International R&D Collaboration and Strategic Trade Policy

We study an international trade model with symmetric countries and symmetric firms, with countries making strategic trade policies, anticipating the decisions of firms on R&D collaboration at the subsequent stage. In general we should observe a conflict between the equilibrium outcome and the efficient one. We find that an asymmetric outcome where one country unilaterally liberalizes trade while the other does not is likely to occur. We also find that while banning international R&D collaboration may help to reach free trade equilibrium in certain situations, it provides little assistance in reaching the outcome that maximizes global welfare.     

An Inframarginal Analysis of the Ricardian Model

This paper shows that a 2 × 2 Ricardian model has a unique general equilibrium, and the comparative statics of the equilibrium involve discontinuous jumps. If partial division of labor occurs in equilibrium, the country producing both goods would impose a tariff, whereas the country producing a single good would prefer unilateral free trade. If complete division of labor occurs in equilibrium, both countries would negotiate to achieve free trade. In a model with three countries, the country which does not have a comparative advantage relative to the other two countries, and/or which has low transaction efficiency, may be excluded from trade.     

Why are Trade Agreements Regional?

This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries a familiar problem of coordination failure occurs, giving rise to multiple equilibria; any one of many possible trade agreements can form. With distance between countries, regional trade agreements generate larger rent‐shifting effects than nonregional agreements. Countries use these effects to coordinate on a unique equilibrium.     

Endogenous trading bloc formation in a North-South global economy

Abstract .  The majority of the trading blocs to date are between similar countries, rather than between developed and developing countries. This paper provides a rationale for why trading blocs among similar countries may arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. It develops a model of an asymmetric world economy in which there are at least four countries. The countries are differentiated with respect to their market size and they choose their trading partners. In the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, either there is global free trade or free trade areas are formed among similar countries.     

Environmental regulation and love for variety

Using a model of monopolistic competition, we examine the relationship between intra‐industry trade and environmental regulation. The decisions on emission standards set by each country show strong strategic interactions. In closed economies regulations act as strategic substitutes, and in equilibrium there is under‐regulation relative to the cooperative outcome. Trade liberalization may lead to stricter or laxer environmental standards, depending on the consumers’ preference for product variety. In addition, we show that with open trade environmental regulations may act as strategic complements and countries may set environmental standards that are as strict (or stricter) than those in the cooperative outcome.     

Optimal trade policy in tariff games with inside money

We construct a bilateral trade model incorporating two physical goods and a financial asset (inside money) to discuss the optimal trade policy that countries would choose to maximize their respective utilities. In this Nash tariff game, the trade of physical commodities only occurs geographically across countries, and the trade of inside money allows for intertemporal allocation of consumptions. When the preferences, present and future endowments for each country are given, according to our numerical analysis, trade surplus or deficit (inside money) and optimal tariff rates are endogenously determined when general equilibrium conditions hold. One country may purchase inside money to shift current consumption to the future, and the other may be willing to issue inside money for smoothing its consumptions in two periods. This imbalance trade contradicts traditional trade models which imply a balanced trade policy. We further find that the price of inside money as an implied interest rate also is determined by the trade intervention policies.     

International Trade Without Autarkic Equilibria

It is possible that wealthy trading countries nevertheless have no autarkic equilibria. However, if a country has no autarkic equilibrium, the offer curve of that country may consist of disjoint segments, which implies that a worldwide trading equilibrium does not always exist, that international exchanges do not always take place in equilibrium, and therefore that econometric estimates of the structure of open economies must be viewed with scepticism. In the present paper, I provide conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a worldwide free-trade equilibrium and for the existence of gains from free trade for individual countries.     

Technical Progress and Real Wages Once again

We construct a general equilibrium model of trade and show that an economy can experience technological progress and declining real wages provided that it is open to trade and import demand is sufficiently inelastic in both countries. This is a puzzling outcome so far as marginal productivity paradigm is concerned. In this context we demonstrate that new technology works differently in a closed vs an open economy. In an open economy, technical improvements may generate a fall in labor real earnings, but not in a closed economy. In addition, technical progress in manufacturing must increase manufacturing–service wage gap according to marginal productivity doctrine. We show that the opposite outcome can occur theoretically in an open economy—yet another seemingly puzzling labor market outcome.     

