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This article has three basic aims: (1) to analyze the impact of the opening of their capital markets on the economies of host countries; (2) to investigate the causes of the Asian financial crisis; and (3) to evaluate the likely effects of the South Korean government's recent attempts to restructure its corporate sector. Although the recent Asian financial crisis has led some to question the merits of open capital markets and to call for regulatory restraints on capital flows across international borders, the scientific evidence suggests that the opening of stock markets to foreign investors has been largely beneficial for emerging economies. On average, stock market liberalization has been accompanied by increases in stock prices and reductions in stock return volatility, reductions in inflation, and reductions in the rate of currency depreciation. Much of the blame for the Asian currency crises is assigned to Asian policymakers' futile attempts to defy market forces by trying to maintain their currencies at artificially high levels. But a more fundamental cause of Asia's economic problems has been the widespread value destruction by Asian corporations, which has led to a lower value for the overall economy and weakened the banking sector. The government-directed banking systems and weak corporate governance structures (including managerial incentives to increase size and market share at the expense of shareholders) that characterize most Asian economies have resulted in systematic overinvestment, bloated payrolls, and sharp declines in corporate profitability. While applauding most of the Korean government's recent measures to reform the economy, the article expresses skepticism about the government-mandated restructuring of the chaebol known as the “big deal.” Rather than trying to direct the process of restructuring, Korean policymakers should limit their efforts to improving the market mechanism by increasing competition in the markets for capital, corporate control, and goods and services. The Korean market for corporate control transactions could be greatly improved by increasing the efficiency of bankruptcy proceedings and by allowing hostile takeovers by foreign as well as domestic investors. To increase the productivity of capital, Asian companies should seek to realign managerial with shareholder interests by tying compensation to measures of value creation like EVA.  相似文献   

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金融市场体系的关联性与社会资金配置格局   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:1  
张伟 《金融论坛》2002,7(7):7-10
任何一种市场现象都是市场主体在特定的市场环境下一系列市场行为的反映,资金趋利避险的本能及其跨市场、跨品种、跨时段的套利行为,构成了金融市场运行的永恒的推动力.本文以诠释近期债券市场运行中的若干现象为出发点,循着社会资金流动的主线,透过经济主体的资金运作行为,时以信贷市场、债券市场和股票市场为支柱的金融市场体系间的资金互动关系进行了研究,从贴近现实经济生活的角度,分析了近年来较具代表性的金融市场行为的内在动机、市场背景和行为效果,对我国社会资金配置格局和金融市场运行效率作了初步的探讨,并提出相关政策建议.  相似文献   

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FINANCIAL MARKETS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE   总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5  
Many factors contributed to the rapid growth of the economiesof East Asia in the past quarter century. This article examinesone important aspect of that growth—commonly referredto as the "East Asian miracle"—public policies affectingthe financial markets. East Asian governments intervened extensivelyin financial markets at all stages of their development. Whatsets their actions apart from those of other developing countriesthat have not fared as well? We do not have the informationto answer conclusively what effect particular actions had (thatrequires a counterfactual test of what growth would have beenwithout the particular intervention). But we can identify themarket failures the East Asian governments addressed, assesssome of the theoretical reasons why each policy might be growthenhancing, and provide some data attesting to the impacts ofthe policy. Several characteristics of financial sector interventionsin East Asia stand out: they incorporated design features thatimproved the chances of success and reduced opportunities forabuse; interventions that did not work out were dropped unhesitatingly;and policies were adapted to reflect changing economic conditions.   相似文献   

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Agency theory and signalling theory both suggest that firms are motivated to disclose excellence of financial performance in an unambiguous manner. We might expect, therefore, that good financial performance is associated with a clear and readable Chairman's narrative and poor performance with an obscure or misleading message. Extant work linking corporate performance with clarity of executive narrative fails to distinguish sample cases by industry or financial status. This paper seeks to overcome the consequences of such deficiencies explicitly, by conducting a systematic analysis of the relationship between narrative complexity and alternative measures of financial performance, for a matched sample of failed/non-failed companies across common industries. This study employs separate measures of the readability and the understandability of the chairman's narrative and finds them to be significantly related to overall financial performance and individual measures of performance, most notably liquidity. Poor readability is strongly associated with poor financial performance and ease of readability with relative financial success. The implication is that firms actively signal good news while obscuring, perhaps deliberately, messages which convey bad news.  相似文献   

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I examine the informational contributions and effects on transitory volatility of trades initiated by different types of traders in three actively traded index futures markets. The results show that trades initiated by exchange member firms account for more than 60% of price discovery during the trading day. These institutional trades appear to be more informative than trades of individual exchange members or off‐exchange traders. I also find that off‐exchange traders introduce more noise into the prices than do exchange members. My findings provide new evidence on the role of different types of traders in the price formation process.  相似文献   

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