problems.Complementarity and rivalness do lead to the ALEP criterion in the examples we worked out above, but we have made no attempt to formalize this rule into a general theorem. Intuitively, the ALEP condition must appear when the complementary or rival relationships are somehow active in the inner or outer marginal uses, but it is not clear exactly what the circumstances are under which this holds.Although the theory leads to quasi-concavity of commodity preferences over goods in the particular cases we worked out, even when rival or complementary interactions are present, it has only been proven that this must be generally true when there are two goods, and then only in the case when the two goods are independent. Perhaps preferences do not really have to be quasi-concave after all.And finally, it must be resolved whether the possibility of intrinsically ordinal preferences nullifies the von Neumann-Morgenstern axiom system, or if instead the validity of those axioms rules out intrinsically ordinal preferences.After over a century, the Austrian theory is still in its youth. Perhaps the day has come for Felix Kaufmann's youngGrenznutzler to return from the netherworld of economic doctrine: There I will quietly lie in wait, Amid my neglected writings, Until I hear the trumpet call of Complementary Goods. Then through the sky will gallop Böhm-Bawerk, Polemics will thunder and flash! Then armed with a quill I'll rise up from the grave, To fight for theGrenznutzen school!²⁷ The author is Scherman Research Fellow at NBER-West and Assistant Professor at Boston College. He is grateful for helpful suggestions made by J. R. Meginniss and by various participants in seminars at Boston College, at the Universities of Hartford and Chicago, at Stanford University, and at NBER-West.     

马克思剩余价值理论视角下信息商品增值研究

信息劳动创造价值,如何在马克思剩余价值理论视角下研究信息商品增值是一个新的研究课题。信息劳动是复杂劳动,创建期投入巨大,一些信息商品具有独特形式。将信息生产的不同时期的区分引入复杂的劳动过程和价值增殖的研究：信息商品创建期和扩大生产期都属于生产过程,在生产中获得价值增殖的潜力,而通过流通过程,创造出巨大数量的消费受众,从而实现了剩余价值的获得。巨大的规模投资、极高的技术门槛和政府政策保护使信息企业获得超额剩余价值。     

The value of a stochastic information structure

Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and the action taken. An information structure determines the set of possible signals and the probability of each signal given a state. For a fixed decision problem, the value of an information structure is the maximal expected utility that the decision maker can get when the observed signals are governed by this structure. Thus, every decision problem induces a preference order over information structures according to their value. We characterize preference orders that can be obtained in this way. We also characterize the functions defined over information structures that measure their value.     

Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others

Economic models typically allow for “free disposal” or “reversibility” of information, which implies non-negative value. Building on previous research on the “curse of knowledge” we explore situations where this might not be so. In three experiments, we document situations in which participants place positive value on information in attempting to predict the performance of uninformed others, even when acquiring that information diminishes their earnings. In the first experiment, a majority of participants choose to hire informed—rather than uninformed—agents, leading to lower earnings. In the second experiment, a significant number of participants pay for information—the solution to a puzzle—that hurts their ability to predict how many others will solve the puzzle. In the third experiment, we find that the effect is reduced with experience and feedback on the actual performance to be predicted. We discuss implications of our results for the role of information and informed decision making in economic situations. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9128-y. JEL Classification C91, D83     

Liquidity and interest rates

This paper analyzes a series of models in which money is required for asset transactions as well as for transactions in goods. In these models, government open-market operations induce liquidity effects that lead to interest rate behavior quite different from the behavior one would predict on the basis of Fisherian fundamentals. The paper characterizes these effects under various assumptions about the nature of securities traded and the behavior of shocks.