The Triple Inefficiency of Uncoordinated Environmental Policies

When pollution is transboundary and there is international trade, a domestic inefficiency may arise in addition to the well‐known inefficiencies at the international level. More precisely, there will be a Nash equilibrium in which each country chooses a policy that gives it lower welfare than would otherwise be possible given the emission levels of all countries. However, there will also be a Nash equilibrium in which each country chooses tradable emission quotas as its policy instrument to achieve its desired level of emissions. In this Nash equilibrium, welfare in each country is maximised given the emission levels of all countries.     

Trade theorems with search unemployment

Abstract We revisit the Heckscher‐Ohlin‐Samuelson model in the presence of labour market frictions à la Mortensen‐Pissarides. Relaxing the assumption of the one‐worker‐one‐firm matching rule, we show that the Stolper‐Samuelson theorem and the Rybczynski theorem may not hold in specific circumstances. We also demonstrate that the Factor Price Equalization theorem is valid only for capital and unemployed labour across countries, but not for employed labour. In equilibrium, trade patterns are determined by countries’ factor endowments and relative factor intensities in sectors (independent of factor intensities in production). Finally, our results suggest an additional explanation for the ‘missing trade’ phenomenon.     

Endogenous timing,strategic tariff game and bilateral trade in vertical oligopoly

This paper builds an observable delay game in endogenous timing to study the possible occurrence of trade wars in a vertical, bilateral trade model. It examines the effects of production cost differences and order of moves on optimal tariffs, market equilibria, dumping margin and social welfare in both fixed timing and endogenous timing games. In a fixed timing game, it shows that price dumping in the intermediate good market arises from differences in country-specific final good production costs. Different from Bernhofen (1995; Journal of International Economics), trade costs resulting from reciprocal tariffs in upstream markets can reverse the price dumping under certain conditions. In an endogenous timing game, this paper finds that the magnitude of cost differences significantly influences countries’ decisions on the order of moves in a strategic tariff-making game. Both countries want to be the first movers under a small cost difference and consequently reach a simultaneous equilibrium result. This demonstrates that the second-best equilibrium proceeds under certain conditions. Under a large cost difference, sequential policy-making is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. If the cost difference is sufficiently large, both countries have an incentive to launch a trade war as a multiple equilibrium game.     

World Agricultural Trade Reform: Implications for Australia

In this paper we assess the implications of agricultural trade reform by GATT member countries. To do this, we link two general equilibrium models, a world food trade model and the ORANI model of the Australian economy. By treating the ORANI model as an integral part of the world model, we are able to focus on the implications for Australia of world agricultural trade reform.
The findings suggest that, if price distorting agricultural policies were removed by GATT member countries, world food commodity prices would rise, some by up to 30 per cent, and world food trade expand by about a third. Australia would be a major beneficiary of these international developments, the value of its agricultural exports rising by close to 15 per cent. In 1986, this would have meant for Australia additional export earnings of around SUS750 million, as well as more rapid economic growth.     

GRADUAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION WITH SLUGGISH CAPITAL MOVEMENT

Abstract.  This paper analyses how domestic sluggish capital movement can affect multilateral trade negotiations between countries. In multilateral trade talks, including the current Doha Round of trade talks organized by the World Trade Organization, countries take steps to liberalize even though they seem to be moving towards the ultimate free trade equilibrium. This paper argues that when capital moves sluggishly between sectors in an economy, there are cases in which countries do not want to move to the ultimate free trade equilibrium immediately. Instead, they find it more beneficial if they simultaneously move gradually, with their tariffs lowered step by step.     

International Economies of Scale and the Gains from Trade

In this paper, we present a two-country trade model with external economies of scale that emerge on an international level but are partially localized in each country. First, we show that the larger country exports the good produced in an industry with external economies of scale in the trading equilibrium. Second, we investigate the welfare effects of trade for the following two cases: (I) the case where external economies are completely localized in autarky; (II) the case where external economies are internationally effective in autarky. In case (II), it is shown that trade can be welfare-decreasing for both countries.     

Trade Gains, Paretian Transfer and the Tragedy of the Commons

Consider trade liberalization between two countries, each of which produces two private goods and provides on a voluntary basis one public good (the common). In these circumstances, what are the consequences of trade liberalization on the production of the public good and on welfare in both countries? Using a Ricardian framework, we first show that the opening of trade increases the opportunity cost of producing the public good in both countries and will therefore reduce the aggregate supply of the public good. On the other hand, at the autarky equilibrium, only one country supplies the public good, the other “free rides”. The analysis of the welfare incidence of the opening of trade then reveals that the country which provides the public good under autarky always enjoys a welfare gain from trade while the free rider under autarky does not unless the terms of trade are sufficiently in its favour to compensate for the reduction in the supply of the common. Finally, if all countries involved in trade liberalization can without cost coordinate their supplies of the common, then the implementation of the first-best outcome is shown to be possible with a conditional Paretian transfer scheme.     

Dynamic modelling of agricultural policies: The role of expectation schemes

The highly disputed effects of agricultural trade liberalisation are mostly simulated with static models. Our main objective in this paper is to evaluate the robustness of the static simulation results to the consistent modelling of dynamic behaviours and to the linked specification of price/return expectations. Focusing on the scenario of a complete trade liberalisation of arable crop markets by developed countries, we find that available static results are quite robust compared to dynamic specifications and to most expectation schemes. Endogenous market fluctuations due to expectation errors may appear following trade liberalisation. These fluctuations are nevertheless limited by the many feedback effects revealed by our general equilibrium framework.     

Spillovers from Foreign Exporters

We develop a general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous firms that accounts for productivity spillovers transmitted by foreign exporters. Everything else equal, stronger spillovers increase welfare. We embed the model framework into a trade policy scenario where countries strategically set inter‐country variable trade costs for the trading partner. In the strategic Nash‐equilibrium policy, governments trade‐off welfare gains from protectionism and those that are due to spillovers from foreign exporters. The equilibrium degree of protectionism is decreasing in the strength of the spillover. Policy coordination induces welfare gains but these gains can be hump‐shaped in the spillover strength.     

Endogenous Comparative Advantage*

We develop a model of trade between identical countries. Workers endogenously acquire skills that are imperfectly observed by firms; therefore, firms use aggregate country investment as the prior when evaluating workers. This creates an informational externality interacting with general equilibrium effects on each country's skill premium. Asymmetric equilibria with comparative advantages exist even when there is a unique equilibrium under autarky. Symmetric, no‐trade equilibria can be unstable under free trade. Welfare effects are ambiguous: trade can be Pareto‐improving even if it leads to an equilibrium between rich and poor countries, with no special advantage regarding country size.     

Factor Endowment,the Choice of Technology,and the Volume of Trade

Abstract

This paper studies impacts of factor endowment on international trade in a general equilibrium model in which firms choose their technologies endogenously. Although countries only differ in factor endowment ex ante, countries may also differ in their chosen technologies. If industries choose different capital-labor intensities in equilibrium, the Heckscher–Ohlin theorem, factor price equalization theorem, the Rybczynski theorem, and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem hold. If industries choose the same capital-labor intensity in equilibrium, the volume of trade is zero. None of the four theorems applies.     

TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION*

This paper examines the gains from cooperative agreements on transportation infrastructure investments when there are terms of trade and technological spillovers between countries. In a two ‐country model, cooperation on investment levels will result in a lower level of transport costs. However, the cooperative equilibrium may have a higher or lower level of infrastructure investment between the partner countries in the case of preferential liberalization. The paper also addresses the desirability of linking trade and infrastructure agreements when investment choices can be used strategically.